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## REGULAR PAPERS

# UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER BEHAVIOR IN GEORGIA AFTER THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR

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### **Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to explore Russia's soft power behavior, specifically the explicit or implicit nature of its soft power strategy and actions toward Georgia after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. To analyze this issue the research tends to focus on the insight proposed by Craig Hayden and discuss it according to three kinds of soft power behavior presented by Joseph S. Nye. Based on the primary and secondary sources the article establishes the context of the modern Georgian foreign policy in which Russia's soft power is on the rise. Using qualitative and quantitative research methods the paper discusses Russia's soft power agenda, its principal means and primary goal in Georgia. Overall, research results suggest that in the first decade after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 Russia's soft power strategy conceptualization toward Georgia has an implicit nature, but its actions through the anti-Western propaganda narrative in media are explicitly implemented.

**Key words:** *Soft Power, Russia, Georgia, Russo-Georgian War*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Specific power form, i.e. hard, soft, smart or sharp, is a relatively new topic in an academic field. But, practically, each of them has almost always been an indispensable foreign policy tool for states acting to defend national security interests and to strengthen foreign policy domain. Nowadays a much debated issue in the practical and academic realm of international relations is soft power and its complicated transformative nature. In the modern world of foreign affairs, based on the regional and global contexts of strategic and geopolitical situations, soft power becomes one of the most predominantly wielded forms of power. Numerous studies

have been carried out in the field of international relations focusing on the definition of soft power, its nature and sources [See Nye 1990; Nye 2002; Nye 2004; Nye 2004; Nye 2008; Nye 2011].

The concept of soft power can be most easily defined in contrast with the concept of hard power, which is the ability to get the desired outcomes by coercion or inducement [Nye 2004: 7]. In this paper the term “Soft Power” is used in its narrowest terms provided by Joseph S. Nye that refers to “the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction” [Nye 2011: 16]. Although there might not be much terminological confusion about this term, its meaning has been broadened in terms of the theoretical interpretation. Furthermore, particular attention has been drawn to the historical, practical and contemporary dimensions of soft power, mostly in the context of U.S. foreign policy [See Parmar and Cox 2010; Cowan and Cull 2008; Chitti and Ji 2016; Berenskoetter and Williams 2007]. Only during the past few years has there been an increasing interest in Russia’s soft power and have there been studies of soft power directly addressed Russia’s planning, formulation and implementation of this particular face of power [See C’wiek-Karpowicz 2012; Kosachev 2012; Pilko 2012; Monaghan 2013; Simons 2013; Sergunin and Karabeshkin 2015]. One of the most methodical works regarding Russian soft power in the context of the post-Soviet era, mainly focusing on Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, is “Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy” by Marcel H. Van Herpen that examines Russia’s soft power instruments and their transformation [See Herpen 2015].

The past ten years in Russian-Georgian relations after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 have also led to increased interest in Russia’s soft power actions toward the post-Soviet republics. To date, some studies highlight the importance soft power has for Russia to “delineate a sphere of responsibility in the post-Soviet space” [Sergunin et al. 2015: 349] and “rebuild its external attractiveness” [C’wiek-Karpowicz 2012: 5]. There is a relatively small body of academic literature that is specifically concerned with the theoretical issues of Russia’s wielding of soft power in the post-Soviet space, particularly, in Georgia. What we know about Russia’s soft power in Georgia is largely based upon policy-focused papers [See Makarychev 2016; Panchulidze 2017] and news publications [See Rimple 2015], rather than historical, theoretical aspects and functional or regional perspectives with deeper academic analysis. Existing publications describe the threats of Russia’s hard and soft power in Georgia [See Tughushi 2016], past achievements, limitations and future threats of Russia’s soft power from the Georgian perspective [See Kanashvili 2017], Russia’s soft power actions in Georgia [See Rukhadze 2016; Avaliani 2016], specifically, the Kremlin’s information war and propaganda in Georgia [See Lomtadze 2017, Avalishvili 2016]. However, many of these studies up to now have been descriptive in nature. Such approaches have failed to address the theoretical assessment of Russia’s soft power behavior in Georgia.

Recent developments in the field of soft power as deployed by Russia toward Georgia have made it necessary to reevaluate Russia’s soft power behavior. Based on the major foreign policy-related primary sources of Georgia and Russia, such as the Foreign Policy Strategy and National Security Concepts, this paper examines Russia’s soft power behavior in Georgia after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 built upon the insight introduced by Craig Hayden in his book “The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts” (2012). In the framework of this

standpoint the specific objective of this article is to evaluate Russia's understanding of soft power by discussing it according to three kinds of soft power behaviors – agenda-setting, persuasion and attraction, presented by Joseph S. Nye in the book "The Future of Power" (2011). A full discussion of Russia's soft power lies beyond the scope of this study, but the two primary objectives of this research are to determine how Russia understands the soft power concept and how Russia makes use of soft power in Georgia, explicitly or implicitly in its strategy or action. "Explicitly" in this context means clear, detailed formulation of soft power strategy and implementation of its activities. "Implicitly" refers to the unclear, indirect manner of soft power formulation and implementation. Based on the primary and secondary sources this study seeks to obtain data which will help to address research gaps. The methodological approach taken in this study is a mixed methodology based on the case study and quantitative and qualitative research methods, including data analysis and document analysis. The importance and originality of this study is that it aims to contribute to soft power research by exploring Russia's soft power in Georgia. It is hoped that this research will contribute to the theoretical and practical aspects of international relations, specifically, the debates about the role of soft power in Russia's foreign policy. It might also provide the value-added information to advance theoretical and academic discussion about Russia's soft power behavior in post-Soviet space, particularly in Georgia. From the policy perspective, this study will contribute to better understanding of Russia's soft power. This paper is likely to be beneficial for country leaders, foreign policy scholars and practitioners, and experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations in improving their working practices, thus contributing to the societal relevance of the research.

This paper consists of three themed sections. To establish the context of the research the main issues addressed in the first section are Georgia's national interests, national security environment and foreign policy priorities after the Russo-Georgian War. The second section is concerned with the conceptual framework used in this study. Some of the main research questions in this section are to find out how the concept of soft power is defined in the Russian foreign policy mainstream and the purpose behind Russia's soft power agenda framing toward Georgia. The following section describes the principal means of Russia's soft power in Georgia and analyzes its persuasive and attractive nature after the Russo-Georgian War. Therefore, this section seeks to answer one of the main research questions regarding explicit or implicit nature of Russia's soft power strategy and actions toward Georgia.

## **1. GEORGIA'S FOREIGN POLICY REALITY AFTER THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR RELATED TO RUSSIA'S SOFT AND HARD POWER USE**

Georgia's modern foreign policy reality and multidimensional national security environment, in which Russia's soft power is on the rise, face political and diplomatic challenges. These challenges are caused by the various geopolitical and policy factors. It is a widely held view that Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and its aftermath not only challenged Georgia's national security and foreign policy environment, but imposed threats from Russia that are soft and hard power by nature. It has commonly assumed that Russia repeatedly used hard power instruments in the post-Soviet space [Sergunin et al. 2015: 347], that the Russo-

Georgian War of 2008 was the first case in the post-Soviet era where the Russian Federation deployed military power across international borders [Rutland at al. 2016: 407] and therefore by illustrating its own willingness to use the hard power again [Wieclawski 2011: 15] this war was Russia's public return to great power status [Friedman 2008]. According to Nye, in 2008, after invading Georgia, Russian military power dominated, but Russia was not as adept in wielding soft power to consolidate its military victory [Nye 2011: 99]. Considering all of this, generally the course of Georgia's modern foreign policy strategy was shaped by the Russia's hard power moves in 2008 and has been transformed since then due to the Russia's continual use of soft power and the interplay of these two forms of power as well.

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008, which is considered military aggression by the Georgian Government [Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy 2015-2018; Threat Assessment for 2010-2013], radically changed [Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020: 49] and considerably worsened [Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020: 53] Georgia's security environment. In the aftermath of the 2008 conflict, Georgia continuously stated its Western-oriented aspirations. EU-Atlantic integration became one of its main national interests [National Security Concept of Georgia 2011], foreign policy objectives [Panjikidze 2013] and key strategic goals [Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy 2015-2018]. But the further Georgia steps toward the EU family, the more Russia seems intent on wielding soft power in Georgia. Hence Georgia's national interests, national security environment and foreign policy priorities seem to have been structurally changed vis-à-vis Russia's soft and hard power actions on the local, regional and global level.

As mentioned in the document "Threat Assessment for 2010-2013 of Georgia," "The primary goal of the Russian Federation is to hinder realization of the Euro-Atlantic choice of Georgia and to forcefully bring Georgia back into the Russian sphere of influence" [Threat Assessment for 2010-2013]. Highlighted in the Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020 of Georgia, Russia's aggressive foreign policy agenda represents a major threat to Georgia's national security [Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020: 48]. Moreover the use of elements of "soft power" and economic tools (a form of hard power) by the Kremlin against Georgia's national security represents the challenge for its security environment [Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020: 53]. As stated in this same document, "The Kremlin will particularly focus on reinforcing the elements of its soft power to ensure the weakening of state institutions, strengthening of pro-Russian civil and political movements and discredit pro-Western foreign policy agenda. Using political, economic and information tools, Russia continues its attempt to limit international political support for Georgia and weaken cooperation directed at strengthening Georgia's defense capabilities" [Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020: 54]. Considering all of this evidence, it seems that Russia's soft-power-focused foreign policy agenda does not represent an indirect or uncomplicated factor affecting Georgia's national security policy. Rather, it directly affects Georgia's multidimensional national security environment as its objectives, nature and means are addressed in some of the major foreign policy documents of Georgia.

Ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity remains the primary national interest, and so is one of the major foreign policy strategic goals of the Georgian government [Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy 2015-2018; National Security Concept of Georgia 2011]. Russia's hard power effort - military presence of Russian troops in the occupied territories of Georgia - and its soft power capabilities - the increasing



propaganda and disinformation activities - are likely to jeopardize Georgia's foreign policy prerogatives by challenging its additional foreign policy objective of European and EU-Atlantic integration.

Nowadays Georgia's relations with Russia undergo a difficult period because of the active use of soft power from the latter [Official Web Site of the President of Georgia 02.03.2016]. This particular notion, including the negative impact of Russia's hybrid war, cyber-attacks and propaganda on regional security environment is intensified in the public and political discourse of Georgia, specifically in some of Georgia's presidential rhetoric [See Official Web Site of the President of Georgia 04.11.2017; Official Web Site of the President of Georgia 05.14.2018]. Moreover as President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvili highlights in some of his speeches, Russia's soft power and propaganda challenge the Western choice of Georgia's society [Official Web Site of the President of Georgia 26.03.2015; Official Web Site of the President of Georgia 09.12.2017].

The evidence reviewed here seems to suggest that this is the post Russo-Georgian War environment in which Georgia's modern foreign policy objectives, national interests and national security environment interact to determine and shape the future of Georgia's EU-Atlantic integration. However, another significant issue emerging here can be whether soft power can be the flexible and effective tool for Russia to wield in Georgia, particularly when formal diplomatic relations are absent between these two countries. In addition to Russia's hard power actions, its soft power remains the prevalent challenge for modern Georgian foreign policy. The outcomes Russia seeks in Georgia through its use of soft power measures are irreconcilable with Georgia's national interests and foreign policy priorities.

## **2. RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER AGENDA FRAMING TOWARD GEORGIA**

The foreign policy context in which Georgia's foreign policy objectives, national interests and national security environment interact has been described in the previous section. A more detailed account of Russia's soft power agenda framing toward Georgia is presented here.

From the global perspective, the past decade has seen the stunning and rapid transformation of Russia's soft power strategy. From the regional point of view this process can be easily observed in case of Georgia. To better analyze the research topic this particular paper is based on the conceptual insight proposed by Craig Hayden in his book "The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts" (2012). According to Hayden "a crucial step toward understanding soft power is to ascertain how international actors understand the concept and make use of it, explicitly or implicitly, in their strategies and actions" [Hayden 2012: 37]. However, the advantage of this insight is that it provides the basis to better explore the soft power of an actor state. Building on this viewpoint this section seeks to examine how Russia understands soft power and how its soft power strategy toward Georgia is framed. In order to address the theoretical aspect of Russia's soft power strategy related to Georgia, it must be discussed according to one of the soft power behaviors - agenda-setting.

Incorporating soft power into a government strategy is more difficult than may first appear [Nye 2011: 83]. Its theoretical conceptualization in order to practically exercise and examine soft power in international relations requires a well-designed approach to the framing of foreign policy-related documents, i.e. foreign policy strategies or national security concepts. In case of Russia, primary formulation of

the idea of soft power can be viewed in the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation issued in 2013 and 2016. Russia's traditional diplomacy was strongly tied to such hard power resources as gas, oil and military might [Maliukevičius 2013: 6]. Soft power, resource of non-traditional diplomacy, is considered to have the essential part in Russian foreign policy in today's world. In the fundamental foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation soft power is formulated as a comprehensive toolkit [Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013] and an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives [Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2016].

In addition to these foreign policy related primary sources, the concept of soft power and its importance in the sphere of foreign affairs have also been articulated in the Russian foreign policy mainstream. Specifically, soft power is not only considered to play an increasing role in foreign policy [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 21.01.2017] or to be one of the main components of the international influence of states [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 01.12.2012], but it is intended to be used broadly and effectively [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 14.10.2015]. From the broad perspective, Russian foreign policy discourse measures soft power tools as integral parts of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives, defines this form of power as including a practically unlimited set of possibilities [The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2016] and considers the greater use of its capabilities as a means to increase the effectiveness of Russia's foreign policy activities [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 30.01.2013]. Further, Russian policymakers see soft power as a means of strengthening Russia's authority, as well as promoting a positive, balanced and unifying international agenda [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 26.03.2018].

The past decade was momentous not only for the theoretical evolution of Russia's understanding of soft power, but also for its practical use. It is considered that the "Color Revolutions" in post-Soviet space - the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine - stirred Russia's interest in the concept of soft power [Herpen 2015: 34]. Over the past few years, especially after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, upgrading the instruments of soft power [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 29.12.2014] and mastering the use of its mechanisms [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 25.02.2013] became one of the priorities of modern Russian diplomacy. Furthermore, the greater reliance on soft power was regarded by Russia as a way to promote the radical improvement in the efficiency of Russia's foreign policy [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 23.01.2013].

In addition to the soft power concept of framing, development and implementation of soft and hard power elements, such as the interrelated political, diplomatic, military, economic and informational measures, are considered useful in ensuring strategic deterrence, preventing armed conflicts and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation [National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020]. In addition to this, the constructive soft power component - public diplomacy - has been seen to be one of the non-military ways to ensure national defense of the Russian Federation [Action Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the period of 2018]. On the other hand, Action Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the period of 2018 issued in 2013 endorses the theoretical and practical advancement of

Russia's soft power as part of building up Russia's cultural and educational presence in the world.

The way Russia understands soft power should be discussed with scrutiny in accordance with the classical definition of this term provided by Joseph S. Nye. Future research might deeply explore Russia's theoretical understanding of soft power. But it could be relevant now briefly to analyze the question. A descriptive study shows that there can be an important difference between the Russian and traditional perceptions of influence in soft power. Soft power, as stated by Nye, is not merely the same as influence; it is the ability to attract [Nye 2004: 6]. In contrast, from the Russian foreign policy viewpoint, soft power is "the ability to influence the surrounding world through civilizational, humanitarian-cultural, foreign policy and other attractiveness" [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 07.07.2008]. On the other hand, it has been reported that Russian elites are drawn to soft power as a means to attain status and influence in the international system [See Kiseleva 2015], and that Russia's present-day influence is based upon 'soft-coercion' - "influence that is indirectly coercive, resting on covert methods (penetration, bribery, blackmail) and on new forms of power, such as energy supply, which are difficult to define as hard or soft" [See Sherr 2013]. Hence, it can be observed that both wielding and gaining influence simultaneously might be seen as Russia's soft power instrument and goal.

However, contrary to the observed difference regarding the sense of influence, Russian and traditional awareness of soft power resources are seem to be similar. The three basic soft power sources, specified by Nye, that are culture, political values and foreign policy [Nye 2011: 84], are also shared by the Russian conception of soft power. The concept itself is regarded as an ability to promote a positive international agenda [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 27.03.2007]. Furthermore, it is also believed that the Kremlin was seeking to exploit the Western concept of soft power and reframing it as a euphemism for coercive policy and economic arm-twisting [Minzarari 2012].

In addition, a reasonable approach to examine Russia's soft power can be found in the article "Russia and the Changing World" by Vladimir Putin published in 2012. It sets the further stage for the ideological understanding of Russia's soft power. Soft power, as highlighted in this article, is a set of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy goals without the use of weapons. These methods are often used to nurture and provoke extremism, separatism, nationalism, manipulation of public consciousness, direct interference in the internal politics of sovereign states [Moskovskiy Novosti 27.02.2012].

Having examined how the concept of soft power is comprehended in the Russian foreign policy mainstream, it is important to discuss the purpose behind Russia's soft power agenda framing toward Georgia. As indicated previously, a specific power form, i.e. hard, soft, smart or sharp, has almost always been the indispensable foreign policy tool for states acting to defend national security interests and strengthen foreign policy domain. In other words, soft power helps states to advance foreign policy strategy by defending fundamental national interests anchored in national security policy. Hence, in order to explore purpose behind Russia's soft power strategy toward Georgia, national interests of Russia and Georgia should be compared. As was mentioned in the previous section, ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity and the European and Euro-Atlantic integration are some of the major national interests of Georgia. Turning now to the Russia's

national interests, it might be observed that sovereignty and state and territorial integrity is one of its key national interests as well. The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013 and 2016 outline a negative perspective towards NATO's expansion. These documents view NATO's growing military activity in regions neighboring Russia as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security and leading to the deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to the emergence of new ones.

A closer look at the findings from this evidence appears to suggest that there is not a correlation between national interests of Georgia and the Russian Federation, and that the strategic national priorities of these two countries are irreconcilable with each other. Here, it is possible to propose the idea that those national interests determine not only the soft power agenda setting, but the outcomes the wielder state pursues. In general, this observation may support the hypothesis that the mutually beneficial nature of the national interests between the soft power actor state and its target state may determine soft power strategies and actions. The additional point to be stressed here is that mutually beneficial national interests may directly affect the credibility upon which soft power depends.

As indicated previously, there is not a correlation between national interests of Georgia and the Russian Federation. Hence, it is possible that the further Russia mixes soft and hard power tactics towards Georgia, the slower it attains its desired consequences. This enables Georgia to progress along the road to its priorities related to EU-Atlantic integration.

These findings suggest that in general the concept of soft power is comprehended in a relatively detailed manner in the Russian foreign policy mainstream. Overall, the nature of national interests plays an essential role in Russia's soft power agenda framing toward Georgia. This study raises important questions about the role of national interests - conflicting or compatible - between the soft power actor and target states that might directly affect the quality of the outcome the actor state wishes. In summary, these results show that Russia's present soft power agenda framing toward Georgia is conceptualized in Russian terms. Moreover, it seems possible that in terms of the role of influence Russia's soft power represents the counterfeit of the classical soft power definition.

### **3. ATTRACTIVE AND PERSUASIVE NATURE OF RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER IN GEORGIA**

As explained earlier, according to Hayden (2012) to understand the soft power of an international actor its concept and actions should be identified. This is evident that understanding soft power requires its inspection in theory and practice. The previous section illustrated Russia's soft power strategy framing toward Georgia as specified by one aspect of soft power – agenda-setting.

It is now necessary to explain the nature of Russia's soft power actions in Georgia according to other soft power behavior – persuasion and attraction. In this context, key issues of the research are the principal type of Russia's soft power means in Georgia, the manner and extent of attraction Russia draws in Georgia and the kinds of argument Russia uses to influence the beliefs and actions of Georgians. Discussing these issues might eventually lead this research to evaluate the explicit or implicit nature of Russia's soft power in Georgia.

Up to this point, this section is based on the surveys conducted in recent years among Georgians to study their attitudes toward major foreign policy issues, including Georgia's aspiration to EU-Atlantic integration, Russian propaganda, etc. Primarily based on the results from these surveys, this section discusses the tendency that is depicted in the willingness the Georgian community has to pursue EU-Atlantic integration and to explore if Russia's soft power in Georgia is welcome, unwelcome, negative or positive. Next the section focuses on the degree of argument Russia uses to influence the beliefs and actions of Georgians. A key aspect of this is to explore if the beliefs and actions of Georgians are influenced with or without the threat of force from the Russian side. In general, data retrieved from the quantitative methods can be more useful here for identifying and characterizing attractive and persuasive nature of Russia's soft power in Georgia after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. But before analyzing Russia's soft power actions, it is important to specify Russia's principal soft power means in Georgia.

Discrepancy between the national interests of these two countries can not only affect the manner and extent of attraction Russia exerts in Georgia, but the arguments Russia uses to influence the beliefs and actions of Georgians. A probable explanation of this is that Russia combines soft and hard power in its policy toward Georgia. In other words Russia tries to influence the beliefs of Georgians through the threat of creeping occupation. In general Russia's combining soft and hard power in its foreign policy toward Georgia, when the national interests of an actor and a target state are not corresponding, might produce unwelcome sentiment among Georgians regarding Russia's soft power behavior.

According to recent surveys and reports, media outlets are regarded as the main pillar of Kremlin propaganda [IDFI 2016: 9] and the main source of anti-Western propaganda in Georgia [Media Monitoring Report 2014-2015: 9; Anti-Western Propaganda 2016: 19; Anti-Western Propaganda 2017: 19]. One explanation of how Russia's soft power actions generate anti-Western sentiment in Georgian population can be seen in the case of anti-Western Russian propaganda narrative in some of the Georgian media outlets, including in TV, online and print media. On the other hand, Anti-Western Propaganda Media Monitoring Reports conducted by Media Development Foundation (the MDF) in recent years (2014-2015; 2016; 2017) classify the primary group of pro-Russian Georgian media outlets [Anti-Western Propaganda 2017: 18-19; Media Monitoring Report 2014-2015: 9]. These reports outline the main objectives of the Kremlin narrative in Georgian discourse: creating threats; sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats; and that authoritative/Soviet-style governance is necessary [Anti-Western Propaganda 2017: 26]. Moreover, it is a widely held view that Kremlin propaganda aims to incite anti-Western sentiments, disrupt Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspiration, popularize the Kremlin's global policy and instill confusion, fear and hatred among the Georgian population [IDFI 2016: 8]. The data reported here appear to support the assumption that media is the principal mainstay of Russia's soft power actions in Georgia and that Russian propaganda is used to undermine one of the major national interests of Georgia, which is EU-Atlantic integration.

Russia's anti-Western narratives regarding NATO and the EU [See MDF Reports 2014-2015, 2016, 2017] include the opinion that EU-Atlantic integration is associated with the expansion of Turkey and loss of Georgian territories [MDF Report 2014-2015: 12], NATO does not need Georgia and the country's aspiration

towards the North-Atlantic Alliance is utopian [MDF Report 2016: 14], Georgia would fail to either achieve visa free travel with or integration into the EU because the EU would disintegrate [MDF Report 2016: 17], Georgia's NATO membership is unrealistic and that Alliance is in crisis itself and requires reformation [MDF Report 2018: 11]. Overall, these trends strengthen the idea that these narratives have been aimed to stir Georgians' skepticism about the EU and NATO.

Media has almost always been regarded as a factor in shaping the perceptions and attitudes of population, while persuasion is a significant determinant in changing one's attitudes. According to R. Lance Holbert and John M. Tchernev media influence and all its complexities can be understood as persuasion [See Holbert and Tchernev in SAGE 2013: 37]. Moreover, as James Price Dillard suggests, persuasion is "the use of symbols (sometimes accompanied by images) by one social actor for the purpose of changing or maintaining another social actor's opinion or behavior" [Dillard 2010: 203]. However, caution must be exercised, as the findings provided here might not rule out the impact of other factors on the changes of attitudes and beliefs of the Georgian population; i.e. influence of the other types of Russia's propaganda on them.

Due to practical constraints, this paper cannot provide a comprehensive review of all the means and goals of Russia's soft power in Georgia. But this research specifically addresses Russia's primary goal of inciting anti-Western sentiment and explores this through the lens of cognitive impact of media on society.


The idea explored by applying proposed theories to the research question is that Russia's anti-Western propaganda tries to change Georgians' opinions and attitudes.

Traditionally, there are two major nationwide surveys that explore the Georgian population's attitudes. These surveys are carried out for National Democratic Institute Georgia (NDI Georgia) and International Republican Institute (IRI). However, observations have indicated that questions in NDI polls do not have the methodically arranged structure, are interpretative in nature regarding Georgia's membership to NATO and tend to focus on the issue in two different directions: firstly, quantitative analysis of NDI's six waves of survey-based data from 2008 to 2011 [NDI 2011: q76] deals with the issue regarding the extent Georgians support Georgia's membership to NATO. Secondly, NDI polls in 2012-2018 investigate if population approve or disapprove of the Georgian government's stated goal to join NATO [See NDI Polls 2012-2018]. Such formulations seem to be unsatisfactory because they fail to methodically address the research content of this particular paper. In contrast, IRI polls [IRI 2018: 30] obtain data by relying on a consistent question over years, i.e. they seek to illustrate the degree of support of Georgians for joining NATO. Also, since 2013 IRI polls examine Georgians' support for joining the European Union [IRI 2018: 32]. Therefore data for this study regarding Georgia's NATO and EU membership were collected from the IRI polls. Such approach is important to directly address this research topic to find out the tendency of Georgian population's full support toward Georgia's EU-Atlantic integration.

Based on IRI surveys, Georgians' support of Georgia's EU-Atlantic integration in 2008-2018 is illustrated in the chart below. This data show that Georgian population's full support of Georgia's EU-Atlantic integration does not vary much over the years since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. In general, the statistical differences in the population's attitudes toward Georgia joining NATO and EU are evident. The chart reveals that respondents' will is variable and has been declining

inconsequentially since 2008 Russo-Georgian War. There might be several direct and indirect causes for the deficiency of these attitudes. But, if we take media cognitive effects into account, Russian anti-Western propaganda may have been one of the contributory determinants.

**Fig. 1. Changes in Georgian population’s full support toward Georgia’s joining to NATO and European Union.**



Source: IRI 2018: 30. Note: Own figure.

Since one of the major issues in Georgia in recent years is Russian propaganda and disinformation, questions about these topics were added in the NDI surveys in 2017. Compared to EU and U.S. propaganda, a majority of respondents (53%) agree that there is Russian propaganda in Georgia [NDI Polls from December 2017: q.11, q.13, q.15]. Analyzing NDI attitudes’ surveys from December 2017 shows that respondents think the Georgian TV channels are the major disseminators (53%) of Russian propaganda [NDI Polls from December 2017: q.11, q.13, q.15] and 60% of them agree that Georgian TV stations are often spreading disinformation. Moreover, the NDI public attitudes survey from March 2018 illustrates that 48% of Georgian population agrees that Russia spreads lies and false information in Georgia when promoting its image and interests, while 25% of those surveyed agree that EU and 26% of the respondents agree that the U.S. spreads lies and false information in Georgia when promoting their image and interest [NDI Polls from March 2018: q41, q44, q46].

The most interesting aspect of the closer inspection of the data is that while there is diminishing support from the Georgian public regarding Georgia’s EU-Atlantic integration, their perception of Russia’s disinformation efforts remains high. This result might not be counterintuitive, but describes the tendency of Georgians to recognize that prospective EU-Atlantic integration is being discredited by anti-Western Russian propaganda through media outlets. Together these results indicate that on a macro-level anti-Western Russian propaganda in Georgia has an effect, but the Russians’ efforts are almost certainly oriented to producing long-term results.

This study set out with the aim of assessing the explicit or implicit nature of Russia’s soft power in Georgia. The results of this study might not comprehensively

show the nature of Russia's soft power in Georgia, but, what was found is that through the anti-Western propaganda narrative in media its actions are explicitly implemented. This combination of findings provides some support for the conceptual premise that, through the lens of cognitive impact of media, Russia's use of media as a source of propaganda in Georgia impacts attitudes of Georgian population toward EU-Atlantic integration. Despite these results, questions might still remain. The aim of this paper is not to develop a full picture of Russia's soft power behavior in Georgia, but to explore the issue by taking into account media, the main pillar of Russia's propaganda and its primary tool for inciting anti-Western sentiment in Georgian society. Therefore, further research should be undertaken to investigate the explicit or implicit nature of Russia's soft power by exploring its other soft power actions regarding their different goals. But it is important to note that present work provides one of the first investigations into Russia's soft power behavior in Georgia and it is hoped that this research will contribute to a deeper understanding of the issue in various contexts.

## **CONCLUSION**

Although the scope of this study was limited in terms of Russia's soft power actions in Georgia and included only its principal means and the primary goal, the following findings of this study might have a number of important implications for future practice. Particularly, it is hoped that these findings should contribute to the current literature regarding Russia's soft power theory and practice in post-Soviet space, specifically in Georgia. Another valuable practical implication of this study might be that this will also probably provide a basis for further research to expand the topic in various contexts.

In this present investigation, to establish the context of the research one of the aims was to assess Georgia's foreign policy reality after the Russo-Georgian War related to Russia's soft and hard power use. This study has identified that the post Russo-Georgian War environment in which Georgia's modern foreign policy objectives, national interests and national security environment related to EU-Atlantic integration is challenged by Russia's soft power actions. The research has also shown that the outcomes Russia seeks to get in Georgia through its use of soft power are irreconcilable with Georgia's national interests and foreign policy priorities.

The present study was designed upon the conceptual insight proposed by Craig Hayden, according to whom a crucial step toward understanding soft power is to ascertain how international actors understand the concept and make use of it, explicitly or implicitly in their strategies and actions. Based on this insight in order to find out the nature of Russia's soft power strategy and actions, soft power behaviors presented by Joseph S. Nye – agenda-setting, persuasion and attraction – were considered. Therefore primary source analysis regarding Russia's understanding of the concept of soft power illustrated that theoretically this concept is comprehended in a relatively detailed manner in the Russian foreign policy mainstream. In addition this paper has discussed that the nature of national interests plays an essential role in Russia's soft power agenda framing toward Georgia.

The research addresses the principal means and primary goal of Russia's soft power in Georgia. The results have shown that media is the mainstay of Russia's soft power actions in Georgia and that Russian propaganda is against one of the major



national interests of Georgia -- EU-Atlantic integration. Moreover, quantitative data analysis has found that though no significant increase was detected among Georgian population's full support regarding Georgia's EU-Atlantic integration since 2008 Russo-Georgian War, their perception of Russia's disinformation and its principal means is high.

Taken together, these findings suggest that in general in the first decade after the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 Russia's soft power represents a clear challenge to Georgia's goal of EU-Atlantic integration. The present results show that Russia's soft power strategy conceptualization toward Georgia has an implicit nature, but its actions through the anti-Western propaganda narrative in media are explicitly implemented. On the other hand, the research indicates that the past decade was momentous not only for the theoretical evolution of Russia's understanding of soft power, but for its practical application. Moreover, this decade has shown the necessity for Georgia to strengthen its own soft power and public diplomacy in order to tackle soft power and propaganda challenges coming from the Russian side. This whole process is still in progress. The long-term structure of Georgia's foreign policy reality in the upcoming years will likely be influenced by this past and current experience regarding Russia's soft power behavior.

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# UKRAINE BETWEEN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY'S VISION

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## **Abstract**

In the article a problem of positioning of Ukraine between Europe and Russia in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's creative heritage has been investigated. The scholar's emotionality in historiographic and politological discourses that became sensibly manifested when he put the question of the Ukrainians' geopolitical interest on axiologic lines „the friend – the foe” is particularly specified. In that case, on the contrary to his repeatedly declared pro-western orientation, M. Hrushevsky's sympathies were often at the side of the Russian neighbour. The fact that such ambivalence was characteristic to Ukrainian humanitarian studies and political thought not only of the 20th century, but elsewhere in Ukrainian historical time is pointed out. The aforementioned fact activates the continuation of the research of the problem „Ukraine between Europe and Russia” in wider chronological and thematic contexts.

**Key words:** *M. Hrushevsky, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, geopolitics*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The thesis about Ukraine as an original „Middle-world” between Europe and Russia has been firstly substantiated by Ukrainian romanticists in the mid 19th century and since then it remains one of the most discussed theses among historians and political scientists [Kutsyi 2016: 89-184]. Thus, the peaks of such discussions

always preceded periods of the attempts of Russian governments of whatever colour to prevent the „drift” of Ukrainians into the western direction. The contemporary polemics in the expert environment and public space concerning the geopolitical place of Ukraine, caused by Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and escalation of the war in the Donbas is a vividly testimony to this. Obviously, many arguments that are popular today, were already actively used in the discussion throughout the 20th century.

In this regard, the first decades of the 20th century when Ukrainians, similarly to other „stateless” peoples of Central-East Europe, were undergoing steep processes of national establishment, are of special interest. Reacting to public demands, the leaders of Ukrainian liberation were for the first time compelled to co-ordinate their entirely intellectual designs with the severe reality of the consequences of World War I. Primarily, they had to face disintegrations of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, as well as attempts of the young Bolshevik authorities to forcefully keep national "borderlands" under their control. For the Ukrainian intelligentsia, to whom the historical circumstances in 1917, in fact, granted „independence”, that meant a psychologically painful destruction of their stereotypes and illusions which since long ago had deeply taken roots in their mentality, impelling them to emotional discussions and, as a result, making them to reconsider the geopolitical models already consecrated by the historical tradition. Eventually, as mass media issues of today allow us to conclude, similar emotions influence a part of the Ukrainian society now, which, in fact, considerably encourage an immersing investigation into the events of the previous century.

In the article the processes under consideration are attempted to be recreated through a prism of views of Mykhailo Hrushevsky<sup>1</sup>, a landmark figure of Ukrainian movement of that time. As the most authoritative Ukrainian humanitarian and historian-conceptualist, in his „History of Ukraine-Rus” for the first time he tried to find out the civilization belonging of the Ukrainians, having outlined their place on the mental map of Europe. At the same time, M. Hrushevsky was not an “armchair” scientist, but an active public and political figure. As he once told about himself, „I came into politics through history and, as for me, such a route is a normal one” [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 226]. Therefore, as a practical politician and the all-time chairman of the revived Ukrainian state’s parliament (Central Rada), M. Hrushevsky at first hand verified the suitability of historiographic models to explain quickly

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<sup>1</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) - an outstanding Ukrainian historian, sociologist, literary critic, publicist, public and political figure. A prominent organizer of science, the founder of the Lviv and Kiev scientific schools, a member of the Ukrainian and other Slavic academies. He is the author of more than 2000 works, among them the most fundamental ones are "History of Ukraine-Rus" (10 volumes, 1898-1937) and "History of Ukrainian Literature" (6 volumes, 1923-1995). In 1886-1894 he studied at the University of Kyiv. During 1894-1914 he conducted his activity in Lviv as a professor of the Department of Ukrainian History at Lviv University, a chairman of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and as an active public figure. After 1905 he concentrated his activity in Kyiv and St. Petersburg, becoming one of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire. During the First World War, he was exiled to the Russian countryside. The all-time chairman of the Central Rada (March 1917 - April 1918). In 1919-1924 he was forced to flee the country. In 1924 he was elected as an academician and returned to Kyiv, where he headed the historical institutions of VUAN. From the autumn of 1929 academic institutions headed by him were repressed by Soviet government which led to an actual exile in Moscow from March 1931. He died in Kislovodsk due to an unsuccessful surgical operation under unclear circumstances.

changing realities. It is quite possible to trace his ideological searches and spiritual evolution as typical for a whole generation of the Ukrainian intellectuals who had chanced to feel admiration caused by the birth of the Ukrainian statehood and then to test the bitterness of its loss. Eventually, the consideration of the problem „Russia – Western Europe” in M. Hrushevsky’s heritage is also important as considering considerable influence of his ideas on the East European studies in the 20th century. This will help to find out the ideological roots of many contemporary discussions of historiosophical and geopolitical character, which too often focus on the consideration of Ukraine’s place between the East and the West.

Besides, it is necessary to notice that despite of M. Hrushevsky’s great popularity among the researchers of East European intellectual history, his historiographic heritage today is much more popular than his works on Political studies. Hrushevsky-politician still remains in the shadow of Hrushevsky-historian. Although there has been written quite enough works about his concept of the national state, the civilization context of this problem still remains hardly, if ever, noticed. Therefore, this article is intended to draw attention to the originality and – somewhat – to the topicality of the scientist’s politological discourse.

## **1. HISTORIOSOPHIC REFLECTIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC PRACTICE**

### **1.1. The „allied” West**

M. Hrushevsky’s scholarly works positioned in co-ordinates „Russia – Western Europe” have always been a hard problem for researchers of his heritage. On the one hand, he was a graduate of a Russian university and a sympathizer of the Slavophile ideology, and as his ideological opponents of the period of the Ukrainian revolution repeatedly confirmed, through all his life he carried „a non-cooled” love to the „fiction of federal Russia” and „inexhaustible belief in the Moscow liberal” [Mukhyn 1936: 102]. On the other hand, as the author of an original scheme of the Ukrainian historical process that broke off with traditions of state-centric school of Russian historiography of the 19th century, Hrushevsky was perceived by many Russian intellectuals as a scientist, who lacked proper diligence and who by scientific means tried to carry out an insidious political plan of disintegration of „the unique and indivisible” Russian empires with the help of financial support of the hostile to Slavic peoples Germany and Austro-Hungary. Due to these and other facts, the Russian publicism of the previous century, as well as of the contemporary one made M. Hrushevsky one of the notorious leaders of the Ukrainian „pro-Mazepa” movement<sup>2</sup>.

Not less ambiguous was the interpretation of the role of Western Europe as a civilization factor in Hrushevsky’s works. Such an ambiguity was caused by a two-dimensional measurement of the problem, that is, historiosophic and historiographic. After all, for a positivistic philosophy adherent the civilization priorities were a priori connected with the western culture. Furthermore, a considerable amount of empirical material used by M. Hrushevsky was so

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<sup>2</sup> The Mazepa movement - a disdainful label of Russian imperial propaganda used in relation to the national liberation movement of Ukrainians in the Russian empire. The term began to be used in the 18th century after Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s speech against Russian Tsar Peter I in 1709 in front of Hetman’s supporters, and later on to others suspected of disloyalty to the regime.

multifarious that often made the scholar loose carefulness and to depart from his declared theoretical positions.

So, already in the first volumes of his „History of Ukraine-Rus” (1898) M. Hrushevsky positions the Ukrainian lands as an original gate from the East to the West, which during the times of massive migrations of militant steppe hordes played the honourable role of a „visor” of western civilisation in conditions of destructive influences of steppe hordes. However, such a noble bearing of the Slavic tribes living in territory of Ukraine cost the local population too much and was never properly estimated by the neighbours:

„Throughout centuries the struggle against the steppe takes away the energy of the people, its upper class and governments. Colonization and economic worries hampered a firm establishment of both public and political relations. Having a dangerous enemy along the whole southern-eastern bordering line, the Ukrainian political organisations were not capable to hold out if in their rear, along northern-western or northern lines some stronger political organisms were formed. They fell prey of those who were better protected and situated in more advantageous circumstances neighbours. Hence, a political decline brought the expropriation of everything that made up the national means by the foreign social strata.” [Hrushevskyi 1991: 15].

Since then an uneasy history of mutual relations between the Ukrainian lands and the Western world, actually, begun: as the scholar held it, „...*the historical living conditions directed Ukraine westwards, whereas its geographical ones directed - and still direct - it southwards, to the Black sea.*” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 236]. For a long period, - actually, until the disintegration of the Old Rus’ state under the pressure of steppe hordes and due to internal civil strifes, those mutual relations M. Hrushevsky named as equal and partnership. Principality of Kiev which had made its civilization choice in favour of the Byzantine values, arose as an original regional leader which converted pagan tribes in its northeast borderlands to the Christian culture. The initial volumes of the scholar’s main work abound in references to how the Riurykids of Rus were favourably received at courts of the western capitals, and how influential governors of Europe competed for the hands of their daughters.

As an adherent of positivistic priorities of order and progress, M. Hrushevsky in his historiosophic reflexions generously praises the virtues of the western civilisation and exalts its significance in the formation of the Ukrainian national cultural type. The scientist underlines close connections of the Ukrainian lands with the German and Celtic cultures during prehistoric times. Further on he dwells on a mass flow of the Scandinavian element at the beginning of formation of the Old Rus’ state. During the princely time these contacts with the West grew only stronger: Hrushevsky draws his readers’ attention to „unusually branchy dynastic links” as the Riurykids were related to a German (Bavarian) dynasty and representatives of other principalities which were in the sphere of the German culture. Along with that, cultural and trade relations with the countries of the European West became stronger and gradually substituted earlier interrelations in the Black Sea direction, i. e., with the Balkan countries, Byzantium, and Asia Minor [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 234].

With the decline of Kiev in the end of the 12th century, the centre of Ukrainian statehood gravity M. Hrushevsky transfers to the Galician-Volhynian lands where the state of the Romanovych dynasty, „...*starting from the threshold of the 13th*

*century, held on in the Ukrainian lands through the whole century after Kiev's decline in the full force of the tradition of a strong-power policy and life, prince-and-druzhyna militia regime, political forms, and the culture developed by the Kievan state"* [Hrushevskiyi 1993a: 1]. The fact of close neighbourhood of the Galician-Volhynian principality with the countries of Western Europe had determined a civilization vector of development of the young state and other Ukrainian lands, which followed its political lead. The scientist himself emphasizes on „...*the full advantage of the dominating western influences on that combination of Byzantine and Eastern influences which prevailed in the period of formation of the Kievan state"* [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234].

It is worth to mention, that – in Hrushevsky's opinion - the civilization divergences between Ukraine and Russia had taken roots as early as at the break of the 12th – 13th centuries. After all, according to him, the Vladimir-Muscovite state took for a development model the cultural practices of northeast and steppe tribes [Hrushevskiyi 2002: 77]. The civilization heritage of the Kievan state, in accordance with the scientist's views, the Muscovite state had acquired only partly, „...*being all the time mixed with the Finnish, Tatar, and Mongolian elements"*, meanwhile „...*the western Ukraine wherein since the 13th century the Ukrainian life got concentrated, plainly entered the domain of the West European life"* [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234]. Despite religious differences from the Catholic West, M. Hrushevsky constantly underlined that „...*the whole sphere of its [Galician-Volhynian Rus'] political and cultural interests was oriented to the West"* [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234].

The western vector of the cultural development of the Ukrainian lands, continues M. Hrushevsky, becomes stronger with the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands into the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state, after which „...*for the Ukrainian culture new favourable horizons became opened again"* [Hrushevskiyi 2007b: 316]. Illustrating a favourable character of the western influence on all manifestations of the Ukrainian life, the scientist first marks the economic increase of cities, reorientation of their internal life toward the German samples.

„Thus, - the researcher sums up this historical period, - Ukraine, connected closely and directly with the Western Europe, - first of all, with Germany and, further on, also with Italy, Ukraine only with some delay passed through the periods of Italian-German revival (Renaissance), German Reformation, and Catholic reaction, which fell on the Ukrainian lands with all its burden in the end of the 16th century" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 235].

This period made still deeper the civilization differences between the peoples of the Ukrainian and Russian lands. According to M. Hrushevsky, under a powerful pressure of the steppe's oriental influences the Muscovite kingdom was more and more losing its Old Rus' cultural heritage. At the same time, „...*Ukraine lived in the same way and by the same ideas as the West. It was from it that Ukraine scooped cultural means and from it Ukraine took samples for its culture"* [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 235].

M. Hrushevsky considered, that it was indeed due to the constant interaction with the West European culture, that the features of national Ukrainian character were formed, making Ukrainians mentally related with their Polish, Czech, and Slovak neighbours. In that view, he considered, that „...*the Ukrainian people belongs to the West European or, to speak shorter and more precisely, to the European circle not just by the power of historical ties which throughout centuries linked the Ukrainian life*

*with the western one, but also by the structure of its national folk character”* [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 238-239].

As a matter of fact, the researcher was of the opinion, that the Great Russian character had been formed under the influence of the east civilization influences, which began to dominate during the time of the Mongol-Tatar invasion. Hence, it acquired such features as the lack of one’s personal dignity and disdain of the dignity of other persons, insufficient taste of comfortable life, and an inclination to anarchism. All that, in the opinion of Hrushevsky, is *„...a complete antithesis to the Ukrainian national beliefs”*, which *„...makes the Ukrainian by spirit and character to be very congenial to the West European environment, either to the Germanic, or – in other dimensions (...), - to the Romance one”* [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 239].

Accentuating various and considerable influences of the western culture on the Ukrainian one, M. Hrushevsky constantly emphasizes the creative character of that influence. In his view, the western influences mixed up with the old Byzantine traditions once acquired by the Old Rus’ society. This process resulted in the creation of an original Ukrainian culture, which was highly appreciated in that tome world. In that way the original Ukrainian art of the 17th – 18th centuries evolved, which, as Hrushevsky specifies, attracted *„the West European man”*.

*“The culture and art of the 17th -18th centuries, to the very end of the Hetmanate, - underlined M. Hrushevsky, - should be referred to as western. Basically, they were German, partly Italian and French, all – either directly or by mediation – having passed through the Polish stratum”* [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 235].

However, such an almost idyllic picture of the mutual relations between Ukraine and the West, depicted by M. Hrushevsky, by far did not sustain the verification by a branchy source material. Here again the pages of the majority of volumes of *„History of Ukraine-Rus”* become consecutive objections to practically all his aforementioned theses. Thus, paradoxical as it can be, the researcher again appeals to positivistic values. Thus, the West European influences on the Ukrainian education during the 14th – 16th centuries the scientist subjects to a double criticism. On the one hand, he grumbles at the fact that the borrowed western educational samples destroyed Ukraine’s own educational traditions and hampered regaining its internal reserves for the modernization of this important segment of social life:

*„A ready-made type of school was borrowed from the Latin rite Polish samples, no original type was ever created. But for that mere reason the Ukrainian society can hardly be reproached in concern of its cultural weakness: it was too difficult to avoid an influence of the samples which had by then extended through all cultural Europe. Nevertheless, it was a great fault, and it should be noticed that in the early beginnings of the organisation of new school it had been more original, only that those independent beginnings had no further development”* [Hrushevskyi 1995: 477].

Simultaneously, the researcher specifies another equally negative fact:

*„The problem foregrounded the fact that this scholastic school gave in general very little real knowledge and absolutely no encouragement to it and to positive sciences. Besides, this school was very weakly connected with real life of the Ukrainian people in its past and present, small and it had a very poorly specified national character in wider meaning of that word”* [Hrushevskyi 1995: 478].

Moreover, M. Hrushevsky complains of the fact that the pupils of such schools „...formally could feel themselves Ruthenians<sup>3</sup>, they were even brought up as hot defenders of their case, but by their education and study they were torn off from the people, its real life, its competitions and traditions, and by their all cultural gains, beginning from the Latin and Polish languages and finishing with their interests, views, and tastes they were connected with the Lithuanian- Polish life” [Hrushevskiyi 1995: 478].

In absolutely other tonality in „History of Ukraine-Rus” the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands to the Polish-Lithuanian state is treated. On the pages of the third volume of this work M. Hrushevsky passionately refers to that event as a „fatal” crisis in the life of the people of Ukraine-Rus’, from which Rus’ and Old Rus’ culture gained nothing, but „...lost infinitely much (...) not only for the misfortune of its people, but to the detriment of the civilisation on the whole” [Hrushevskiyi 1993: 503]. Explaining his being so categorical in judgments, the scientist singles out the differences of the Lithuanian and Polish domination on the Ukrainian lands:

„The Lithuanian superiority at least did not bring considerable changes into the cultural and national life, but the Polish destroyed materially and morally those upper strata, which held Rus culture, and they faded to give way to the gentry to the Polish, German bourgeoisie. With that decline, the cultural development of the Rus was almost cut off: only the lower, the masses and the lower clergy, were the ancient Russian cultural tradition, that is, those needy remains of the Old Russian culture, which had time to pass into those lower layers” [Hrushevskiyi 1993: 503].

On the pages of the „History of Ukraine-Rus” German influences on the Ukrainian culture, so idealised later under the influence of foreign policy conditions in M. Hrushevsky’s historical publicism, had absolutely other value colouring:

„The German forms were transplanted on our soil by the government and the gentry without being adapted to local circumstances from the very beginning, they were plagued by national and religious exclusivity, trimmed or curved by fiscalism in the interests of noble state, and further spoiled and wrecked on the same motives. Being trapped in ready-made and canonical clichés, these forms did not develop, but degenerated and lurked under the oppression of unpopular politics and difficult economic circumstances” [Hrushevskiyi 1995: 138-139].

M. Hrushevsky’s emotional attitude towards the influence of the western civilization was also rather negative, he viewed it as an exclusively destructive factor for the original Old Rus’ urban culture. In particular, as Natalia Yakovenko was the first to notice, its most evident example is the scientist’s judgments concerning the spread of Magdeburg law on the Ukrainian lands [Yakovenko 2008]. However, the researcher repeatedly attributes the full responsibility for such a status quo to the Polish government which, in his opinion, by a system of interdictions broke the old direct link between Ukraine and the West, thus, having made all so that the western culture could reach Ukraine in no other way but only through the „nasty

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<sup>3</sup> We would like to note that the meaning of ethnonym "Rusyn" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries differed from its significance today (i.e., Rusyns as an ethnic group living in Transcarpathia, Eastern Poland, Eastern Slovakia and Vojevodyn). During the time period under investigation, it was the self-naming of Ukrainians that lived in Galicia.

Polish alembic” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 139]. The consequences of that for Ukrainian national life, as M. Hrushevsky described them, were simply fatal:

„Then, after this process of pauperisation and decline of the Ukrainian town folk had reached its extremes, and with an account for the poor condition of the Ukrainian element which resulted from the politics and administration of Poland, such a pale copy of the West European culture which the poor Polish culture was in the 17th - 18th centuries became something more, it became a “superior culture” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 139].

The contemporary researchers have already – and repeatedly - attempted to explain the fact, that the pages of Hrushevsky’s „History of Ukraine-Rus” became, actually, a historical indictment for the West in destruction of the original Ukrainian culture through the Polish hands. Thus, Leonid Zashkilniak points to M. Hrushevsky’s Slavophile sympathies acquired by it him still in gymnasium years [Zashkilniak 1994]. Serhiy Plokhyy appreciably agrees with such conclusions in his monograph on the outstanding scientist [Plokhyy 2005: 114]. At the same time, Natalia Yakovenko points out the „Russian mental tradition” in which the evolution of M. Hrushevsky’s creativity took place [Yakovenko 2008: 97]. Probably, these judgements need to be commented, because it is not only his anti-West views on which the aforementioned researchers accentuate, but also his ambivalence in his attitude toward the West.

## **1.2. The images of the „Foreigner”: Russia**

The image of Russia appears not less ambivalent in M. Hrushevsky’s heritage. The majority of researchers of Hrushevsky’s works consider his radical „derussianization” of Ukraine’s history as the main historiographic merit of the outstanding scientist. The Ukrainian historian declared it most accurately in his well known article „The Usual Scheme of „Russian History” and an Issue of the Rational Compilation of the History of East Slavic Peoples” (1904), which was firstly published in the Ukrainian language in a Petersburg edition, which had a reputation among that time experts, namely, in the „Collection of Articles On Slavic Studies”, edited by academician V. Lamanskyi. In fact, that article for the first time in the Ukrainian intellectual tradition conceptually grounded the statement about the Russians as a completely - in cultural, historical, and ethnic senses different people from the Ukrainians. Shortly, that text became a real credo for the historians who were effectively connected with the Ukrainian national movement.

M. Hrushevsky focused the aforementioned article on the all-round criticism of the supported by the Russian historiography Pogodin’s scheme of the East Europe region’s past, in which the civilization heritage of Kievan Rus’ inseparably belonged to the Russians, whereas the Ukrainian past was totally dissolved in imperial historical narratives. The danger of that scheme, according to M. Hrushevsky, consisted in that it was widely used by Slavic studies experts throughout Western Europe to whom it had never occurred to verify Mikchail Pogodin’s theses with the data of many sources.

The Ukrainian scientist dwelled on obvious irrationalities of that „usual” scheme which, after the scheme gained habitual use in the historiographic tradition, were paid almost no due attention:



„First of all, linking of the ancient history of the southern tribes, the Kievan state, with its political way, legislation, and culture, with Vladimir-Moscow principality of the 13th – 14th centuries is very irrational, it is as if this latter was the continuation of the former” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77].

The Ukrainian historian was convinced that while Moscow scribes – as adherents of the genealogical approach - could have been excused for such an anti-historical method, it was not appropriate for the contemporary historiography which „seeks for the genetic link”. M Hrushevsky convinced his opponents that the Kievan state, law, and culture were the product of one nationality, that of Ukraine-Rus’, whereas Vladimir-Moscow represented the other one, - Great Russian. Therefore, to his mind, the Kievan period had passed not in Vladimir-Moscow, but into Galician-Volhynian in the 13th century, and then into Lithuanian-Polish in the 14th – 16th centuries. Thus, the Vladimir-Moscow state was neither a heir, nor a successor of Kiev, it grew from its own root, and Kievan Rus’ attitude towards it the scholar compares to that of the Roman empire towards Gallic provinces [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77].

The noticed misunderstanding brought to life another historiographic irrationality which manifested itself in the fact that the dominating nationalities of the East Europe region (Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians) were, actually, deprived of the sources concerning a well-founded beginnings of their history. This is how the historian saw this situation:

„So, when to consider a consequence of sewing up of the Kiev state to the beginnings of the state and cultural life of the Great Russian people, what do we observe? The history of the Great Russian nationality remains, in fact, without its beginnings. (...) The fiction of „the Kievan Rus’ period” does not give a possibility to accordingly represent to history of the Great Russian nationality. As „the Kievan Rus’ period” is integrated to the state and culture history of the Great Russian people, the history of the nationality of Ukraine-Rus’ remains without its beginnings. (...) But the place of Belarusian nationality is even worse in this scheme, because it vanishes entirely (...)” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77-78].

The solution to eliminate the aforementioned historiographic misunderstanding, which M. Hrushevsky suggested, is very simple:

„(...) It is necessary to part with „the fiction that „the Rus’ history”, perpetually substituted by the Great Russian one, is the „common Rus” history. (...) Eventually, there cannot be any „common Rus” history at all, as there is no „common Rus” people. There can be a history of all „Rus’ peoples”, if there is anyone wishing to call them so, or a history of East Slavs. It is this latter, that, probably, should replace the present „Rus’ history” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 79].

The focal points of the scheme in view M. Hrushevsky repeated later, in 1906, in „the preface to the second edition of „A Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian People” (in Russian), and also laid out in detail in the third edition of the first volume of „History of Ukraine-Rus” (1913). Furthermore, after 1906 the scientist even sharpened certain questions, providing his wider and more extended arguments. M Hrushevsky expressed his expectations, that:

„...less than in ten years the carcass of Ukrainian history as an organic integrity from the beginnings of historical life of the Rus' tribes to our times will seem a phenomenon as much normal, as it seemed (and now it still seems to those people who had no chance to think it over) normal to stick the Ukrainian episodes in the traditional scheme of the „Russian state” ten years ago [Hrushevskyi 1991: 1].

It is necessary to notice, that the article in view became remarkable for Hrushevsky as a social thinker. After all, he had been brought in the environment of federalist values that dominated in the environment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia at Russian empire lands of the second half of the nineteenth century, and he was the first to suggest irredentistic ideas in relation to Russia. The scheme, well grounded in the aforementioned work, was with enthusiasm recognised by its author's many colleagues and became a constant and organic part of scientific creativity of a whole generation of Ukrainian 20th century historians working in the West: it is from it, that many contemporary specialists in Ukrainian history still proceed from in their designs of the past of Eastern Europe. At the same time, already at the beginning of the 20th century M. Hrushevsky's historical scheme incited certain objections on behalf of many German, Russian, and Polish researchers (particular, concerning the question of ethnic processes in the time of Kievan Rus' and the role of the Old Rus' inheritance in the historical destinies of the three East Slavic peoples).

The political and historiographic significance of M. Hrushevsky's scheme were correlated. After all, the formation and recognition of concepts about common past, especially, about ethnic origin, is of very great importance for national self-comprehension and consolidation of nations. It was precisely on this moment that the critic accentuated. Favourably received in the Ukrainian intellectual milieu as a harmonious theoretical substantiation of the independence of the national historical process, the aforementioned article caused polemics and cautions, first of all, - in the environment of Russian scientists. The majority of them became indignant of the mere fact of the admission of the Ukrainian language to an academic publication, which legalized it as an instrument of science and created a precedent for the continuation of the work on the popularisation of achievements of the Ukrainian cultural movement.

Most distinctly this position in his review of literature on Slavic studies was expressed by Tymophiy Florynskyi, M. Hrushevsky's former professor at St Volodymyr University. He stressed on inaccuracy and danger of the admission of a Ukrainian language article to the academic publication and condemned the very fact of „protection” over the Ukrainian cultural movement of some Russian scientists [Florynskyi 1905]. Separately the Kiev professor dwelt on historiosophic proposals of his former pupil, having deprived them of scientific character. In his final words the author appealed to Russian historians „to make an appropriate assessment of Hrushevsky's works”.

As a matter of fact, the theses stated in T. Florynskyi's review were later widely reprinted and distributed by adherents of right-monarchic ideology [Shcheholec 1912: 139-140]. Its adherents also saw a powerful ideological implied sense in the publication, fairly considering the scientific positions stated in it the basis for a development of „separation tendencies” in the environment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the country. Among other readers, there also were such who from a the position of the „plot theory” postulates tried to show the harms and banefulness of separate interpretation of historical destinies of the two neighbouring peoples,

appealing to the classical Slavophile thesis about an „external threat” for the Slavs. So, one of reviewers of M. Hrushevsky’s article pathetically wrote as follows:

„Can it be, that the old Slavic enmity which caused so much harm to the Slavs, will also infinitely go on in the environment of the Russian people, and instead of common cultural work we shall hear such exclamations, as: we are by ourselves, and you are by yourselves, we are Ukrainians, and you are Great Russians, so – let’s mind our own businesses! Who, eventually, will benefit from that, if not the enemies of the Slavs?” [Radchenko 1905: 453].

From the positions of the already analyzed historiosophic models, the northern neighbour is depicted by M. Hrushevsky as a consecutive antithesis to the civilised West, as a country that lives exclusively under laws of eastern despotism. The political elite of Muscovy the scientist expressively calls „northern barbarians”, opposing it to the „...skilled and civilised people of the western culture” [Hrushevskiyi 1997: 759]. From here it becomes quite natural that the foreign policy choice of the Cossack starshyna headed by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in favour of the Moscow kingdom M. Hrushevsky considers fatal to the European prospects of Ukraine. However, that choice, he also remarks, was to a great extent made under the pressure of that time circumstances as a reaction to abuses of Catholic Rzeczpospolita Polska.

The geopolitical choice of that time Ukrainian elite M. Hrushevsky calls epoch-making also for the history of Eastern Europe as it cardinal changed the political map of that time world, having initiated a steep fall of Poland and the transformation of the Moscow kingdom in a powerful regional leader:

„... The transition of Ukraine from under the power Polish Rzeczpospolita „under a high hand” of the Moscow tsar (...) shifts the centre of political gravity in Eastern Europe from Poland to Moscow, gives a powerful impulse of Europeanization of Muscovy, of its inclusion in the political system of Europe, etc. This is what in these events attracts a „history of the world” specialist’s interest, and it should interest also us” [Hrushevskiyi 1996: 4].

However, along with the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands into Muscovy, they long enough remained in the sphere of European culture, hence, the researcher emotionally underlines, that „...Ukraine of the 17th century was Europe all the same, and it wanted to be such with each joint of its essence!” [Hrushevskiyi 1997: 1497]. And only after the liquidation of the Hetmanate in the end of the 18th - beginnings of the 19th centuries, Ukraine was forcefully made to reorient to the Russian imperial north. M. Hrushevsky specifies a compulsory russification of the Ukrainian life, economical exploitation of Ukrainian lands, purposeful destruction of the educational space generated after the western samples. As a result, the scientist remarks:

„Ukraine of the 19th century was torn off from the West, from Europe, and turned its face northward, its nose stuck into a god-forsaken place of Great Russian culture and life. All Ukrainian life was turned out of the normal conditions, from its historically and geographically generated path, and was thrown out on a Great Russian ground for vagrancy and plunder” [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 236].

It is noteworthy, that M. Hrushevsky cherished his conviction in the fatality of a pro-Russian choice of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in his pupils. Here the best examples are M. Hrushevsky's consultations of his Lviv pupils, in whom he outlined an ideological model of interpretation of historical events investigated by them. So, in a letter Ivan Dzhydzhora, his favourite pupil who studied the peculiarities of Peter I's economic policy concerning the Ukrainian lands, M. Hrushevsky strictly advised not to adhere to the theses spread in that time science about the Russian tsar's economic pragmatism, but, contrarily, to try to prove, „...*that this was not mercantilism, but politics*” [Lystuvannia 2008: 281] (M. Hrushevsky's emphasis). To the Russian monarch himself the scientist refers as „...*the historical tyrant of Ukraine*”.

Along with such severe estimations of the consequences of joining of the Ukrainian lands to the Russian state, M. Hrushevsky again shows surprising as for a scientist-positivist ambivalence of historical thinking. Despite numerous remarks about mental incompatibility of Ukrainians and Russians, the researcher often points out their confessional closeness which forced the Ukrainian elite to cling to their northern neighbour, in particular, after definite transition of the Lithuanian administration to Catholicism. The author of „History of Ukraine-Rus” asserted that „...*at the break the 15th and 16th centuries the existence of such an inclination [towards Muscovy] became as already very clear*” [Hrushevskyi 1993b: 183].

Beside the religious argument, M. Hrushevsky also specifies the fact of the commonness of historical traditions uniting Ukrainian and Muscovite princes. The specified historical traditions the scientist explained so: Moscow „...*represented itself as a heir of the Ancient Rus' state*”, and also attracted „...*with strongly developed aristocratic structure, - mainly with that of princely aristocracy*” [Hrushevskyi 1993b: 338]. This closeness of religious practices and historical traditions, „notwithstanding their existing under a despotic form”, specifies M. Hrushevsky, soon became the basis for gradual change of geopolitical priorities, that, eventually, prepared the aforementioned civilization choice of the Cossack starshyna in Khmelnytskyi's time.

## **2. A TEST BY REVOLUTIONS. A POLITOLOGICAL DISCOURSE**

In M. Hrushevsky's understanding, for Ukraine's geopolitical positioning in coordinates „Russia – the West” Russian revolutions and the significant consequences caused by them became critical. As well as the majority of the intelligentsia of the Dnieper Ukraine, the scientist was full of sincere expectations about democratic achievements of the first Russian revolution in 1905. He finished his „Illustrated History of Ukraine”, upon which he worked just then, with a belief that „...*a wide national development of Ukrainians become in Russia also but a question of time and we can with full belief look in its future*” [Hrushevskyi 1913: 519]. His estimations of the events of 1917 were too not less elevated. The second Russian revolution, - as the scientist recollected already in emigration, - was seen by him and by his ideological colleagues as „a star of the new world” and „a worldwide liberation of work and working people”.

However, the reality of Russian democracy of different party colours, which unanimously did not recognise Ukraine's right to be a political subject, very quickly cooled M. Hrushevsky's enthusiasm. Elected chairman of the Ukrainian parliament (Central Rada) in the beginning of March, 1917, he was shocked by the

unwillingness of the Provisional government to come to any, even elementary, concessions to the Ukrainians, which was in particular sharp contrast with those freedoms which it granted to the Poles and Finns.

M. Hrushevsky's scepticism attains sharp radical hue after the Bolsheviks had come to power in Russia. He was amazed by the similarity of behaviour of the former imperial bureaucracy and figures of Russian revolutionary movement, who in their attitude to Ukraine turned out „blockheads-centralists and unifiers”. The mental identity of the „white” and „red” Russians was proved by the Ukrainian-Bolshevik war of the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918. In the article „Purification by Fire” (1918) M. Hrushevsky was the first among his contemporaries to define a hybrid character of the war: despite its socialist slogans of the struggle against the bourgeois Central Rada, it, actually, had nothing common with the ideas of socialism and democracy. The historian underlines a frankly interethnic character of the conflict:

„The task of this campaign is „to beat the Ukrainians” who after 250 years of enslavement ventured to raise their heads and to get rid of the Moscow parasite. (...) Now, we, in the most obvious way, have a struggle of the two peoples - Great Russian and Ukrainian. One attacks, the other defends itself” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 89].

A practice of total public destruction which was embodied by the new Petersburg rulers, led to an essential correction of political outlook of M. Hrushevsky, radically changed his views as a scientist and a politician. The conscious destruction of Kiev architecture by M. Muravyov's artillery (including M. Hrushevsky's family seven-storyed house), and a later barbarous days long slaughter of the inhabitants of Kiev by Bolshevik armies, left to chairman of the Central Rada no geopolitical choice. He expressed his that time situation assessments in his work „On the Threshold of New Ukraine: Assumptions and Dreams” (1918), which he called his political testament. The emotional condition of the scientist is clearly demonstrated by the following quotation:

„Shooting to death, capture and destruction of Kiev by the Bolsheviks made up the summit, the culmination, the modular point in which this great, simply immeasurable in its consequences change in history of Ukraine, committed by the aggression of the Bolsheviks, concentrated. And for me this crisis is concretised still more sharply by this destruction of my house, of my study-room with all of my property in it, of my spiritual products, of all the dear that I collected around myself, of all thought over and suffered during the recent, most difficult and most significant year of my life. (...) And it seems to me, that what I suffer so bitterly, in this moment all Ukraine suffers too” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 227].

As M. Hrushevsky underlines, the Bolsheviks' actions not only ruined Kiev, they also forced the Ukrainian community and its leaders to throw away the remains of their illusions concerning a possibility of co-habitation with Russia. In the destroyed Ukrainian capital, he insisted figuratively, „our orientation to Muscovy, to Russia” burnt down, which for centuries was instituted in the public discourse and which became axiomatic for the majority of the inhabitants of the Dnieper Ukraine. The politician points out to his compatriots that the blood of thousands of killed Ukrainians was shed in Kiev streets not in vain only under the condition that it was

possible to be freed spiritually from „the most difficult and harmful yoke” only by such a terrible sacrifice, which he calls „a dog’s duty” against Russia. These theses which, in fact, grounded the necessity in a construction of the national state, were eagerly received by Ukrainian intelligentsia, whereas the chairmen of the parliament that time publicistic milieu called his in no other way than „Father Hrushevsky”, by which underlying his prominent role in the establishment of the idea of Ukraine’s independent state.

Hopefully, that on his return to the destroyed Kiev, the chairman of the Central Rada appealed „with a new effort, with a new energy” to restore the communications with the Western world [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 238]. The scientist repeatedly reminded, that this was dictated not only by old Ukrainian traditions, but also by „that spiritual cognition” which undoubtedly always was between the Ukrainian national ethnic element and life and the West European ones. The researcher again underlines that Ukrainians belong to the European civilization circle by the structure of their national character alone. Therefore, M. Hrushevsky is convinced, their return to the European culture will take place quite naturally thanks to this internal kinship:

„Ukraine can come back now with a new, even – depending on the reaction – with an exaggerated force to this world, close to it in spirit and character. First of all, to the Germanic world, especially German world, with which in the past it had most communications, most borrowings and loans, and now the circumstances so develop that it is here that the easiest contact with the Western world can be established so as to make use of its stocks of knowledge, culture, public instinct, and discipline” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 238].

It is interesting, that M. Hrushevsky, agitating for strengthening of communications with the Western world, urges not to get restricted only to those traditional time-honoured relations and not to replace one mental dependence with another. It is necessary to consider proclaimed by Hrushevsky orientation to one own forces, focused in the slogan „Ukrainian life should get emancipated”, as a display of certain political maturity both of the chairman of the Central Rada and Ukrainian intelligentsia in general. As M. Hrushevsky explains:

„The Ukrainian life (...) should, first of all, „find itself”. To clarify its means, problems and needs, and - at the same time - not to hasten to become fixed in any circle of communications, relations and influences, and to take with widely opened hand everything that can be useful for it” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 241].

As an experienced historian, M. Hrushevsky illustrates at numerous examples that Ukraine should use a unique position between the East and the West, having absorbed all what is valuable and necessary for its existence from the cultures of her neighbours. Considering it, the scientist suggests and comprehensively proves a new geopolitical construction in which the young state itself could already become a regional leader. Remaining an adherent of the idea of „world federation”, the chairman of the Central Rada sees the federal associations at regional levels as the first step to its realisation, in particular, the federation of the people of the Black sea which, he repeats, from the time immemorial „...*did not divide, but connected the coastal countries*” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 237]. Explaining his logics in the

geopolitical proposition, - so resembling the political organisation of GUAM of 1990s, - M. Hrushevsky explained so:

„The Black Sea unites and connects together countries with very different physical and economic conditions, which unusually well can supplement each other. (...) In case they would closely fasten one with another, these Black Sea countries could create unusually rich, large and multisided economic base, and the elementary care about national wealth requires such an economical policy when economical work on this base is conducted by the nation's own actions” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 243].

The new geopolitical proposition, proved M. Hrushevsky, appeared on time. After all, having returned the power into Kiev at the beginning of March 1918 by means of the German weapon, the Central Rada, in fact, became a hostage of its idealised partner. The Germans who came as the allies, shortly turned out to be banal invaders. Seeing Ukraine only as a source of economic exploitation, they without doubt authorised the dispersal of the democratic Central Rada, having understood that it was in no condition to fulfil the obligations of gathering of excessive grocery tributes under which the Ukrainian peasants laid. The puppet government of hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi (from April 29 to December 14, 1918) established by the Germans left M. Hrushevsky out of active politics and he himself had to hide, being afraid of the reprisals of the new power.

His attitude to the political events the historian stated in his articles „After the Damage” (1918), full of many humiliating epithets describing his opponents: „a bad anecdote, created by the association of our landowners and German generals”, „a nasty landowner-gendarme regime of the former guards and policemen”, „a grandiose crime committed on Ukraine's basic political, national, and economic interests”, „the epoch of disaster and shame”. The author characterises hetman P. Skoropadskyi as a German „creation” in the role of an irresponsible governor”, „a simple tool in the hands of the unifiers of Russia”, etc. [Hrushevskyi 2013: 5]. The former allies also were criticised:

„As far as a resolute role in it [the hetman revolt] was played by German representatives, it [the UNR management] should gain an appointment of the international court of inquiry consisting of representatives of parliaments or other responsible democratic bodies of Germany, the Entente, and our Ukrainian Republic, so that this commission could find out how, by whose authority, and according to whose sanction the leaders of the German army, which came as though with the aim to support the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic in its war with Russia, factually, made an occupation of Ukraine, caused a revolt and, having given their figure the role of an irresponsible governor of Ukraine, together with him organized the robbery and destruction of the Ukrainian state” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 5].

Having found no understanding of and no support to his political ambitions in young politicians-leaders of the UPR's Directoria (from November 14, 1918 to November 10, 1920), M. Hrushevsky in the end of March, 1919 left for the West. There, travelling the European capitals, he tried, entirely unsuccessfully, to draw attention to the Ukrainian affairs in influential political circles. The historian so regretfully wrote about the results of his meetings:

„I witnessed the last illusions, which some Ukrainian optimists still had, among whom the chairman of the Ukrainian mission was the most determined one, to vanish into thin air. An absolutely ill-disposed position of the French ruling circles was already admitted by everyone (...). Neither the French, nor the English circles did not want to support Ukraine in the confrontation with the Polish or Russian conjuncture: they accepted all those arguments which the Polish and Russian sides put forward against Ukrainians. (...) In the American circles the tendency to abandon any participation in the European affairs was prevailing more and more...” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 116-117].

The June events of 1919, when the Supreme Council of the Parisian peace conference made a fatal for the Ukrainians decision to authorise a temporary occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Poles completely buried M. Hrushevsky's illusions concerning a possibilities to interest the western politicians with a question of Ukrainian independence. With undisguised irony the scientist so commented on this event:

„It is possible to consider as a new triumph of the grand principles of the Entente the fact, that Eastern Galicia was rescued from the Ukrainian democracy and handed to the Polish nobility and Catholic clergy” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 42].

Having understood the crash of his expectations in concern of the western partners, M. Hrushevsky again took up publicistic work in an attempt to clear up - for himself and his compatriots - the interest of Ukrainians in the new confused geopolitical realities. For the first time he turned to this problem in his article under the self-expressive title „Between Moscow and Warsaw” (1920). It was clear, that after the annexation of Eastern Galicia and the terror caused by the Poles against the indigenous population of the land, M. Hrushevsky's sympathy could not be on the side of the western neighbour at all. Bringing the reader to the logicity of an alternative, the scientist gave his arguments in favour of a new criterion of the geopolitical interest of the Ukrainians:

„(...) The perpetual transitions of Ukrainians from one orientation to the other, from one camp to the other one, extremely badly influence the reputation of our case and our cravings. The conviction taken by our people from the Polish school, i. e. that a successful politics should operate with slyness and treason, brings quite the other fruits. At this time, the betrayal of the socialist party at the moment of the approaching of the szlachta-ruled Poland was simply fatal for the Ukrainian issue! The Ukrainians, whose all future relies on the working people, can not be deserters from the socialist front to the bourgeois one! This is one thing. And the second is, that notwithstanding the various drawbacks of the Bolshevist politics in the Ukrainian question, we should not loose from our view the fact that all the same, we'd sooner with them, than with any other Russian government or party, should hope for a consent” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 106-107].

Even more overt curtseys to the Bolsheviks M. Hrushevsky made in his more often quoted program publicistic article „The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and Its Tasks” (1920). The article was an attempt to strengthen the ideology of main principles of the social and political program of a part of the Ukrainian SRs, headed by M. Hrushevsky, in the context of new geopolitical



realities. Pondering over them, the author reminded his readers of his article to the first volume of „Zapysky NTSH” (1892) („Proceedings of Shevchenko Scientific Society”), in which he justified the actions of the so-called „Tatar people” who helped the steppe people to destroy the power of their prince by means of certain economic and social preferences. Extrapolating a situation in the 13th century on those realities which developed in Ukraine under the Russian rule, the scientist called for a search of the compromise with the Bolshevik power in exchange for a possibility of an active participation in the life of the Ukrainian people. He wrote the next:

„We got convinced that the objective data, real conditions of the Ukrainian life, and the inheritance of imperial Russia do not give a possibility to build the Ukrainian life without peace making, without the consent with Russia. Having put off arrogance from our hearts, we should seek for the consent, we should gain good-neighbourhood and benevolent relations with it, even by making certain concessions, otherwise, we shall not move from the present deadlock” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 93].

The article caused literally a squall of indignation from the majority of representatives of emigratory and West Ukrainian intelligentsia, including the scientist’s recent party companions [Telvak 2008: 220-226]. Painfully bearing the defeat in the struggle for independence, they accused Hrushevsky in treasuring the national state ideal which he himself had announced in his work „On the Threshold of New Ukraine”. Every time he was compared more and more to Khmelnytskyi, who in Pereyaslav had actually passed the Ukrainians onto the slavery of Russian Moloch. Contemporary researchers, considering the reason for such a frank pro-Soviet pronouncement of the former chairman of the Central Rada, focus attention on the situational character of these ideas:

„Under the circumstances of the crash of the armed struggle, M. Hrushevsky ought to have made an amendment on his time political situation. And such a cardinal amendment was a change of a political accent: a social problem became prior to national” [Hyrych 2016: 108].

A wide discussion around the aforementioned article showed M. Hrushevsky, that the geopolitical choice, as well as a substitution of independence mottoes by federative ones, which he had made left him practically alone. So, the scientist took a decision to gradually stop political activity and fully to immerse into scientific work. Its possibilities for the historian were connected with access to archival materials which mostly remained in collections on the territory of the Soviet state. Thus, his geopolitical sympathies coincided with his scientific interests, which made his returns to Kiev only a matter of time. Hence, when the Soviet power, aiming at a split of the Ukrainian emigration in Western Europe, offered M. Hrushevsky the rank of academician and gave him a personal security guarantees, he decided to return to Ukraine, and he did it in March, 1924. However, his last decade of life proved an inaccuracy of his expectations on the declared democratic character of the builders of the Soviet empire. In the obituaries by which the Ukrainian press in the free world responded to the premature death of the outstanding figure in November, 1934, it was fairly underlined that he „fell the victim of his trust in the terrible power of the Bolsheviks” [Telvak 2008: 356-405].

## CONCLUSIONS

Generalising the observations of M. Hrushevsky's attitude to the problem „Russia – the West” within the context of the historical evolution of the Ukrainian people, a considerable emotionality of his historiographic and politological discourses should be pointed out, which, in general, was not inherent to the scientist an adherent of the positivistic formula of history writing, i.e. sine ira et studio. This emotionality arose when the researcher transferred purely scientific questions in the axiological plane „the native: the foreigner”. Here again, on the contrary to his repeatedly declared pro-western inclinations, M. Hrushevsky's sympathies, - although, not always very explicit, - often were on the side of the Russian neighbour.

The situation with Hrushevsky-politician was even more difficult: as well as the rest of the Ukrainian figures, he was long enough in the captivity of the illusions that the Ukrainians had true and disinterested allies in the east and in the west of Europe. Not less illusory was the belief in the possibility to reconcile the revolutionary initiatives put forward by independent movements with the federalist outlook adopted from the youth. The understanding of a situational and pragmatic character of any geopolitical configuration, as well as a requirement to rely only on one's own forces came to him too late. Unfortunately, Hrushevsky, together with the rest of the Ukrainian revolution leaders, reacted to the political events untimely and lacked the gift of anticipating them. All that postponed carrying out of the dream of the Ukrainians about their own state for long decades, the responsibility for that is often – but absolutely unjustly – laid on Hrushevsky.

In general, M. Hrushevsky considered the problem „Russia-the West” as if in two time lines: as a long historical period of co-habitation of Ukrainians with their western and east neighbours, and also from the viewpoint of his own life experience, first of all, taking into account the storming events of the first decades of the 20th century on the European continent. It was the latter that influenced the development of his outlook and the formulation of historiographic ideas and geopolitical constructions got corrected. The author of this article is of the opinion, that the aforesaid appreciably explain the noticed ambivalence of his theses in his publicistic works, as well as his radical ideological and political transformations. It should also be noted that this ambivalence, not in the last instance from M. Hrushevsky's side, became one of characteristic features of the Ukrainian humanitarian studies and political thought not only in the 20th century, but also in our time. This activates a continuation of the study of the problem „Ukraine between Europe and Russia” in wider chronological and thematic contexts.

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# MODERN INFORMATION MODELS OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTS' PROTECTION POLICY OF THE WORLD COUNTRIES

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## **Abstract**

The paper generalized experience of formation and implementation of the informational direction of policy on protecting national interests of the states and supranational organizations. Authors formed two models – subsidiary (US, UK, EU and NATO) and vertical (Russia) on the base of generalization. Transitional model of the development and implementation of the informational direction of policy on protecting national interests in the conditions of nonlinear processes was proposed. The model reflects modern transformation of Ukraine and transition from a vertical to a subsidiary model.

**Key words:** models of information policy, national interests, national interests' protection policy

Modern world order consists of multi-vector processes, which purpose is to control the global information space, access to metacapital of states and global resources, and marginalization of national interests and national governments. Centers for decision-making and launch of such processes vary from transnational corporations and world leading countries to particular individuals who possess information. The foreign policy of a state and the protection of its national interests are connected to a wide range of issues, risks, and opportunities, the use of the balance between a soft power and a defense system. Information direction in the policy of national interests' protection of the world countries is a high-priority direction in the development of G-8 strategies, and it remains largely underdeveloped in transitive countries, which makes them an easy prey.

This study is topical for Ukraine and its neighbors because, unfortunately, national interests do not determine the nature and content of government decision-making. As a result – Ukraine has lost state integrity and control over its own information space, and currently experiences undeclared war and manipulative official discourse.

The information component in the policy of national interests' protection is the subject of interdisciplinary research for half a century. Various theoretical and applied aspects of this problem are studied in the works of J. Baudrillard [Baudrillard 2016], S. Vnuchko [Vnuchko 2012], J. Habermas [Habermas 2007], V. Horbulin [Horbulin et al. 2010], L. Huberskyi [Huberskyi, Makarenko et al. 2007], S. Danylenko [Danylenko 2015], K. Deutsch [Deutsch 1993], D. Zamiatin [Zamiatin 2014], Y. Komarova [Komarova 2005], V. Lipkan [Lipkan 2006], Y. Mahda [Mahda 2017], Y. Makarenko [Huberskyi, Makarenko et al. 2007], H. Morgenthau [Morgenthau 2000], G. Moskalova [Moskalova 2016], T. Nahorniak [Nahorniak 2013], G. O'Toal [Lyakhovenko 2009], M. Polovyi [Polovyi 2011], G. Pocheptsov [Pocheptsov 2016], V. Prorok [Prorok 2016], L. Smola [Smola 2016], N. Taleb [Taleb 2014], Y. Tykhomyrova [Tykhomyrova 2016], A. Toffler [Toffler 2009], O. Turchenko [Turchenko 2013], L. Fuerth [Fuerth 2011], O. Chaltseva [Chaltseva 2015]. Generalization of the practice on the protection of national interests of such countries as the United States, Great Britain, the Russian Federation, as well as the practice of supranational unions, such as the EU and NATO, shows that there is a common institutional structure. Its main components are central and state authorities, local self-government bodies, territorial communities, civil society institutions, business communities, media, etc.

As for the mechanisms that implement the information direction of the national interests' protection policy, their instruments include: public policy, public diplomacy, interaction with media, new media, special events, public-private partnership.

In spite of the fact that world countries have common features in the implementation of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy, the specificity lies in the development of content and ways of its implementation. This specificity aims to take into account the interests and needs of target audiences; diversify channels and mechanisms for the spread of national interests in politico-imaginative and politico-semantic spaces from vertical to horizontal interaction with internal and external audiences. The emphases, thus, shift in order to attract a wide range of stakeholders for development and implementation of information policy, delegation of authority to system elements which are far from the center, while preserving the main parameters of the policy

(compliance with strategic goals and tasks, orientation towards maintaining the stability of the political system, univocal perception of national interests, etc.).

We have analyzed political and legal principles of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy in the United States, Great Britain, the EU, NATO, and the Russian Federation and found out that the information and psychological influence on competitors plays an important role in conquering external and preserving internal politico-symbolic and politico-semantic spaces, where national interests are aggregated and articulated. There are two models of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy: subsidiary – “western” and vertical – “Russian”. Their comparative analysis showed that the main difference lies in the basic principles of involving the public in the development and implementation of policies, decision-making mechanisms, and management of political space.

The United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, and NATO are oriented for the horizontal information and communication interaction among structural elements of a political system. Its purpose is to create an extensive network of process participants who can independently counteract threats and ensure the implementation of the national interests' protection policy on the ground.

Involvement of the maximum number of stakeholders in policy elaboration and implementation ensures not only understanding of national interests' basic parameters, but also participation in their formation. The strategic priority to create horizontal channels of communication at different levels is one of the features of this approach. This ensures adaptation of information policy to the needs of target audiences and a more flexible reaction to information and communication influences. A compromise and coherence between the interests of the center and the basic elements of the system may reduce the level of influence of destructive factors on the system as a whole, as well as to give possibility of an equivalent response to threats, both from a "decision-making center" (hereinafter - DMC) and from the system's elements.


Participation of the central authorities focuses on the development of strategic narratives and the provision of methodological recommendations and assistance when it is impossible for the elements of the system to independently resolve problems in the areas of their responsibility.

Within the delegated powers, civil society and local authorities are limited to the implementation of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy at the local level. As far as the information and communication influences, in most cases, occur at this particular level, local structures must independently fend off attacks and impact internal and external audiences in order to protect national interests within their competencies.

System elements, which fall under the influence, can communicate with other elements and form tactical links among themselves, bypassing the DMC. This gives the possibility to warn potentially vulnerable sectors about probable attacks and to provide the DMC with operative information about the presence of threats, their source and taken actions. The DMC, similarly, sends signals about the possible consequences of the influences that were directed towards it and other sectors, where the basic elements do not intersect. If the problem can not be solved independently, system elements may address the center of the system for assistance.

This model can be conditionally called a subsidiary model of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy. Under subsidiarity we mean the maximum delegation of powers in the area of the national interests' protection to local authorities and civil society institutions, their direct involvement into the development of regional and national policy.

**Fig. 1. The subsidiary model of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy.**



The Russian Federation tends to create a definite vertical for the development and implementation of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy. The participation of a wide range of stakeholders in its elaboration and realization is limited. This model can be called vertical.


The basic structural elements of the system are the government, ministries and departments, media controlled by authorities, and civil society institutions that execute the agenda developed by the DMC. Powerful control over the information infrastructure (control over the Internet, social networks, mass media, etc.) creates conditions in which the promotion of alternative opinions and information is impossible. External influences are blocked and reduced through the system of censorship, extensive networks of "trolls" and professional "commentators".

Public opinion (sentiments, information and communication needs, expectations and fears of the population) is used to create politico-imaginative and politico-semantic spaces which are fully controlled and governed by power and which will not accept any alternative. The peculiarity of this approach is to construct an impersonal image of a state as a collective simulacrum, which eliminates the consideration of the true interests of interest groups.

External influences, in such conditions, are minimal but with the destruction of the grassroots elements (including controlled media and civil society institutions) and the DMC (a president and/or government) – the entire system is destroyed. The main reason is that grassroots elements cannot independently take decisions about

protecting the system, because they do not have sufficient authority for this. This does not ensure a solid foundation that can resist system failures and preserve the system from destruction. In the long run, the elements of the system start to atrophy and cannot adequately react to challenges without the sanction of the “center”.

**Fig. 2. The vertical model of the information direction of the national interests’ protection policy.**



In modern conditions, it is important for Ukraine to preserve the integrity and independence of the national information space with the participation of basic territorial units at the level of territorial communities, civil society, and regional state administrations. In the conditions of decentralization, territorial communities and civil society are the main drivers of the development of certain local territories, and the regional state administrations are hubs between territorial communities, civil society, and central state authorities.

The transformations taking place in Ukraine, paradigmatic changes in the principles of formation and implementation of state policy, increasing influence of communities and civil society on political decisions – all these require improvements to the model of the information direction of the national interests’ protection policy. The analysis of the implementation of this direction shows the transition from the vertical to the subsidiary model.

The transitional period is determined by the following parameters. Firstly, preliminary practices of implementing a “top-down” policy lose their relevance, because they do not correspond to the current challenges and demands of society. Secondly, decentralization reform expands the authority of territorial communities in the field of territory management, including the information and communication




field. Thirdly, mentioned authorities require an appropriate qualification of policy makers. Fourthly, the concentration of political activity in a territorial community should promote the engagement of civil society in the territory management. However, current practices show that civil society institutions are not integrated enough into this process. This happens because of the low professional level of civil society institutions in relation to the development and implementation of policies and due to the lack of understanding how their potential can be used by the state power.

Taking into account the parameters mentioned above, the regional state administrations are the most prepared structures for the implementation of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy on the ground. It is these structures that ought to become communication hubs, which will:

- adapt national policy upon request of local communities;
- help the territorial communities in their formative stages to fend off information attacks and influences;
- moderate the process of communication between the territorial communities and civil society with its target audiences;
- monitor and assess threats;

provide the “center” with a request of a local territorial community and civil society about the agenda of national policy, including the issue on the protection of national interests.

**Fig. 3. The transitional model of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy.**



The transitional model of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy consists of:

- decision-making center – central authorities, which perform the functions of state management at the national level. These are, first of all, the Presidential Administration, the National Security and Defense Council, the Ministry of Information Policy;
- network elements – a set of structural units (local self-government bodies, communities, civil society, legal entities and individuals), united by common features such as citizenship, permanent residence in Ukraine, recognition and actions within the limits of national jurisdiction, self-identification as a part of the state, etc. network elements can consist of political institutions (state authorities and local authorities, civil society institutions, media, etc.), but also of separate legal entities (primarily business structure) and private individuals, who influence the political processes inside the state and beyond it;

It should be noted that information and communication activity is not only focused on the work of press services of state and local authorities. It is about the implementation of national interests in the form of semantic and imaginative content of communities' information space, detection of threats, their prevention, the formation of an information agenda, the formation of a request, and the adaptation of the national policy at the local level, etc.

- communication hubs – which are contact nodes between the elements and the DMC. In the context of the model, proposed by the authors of this paper, communication hubs are regional state administrations, which act as a bridge between the central authorities, territorial communities and civil society. The main tasks of such hubs are to identify threats at the local level, to moderate the communication process between a territorial community and a civil society with its target audiences, to adapt the national policy to the demands and needs of a region, to formulate and convey a local agenda to the central authorities. In a transitional period, the communication hubs are responsible for implementation of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy at the tactical level. Most of their functions will be completed when the territorial community and the civil society will be able to manage communication processes and protect national interests at the local level (levels of territorial communities);
- communication channels – a set of technical tools and instruments which broadcast information and provide feedback between structural elements, communication hubs and the network center, both on the horizontal (between elements of the network) and on the vertical (between elements and the center of the network) levels. It should be noted that these communication channels can change their configuration depending on the situation and challenges facing the network elements;
- strategic narratives – a set of images and meanings in which the basic features of national interests, adapted to information and communication needs and demands of target audiences, are laid down.

The basic functions of the model are:

- monitoring and assessment of threats - a special place in this function belong to those elements of the system which are closer to the outer world and direct information and psychological external influences. They act as receptors reacting to any impulses that threaten the state in the external and internal spaces. The information they receive through communication hubs goes to the

DMC for taking strategic decisions at the system level, and, simultaneously, to other elements to ensure prompt information;

- adaptation of the information and communication network to the current conditions and threats, in which the nation-state is located, while preserving the basic parameters (national interests laid down in strategic narratives). Efficient implementation of this function will enable quick customization of individual elements and the network in general under the current conditions;
- mobilization of structural elements with a view to localize separate or series of cases in specific sectors of the system, as well as assistance to other elements of the system in counteraction against threats;
- management of the information and communication field at the level of individual elements (tactical level) and the system as a whole (strategic level);
- communication – information exchange and provision of feedback within the structural elements, between other elements and the center of the system;
- mutual control with regard to the compliance of national and regional policies to the common interests.

The management of the information direction of the national interests' protection policy is implemented at the strategic and tactical levels, as well as at the level of coordination of joint actions between the center and elements of the network.

Under the strategic level we understand a set of administrative actions at the level of central authorities, structures and organizations with national competencies (for example, defense, official international relations with other states, etc.). At this level, the model of strategic communications suggested by the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine fits in logically. Under the tactic level we understand a set of managerial actions at the level of individual elements within the basic parameters of the whole network but in conditions, inherent to each individual element or a group.

Separately, we should highlight the level of coordinated management, which ensures interaction between the elements (communities) and the center of the network (state bodies) through communication hubs (regional state administrations). We believe that at this level it is expedient to introduce the institute of public advisers of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, for example, such as public advisers on internally displaced persons, working under the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine with the support of the Government of Great Britain. This program consists of a network of 30 experts who provide advice to specialists on social security at the local and national levels in order to resolve the problems of displaced persons. The program should provide support for cooperation between the authorities and civil society in order to successfully reform social institutions and develop a legal social state [Counselor Program 2017].

Within the suggested model it is appropriate to use two communication strategies – “framing” and “setting the agenda”. According to the Ukrainian researcher M. Ozhevan, “framing” is “a communicative strategy aimed to organize the content of a news message by “inserting” it into a “frame”, i.e., putting it into the context of a certain narrative in order to outline the “correct” perception of news by the mass audience” [Ozhevan 2016: 31]. In other words, under the frames we can consider the whole set of strategic narratives that go from the "center" of the system to its structural elements and determine the basic parameters of national interests, which adapt then to specific regions through communication hubs.

The strategy of “setting the agenda” means to control public perception of a certain reality (political, economic, financial, etc.) by finding and maintaining a certain compromise between “true” and “media” realities [Ozhevan 2016: 31]. In the context of the model described in this paper, this strategy provides a “center” with the request to meet the information and communication needs of its elements and to develop a compromise policy. In case of their satisfaction, the center will be able to form national and regional information and communication agenda. This will give a possibility to harmoniously enter the personal and intergroup agenda of target audiences.

As the Ukrainian researcher V. Horbulin points out, “the definition of own national interests is a topical task for state and political institutions. The state as the subject of politics should not only determine strategic interests. They must be authoritative both for the citizens of this state and for the international community. The strategic interests of the state must be legitimate. The high level of their legitimacy outlines the legal space for institutions, which purpose is to defend these interests, to regulate social, economic and political processes in society” [Horbulin et al. 2010: 42].

The interests of territorial communities and civil society, when taken into consideration, ensure the formation of common, generally supported trends of state development and the adequate response to challenges that threaten national interests. According to the Ukrainian researcher H. Kuts, “the choice can only be complete if there is a freedom of choice, when the access to the full options' palette is open. First of all, it concerns information, which in the modern global world is considered as the most important resource. Free open access to information, promoting full and unbiased personality development, is able to provide individual freedom. Accordingly, the vector of liberal transformations in the Ukrainian political space should be directed at the creation of the widest possible opportunities to provide free choice in various areas of being” [Kutz 2017: 55].

If the system has weakness or the lack of flexibility (adaptive function) nonlinear influences can cause its destruction and the transition to another system's control. In the case there are strong links between structural elements, connected by common goals and understanding of the essence of the system, its strategic goals and interests - it will be the transition to a new level of development that will meet current challenges. As a result, the system will preserve its integrity and will develop in modern conditions.

The effectiveness of information policy depends on the prompt reaction to external influences, the identification and satisfaction of the urgent information needs of target audiences, provision and adjustment to existing conditions without loss of its strategic priorities and preplanned results that meet national interests.

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# COOPERATION PERSPECTIVE IN BUILDING A HUMAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND COOPERATION OF VISEGRAD FOUR

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## **Abstract**

The paper focuses on the analysis of the possible models of regional cooperation concepts, within the framework of human security building. Authors focus on the human security concept, its challenges and how it reflects contemporary security threats identified in the European Security Strategy. The particular focus is on the potential of Visegrad group cooperation in the European Union security and defence policy. A specific role of other actors, as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation is included.

**Key words:** *human security, regional cooperation, Visegrad group, cooperation, European Union*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The concept of security has been evolving for a long time, however, the main course was established during the Cold War. The nuclear threat resulted in military

deterrence that has come in the centre of security studies. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the international environment started to re-shape, so did the security environment. Multilateralism became prioritized over a zero-sum game and cooperation has become a buzzword for policy making at international level. Therefore, the paper focuses on the regional cooperation as a subsystem of the international level of analysis and its role in human security approach in Europe. It explores the particular stakeholders, their activities and potential for improvement in the context of successful process of building secure environment while applying a broad approach to security. We seek to answer the question *how do the particular stakeholders contribute to the human security approach and where does the biggest potential lie within the regional cooperation mechanisms*. Based on critical approach to security, the human security principle will be reviewed from the Copenhagen school perspective as well as from policy making perspective. As we are concentrating on the European territory, later the European perception of security will be conceptualized followed by identification of core stakeholders at the regional level, including to special impact on cooperation between Visegrad Group countries.

## **1. CRITICAL SECURITY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The European territory has experienced two World Wars and in the middle of 50s, it was completely destroyed. The Hitler's ambitions to restore the glory of the Third Reich ended up with damaged economies, over six million dead Jews and hundreds of thousands of war casualties. With the coming Cold war, the security had been strictly focusing on the state borders and state sovereignty as the "newly" adopted norm in the UN Charter. The fight over political, ideological and military hegemony gave rise to the realist perception of security concerning the military-political sector. The traditional security centred its attention on the issue of survival of referential object being mostly state or nation. However, at the moment we might observe that the priorities of different international actors are changing and thus there is a need to analyse this security shift. The shift in policy making and threat perception may be explained by the critical approach to security which broadens the traditional perception of the security concept and thus goes beyond the conventional military-political scope. The theoretical basis for this paper is put within the Welsh and Copenhagen school.

Critical Security Studies (CSS) or "Welsh School" of security studies is based on the extension of Marxian philosophy, while its origins can be found in the peace studies. (Peoples, & Vaughan-Williams, pp.18) Arguing against the traditional security studies, the Welsh school states that wars between states are no longer the most common ones. In fact, "New Wars" have emerged, being the civil wars, intra-state conflict and most currently the conflict with / or between the non-state actors such as Daesh (Kaldor, 2012). In order to further distinguish the Welsh school from the traditional security studies, Vaughan-Williams provides three features: a) security is a derivative concept – its understanding is dependent on the understating of politics and the world per se; b) broader security agenda in the context of security threat, but there also other, such as environmental, societal or economic; c) the change in the referential objects of security threats being not state anymore, rather people. There are then specific streams of political scientists dealing with each of the points and developing a more specific schools of thought. For us, the most



relevant is the Copenhagen school which argues for the re-conceptualization of military-oriented security to the broader one including also environmental, political, economic, and social security, while still veering in mind the important role of the military one (Buzan, 1983). Barry Buzan, Weaver and de Wild (1998) further elaborates on the issue of the security threat and the way it occurs. They argued that it is important to consider what is and what is not an issue for considering security in the above mentioned areas. Through the concept of securitization, they developed threat as a social construct. They define securitization as involving every subject within the public debate and it does not matter if it is connected to politics or not. The subject is consequently threatened by a question of survival limitations and requires some measures that are not used in the ordinary political proceedings. In reality the evaluation of the subject's position differs from country to country. What might pose a threat for one country does not have to necessarily threaten the other. Although if this happens, the situation is used as an excuse and legitimization for the involvement of extraordinary tools to avoid, or combat a current threat. Those might include secret negotiations, limitations of the civil rights, arming actions and many others" (Buzan, 1991).

In other words, Buzan argues that threat might become anything that is being posed as a threat by the stakeholder, who has the political power to influence the public to believe an issue is a threat. Concerning the fact that threat embodies different variations for different subjects, the definition and criteria for securitization are triggered in inter-subjective construction of existential threat. Nevertheless, the crucial here is the process of securitization, which starts by labelling an issue as a security threat by an important political actor, even though in that particular moment, only a small part of the public would consider it a security threat. This is known as a speech act. What the authors suggest is that security issues can evolve from the presentation of the issue and its constructivist character not because of what threat they actually represent. More crucial is though how this speech act is welcomed in the public. In order to be widely accepted, there are three felicity conditions that are about to be fulfilled when increasing the chances of public recognition of the threat. These conditions are a) the conventional chain of events and reactions to it; b) the expertise to speak about an issue; c) the historical connotation and liaisons. It is important to add that securitization does not apply to military threats only. The same logic can be used also in the framework of other areas falling under the scope of Copenhagen school. Based on recent development, the migration and the so called refugee crisis has been securitized in the context of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996). Securitization has not always positive connotation. Waever, in contrast to Buzan proposes that environmental securitization has negative aspect when it comes to actors who should react to environmental threats and the reaction to it as such. Waever proposes to securitize issues only when necessary. Some scholars react to Securitization Theory with fear that in some issues it will create conflicts. Also the "speaking security" is problematic when it comes to who communicates it. Turning back to the theoretical standards related to our analysis we have to define levels of these standards. Levels of analysis refers to the subjects measured by the spatial scales, which provide a framework for analysis, not the results per se (Krause & Williams, 1997). The aim of these levels is to distinguish a different set of actors and different practises used at these level in the context of action-reaction

effect. From a top-down approach, the first level is the international system that may be constituted by several international subsystems understood in territorial terms also as a regional level. The third level is then the state or national level, where state is the main actor. This state level may also have subunits such a bureaucracy or lobby groups. The final level is focused on an individual. All the levels may intertwine and overlay not only from the top-down, but also from the bottom-up.

## **2. HUMAN SECURITY – A POLICY OPERATIONALIZATION OF CRITICAL SECURITY**

The Critical security studies provided us with the introduction to the security-shift analysis of different stakeholders' policies. Based on the Welsh and Copenhagen school, the focus of security is not only on state, but also on people and does not only relates to military threat, but also to non-military threats as well. These ideas and criticism of traditional security were later institutionalized in the concept of human security.

Human security may be identified as a policy approach within international fora. Having a closer look tough, there is number of definitions whose feasibility and operationalization is hard to explore. Nevertheless, the concept emerged in 1993 when it was firstly mentioned by *Mahbub ul Haq*, the Pakistani development leader and thinker, who introduced the human security, as a supplement to his “human development” concept in the United Nations Development Program (Gasper, 2005). The 1993 report prioritized human development before traditional security when suggesting the defence cuts and re-shifting from military industry towards peace economy and, in case of developing countries (according to World Bank classification developed and developing countries) investing rather in health care, literacy or safe drinking water (UNDP, 1993). Mitigating the realist approach towards international politics and security as well, the report proposed deeper commitment to multilateral cooperation bodies concentrating their capabilities on prevention by soft-power instruments and social justice. Later on, the 1994 report actually did pay a huge attention to the concept defining it firstly as “...safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life...” (UNDP 1994, 23). These two dimension are usually referred to as freedom from want and freedom from fear, where the first constitutes freedom from violence and the latter freedom from poverty. Thus the human security goes even beyond the CSS bringing both main critical arguments into one – where non-military threats apply to security of an individual or of a community of people, whether a marginalized group or a whole nation. The concept concerns not only the post-traditional areas covered by the Copenhagen school being political, economic, environmental and social, but also food security, health, personal and community security.

The areas involved reflect to some extend the Peace studies perspective developed by Johan Galtung and his study of roots of violence that might be seen in the context of human security as a root of the threats to human life and dignity. Galtung (1969, p.168) differentiates between direct and indirect violence. Direct violence is described as the one that is seen from the surface and relates to personal violence and physical harm. The indirect violence, on the other hand, is hidden under the surface and may take two forms. The famous structural violence concerns wrong and inappropriate allocation of resources, including food and

water, roots of different types of inequalities and unemployment. The violence is deeply rooted in the structures and reveal itself as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. The structural violence is of great importance for this paper, since the human security concept tries to capture those issue in particular. The second form of indirect violence is the cultural violence, which was defined as *“those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence . . . that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”* (Galtung, 1990)

The emergence of human security concept reflected the international development of value and norms such as human rights, development goals and principle of solidarity. However, despite being a people-centred approach, it does not stand in contradiction towards state security approach, rather a complementary one. It does not claim the insignificance of state sovereignty and state security, though it claims that it is not the only actor in the international politics that may be threatened. State security became insufficient when looking for human welfare, since individual can feel insecure even when state feels secure. States are not influenced by external impact, but are influenced from within as well. Hence the security discourse began to be more people-oriented (Newman 2001, 240). The focus here is on vulnerable groups of people under existential threat, including conflict, internally displaced person, refugees, and victims of natural disasters, those who live in poverty or close to the poverty level (Suhrke 1999, 272). Thus the human security aims not only to prevent the threat, but also to secure a better future as it is emphasizing the prevention mechanisms rather than late interventions. The debate about the purpose and goals of human security is nevertheless a bit more complex. In 2003 Sabina Alkire used the working definition stating that *“the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment”* (Alkire 2003, 2), where under the vital core of human life she meant fundamental rights and freedoms pertaining to survival, live hood and basic dignity.

Even though there is a theoretical framework for human security to emerge, the crucial points in the history were identified as well as to enable the different policy orientation of particular stakeholders. Newman (2001, 241-242): recognizes three key historical marks:

- 1) The end of the Cold War and the diminishing of the security dilemma, a traditional realist point of view on international relations based on the state survival and power politics.
- 2) Globalisation, rise of multilateralism in foreign policy, collective crisis management – non-traditional forms of security, epidemiology, AIDS, drugs, terrorism, small arms, inhuman weapons, cyberwar, human trafficking
- 3) Normative changes – internationalisation of ethical standards and issues like forms of government, human rights and gender equality, development and education.

According to Mishra and Kumar (2013), there are key points that provided an appropriate environment for the human security concept:

- 1) Decreased threat of global nuclear war
- 2) Predominance of non-traditional and non-military threats
- 3) Democratization
- 4) Strengthening of human rights and freedoms in national and international policies
- 5) Increasing awareness of the important of human life and well-being

- 6) Globalization and related consequences
- 7) Increasing poverty and wide differences between developed North and poor South
- 8) Increasing number of internal armed and violent conflicts
- 9) Spread of small arms and light weapons, as well as the issue of anti-personnel mines

Alkire (2003, 10) classifies the reasons from the security studies perspective:

- 1) empirical changes in the nature of security threats,
- 2) analytical changes/advances can be observed as well referring to the interdependence between security threats
- 3) the institutional character of security structured at the national and international level has changed.

### **3. CRITIQUE OF HUMAN SECURITY**

The human security has been evolving mainly within different institutions. In order to better capture the concept, many analysts and scholar became interested in order to develop a version easily operationalized in real policy. These diverse inputs into the topic resulted in diverse versions of the concept and no unified definition. According to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) the approaches towards human security may be classified as following:

- 1) realists and neo-realists approach that does not consider human security as an analytical category, hence not interesting for further research;
- 2) narrow approach of human security focusing on freedom from fear rather than freedom from want based on pragmatism, clear conceptualization and analytical relevance. The emphasizes was put on the violence to be incorporated into traditional security reasoning (Owen, 2004)
- 3) broader human security approach including freedom from fear as well as freedom from want.

Despite the good idea and enthusiastic approach, there are several deficiencies about the concept. Martin and Owen in their inspiring article *The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience* outlined critique that might be a reason for the loss of interest of states in the concept (2010, 213-216):

- 1) ambiguity not only of theoretical conceptualisation, but also practical settlement, arguing that human security was written “by idealist for idealist” (The policy implication of the Commission on Human Security report 2003, 9)
- 2) missing clear distinction between different terms used when conceptualising such as development, humanitarian intervention and human rights. These terms are often used as synonyms, however, each of them has its specifics what can cause another conceptual irregularity. This substitution of terms is reflected also in
- 3) the “overstretched” use of human security by the UN (in relation to other concept and terms) resulting in the diminishing interest of the UN in using the term

On the other side, Martin and Owen consider the European way of operationalizing human security the most effective and successful, but still far from perfect. They proposed two ways how to achieve the human security goals. First one being the combination of military and civilian power and command, which the EU has been

trying and today after the successful missions in DRC, Bosnia and Somalia we can say that the EU is on the right way of well-balanced crisis management. Yet, they would like to entrain also the institutional side of the EU, more active European parliament and better coordination between the military and civilian units in the missions. Second way how to approach the human security is the threshold-based definition. There is a big potential in this formulation because if threshold method is interlinked with regional approach, each region could have its own crisis management unit that will administer it by a tailor-made method. The framework would be automatically narrowed down. This threshold-based definition was used by Owen (Owen 2004) as well as by King and Murray (2001). Based on the presumption that “security...focuses on the risks of being severely deprived” (Gary King & Murray 2001-02, 592), the authors developed a clear methodology of area selection for the human security analysis. To set the threshold the figure of generalized poverty was used (for details see King and Murray, 2001-02).

Unlike King and Murray, Kanti Bajpai (2000) underlined the freedom from fear rather than freedom from want, mainly referring to two issues - the bodily safety of the individual; and his or her personal freedom. (p. 38) encompassing not only the physical security, but also the psychological freedom of choice. Regarding the threats, he does admit the impact of direct as well as indirect threat, however only if there is an identifiable source of these threats.

The narrow-v-broad conflict was reviewed also by Roland Paris (2001) who argues that human security in its broader understanding may cause difficulties in decision-making processes about how to allocate scarce resources hence becoming more of a supporter of the narrow conception. This is especially relevant in the area of operationalization, feasibility and policy making. Nevertheless, he critically elaborates also on the narrow conception. As the major problem he sees the prioritization of certain values over the other without a sufficient reasoning. In order to avoid the prioritization, Paris suggest to remove the freedom from fear from the human security definition hence making a clear line between human security and physical security. Paris identifies also another problem being the ambiguity and involvement of many actor providing their own definitions. That results in difficult to determine the core values of the concept. He stresses that the concept is so vague that it is on the brink of meaninglessness that may result in the loss of the last interests into the concept.

As we may observe, it is clear that the main criticism of human security stems from its broadness. Following this critical trend, the concept being too vague and meaning too many things, there were attempts to focus on one specific area such as conflict prevention (Rothschild 1995), physical security (Hampson 2002) or development (Jennifer Leaning & Arie 2000). Emma Rothschild (1995) explored the term of “extended security” from four directions: 1) Downwards from nations to individuals; 2) Upwards from nation to the biosphere; 3) Horizontally from military to political, economic, social, environmental or human security; 4) The political responsibility for ensuring security is extended itself in all directions upwards, downwards and sideways to NGOs, public opinion, press.

Similar to Paris, Tadjbakhsh (2009) emphasizes the problem arising from policy implementation based on the fact that human security is complex and subjective. He criticizes the human security also from conceptual, analytical, people-centred perspective. As a policy concept, human security has not been considered from theoretical point of view of International Relations theories very often. Tadjbakhsh,

however, provides critique mainly from this point of view as the human security fall out the scope of realist theory and from Buzan and Weaver's critical security perspective, he outlines the potential over-securitization. Moreover, oppose to traditional streams of international politics, he identifies that human security may get into conflict with state sovereignty as it puts the individual into centre of security concerns rather than state.

This part provided a conceptual and policy analysis of human security as well as the criticism posed by several scholars. The debate centres on the two perceptions of human security – narrow and broad. The first one provides better guidebook for policy recommendations and implementations (regardless of the inclination to freedom from want and freedom from fear) whereas the latter encompasses the complexity the human security was initially developed for not realizing difficulties in the operationalization framework. One way or the other, the threats people face has changed and they multiplied as well - from WMD, terrorism and non-state armed groups to climate change and diseases. These are only examples of current issues that are perceived as threats in particular part of society. Human security calls on reaction that protects people in the first place. Human security is a normative movement because there exists a clear moral responsibility to move the security discourse from state to individual based on the context of norms relating to human rights, peace and stability (Newman 2001, 240). However, this moral responsibility is connected to the role of “external saviours” and “external judges” upon whom the decision lies (Chandler 2012, 213). This concept goes beyond the traditional model of state-centred security, one of these external saviours is the EU, not only from self-conception but also based on the expectations of international community.

#### **4. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AND HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH**

European security has been a taboo for period of time. This approach can be traced back to 50s when the first defence project was rejected. In 1997, the Amsterdam treaty laid down the foundation for security cooperation. That happened not only because the European Union started already the political project outlined in the Maastricht treaty, but also due to the Yugoslav wars, where the EU was incapable of intervention and prevention of Srebrenica massacre. Later on, the Petersburg tasks were adopted. These defined the priorities of EU action in the field of security and defence being the humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks to combat crisis including peace-making. All these goals had to be guide by the human security principle focusing on individual rather than on state. Thus the Petersburg tasks represent the corner stone of the human rights principle of the EU external action and provided also basis for further institutional development in order to establish structures and mechanisms for fulfilling these goals. These inputs resulted in the European Security and Defence Cooperation, a new platform created in 1999 within the Common Foreign and Security Policy; rapid reaction forces concept adopted the same year in Helsinki, which is not considered as failure has been replaced by the concept of Battlegroup. The EU lack of military force became the driving factor for signing the Berlin Plus agreement enabling the EU to use NATO capabilities in cases and territories where NATO is not active. However, even though the institutionalization of security policy could be recognized, the EU still lacked one clear strategy that would defined the goals and tools of the EU as a unified actor. That showed up as crucial in 2003 when Europe was divided on the

Iraq invasion. Whereas the old Member States were more hesitant to contribute, or participate in any other way on this move (with the exception of the UK), the new Member states, in that time only candidate countries that were stuck with the traditional perception of security arising from their history and ambition to get back to the West after decades of socialist regime, supported the US campaign to Iraq without hesitation. This division triggered the former High Representative to draft first strategy to put Member States back on track for united Europe. The European Security Strategy, titled '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*' was prepared in 2003 and adopted in 2004. The strategy reflexed the complex EU attitude and approach in the area of crisis and conflict management. On the other side, its complexity and broad scope leave "door open or potential future missions" leaving out the concrete strategic thinking about the deploying the operations and setting their aims (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013, p. 59). The main contribution of the ESS is the definition of basic goals of the EU in the area of security and defence, identification of main threats and mechanisms that would be used to tackle the problems. The main goals are to a) confront accurate threats by conflict prevention using civilian as well as military capabilities; b) to build regional security by creating European Neighbourhood policy covering Middle East, Balkan and Caucasus; and c) to promote effective multilateralism in line with the UN and international law provisions. The strategy then defines the main threats, which are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. These reflect the recent development of the international politics including the 9/11, unconventional weapons, recognition of terrorist groups as threats and the factors that enable them to develop in scope and seize. Thus the main problem becomes the state failure where there is no official authority in the state and thus the reality differed from the de jure sovereignty. In the failed state, the non-state actors and rebels usually fulfil the role of the state in supplementing the public goods. The failed state is characterized as a geographical area where there is an ongoing social conflict rooted either in ethnical, religious or linguistic communities (Rotberg, 2003). These conditions are favourable for diverse criminal groups involved in organized crime and of course, there is a high potential of emerging a terrorist group or cell. After years of war waging, Iraq, despite all the odd was classified as a failed state, the most current example to be used a failed state might be Libya, where the elected government gradually loses the influence and popularity of public. From territorial scope, the EU headed its policies mainly to Balkan region, Arab-Israeli conflict, South Caucasus and Mediterranean area. In 2003 these were rational target areas – Balkan due to its geographical area as well as the mission to prevent another bloody conflict in the territory from the normative perspective. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been on the agenda as well since Javier Solana's term and the EU has been part of the Quartet is another way how to become stronger actor in international conflict resolution area using diplomatic means. With 10 new countries waiting for the membership, the EU started to shift its attention to other economically and politically less developed parts of Europe and border countries which explains the focus on South Caucasus. The interest in the Mediterranean area is reasoned by the Barcelona process and close relationship with North African countries that has been maintained since time of colonization. As for the tools and mechanisms used for this strategy, the EU commits itself to a multilateral approach and international law provisions that should serve the perceptions on the EU as a force of good and thus distinguish the EU from the US

and NATO that do not hesitate to act also unilaterally. On the other hand, the EU put great emphasis on the EU-US relationship and NATO is still considered the main guarantor of security on the European territory. Finally, the strategy determined promotion of democracy, good governance, liberal trade and development as a soft power instruments. This strategy represents a comprehensive and holistic approach based on effective multilateralism, rule of law, use of force as last resort and broadened perception of threats. It aims to address root causes of conflicts through community instruments and regional dialogue. These features refer directly to human security concept, however, the EU failed to clearly determine the human security per se being the guiding principle. The debates about why the EU was hesitant to put the concept in the strategy may be explained by rational behaviour and the strategy opened back door. Hence the EU called this approach rather holistic and multi-faced security.

After five years and with negative vote on constitutional treaty, the EU published a revision of the 2003 ESS titled *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*. Even though this 2008 revision has been labelled as a new version, it is, as the title suggests, only an implementation report reflecting the recent development in security environment. It stresses crucial areas of interest as enlargement and European Neighbourhood policy, Security-development nexus, piracy, SALW, cluster munition and landmines. Regarding the threats defined, the 2008 revision added cyber security because of the attack on Estonia, energy security and climate change. The purpose of the revision was the push the EU MS to more coherent and effective external action and more strategic D-M in order to increase the influence in the world. What is, however, interesting on this revision might be the emphasis put on the coherence of the security a defence policy with the EU values hence promoting soft power instruments and EU as civilian (Duchêne, 1973) and normative power (Manners, 2002). Normative power refers to an “ideological power” (Galtung, 1973, pp. 33). The normativeness was transposed into a skill to change the norms of international system. This capability benefits from the perception of the EU as a “force for good” as oppose to the US.

In between the ESS and its revised version, the human security policy approach developed in the EU. In 2004 Barcelona report was published by the Human Security study group chaired by Mary Kaldor and accompanied by names like Christine Chinkin, Ulrich Albrecht or Flavio Lotti. Barcelona report provided basis for a neo-Kantian paradise with military build-up for EU. The main idea of this paradise is a combination of rational self-interest and international commitment that is referred to as enlightened self-interest. The ambition to promote the human security was demonstrated in the Madrid report published in 2007 aimed to include policy of human security into CFSP and CSDP structures in order to become “the heart of EU’s external operations” (Human Security Study Group 2007, 7). This act would clearly manifest the shift from reaction to early protection and prevention as the main strategies used in the EU crisis management. It does not capture the criticism provided in previous part of this chapter as the broadest definition of human security was put in.

The EU is guided by six principles of human security being that 1) primacy of human rights; 2) legitimate political authority; 3) a bottom-up approach; 4) effective multilateralism; 5) integrated regional approach; 6) clear transparent civilian command. There is a clear affiliation towards effective multilateral crisis



management based on prevention. One of the main criticisms related to human security and the EU is rooted in its relevance. One might say that the EU has been exercising human security ever since, but it just does not call it that way (Human Security Study Group 2007, 10). The human security approach should guide especially the EU missions in order to secure the promotion of long-term wellbeing of individuals without subjugating and controlling the target area. (Martin & Kaldor, 2010, p. 57).

## **5. STAKEHOLDERS' ROLE ANALYSIS AND CLOSER REGIONAL COOPERATION CAPACITY**

The current challenges in relation to human security as stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) provide the space for closer regional cooperation, with ambition to contribute to safer environment in the region and in the EU. We will analyse a potential of different stakeholders, concretely states and regional organisations (Visegrad Group and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in contributing to achievement of stable and secure environment.

There are set five main challenges (sometimes also illustrated as threats) to Europe and its security environment, connected to human security:

- 1) terrorism,
- 2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
- 3) regional conflicts,
- 4) failing states (sources of political insecurity) and
- 5) organised crime.

In relation to **terrorism** as the threat to European security it has to be considered in a way that terrorism has an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values. The European Union member states are committed to jointly fight terrorism and provide the best possible protection for its citizens. The EU counter-terrorism strategy (EU counter-terrorism strategy, 2005) aims to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. The EU fight against terrorism is based on 4 principles: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. All principles refer to human security concept.

The question of **non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** is interconnected with the role of international community, in particular UN and the obligation to contribute to maintenance of peace and security. The EU refer to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UN SC 1540 Resolution, 2004), underlining the necessity of states to cooperate in promotion of „the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons“ (UN SC 1540, 2004, article 8). In relation to the general principle of respect to international law, Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/913/CFSP (Decision 2014/913/CFSP, 2014) in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

**Regional conflicts** became up-to-date threat to security, especially in connection to migration flows. However there are not regional conflicts in the European Union, in the neighbourhood territory there are several conflict areas or potential threats. EU

territorial interest in neighbourhood policy and Eastern partnership focuses on the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. As the output of the internal conflicts, elections and political development, state collapsed and it resulted in “new wars” in these territories – especially in the Western Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The lessons of international interventions in places, is that international forces have been ill-equipped for tasks required to restore public security. In these regions, international forces were unable to prevent continued human rights violations and the spread of organised crime, international community is strongly recommended by the EU to apply:

- ➔ preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises. Building security in the EU’s neighbourhood (Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and the Mediterranean)
- ➔ strengthening the international rules-based order through effective multilateralism
- ➔ the importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships
- ➔ needs of improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States (added by EU Internal Security Strategy, 2010)

The present main political threat is **failing states**. The current political environment had influenced the political insecurity, hate speech and propaganda which used to lead to destabilization and fragmentation of political surrounding, strengthening of radical political parties and presentation of extremist political parties in national parliaments of EU member states. Last years’ elections showed strong positions achieved by right-wing parties in a growing number of European countries amid a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the European Union. The right-wing parties included below range across a wide policy spectrum, from populist and nationalist to far-right neo-fascist. (NY times, 2016)

**Organised crime** has been an agenda since the last century, but new aspects have to be underlined connected to the existing situation in Europe. The last decade stronger migration flows especially from African countries and the Arab Spring uprisings (as the output of the regimes transition) and from Middle East (as the result of existing conflict in Syria) had contributed to the increase of human trafficking cases, sexual exploitation and smuggling. The organised crimes contains in EU security strategy following illegal activities (ESS, 2003, p. 3-5)

- 1) drug trafficking,
- 2) economic crime,
- 3) human trafficking,
- 4) smuggling of persons,
- 5) arms trafficking,
- 6) sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography,
- 7) violent crimes,
- 8) money-laundering and document fraud.

As reflected above, all goals connected to building of secure environment are formed within a multilevel governance system. The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats, while different stakeholders are involved. There is a crucial role played by member states, the EU institutions and bodies, as well as by other international actors. The cooperative and coordination approach is requested to achieve the goal which is not only common to EU as an actor operating in the European territory, but also to all international and national stakeholders.

In relation to the identified key threats, strong cooperation between EU and UN and its agencies, in a way of improving the system of information sharing is necessary. The implementation practice in the EU in area of security policy and foreign policy enables member states to cooperate closely in the achievement of EU goals. There exist two main concepts of implementing regional cooperation and regional actorness. In relation to the research topic, there exist two models of regional cooperation which we analyse from the point of the achievement goals set in the European Security Strategy.

### **5.1. Visegrad group and its cooperation within the European Union**

Foreign policy of the European Union provides possibility of enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation is organised by Member States under the framework of European policies. It enables participating States to organise greater cooperation than that initially provided for by the Treaties under the policy concerned. Enhanced cooperation is carried out under the auspices of the European Union, through the European institutions and procedures. (TEU, 2007, article 20).

The Treaty of Lisbon has created three types of cooperation specific to the field of defence (TEU, 2007, article 43):

- a. "Member States wishing to do so may establish permanent **structured cooperation**. They commit therefore to participating in European military equipment programmes and providing combat units for EU missions. The procedure in this field is more flexible. There is no minimum threshold for the number of Member States required and the Council authorises the permanent structured cooperation by qualified majority.
- b. Member States may also participate in certain **missions relating to the common security and defence policy**. These missions are detailed in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union. For example, they concern humanitarian or peace-keeping missions. Such cooperation between Member States must be the subject of a decision given by the Council acting unanimously.
- c. Lastly, the new **European Defence Agency** offers a framework for cooperation to Member States wishing to increase their military capacity. This agency is open to all Member States wishing to participate in it."

In which area or in what field Visegrad group countries should cooperate closely and what are the factors influencing the existence of such cooperation? The model of V4 countries provides possibility of cooperation between small and big states. The alliance of the different size actors provides possibility to contribute to training of common capacities, creating joint troops and also sharing experience from different field. The important factor is the role of technology, where the Visegrad group countries have common history and also common operating teams, using the same or similar technology. This may be an advantage on one side, however the disadvantage in finding proper partners for cooperation. Common training and using new technologies in the field may contribute to increasing of the capabilities of all stakeholders involved. The next factor influencing the proposed cooperation model is position of individual states in international relations.

Visegrad group countries establish regional model cooperation in the EU, which is successful in several political and social areas and the security and defence cooperation is one of the set priorities and challenges for all actors involved. One of the most important factor is the common approach to follow basic principles of

human security needs – morality, legality, **enlightened self-interest' case**. Especially in the last decade the European Union and its leaders express a necessity to create a secure environment not only within the EU, but also in its neighbourhood. “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in a violent conflict, weak states where an organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe” (ESS, 2003, p. 7).

As the European Union in external relations and foreign policy use to coordinate policies of member states, the model of regional cooperation between V4, as prototype of enhanced cooperation provide platform for more effective implementation of measures which should help to create secure environment. Factors identified above set framework for Long Term Vision of V4 Countries on Deepening their Defence Cooperation (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014). The specific need of cooperation, particularly with NATO, but also other stakeholders in the field (international and regional organisations, states etc.) are expressed. Common missions of states in security and defence policy have the highest potential in the moment. Next option is an initiative of structured cooperation within the regular and formal procedure in the EU, where Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic may play a crucial role, like in settlement of humanitarian crises in Ukraine or human security environment strengthening in Central Asia and Caucasus. The role of V4 in settlement of Ukraine crisis is one of the connecting and important point of cooperation, as declared at meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Kyiv in 2014 (Cabada, Waisová, 2018, p. 70), especially when the European Union presented more diffusion position to Ukraine than the unified one.

## **5.2. EU member states and cooperation within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

As set in the European Security Strategy, “regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance” (ESS, 2003, p. 9).

In 2016, when Germany presided the OSCE, and the chairmanship was governed in relation to motto “*Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security*” (OSCE, 2016). There were set two main areas of interest, mainly:

- 1) Crisis and conflict management (including confidence building measures)
- 2) cooperation between the OSCE and other regional and international stakeholders (OSCE, 2016)

Germany took responsibility for security and cooperation in Europe during one of the severest crises in Europe’s security order since the end of the Cold War (OSCE, 2016, p. 2). In relation to this, the cooperation model with Visegrad group countries was applicable, as the common goal of Visegrad group is to contribute to regional stability via security and defence cooperation, as one of the priority under Czech presidency (V4 Czech presidency, 2015). The German chairmanship goals in OSCE over-lapped with priorities of V4 in the same period of implementation, what means that state as actors may contribute effectively in achievement of the goal common to the region as well as to the time. The Long Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on Deepening Their Defence Cooperation (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014) set as the

common goal cooperation of military forces of V4 countries. It includes establishment of V4 EU Battlegroup as well as the Visegrad Group Military Educational Programme (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014, p. 2).

This approach is underlined also in the current strategic approach of Slovakia in relation to its presidency in the OSCE in 2019. "Slovakia's OSCE Chairmanship next year will pursue strategies that boost multilateralism, promote conflict prevention and focus on addressing the needs of people." (OSCE, 2018) Regarding the human dimension, he said that Slovakia is aware of the current challenges in this area. "We call on participating States to defend the third dimension and agree on a long-term sustainable solution that will allow us to focus on improving the implementation of our human dimension commitments," he said (OSCE, 2018).

OSCE civil and military crisis management may use the capacities built by the member states cooperating within V4 group. There is not necessary to establish a new platform of cooperation, the need to cooperate closely depends on a dialogue of the highest representatives of both regional actors.

## **CONCLUSION**

In the new global context, the European Union's security policy should be built on human security, rather than state security. In order to cope with all identified threats to security in European Security Strategy, EU Member States have their own national security policies and strategies coordinated and actively cooperate with different stakeholders operating in the field. As the goal of human secure environment is set within international environment, there exist different possibilities and models what may be applied.

As we identify from the stated goals of security and defence policies and strategies on the European Union level, OSCE level and Visegrad group priorities, in response to effective cooperation between countries, bilateral, multilateral and regional patterns of cooperation among Member States need to be developed. Historical experience, the equilibrium in cooperation between small and big states, common defence history and joint teams operating in the battlefield, justify the model of Visegrad countries security cooperation, which should be accompanied with the position of Germany and a new one proposed by France (Globsec, 2018). The biggest potential of a proposed model of enhanced or structured cooperation in the European Union and also different stakeholders' platform of cooperation within the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe is, that both are immediately applicable options. From the formal point of view, the founding treaties and set framework of cooperation has created the environment, where the human security concept may be applicable. Competences of all actors – states, international organisations and regional organisations may be implemented in a way of achievement universal goal – human secure environment, while contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in the region of its jurisdiction and well as the interest confirmed by bilateral or multilateral treaties.

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# DIAGNOSTICS OF MEDIA IMAGE OF CENTRAL STATE ADMINISTRATION BODY

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## **Abstract**

Media communication has become an indispensable part of society. However, citizens are increasingly 'lost' in the confusion of information and variety of issues. This is particularly true amongst public administration scholars and officials who study and seek communication best practices. To this end, clear answers to questions are sought. Information is sought from the media whom share plans, decisions and arguments for policy-makers in different areas. Within public administration each office has its own means and rules of media communication. Some have set up press departments that specialize in information others have a professional staff to communicate with the media and public. The aim of this paper is to clarify the media communication hierarchy of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic as a state administration body and a public policy actor. It is crucial that their decisions in educational policy are sufficiently communicated with the public and the media. A SWOT analysis is used

to diagnose media communication to find what strategy the Ministry of Education should take in relation to the media and the public. Specific reports are highlighted to show both the managed and unmanaged communications of the ministry. On the basis of the facts and the experience of journalistic practice, proposals for improving communication for the communication department of the ministry, that in turn will lead to a more effective building of a media image with the journalists can be predicted.

**Key words:** *media, media communication, public administration, citizen, information*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Since January 1st, 1993, the Slovak Republic has been an independent state where citizens are represented by their fellow elected citizens; a parliamentary, representative democracy. This means that representatives are elected to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, who are to promote the interests of their voters. The winner of democratic parliamentary elections is commissioned by the President to form the government, which is the highest executive body. On the Slovak citizen's behalf, the ministers manage public affairs, and are responsible for the efficient handling of funds to meet the needs of citizens, to provide services and to ensure a high standard of living. They are active decision-makers, influencing the lives of citizens, forming the results of public policy. Still, often public policy is 'lost' or its information is confusing for the common citizen. Therefore, clear answers to questions about how the government is involved is necessary. However, what are the decisions and specific measures for issues that are in the public interest? The media is the mediator of information. The media enters the policy-making process in different tasks. They communicate plans, decisions and arguments for policies in individual areas (Kupec, 2018). Furthermore, each state or local government has its own way and rules of media communication. Some have set up press departments that specialize in informing, communicating with the media and the public. As such, the media has an indispensable roles in the public policy making process.

### **1. THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN PUBLIC POLICY**

The media has an irreplaceable role in public policy. The spread of information, mediation the arguments of individual actors, allowance for mutual discussion, publication of their suggestions and comments. It is the only way citizens can get information about policies, and the government can explain their program but also mistakes (Briška, 2010).

There is no doubt about the media being a public policy actor. According to Klus (2008), there is a link between voters and their representatives, who they choose. They provide information about the events that happen, but at the same time communicate the values of the individual actors. Especially at the time of the election campaign when they inform about candidates or political parties. The media industry, also called the mass media, or mass-communication raises issues from which to identify social problems (Kupec, 2018a). That is, they define, according to Klus (200), a group of problems that the government should deal with. He points out that the role of the media can also be understood as a tool of education, which can be misused by various ideologies. In the past, the media were

mainly owned by political parties, and this also implies the further role of the media, which has been preserved to date - to attract supporters of political parties and voters, especially before the elections. Klus (2008) also writes about the media as a force that can be used by the citizen. This means that the voter receives compacted information and does not have to search for and evaluate them. Nevertheless, the media cannot avoid criticism since the 19th century of bias and impact on the nature of the news and information. Klus (2008) divided his analysis of the media and interaction with citizens into two points - concentration of mass media and media content. The problem is that the content of some media is adapted to a particular group of citizens. Often, this group is understood as not well-educated and has low qualitative demands on programs chosen. This can be reflected in the behavior of this group, but also in the decision-making of individuals in public affairs (Klus, 2008). Media expert Brečka (2008) views the media as an object, and subject of politics. The media, according to him, play the role of mediator between politicians and citizens, and is a tool for promoting the goals of the program of political parties. Therefore, they are constantly attacked by politicians in an effort to control them. Whoever has power over the media has a tool to push his interests. At the same time, Brečka notes that in Slovakia the media must try to maintain independence from political power. In particular, commercial media needs to achieve the highest audience and readability. This is necessary, according to Brečka, for the credit of an independent media, media that is not influenced by politicians (Brečka, 2008). Both Potůček and Pavlík (2015) see the media as intermediaries between actors, in their opinion among citizens, officials and politicians. They serve as a source of information not only for people but also for politicians. They find out what the needs or moods of the population are and watch competition on the political scene (Schulz, 2004). However, the media are no longer just an intermediary, but increasingly become an active player in public policy. Potůček and Pavlík (2015) draw attention to the designation "Seventh Empire" used by Otto von Bismarck. In the 1870s he declared that the press was offset by its influence in the then six Great Powers, namely the UK, Austria, Russia, France, Germany and Italy (Hvíždala, 2003).

The authors agree that the media have a large impact from multiple angles. According to sociologist Čukan and Šrámek (2013), they form public opinion of citizens, bring research results and act as so-called "Watchdog" or guard dog that controls politicians and their actions. Among the tasks of the media are also agenda setting McCombs (2009) describes this as an instrument by which the media can manipulate the minds of citizens, raise topics that become community-based or, on the contrary, not to be informed in the interests of politicians. An important role is played by the news media at the time of the pre-election struggle. According to McCombs (2009), the public responds to what the media is broadcasting. The opinion of a particular policy will be considered relevant or important, depending on the space it delivers on the media, or by placement in the news block (McCombs, 2009).

From media standpoint, the media is divided into printed, electronic and multimedia, new media (Tušer, 2010). Print media are newspapers, printed weeks, or other periodicals that occur at regular and irregular intervals depending on what kind of information is presented. Publication is based on deadlines responding flexibly to current events and themes that move society but are time-dependent. Only what happens within an hour, may appear in a journal. Meanwhile, for the

week, for example, analytical materials that deal more closely with a specific policy or action in government and social life. The popularity of print media is gradually declining, and publishers are reducing the cost. The reason is that the information market has moved to electronic media and, in particular, to the new media sector (internet, social networks). Whether print media or the Internet is dependent depends on what its target group is. The internet is attractive for the youth, linguistically active in information technology. On the contrary, older readers are accustomed to printed papers. Therefore, the media are adapted to their target group not only with carriers, but also with content. This can fundamentally affect public policy. They communicate topics close to the target group. This means that some topics have more scope and this can create imbalances in the public policy process in promoting the interests of individual actors.

In addition to the media, there is electronic media. According to Tušer (2010) they compete with them but also complement them. Electronic media is radio and television: radio transmits sound, the television transmits sound and video (Tušer, 2010). It broadcasts the prepared news reports, but it can also broadcast live broadcasts from a specific event and briefly inform citizens of the event. In the field of electronic media, there is the so-called dual system described by Mistríková and Žitný (2014) of Transparency International. It should guarantee the citizen two independent sources of information, one through public radio and television stations and the other private media.

Public media have an irreplaceable role in disseminating information. Their job is to provide information to all citizens of the Slovak Republic, to national minorities, to address minority genres and to provide objective information on all topics of social action regardless of audience or interference. Public service media are represented in Slovakia by the Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS). RTVS is a public policy actor which informs about the actors' plans for making, deciding on public policy. It provides scope for arguments and arguments in promoting the interests of political parties or other public policy actors. It provides information on the plans of ministries, other public authorities and Mistríková and Žitný (2014) point out that political power always tends to influence RTVS, for example, he does not want to waive the right to vote and recall the Central Director of RTVS. It will become only a person whose name the parliamentary majority agrees, that is, political parties in power. The more we mentioned that the more power politics in the media, the greater the scope for promoting interests. Public policy is not formed at that time according to objective rules, citizens can get distorted information, or just some arguments why the government wants to implement a specific plan (Mistríková, Žitný, 2014).

Private media are fundamentally different from public funding and how they originate. While public law was established (Act No. 532/2010 Coll., On Radio and Television of Slovakia) and financed from public sources, private media are private equity companies operating under the license of a broadcaster (Act No. 308 / 2000 Coll. on broadcasting and retransmission and amending Act No. 195/2000 Coll. On Telecommunications). By doing so, they generate profits and resources for broadcasting and creating programs. This nature of private media also affects the fact of what they broadcast or what the newspaper and magazine page fills; the program and content structure. The goal of private media is to implement a business plan, to get as many audience as possible, listeners and readers. This will provide space for client and advertiser advertising. The greater the power of private

media, the more expensive the advertising space, and therefore the profit grows. Practice shows that private media do everything to offer audiences and listeners what they want. For example, information on events, government steps, or the public policy process also draws on this. Private media reporting is specific. Themes must meet commercial criteria, which may be in direct contradiction with what politicians or states want to communicate with citizens. Topics that the government is setting up may not be considered attractive by the media. In addition, simplified event reporting can, according to Briška (2010), support the passive approach of broadcasters, that is to say, the downsizing of critical attitudes towards society.

In both public and private media, it is true that they are not just messengers which tell citizens about political affairs. They themselves become a factor that enters public policy in three ways. What the media poses directly affects the public about political issues and individual actors. According to some theorists, the fact that the media can affect citizens appeals to politicians to try to get influence in the media. And the third effect, people working in the media can themselves be considered strong in politics and can try to intervene in political decisions themselves on the order of their advertisers or publishers. Here media lobbying or media activism is seen (Briška, 2010). Authors Jiráček and Köpplová (2009) ask what the risk is that private media will not observe a commitment to citizens, will be an institution of freedom of expression in matters that may affect their profit or are not in the interests of an advertiser or a politician. If such doubts arise, this is particularly the case with the news. Briška (2010) notes that some authors are convinced that traditional journalism can no longer be done. More than ever, the value of quality information is vital. In the flood of conspiracy sites on the Internet, hoaxes on social networks there is pressure on reliable information in the media. The state asks the media to be objective and professional. Media is controlled by law, e.g. according to Act 211/2000 on free access to information and control bodies, the Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission (Act No. 308/2000), however, within private portals or social networks that belong to private media. This media space is experiencing growth, as the information released by this channel has a major impact on different population groups in a short time. Also, public policy actors increasingly use the virtual environment to communicate their interests. In public policy, government institutions are increasingly focusing on websites to make information available online. Profiles on social networks also are used. And this flexible and up-to-date information about events, for example, has increasingly been used in individual ministries. The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic is no exception.

## **2. PUBLIC POLICY ACTOR: THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND SPORTS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC**

The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter "the Ministry of Education") is a public policy actor. As a central government body, it is the policy maker, decides and implements policies in the field of education, performs state administration for mothers, primary, secondary and higher education institutions. The Ministry of Education elaborates the concept of how and where the education and training of pupils in Slovakia will develop. It creates a legislative framework in the field of education in the form of generally binding legal regulations and decrees (Mihálik - Klimovský, 2014). It is responsible

for the content of education at all levels of education, publishes state education programs that define exactly what a pupil should learn and what knowledge and skills he / she should have after completing primary or secondary school. The Ministry of Education is also responsible for approving textbooks and methodological materials, regulating the system of study departments, maintaining the central register of children and educational and professional staff. Furthermore, according to the Ministry's statute, it provides funding through a standard contribution to the pupil, decides on targeted subsidies. It performs the evaluation of the level of education but also the financial and administrative control of organizations belonging to the Ministry of Education. Its role is also the role and the realization of higher education goals, including lifelong learning. The Ministry of Education is responsible for science and technology, sport, talent development as well as youth care.

The Ministry, as a public policy actor, carries out its activities in the public interest. This means that it plans, implements and evaluates education policy, sports policy, and youth care policy for public benefit. First of all, to ensure education from the earliest age to vocational training in line with the needs of the labor market. The Ministry of Education is also responsible for creating conditions for sport, providing financial resources as well as for effective support for sports organizations.

The Ministry of Education is organized into sections, the trade unions and unions are divided into departments. The Ministry of Education also establishes organizations that are linked to the state budget through the chapter of the department but also partly contributing to its operation. This means eleven directly managed organizations and six contributory organizations of the Ministry of Education (Organization of the Department ..., 2017). This very fact, for example, according to Beblavý (2002) causes a great deal of problems and competencies, leading to inefficient management of state administration in the field of education.

The Ministry analyzes and monitors the activities of directly managed organizations (hereinafter referred to as "PRO"). PROs are legal entities that carry out on their own behalf activities which the central state administration has ordered with the organization. The organization is in charge of, and is responsible for, the statutory body appointed and recalled by the minister. Directly managed organizations of the Ministry of Education include the Research and Development Agency, the Research Agency, the International Laser Center, the Methodological and Pedagogical Center, the National Sports Center, the National Institute of Certified Measurements of Education, the Slovak Pedagogical Library, the Slovak Historical Institute in Rome, the State School Inspection, State Institute for Vocational Education, State Educational Institute.

The Ministry of Education also establishes contributory organizations, there are six organizations: the Anti-Doping Agency of the Slovak Republic, the Center of Scientific and Technical Information of the Slovak Republic, the Home of the Speaking Corps of Slovak Teachers, IUVENTA, the National Institute of Lifelong Learning, the Research Institute of Child Psychology and Pathopsychology.

Since the ministry has a large number of organizations in its founding field, it is difficult for the general and uninterested public to identify the fulfillment of the tasks and the sense of the individual institutions. From an organizational and financial point of view, it is common practice for each organization to have a communication department or a dedicated worker to cover information to the

public and the journalist community. In the education sector, therefore, communication is handled at the highest level. Responsible for it is the Communication Department of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Slovak Republic.

### **2.1. Basic communication dynamics of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic**

Part of the organizational structure of the Ministry is the Communication Department. It is the most important communication channel through which information on the implementation of education policy flows to citizens as recipients. It creates an image of the Ministry of Education according to the level of communication and the topics for which it proactively delivers information. If a citizen receives information about schooling from various media they may feel that the Ministry of Education is active and tackles educational and training issues. Thus, the communication department plays an important role in public policy.

The Communication Department answers questions of journalists and the public on the basis of Act no. 211/2000 on free access to information. It organizes press conferences, publishes press releases for print and electronic media and, last but not least, covers communication with directly managed organizations of the Ministry and contributory organizations. One of the key tasks is also the mediation of opinions of representatives of the Ministry on various topics and developments within society. The communication department uses several ways to do this. The website of the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 2017) concentrates all information on the central state administration body and its activities. The page is clear and can be viewed by a common citizen. On the home page you can find press releases from the events in the resort, as well as in individual directly managed organizations. At the same time, we can choose from where we need information.

The communication of the Ministry of Education also affects non-traditional media, for example, on the social network, Facebook, with a profile that is tracked by just over 4,000 Facebook social network users. Admittedly, this is a very low number with regard to the interference of this social network. Therefore, the Ministry of Education should work on expanding the number of followers to disseminate information about its activities among a larger number of people. Facebook is the platform of the younger generation in particular, and it is up to the Ministry of Education to address them and to communicate the importance of education.

An important function of the Communication Department is the organization of press conferences and briefings of the Minister of Education. This is an example of proactive communication. The Communication Department does not wait and proactively provides information on topics that it identifies as priorities for the public. In the case of press conferences, if broadcast live, the education sector has the opportunity to present the tasks of education policy. A wide range of media, press agencies, print and electronic media are presented at press conferences. The media output has wide public reach, and information from it in various forms may take a few more days. So, from this point of view, it is an effective proactive

communication. On the other hand, if media has the opportunity, they also ask questions about other topics that may not only be positive.

Another task of the communication department is to respond to journalistic questions in writing or opinion through a spokesperson. Communication with the media first takes place by phone and mail. It is always important to send a question by mail so that it is recorded on both sides that the question has been asked and accepted. The communication department will send the replies back to the individual journalists and the response will be recorded on a sound or audiovisual record.

The Communication Department is the mediator of the public policy and decision-making process of the public policy actor, both professional and layman. Citizens can learn through the media what the Minister of Education's work program is. Scheduled events are posted in the state-run press agency TASR. At the same time, representatives of the communication department are present at the Government's deliberations. These are always on Wednesdays, and for journalists, this is another opportunity to ask the Minister of Education about issues related to education in the education sector. The communication department of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic has defined principles and procedures, based on media communication, whether in relation to journalists or public events that are monitored by the media. The communication strategy of the current management is generally proactive. The main task is that the media and citizens receive information about the activities in the department but also about the activities of the Minister of Education and other representatives of the ministry, thus, state secretaries, section directors, or directors of directly-managed organizations. Part of the communication department focuses on preparing answers to journalistic questions, hence dealing with reactive communication. In many cases, the media come up with themes on their own initiative. Journalists, who systematically and in the long-term follow education actively look for themes.

If there is a topic the Ministry of Education wants to proactively inform the public through the media, it can organize a press conference. In the main topics, the Minister of Education is present at the press conference if it is assumed that the media will be interested. At the same time, if the education sector wants to communicate with the public in a fundamental position and with full respect, represented by the High Representative of the Ministry of Education. From experience, the contribution of news reporters, it also follows that the press conferences with the participation of the Ministry of Education are organized also for the purpose of promoting the Ministry of Education in a positive way, for example in the drafting of specific laws or the way of solving certain problems. The Ministry of Education organizes press conferences directly at the headquarters of the Ministry of Education or during working meetings or the travels of the Minister of Education.

Before the minister and speaker sit down before journalists, they must prepare. It is hard for the ministry officials to expect their media to ask questions that the ministry's leadership would be. In many cases, journalists quickly identify the weaknesses of the topic presented by the department. There is also the possibility of asking the Minister of Education at press conferences. However, there are cases where the Communication Department only posts a number of questions. In this



case, there are limited possibilities for journalists to ask and find out the answer to the question.

If the Ministry of Education wants to report on specific events, it also proactively uses the press release. In this form of communication, it publishes what it considers important. Press releases are a written source of information, mostly published or referenced by print media. They can quote the statement of the Minister of Education. Electronic media are based on a press release, but they are asked for an audio or audiovisual record. If the Director of the Press Department or spokesperson cannot provide a record, an opinion from the press release may be used in an electronic media report.

The Communication Department also answers journalists' questions under Act no. 211/2000 Coll. Though, according to information from the Ministry of Education, journalists are doing so only rarely. For example, in April 2017, the Ministry of Education addressed 61 requests and only one was from the journalist. For the past three months, the Ministry of Education has not registered any demand from the media in terms of information. Looking closer to this number, this may indicate a favorable situation for journalists to get answers to questions. Thus, the School Communication Department responds to questions such that it is obviously not necessary for journalists to use the Institute for Information Request. This may sound like a positive for the communication department. The media therefore receive what they need to inform the public about the activities of the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education provides media communication also for directly managed organizations. The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport created the so-called Basic communication material and from 2015, new rules for PRO communication apply. Management of directly managed organizations is not directly responsible for providing answers to the media. There is a clear media hierarchy of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic.

## **2.2. Hierarchy of Media Communication of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic**


Directly managed organizations are accountable to the Ministry of Education in fulfilling the tasks and drawing public resources on the activities for which they are responsible. It is natural that, just as everything in relation to their scope is under control, media communication towards the public is also under control. This means all media outputs of a directly managed organization. Press releases, answers to journalistic questions, or the promotion of national projects that are being implemented by PRO. The Media Communication Policy is determined by the "Basic Communication Manual" already mentioned. If the journalist turns to a PRO and sends a question, the PRO sends it to the Department of Communication Department of Education. If the PRO worker is contacted for the interview, the same procedure is followed. The Director of the Department of Communication of the Ministry of Education decides whether the interviewer can provide an interview. If the directly managed organizations want to publish information on the national project in the form of PR articles, interviews or a written article in the media, the responsible person will send it to the Ministry of Education Communication Department for approval. This department grants exceptions to presentation in the

media. There are cases when the PRO worker can answer the questions but only after agreeing with the communication department. But this process is more complicated for journalists. Often, it is not possible for an expert from the organization to explain the matter, even though it is responsible for the action. Directly responsible workers thus largely remain anonymous to the public and cannot be asked to make decisions, even though they directly do so. However, there are organizations where communication with high-level media does occur.

And they get frequent exceptions from the communication manual. For example, the State Institute for Vocational Education, as an output of the national project "Dual Education" and the National Institute of Certified Measurements of Education, as a Performer of Testing 5 and Testing 9, or Maturity. In this case, it is a highly professional matter, and the results of measuring education need to be well explained to avoid misinterpretation. The organization that acts independently in media communication is also the State School Inspectorate. The main school inspector, Viera Kalmárová, often provides interviews on the current impact on education.

Directly managed organizations (PRO) can also prepare a press release for specific activity and events. In this case, Ms. Kalmárová must first send it to the Communication Department at least 3 working days in advance. The Director of the Communication Department decides on the publication of the press release on the website of the organization, the Ministry of Education, as well as in the media. He may grant an exception to this procedure. However, directly managed organizations do not issue press releases regularly, except for the aforementioned media active organizations. In any case, however, the PRO must consult each media output with the Department of Communication of the Ministry of Education. The Ministerial Communication Hierarchy and directly managed organizations are clearly shown in the following diagram.

**Diagram 1: Communications Hierarchy of MŠVVaŠ SR and directly managed organizations.**



Source: own processing, 2018

PRO media communication is covered by the Ministry of Education, and without its knowledge, nothing could be gained in the media. Of course, the effort of journalists is to get information as efficiently as possible, so it may happen that the PRO worker does not follow the Basic Communication Manual. However, this may be considered a violation of internal communication rules.

We also see a certain hierarchy of media communication at the Ministry of Education. Specifically, who answers a question or delivers information. Such decisions are at the discretion of the Director of the Communication Department, but also of the Minister of Education. For the speaker, he is a journalist. You can contact the minister by phone or personally from Monday to Friday at the headquarters of the Ministry of Education at Stromova Street in Bratislava. The speaker provides service to the media to get answers to questions and opinions even if the minister is temporarily or otherwise busy. It is the job of the Minister of Education to be one of the important factors that affects who will answer the questions. For the media, the minister is mostly available before the government, but here too, journalists have to contact the head of the press or spokesman. However, there is a very limited amount of time. It is possible to interview the Minister during other public events organized by the Ministry of Education. The opinion of the Minister of Education is considered to be fundamental and addresses issues that are political, strategic, or at a given moment heavily mediated. Often, after the opinion of the Minister of Education, which is essential, provides details of a spokesman for the Ministry of Education. Moreover, the fact that the minister is the political representative of the education sector, and it is not possible to master all the professional connections in the education and education of pupils is relevant. Therefore, it is understandable that without preparation the minister cannot answer the questions of journalists.

#### *Feed information from journalistic Q&A*

The media communications of the Ministry of Education are governed by principles based on the internal configuration of the department. In particular, we will show how the path looks from the journalistic question to the answer. Starting out from the practice and experience of the co-author of the paper.

If the journalist considers that the Ministry of Education needs an opinion on the objectivity and information completeness of the report, the questions will be sent to the mail address [tlacove@minedu.sk](mailto:tlacove@minedu.sk). To this address, all members of the communication department have access to this address. This minimizes the possibility of not viewing or losing the question. Journalists can submit questions outside the working hours, because a spokesman for the Ministry of Education is available by phone. When the question arises by mail, the employees who are in charge of preparing the answer will first check the database, no matter if the question has been answered. There are many up-to-date topics on the media's own initiative. But there are cases when it is the same day, for example, if they want an opinion, for example, on raising teachers' salaries after a press conference of the Slovak Chamber of Teachers. If the employees of the communications department find a response to a journalist's question, they will send it back to him after consulting the department head. If the processed answer is not in the database, the relevant department of the Ministry of Education is contacted by the staff with the request for information.

They will receive a response from experts at a specified time, which will be adjusted in the form requested by the journalist. If it happens that for some time period or other reasons, the communications department is not able to respond to a journalist's question at a set time. He then consults with him on the phone if the response time can be shifted to the next business day. If the communications department employees are able to process the response, the spokesperson checks it. Subsequently, the spokesperson or authorized person sends a reply to the journalist directly under the heading of the Ministry of Education. This is a simple way for a journalistic question to answer. However, if it is a topic that requires more attention, of a political or strategic nature, the speaker contacts the Director of the Communication Department. The Director of the Department shall consult the Minister of Education if necessary. The final answer must still be passed through the control of the communications department. Only then will the answer get to the journalist. The answer to the question comes to the journalist by mail. If it's a print media, it's enough. However, the electronic media needs sound for broadcasting. In this case, the phone is used, and a sound or audiovisual recording is uploaded.

### **2.2.1. Examples of the media communication hierarchy of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic**

The Communication Department of the Ministry of Education receives daily dozens of questions from journalists. Despite the fact that it has a clear communication strategy and communication procedures, the final outcome of communication depends on several factors. In a few examples, media hierarchy of the Ministry of Education in practice is explored, beginning with TV Markiza's coverage.

#### *a) An example of a proactive communication from the Ministry of Education*

The Ministry of Education uses the media space to promote the ministry, but ultimately also promotes a minister nominated by a political party. It is natural that the minister does not miss the opportunity to report positive information to journalists. In this case, the Ministry proactively comes up with a school bus pilot project from the state budget. It cooperates with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Transport. The resorts organized the first minibus transfer for pupils in Dobrohošť. In the morning before classes, journalists and ministers met. They are briefed about the project. It is positive publicity because the project's aim is public interest - a safe and free transfer of pupils to school. In this case, the Minister of Education answers questions. It is a situation in which the minister did not expect the risk or critical questions from journalists, because the journalists needed only information on the pilot project.

#### *b) An example of crisis communication by the Ministry of Education*

Critical communication is very important. How to disable negative public and critical information? It is effective to publish information about the problem before journalists discard it with its own investigative activity. Here is an example from a directly managed organization Methodological -pedagogical centre from 2015. An official of the organization sent more than 455-thousand euros to a new bank account of the company, which should provide services for a directly managed organization. Money was sent via e-mail to change the company's account, but it

turned out that it was a fictitious announcement of a bank account change. So money came into the hands of an unauthorized person. The Methodological and Pedagogical Center filed a criminal notification of an unknown fraud agent. In order for the Ministry of Education, as a superior authority, to avoid criticism and mass media pressure, it organized a press briefing directly in front of the building of the Regional Directorate of the CA in Bratislava, where then-Director Kapucianová, made a criminal complaint. She explained the situation to the journalist, and at the same time announced the efforts of the Methodological and Pedagogical Center to find out who is responsible for this mission. The questions of journalists were answered by the Director of the Methodological and Pedagogical Center. Therefore, avoidance of the initial scandal occurred. The final impression was that it was initially recognized and immediately sought solutions.

*c) An example of media communication with a directly managed organization*

PRO generally do not communicate with the media. All outputs must be consulted with the Ministry of Education's Communication Department. However, there are cases where the communication of a directly managed organization is at a high level, and a particular PRO is staffed to handle it. An example is the National Institute of Certified Measurements of Education (NUCEM). The director is Romana Kanovská. The organization performs highly professional activity measuring the quality of education through projects such as Testing 9 or Maturita . Therefore, it communicates all questions related to the preparation of national tests, their course and results. The NUCEM also responds to the negative questions about the questions in the tests that they ultimately had to cancel. An example of this report shows that it is important for a directly managed the organization to justify exactly what happened and did not misconduct. From our point of view, this strengthens the image of a professional organization that is responsible for its agenda.

*d) An example of delegating a response from the Minister of Education to a spokesperson*

It depends on the topic of giving the journalist an opinion, either by the minister of education or a spokesman. According to information from the Communication Department, the Minister is expressing his or her concerns. From our point of view, the primary issue is also the legislative change prepared by the Ministry of Education. Former Minister Peter Plavčan announced at the press conference a change in the law on universities. However, many remarks from the Slovak Rector's Conference, which did not agree with the change of law, appeared in the commentary. The unresolved contradiction also remained with Petr Kažimir, the finance minister. The journalists requested the then minister Peter Plavčan, to speak before the meeting. But he did not meet the journalists. He did not deliver the opinion even after the hearing. He delegated this role to the district's spokesman. This example can be understood as the Secretary of State's efforts to avoid unpleasant questions about why he wanted to enforce a law that many do not agree with.

*e) An example of media communication hierarchy between the Ministry and the PRO*

On a specific example, it can be seen that directly managed organizations should communicate separately. But, it's not a common practice at all. According to the

communication manual, all media outputs must be consulted with the Ministry of Education, and the Head of the Communications Department decides whether a PRO representative or a district spokesperson will be speaking. The reporter communicated in the following report. It was the competence of the State Educational Institute (hereinafter referred to as the SPS). The Subject Committee for Slovak Language and Literature added to the obligatory reading for high schools the book by Dušan Tarageľa and Petra Pišťánek - Sekera and the Knifewhat triggered a wave of criticism from educators. There are vulgarisms in the short stories, and teachers of the Slovak language refused to work with the book. However, the SPO did not explain the situation directly. The reasons why the work appeared in the compulsory literature were communicated by the then spokeswoman of the Ministry of Education. Ultimately, the impression that the ministry made the mistake is observed. The State Educational Institute is a directly managed organization of the department but with its own responsibility for the activities it performs from public sources and in this case, therefore, the answer to questions should have been from the SPO.

All the above examples confirm that the Ministry of Education has established communication rules but has to respond flexibly to each situation. The final media outlet is also influenced by other factors - the mood in society in relation to schooling, the business of the minister, what is the topic being communicated, and, last but not least, the tactics of the Minister of Education as a political nominee. All this should fit into the communication strategy of the MŠVVaŠ SR. The Minister can only create it if they know perfectly the environment in which inner strengths and weaknesses also work. To do so, using SWOT analysis is recommended.

### **2.2.2. SWOT analysis of the communication of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic**

Each organization should know its weaknesses, its strengths, but also its impact on the environment. In the positive or negative sense. These are important factors for creating a strategy. SWOT analysis is one of the methods that can reveal the stability or strength of the Ministry of Education's communication. We can say that SWOT analysis is a simple diagnosis, which can also identify the weaknesses or risks from the external environment that influence the way of communication of the Ministry of Education. This SWOT analysis is based on experience as a news editor. The principle of the SWOT analysis is to define the exact factors that influence the communication of the Ministry of Education and at the same time their strength. They are evaluated on a scale of 1 - 10, 1 is for the weakest factor affecting communication and 10 for the strongest. We divide the factors into four groups:

S - strengths = strengths of the internal environment

W- weaknesses = weaknesses of the internal environment

O - opportunities = opportunities from the outside environment

T - threats = threats, risks from the external environment

**Table 1: SWOT Analysis of Communications of the Ministry of Education and Research of the Slovak Republic**


<b>STRENGTHS</b> +	<b>points</b>	<b>WEAKNESSES</b> -	<b>points</b>
Qualified workers	10	Frequent change of the Minister of Education	10
High expertise of communications	10	Frequent change of the district spokesman and the communications	10
Department directors	10	Department director	10
Former journalists at the post of the speaker	9	There was no communication strategy	8
Voice record of the position for radio broadcasting	7	Professional communication on social network Facebook	9
Press news	9	There is no account on Twitter and Instagram	8
Press conferences	8	Press releases in the vestibule	7
Profile on social network Facebook	10	Short space for talks before the government	8
A quick answer to a journalistic question	9	Official answers	10
Speakerphone out of office hours	9	High PRO count	8
		Communication through the Ministry of Education	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b> +	<b>points</b>	<b>THREATS</b> -	<b>points</b>
The document "Learning Slovakia"	10	I do not blame the public for scientific and professional themes	9
Increasing government spending on education	7	Statements by the Minister of Finance	8
Statement by the government	8	Statements by the Prime Minister	10
Employer Investments in Dual Education	8	Impact of employers on education	8
Parental interest in education in regional education	7	Problematic involvement of marginalized Romani communities in education	8
Demand for the company after the reform	7	Graduate unemployment	9
Revision of expenditure Value for money	10	Choice of topics by journalists	10
Slovakia's membership in the EU	10	Tracking and listening to the media	10
Funds from Eurofunds	10	Teacher discontent	10
Amendment to the Higher Education Act	9	Reducing the number of children in schools	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>

Source : own processing, 2018

As calculated, the assessment of the factors in the four groups the strengths of the internal environment have a value of 111, the weaknesses of the internal environment 107, Opportunities are serious in numeric terms 86, and the risk after the factor counting is 91. The results thus calculated give us an idea of what strategy the Ministry of Education should choose in media communication.

However, to accurately determine the strategy, it is necessary to transfer the results to the axes of the table.

**Graph 1. SWOT analysis matrix of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic**



Source: own processing, 2018

According to the SWOT analysis, defensive strategy - ST (strengths-threats) is chosen for the Communication Department of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Slovak Republic. This strategy focuses on strengths and uses them to the maximum extent in communicating with the media and the public. The strengths of the communications department may respond appropriately to the risks from the external environment, which the Ministry of Education cannot directly influence. The Ministry, as the central government administration body in the field of education, needs to maintain its firm position in an unattractive state administration environment. They have public resources to serve the public interest in the field of education. That is why it should concentrate on its strengths in media communication and, on the contrary, eliminate or mitigate its weaknesses. This means taking advantage of the potential of skilled workers, among whom are also former journalists. This has a practical point of view since they know how the editorial staff operate, which the ministry can use to its benefit. More to the point, the focus should be on strengthening social communication on Facebook. The Ministry should therefore more closely orient its communication towards parents and pupils for key addresses on education.



### **3. CORRECTIONS TO IMPROVE THE COMMUNICATION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND SPORT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC**

The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports has the human potential to communicate effectively. They showed concrete examples of the news broadcasts that are documented, for example, by a media communications hierarchy, but also by avoiding the Minister of Education on journalistic issues. All this appears to be a brake on the effectiveness of communication, however. The SWOT analysis highlighted reserves, defined the weaknesses of the internal environment as well as the risks from the external environment. Additionally, the strengths of the Ministry of Education have been defined, but the situation in practice shows that the ministry does not fully use its strengths to present the fulfillment of the tasks in the educational policy. There are skilled workers in the communications industry. The communication department can communicate in particular topics that they know to be of interest to the media. At the same time on negative topics, the Ministry should persuade the public to explain why it made a concrete decision. As one of the strongest channels of communication, it should make more use of the existing profile on the Facebook social network and communicate not only to the professional public but to address the younger generation. In such a way, the ministry can show that education is important to them and to society, while at the same time it can be interesting and playful. The Ministry of Education publishes press releases, but it is not enough from the point of view of the wider public. There are no videos from the Minister of Education's working visits, short video positions where the management of the ministry comments on the current events. It is more out of the backstage of the education sector. All this could popularize the area of education. This can be especially attractive to the younger generation, so that it is interested in the work of the Ministry of Education. Strong aspects of the internal environment also include proactive communication tools such as press releases and press conferences. From our point of view, press conferences should take place more frequently, even on a regular basis. The Ministry of Education could evaluate its activity every three months, fulfilling the tasks of the government's program statement, or answer the current questions that resonate in the public. Citizens would regularly register that the Ministry of Education is not closed, but it does deduct its steps and decisions. As a public policy actor, the public might be more likely to strengthen the impression that the department is working systematically to meet the public interest of quality education. The Ministry of Education could also regularly organize "Media Breakfast". A meetings with journalists to explain facts, laws and strategies in education in a less formal atmosphere, with the interviews usually take place at the end of the meeting.

The Ministry of Education's strengths can be the work outings of the Minister of Education. The minister can use them more to communicate with the public. Not only in the schools which they visit, but also towards the general public. Newsrooms are currently not receiving a program of ministers on a daily basis. Only invitations to larger or more important events. The Ministry of Education should, however, think that the less the journalists take part in the visit, the less readers and the audience will learn about it. This means that the intervention of such a communication is less than it could be if journalists were given a program by the Minister of Education.

A more effective communication by the Ministry of Education would also contribute to the refinement of the official language in response to journalists. In written statements from the Communications Department, it is often perceptible and visible that the answers come from individual sections. Often they are written in an official language that a normal citizen does not understand correctly. It is important for the journalist to be able to give information briefly, clearly and comprehensively. However, this is not always the case if it is a very expert topic. This can also discourage editorial staff to inform more about educational activities. One of the weaknesses of the internal environment of the Ministry of Education is directly managed organizations. As we have already mentioned, all outcomes must go through scrutiny and consultation with the Ministry of Education. As a result, these organizations are often perceived as unnecessary, and the official and ordinary citizen is hardly in their business. The Ministry of Education should consider whether the PRO should not communicate more effectively, while interacting proactively with journalists on specialist topics.

As we have seen in the SWOT analysis, the risks from the external environment are also affected by communication. The Ministry of Education does not know how to influence them, but the role of its communications department should be to confidently respond to the risks due to its strengths (Butoracova Sindlerova, Ferencova, 2009). If the Ministry of Education knows that the public is not interested in scientific and professional themes, it should make more effort to popularize these themes and bring them to the widest possible group of people. A press release or a brief press conference is not enough in this case.

From the risks we have defined in the SWOT analysis, we are discussing the still decreasing number of pupils. In recent years, it has declined sharply, but the Department of Education has only very limited communication from our point of view. It should explain more to the public what it means to school if it has fewer pupils. What this means for the quality of student learning. Education is an area where there is a lot of interesting analytical data. But they remain hidden from view of the public. Recently, analysts from the Institute of Educational Policy have written several publications. The Ministry of Education has published them on the website, despite not working with the Institute anymore. Their statements should be publicly documented by numbers, data, so that it is understandable to the ordinary citizen. A relevant example would be if the Ministry of Education states that in Slovakia there are many schools and by reference states the fact that in 2014/2015 there were 415 schools with less than 50 pupils, while another school in the neighbouring community is within 5 km. There are several ways to improve the media communication of one of the public policy actors.

There are many factors in the work of the communications department, demonstrated in the SWOT analysis, but in the subchapter as well in more effective communication engagement. Possible solutions to improve the communication of the Ministry of Education have been defined. They are summarized in a clear list below.

- Reflect the power and audience of the media.
- Communicate proactive topics that are of interest to the media.
- Proactively draw attention to new statistics and numbers.
- Proactive communication should be in balance with reactive communication.
- Prevent the scandal of the resort by confronting the problem before the media find it.

- Use crisis communication.
- Regularly organize press conferences with less labor.
- Journalist at the informal meetings to explain the context in education.
- Allow journalists to consult professional topics with heads of individual sections of the Ministry of Education.
- Increasingly and creatively use the profile of the Ministry of Education on the Facebook social network.
- Publish short videos from the work outings of the Minister of Education.
- Publish short video views on the events that move the company.
- Publish the daily program of the Minister of Education.
- Refinement of the official language where it is not necessary.
- Information to target parent and pupil as a key element in education.
- Communicate more strongly support for the reform of education.

Measures should also be taken by direct organizations to change their current media image. At present, when fully responsive in the communication to the Ministry of Education, they appear non-existent. In doing so, they often perform irreplaceable activities in the field of education. Through the SWOT analysis, defined measures and proposals to improve media communication for the PRO have been shown.

- Regularly issue press releases about organizational tasks.
- Publish them on their website at the Ministry of Education.
- Regularly update website data.
- Publish short videos and PRO statements.
- Be more active in communicating with the media through the Communications Department of the Ministry of Education.
- Notify proactive journalists about the performance of the organization.
- Enable journalists to communicate with experts in the organization.
- Create a database of journalists with whom a directly managed organization communicates and sends press releases.
- Clearly explain the principles of national projects and the use of Eurofunds.
- More communicate to the public why we need individual directly managed organizations.
- Verify the communication model that the communications department will issue a PRO statement according to the set rules and refer it to an employee of a directly managed organization that explains the details.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic is a public policy actor which carries out activity in the public interest and through public funds. Therefore, they must inform citizens about their activities, make deductions from the Government Program Statement and explain the educational policy they are promoting. The Department of Communication has developed its own communication system, but contains shortcomings as highlighted in SWOT analysis. It does not use communication effectively. All journalist issues, not just the minister, focus on the communications industry. All outputs must be consulted by the communication department, since directly managed ministry organizations do not have their own authority to express themselves to the media. The very large number of directly managed organizations communicating through the Ministry of

Education and the frequent change in the staffing of the communication department are a brake of the effective communication of the Ministry of Education in relation to the public and the media. These weaknesses should be eliminated as quickly as possible. In doing so, an increase in the efficiency and interference of the Ministry of Education's communication as a public policy actor as well as directly managed organizations may occur. The underlined, summarized, individual proposals could lead to a partial correction of the negative media image of the education sector.

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# **PLANNING METHODS AND THEIR USE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF CIVIL POPULATION**

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## **Abstract**

The main objective of this paper is to analyse and research demands of citizens on social service providing in relation to the age of citizens in a researched community, based on theoretical knowledge acquired from foreign and national literature. Out of 120 respondents addressed, there were 69.16% out of all addressed respondents who took part in the research. Leaders of borough aim to secure and create favourable living conditions for satisfying and secure living for borough residents. Community planning of borough is aimed especially at development of social services and it results in services to be provided in such manner for residents to maintain in their natural environment while their needs are satisfied.

**Key words:** *social services, social care, population*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Social planning can be characterized as a process in which politicians - legislators, government agencies, planners, and often investors - seek to address community problems or improve the conditions in the community to design and implement

policies aimed at delivering results. These policies can take the form of laws, regulations, incentives, media campaigns, programs or services, and information that forms a wide range of social policy implementation options.

The reasons why communities and cities should be involved in social planning are many. The participation of the municipality and the cities in the planning of social services at the national level is a necessary condition. However, the implementation of social services at the level of municipalities requires time, commitment and efforts of the organization and its members to actively cooperate in building a community plan of social services. Members of the community planning team should be trained and mentored to be able to participate in the planning of a community plan that should ensure the synergy of the planning process. They may have skills but must be motivated to do so.

The best motivation for community and community planning members is a reward in the form of a functioning social environment and social services provided. The reasons for engaging the community in social planning are many. Community members can help policymakers understand their lives - difficulties encountered, their needs and social problems that need to be addressed. Participation allows members of the community to help create a policy that really works to meet their needs.

## **1. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Health care was the top priority out of all social care services, with approximately four - fifths of elderly people stating that they required this service [Hu et al. 2015; Huang, Li & Zhao 2014; Tian & Wang 2014; Wang 2013; Zhou, Yan, Zhao, & Qi 2001].

The direction of development of social care for elderly people has been further clarified by the central government since the turn of the 21st century. Until 2015, over 30 policies had been published by relevant government departments with the aim of promoting social care for elderly people [Li, Zhang, Chen 2015]. In addition to healthcare services, the social services supported by the government included township nursing homes, which provided the “Five Guarantees” (guaranteed food, clothing, housing, health care, and funeral costs).

Social service policies have radically changed, along with the reform of the economic system from a planned to a market oriented economy. Influenced by neoliberalism, the government aimed to establish a new welfare system marked by a reduction of its responsibilities via the introduction of markets in place of the state [Hu 2012].

Social cooperation has historically played a pivotal role in developing socio-educational services for people with disability, there by contributing to counteracting the social isolation often associated with this condition. Using a mixed-design methodology, this study maps the diversity of perspectives on how the use of disability-related services run by social cooperatives impacts on and becomes meaningful to family life [Bucci, Vanheule, 2017].

Although the strategy of social welfare socialization conformed to the socioeconomic context, both central and local governments were confused about how to realize this goal. However, over 80% of elderly people prefer living with their family members rather than in nursing institutions, especially when they are disabled or frail and need assistance to maintain daily living [Wang 2013; Wang & Schneider 2000].

The goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects requires the development of an effective social care system for elderly people [Zhu, Walker 2017]. Trust building in process of planning may require a lot of community work – door-to-door agitations, personal conversations, small meetings at resident houses, before community is prepared to incur the risk of social planning [Segal, Brzuzy 1998]. For establishment and planning of social community plan of towns and villages it is necessary to perfectly understand history of the place, social structure of society and to know community members.

Until 2015, over 30 policies had been published by relevant government departments with the aim of promoting social care for older people [Li, Zhang, & Chen 2015]. One important shift was from institutional to home-based care, which is consistent with the global trend since the mid-1990s [Anttonen & Karsio, 2016; Ranci & Pavolini 2013].

Impacts of social planning are often not apparent. Sometimes, a social plan or a social policy that seems positive has in fact a deeply negative impact. In the past, after the Second World War, in the USA there were built apartment blocks, which were supposed to be clean, safe, comfortable residences for citizens with low incomes. Instead, their institutionalised character and isolation from main stream of life outside their communities, estrangement and misery led their inhabitants towards criminal activity and horrific life conditions [Dalton, Maurice, Wandersmann 2007].

According to Kasanova, A. community work and community planning are aimed at a model of community care and simultaneously at cultivation of social network and voluntary work. The main objective is to satisfy community needs [Kasanová 2007].

With reference to Matouška, O. community planning might be defined as follows: Community planning represents a process, which is aimed at mapping local needs for social work and comparing them with local resources [Matoušek 2007]. In general, this is a method of planning with immediate participation of public, where community can be considered as those affected by a given area, or those who will utilize services of a given area.

„For the needs of community planning of social services a community is represented by borough or a micro region and community planning is a mean of seeking help for certain social groups of this borough, which may require this help“ [Artimová 2008].

A community plan ensures a cooperation of public in preparations and implementation of the process. Hence, citizens have a possibility of involvement, participation of borough or town happenings. “They have an option to point out problematics of social services – their quality, accessibility. The process of a community plan creation allows its participants to feel involved and deepen their relationship towards a community. Together they seek possible solutions, resources and hence increase their effectivity“ [Vereš 2013].

This article is unique because similar studies abroad are not reported only in Slovakia within individual regions in the form of a community plan, which is not published.

## **2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

The main objective of this paper is to analyse and research demands of citizens on social service providing in relation to the age of citizens in the researched



community, based on theoretical knowledge acquired from foreign and national literature. Consequently, by means of community planning to plan social services, to satisfy needs of individual community groups and also to be in accordance with local specifications.

For achieving the main goal is conditional upon setting and fulfilling the following sub-objectives:

- based on the comparison of the definitions of social planning published in recent years in foreign and Slovak literature theoretically define the concept of social planning,
- to analyze and to define concepts related to social planning issues and describe their relationship with community planning of social services,
- to identify basic questions of the survey questionnaire that help analyze questions and then synthesize the respondents' answers to the survey questionnaire,
- to determine of hypotheses and subsequent verification of dependence on the studied variables,
- to establish interdependence between the surveyed variables mentioned in the questionnaire,
- to set the basic objectives and priorities of individual target groups,
- to design possible solutions for the social area of community planning.

Respondents of the research were mainly represented by a sample of citizens in retirement age and citizens in a mid-age group from 30-50 years. We found out, that it was possible to obtain a sufficiently structured research set representing borough citizens.

The research set has collected responds of different groups of citizens and different environments. The set is sufficiently diverse based on a type and composition or size of a household, according to the highest education or age of household members, as well as socio-economic situation of household. Therefore it can be assumed that it captures experience, needs and attitude of borough citizens with different living situation.

A questionnaire was selected as a tool of research. The questionnaire consists of 14 questions regarding social services provided in a borough.

Methods and methodology of the research were defined based on the connectivity with the main objective of the research. In the research of background material findings especially following methods were used:

- Analysis in processing of theoretical knowledge and questionnaire processing,
- Synthesis method in conclusion making for individual chapters and analysed events,
- Comparison method in processing of community plan emerging from comparison with original setting of borough,
- Observation method in searching visual elements in surroundings,
- Induction and deduction method in forming proposed solutions of current condition for community plan.

In the research result processing there were used also special methods – mathematic-statistical. In the final phase there was applied a combination of the mentioned methods, apart from the listed methods, with the purpose to achieve higher quality research outputs and acquire the most relevant information.

The object of the research is the separation of social services provided in the municipality over 5000 inhabitants in Slovakia. By applying a method of community planning we analysed the current condition of social services and consequently based on proposals collected from different methods we determined a direction of social services with an aim to increase life quality for people in the borough. We realised quantitative research.

### **3. EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS**

Out of 120 addressed respondents, 100 took part in a research. There were 83 questionnaires, which represents 69.16% out of the whole of addressed respondents. The research was realized on grounds of combination of random respondent selection.

Respondent accosting came through via random, direct respondent addressing, residing in a village. In order to secure a high validity of the questionnaire research, the questionnaire was completed together with respondents with a detailed description of a question.

In the questionnaire we asked respondents about which social facilities and social services would you be interested in in the community to increase social empathy from the point of view of the municipality. In determining our hypotheses, we were dependent on the decision of the respondent about the need for a social facility that is interested in its age.

In collecting questionnaires we applied an observation method in personal meetings with citizens, respondents of a questionnaire survey.

Another method applied in collecting questionnaires was a special method – directed interview method, which was applied when collecting information and knowledge required for research realisation. Questionnaire collection was realized via direct contact with respondent, who was provided a questionnaire content description in the filling out process.

For statistical verification purposes of dependencies of two variables we defined the following hypothesis:

H: Requirements for social service providing differ with growing age of respondents:

Within the partial part of the research we asked questionnaire respondents about their age with the aim to determine the age impact on social services in the borough. As we found out the age of addressed respondents is highly dependent on the kind of social services required. Their responses were closely connected with the phase of life they were currently at. 83 respondents took part in the research, represented by 53 women and 30 men. The number of women exceeded the number of men by 28%.

The age structure of respondents was following:

- up to 18 years – 0%
- from 18 to 24 years – 52%
- from 25 to 49 years – 39%
- over 75 years - 9%.

A respondent sample in relation to family condition represented 51% of married respondents, 13% respondents were single, 28% were divorced and 8% were represented by widows. Based on the respondent structure in relation to their

family condition there were also findings regarding required social services for family support.

Respondents participating in the research expressed their opinion that in share of 95% it would be necessary to provide social services in facilities of temporary custody for children. Remaining 5% in share of 3 % expressed the need to provide social services in day care centres for children and families and 2% of respondents addressed the need to implement help in personal care for children and support coordination of family life and working life. Within the statistical analysis to evaluate the empirical data was used Chi – quadrant test.

H: Requirements for social service providing differ with growing age of respondents.

**Table 1. Calculation of dependence of two variables**

	25-49 years	50-75 years	75 + years	Sum
Social service providing in day care centre for children and families	2	8	1	11
Assistance in personal care for child and support for coordination of family and working life	4	12	3	19
Social services providing in facilities of temporary custody for children	37	12	4	53
Sum	43	32	8	83

Source: own process of calculation

Calculation of chi-quadrant: 
$$\chi^2 = \sum_i \sum_j \frac{(O_{ij} - E_{ij})^2}{E_{ij}}$$

*Chi -quadrant* = 19.971

*Calculation for degree of freedom:*  $df=(s-1)*(r-1)$

$Df=(3-1)*(3-1)$

$Df= 4$

$P=0.00050603$

Hypothesis was confirmed, because P is smaller than 0,05.

#### **4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

*The main objective is to secure favourable living conditions for families with children and youth, peaceful life with help of provided social services, facilitating life for citizens in a borough.* Discovering research results we can conclude that corrective measures for the determined target group were following:

1. Providing a sufficient capacity of kindergartens and nurseries

Currently, a kindergarten capacity does not cover the demand for this service. The objective is to build and broaden the existing capacity of kindergarten with the aim to cover a demand and hence allow parents to return to their workplaces. There

would also be a big advantage in building nurseries for children younger than 3 years.

2. Support of non-formal and formal citizen activities oriented at helping families with children.

Organizing charitable activities and actions to support families in need is one of the possibilities how to offer a helping hand to citizens and young families in the form of clothes and toys collections for families in need.

3. Support of free time activities for children and youth

These activities assist prevention of harmful socio-pathologic events especially at young people, unemployed, or other target groups. The aim is to continue, or broaden realisation of cultural, sociable and sport activities, with already existing tradition in a village such as winter carnival, May pole building, village days – bonfire, festival, St. Nicolaus day and many others. The main target of these measurements is to fulfil a role of an effective prevention of a social isolation of a target group.

4. Initiate facilities of supported living

Nowadays, one of the major issues of young families is a possibility to become independent and create home for their own family. One possibility would be participation in projects for construction of social apartment buildings for young families with children. The village has already organised a construction of flats for the mentioned target group which was met with a very positive feedback and high demand.

5. Establishing club organisations for families with children and youth

In order to exchange experience and socialise young mothers and parents, it is positive to establish a club for baby and mothers. On monthly bases, there are regular meetings with paediatricians, counsellors and specialists from different areas, who answer questions of young parents regarding nutrition and child upbringing.

6. Providing financial contribution to secure lunches for children from families applying for social contributions.

Management of the municipality devotes financial means to contribute to children attending primary schools or kindergartens in amount of 0.7 cents/per child as an aid for families in financial need.

7. Establishing playgrounds, multifunctional sport grounds and stadiums

In modern world full of technological conveniences it is positive to set up playgrounds and spaces for physical activities for children and youth with the aim to socialise and fulfil free time of kids. The establishment of chess clubs, tennis clubs, ping-pong clubs are also a possibility how to engage children while securing at least some physical activity.

8. Organising annual children events, such as St. Nicolaus day, Winter carnival, Children´s day, ...

Organising children´s events belongs to the best solutions of cultural living of young people. The events allow them to be culturally involved in the society, young ones

can meet to exchange experience. There is a space created for children to make friendships, make memories and to know traditions better and it has a positive mental impact on the social development of children.

#### 9. Establishing a free time centre for children and youth

A free time centre is an establishment with great demand from parents of school attending children. Especially in situations such as a teacher strike or during summer holidays when parents do not have an opportunity to leave their child with relatives. One of possible options would be organising summer camps for children from the village till a certain age level.

#### 10. Securing a work assistant for children with health disability at a kindergarten.

The village has an opportunity to apply for a contribution for a work assistant for citizens with health disability. The village utilises this opportunity for the kindergarten, where a young assistant helps a child with disability to socialise. From the point of the mental and physical development of a child it is a very favourable solution. In the future the management of the municipality plans to apply for the mentioned contribution in the form of social service support for families in need.

### **CONCLUSION**

The management of the municipality intends to secure and create favourable living conditions for comfortable and secure living of their citizens. The community planning of the village is aimed especially at the development of community social services and thus the services are provided in such manner that the citizens remain in their natural environment while their needs are satisfied.

Within the preparations of the community plan for the borough we divided target groups into two parts. The first group is represented by seniors and citizens with health disability and the second group is represented by families with children. These two target groups cover the entire composition of the borough with no regards of nationality, age, racial integrity or gender.

A community plan of social services is created for all citizens of a borough with no regards of above listed groups, e.g. age, gender, racial integrity or nationality.

The presented empirical research was the main base for determination of basic target groups to provide social services to. The respondents' answers were an impulse for the borough leaders and management in setting strategic objectives. The aim of the community planning is to map, analyse requests of citizens and collect data assisting in social planning and following implementation of activities with an intention to make activities more effective. Ground pillars of successful functioning of any borough are functional health services, offered social services, borough facilities, technical infrastructure and effective utilisation and maintaining tradition and history. Maintaining of the stated pillars results in citizen's satisfaction, which is a main intention of every village. The support of young families and youth belongs to strategic goals as well, considering that a beneficial village must on attracting young people in order to secure minimal emigration and a dynamic growth of the village. Last but not least we must highlight the importance to maintain the composition of citizens. Minimisation of inadaptible citizens and maximisation of citizens contributing to the village development. Rating and image of a village have a strong impact on the composition of citizens. A growing number

of inadaptable citizens decreases an image of the village, demand for estate and number of newly moved citizens.

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# IS THERE A NEED FOR LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CREATION REGARDING TOURISM IMPACTS?

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## **Abstract**

The main purpose of this paper is to determine the local residents' attitude differences and to segment them into diverse groups regarding their consciousness of environmental tourism impacts in order to define the need for creation of local environmental policy. The empirical research was conducted in the period from May 1st 2015 to May 1st 2016 on a convenient sample of 1, 339 local residents living in the City of Dubrovnik (The Republic of Croatia). Cluster analysis and ANOVA were used for data analysis. The findings indicate the existence of three different segments based on local residents' attitudes toward environmental tourism impacts. Also, education as a socio-demographic variable, together with spatial and temporal ones has been found statistically significant. Outcomes of this paper show the general absence of environmental consciousness which implies the necessity for environmental policy creation through the process of increasing local residents' level of awareness toward environmental tourism



impacts. Local residents and their passive and active involvement in environmental policy making are an important factor of quality and sustainable tourism development.

**Key words:** *local residents, segmentation, cluster analysis, environmental policy*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Due to the fact that negative impacts of tourism development are intensifying, tourism policy must be, in its concepts, plans and strategies, focused on sustainable tourism development principles. Mass, uncontrolled and unplanned tourism development has caused degradation of natural resources. As natural resources and environment are mostly primary attractors to tourism destination, monitoring and researching tourism impacts are essential and crucial. Local residents' attitudes towards environmental tourism impacts and their consciousness of environmental degradation are important inputs for sustainable tourism development and for creation of adequate environmental policy. "The attitude of host community should be monitored on a frequent basis and incorporated into tourism policies" [Jackson, 2008: 253]. So, it can be seen that local residents' attitudes towards tourism impacts are essential for the successful tourism and also environmental policy in their community. The importance of local residents' attitudes is even more important in the area of environmental tourism impacts.

According to Zhong, Deng, Song, and Ding (2011) tourism, besides positive impacts, also causes negative impacts on the biophysical environment (water pollution, air pollution, ecosystem degradation) and social/cultural environment (i.e. loss of the traditional culture). Environmental consequences caused by rapid tourism growth can no longer be ignored [Gössling, Hansson, Hörstmeier, & Saggel 2002]. In this paper environment covers biophysical environment, namely water pollution, air pollution, raise of waste and uncontrolled use of ecosystem and its degradation. Tourism impacts have been extensively examined in developed and developing countries and have also become the main research topic among Croatian researches in tourism field in the last ten years [Marušić, Horak, & Tomljenović, 2008; Logar 2010; Carić 2011; Pranić, Petrić, & Cetinić 2012; Pavlič, Portolan, & Puh 2017].

The main goal of this paper is, by analysing local residents' attitudes of tourism impacts on natural resources and environment, to define different segments of residents considering their socio-demographics, spatial and temporal characteristics as well their support for current or sustainable tourism development. By defining consistent segments, a basis for modifying local residents' attitudes towards tourism environmental impacts will be established which the foundation for creating environmental policy is. Since, in the Republic of Croatia there are no papers researching environmental tourism impacts from local community perspective by applying cluster analysis, this paper will try to fill in that gap.

## **1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

### **1.1. Environmental tourism impacts**

Tourism development does not occur in isolation; it occurs within specific environment and community. Among those specificities, residents' support is a key factor in sustainable tourism development [Almeida, Peláez, Balbuena, & Cortés 2016]. Residents' attitudes toward tourism impacts have been a topic of research for more than 40 years, so analysing all the studies in their entirety would be a difficult task if not impossible [Sharpley 2014]. In the beginning, due to the economic dimension of tourism, only positive impacts of tourism development have been pointed out and later the attention was drawn on exploring local residents' attitudes on various impacts of tourism [Pavlič, Portolan, & Puh 2017]. The results of studies have indicated that tourism influences local residents through three parts, namely, environmental, economic and socio-cultural [Gursoy, Jurowski, & Uysal 2002]. Most studies have identified these impacts in two possible aspects, positive and negative [Almeida, Balbuena, & Cortés 2015].

Researching environmental tourism impacts is very important due to the fact that tourism is often developed in attractive but sensitive environment and can cause significant environmental damage [Andereck, Valentine, Knopf, & Vogt 2005]. Also, local residents prefer to support tourism development putting its advantages ahead of natural resources and environmental damage [Almeida et al. 2015], and local development policy becomes focused on meeting the needs of travellers often without regards for the environment [Andereck et al. 2005]. According to exchange theory numerous scientists have concluded that those residents who benefit from tourism perceive less environmental impacts from tourism [Perdue, Long & Allen 1987; Lankford & Howard 1994; McGegee & Andereck 2004]. But the question has to be raised "do environmental costs of tourism development outweigh economic benefits?" The identification of environmental tourism impacts, both positive and negative, is essential but it has to be emphasized that negative consequences have to be minimized and eliminated. If local residents support mass, uncontrolled and unsustainable tourism development underlining only positive tourism impacts, harmful consequences could arise, especially on natural resources and environment that are key contributors and main attractors to tourist destination.

Different potential environmental consequences have been summarized, namely air pollution (emissions from vehicles and airplanes), water pollution [waste water discharge), wildlife destruction (results of hunting, trapping, fishing, disruption of natural habitat), plant destruction and deforestation, forest fires, trampling of vegetation, destruction of wet lands, soil and beaches, and what is also very important, environmental consequences that disturb humans (large buildings that disturb views, noise pollution from planes, cars and tourists, vandalism, graffiti) [Liu, Sheldon, & Var 1987; Andereck et al. 2005]. At the same time, only few positive environmental impacts of tourism have been identified, namely preservation, protection and recovery of natural resources and environment and environmental consciousness [Liu et al. 1987; Jurowski & Gursoy 2004; Andereck et al. 2005; Bagri & Kala 2016]. It can be concluded that there are more negative tourism environmental impacts than positive ones.

By suggesting how to minimize negative environmental consequences outcome from tourism development, Cook (1982) recommended that tourism planning in total should be based on the goals and priorities of residents and that local attractions need to be promoted only when endorsed by residents. Considering her opinion


local residents attitudes towards tourism development and environmental tourism impacts need to be priority in planning sustainable and long term tourism development. In 1986 Liu and Var have researched resident attitudes toward tourism impacts in Hawaii and have concluded that respondents strongly agree that tourism provides many economic and cultural benefits but are ambivalent about environmental ones. Amuquandoh (2010) had similar conclusions. Based on his research he concluded that residents perceived both positive and negative environmental impacts of tourism, but were more inclined to the positive side. Despite the existence of numerous negative environmental tourism impacts there is lack of local residents' awareness towards the consequences of tourism development on natural resources and environment.

### 1.2. Local residents' segmentation

Market segmentation is one of the most important and used strategies in marketing. Its main role is to identify homogeneous groups of consumers with similarities in an effort to satisfy their needs and increase marketing effectiveness [Tsiotsou 2006]. The best and most used tools for local residents' segmentation based on their attitudes towards tourism impacts is cluster analyses. This approach is used because residents' attitudes consist of both positive and negative attitudes about economic, socio-cultural and environmental tourism impacts. The non-homogeneity of attitudes within residents suggests that representations are shared by various societal groups as a result of the consensus of community perceptions. Segmentation of residents based on the attitudes have resulted in findings that any host community is not homogenous but comprises a number of groupings of like-minded individuals [Andriotis & Vaughan 2003].

Table 1 presents review of researches that have used cluster analysis as a tool for local residents' segmentation based on their attitudes of tourism impacts. There are number of segments according to the degree of positivity in local residents' attitudes, ranking from lovers to haters.

**Table 1. Researches of local residents' attitudes applying cluster analysis**

Authors	Number and names of clusters
Davis et al. (1988)	Haters, In-Betweeners, Cautious Romantics, Love them for a Reason, Lovers
Evans (1993)	Haters, Controlled, Selfish, Lovers
Ryan & Montgomery (1994)	Somewhat Irritated, Middle of the Roaders, Enthusiast
Madrigal (1995)	Haters, Realistics, Lovers
Ryan et al. (1998)	Cautious Supporters, Moderate Enthusiastics, Extreme Enthusiastics
Fredline & Faulkner (2000)	Haters, Concerned for a Reason, Realistics, Ambivalent Supporters, Lovers
Weaver & Lawton (2001)	Opponents, Neutrals, Supporters
Williams and Lawson (2001)	Cynics, Innocents, Taxpayers, Lovers
Andriotis & Vaughan (2003)	Economic Skeptics, Socially and Environmentally Concerned, Advocates
Perez & Nadal (2005)	Development Supporters, Prudent Developers, Ambivalent and Cautions, Protectionists
Barquet, Brida & Osti (2010)	Ambivalent, Protectionists, Development Supporters, Environmental Supporters
Vareiro et al. (2013)	Skeptics, Moderately Optimistics, Enthusiasts
Degree of positivity	High (+)  Low (-)

Source: Author's research

In order to define a profile of each segment scholars have used different variables. Faulkner and Tideswell (1997) have identified two groups of those variables, namely extrinsic and intrinsic variables. According to their opinion extrinsic variables are related to the location characteristics with respect to its role as a tourist destination, and intrinsic variables to characteristics of members of the host community. The major extrinsic variables, linked with local residents' attitudes found in the literature, are degree or stage of the host destination's tourism development, type of tourists/travellers' and seasonality. Intrinsic variables are the living distance from the centre of tourist activities, length of residence, economic and/or employment dependency of tourism and socio-demographic characteristics. Variables used in this paper to define a profile of each segment of local residents are namely socio-demographic (gender, age, education, occupation personal monthly income) as intrinsic one, temporal (length of residence as intrinsic and period of research as extrinsic variable) and spatial (distance from the centre of tourist activities) as intrinsic variables, support for current or sustainable tourism development.

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

### **2.1. Area of research**

Dubrovnik-Neretva County is the southernmost county of the Republic of Croatia. Territorially it is organized into 22 units of local government and self-government (17 municipalities and five cities). The research area of this paper is the city of Dubrovnik that has a corporate status as well as local government, and covers 17 settlements. It is situated on the Croatian southern coast of the Adriatic Sea, is the centre of Dubrovnik-Neretva County and has 42,615 inhabitants (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

Tourism is a priority in Dubrovnik's economy. It is estimated that tourism provides approximately four-fifths of Dubrovnik's gross domestic product, jobs and government revenues. In 2017 the number of tourists and visitors from cruise ships exceeded 1.9 million that results with about 1:45 resident-traveller ratio (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2018; Port of Dubrovnik, 2018). The number of excursionists visiting Dubrovnik is not included due to the data inexistence but it should be emphasized that this number would increase a total number of travellers and the resident-traveller ratio. The city of Dubrovnik has been chosen for this research because it is a mature seaside destination with unsustainable, uncontrolled and unplanned tourism development. In 2017, it has generated more than 8% of total tourists' arrivals and 4.85% of total tourists' overnights in the Republic of Croatia, and it was on the first place in the whole country in tourists' overnights and in tourists' arrivals (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Despite the great tourism results it should be questioned whether natural resources and environment are capable, in the years coming, to handle and carry out that pressure of tourism development without consequences.

### **2.2. Sampling and questionnaire design**

The empirical research was conducted in the period from May 1st 2015 to May 1st 2016 on a convenient sample of local residents living in the City of Dubrovnik (The Republic of Croatia). Of the initial sample, 1,339 questionnaires were correctly

fulfilled. This research is a part of a broader research of local residents' attitudes towards tourism impacts in the city of Dubrovnik, so only one part of the questionnaire (focused on the environmental impacts of tourism) was used for the purpose of this particular analysis. Data were collected through a questionnaire consisting of structured questions based on the literature review and previous research in the field [Liu & Var 1986; Perdue, Long, & Allen 1987; Kuvan & Akan 2005; Gursoy et al. 2002; Bujosa & Roselló 2007; Amuquandoh 2009]. The questionnaire included statements of environmental tourism impacts on which respondents had to express their level of agreement using a five-point Likert scale (1=totally disagree, 5=totally agree). The second part included statements about support for current or sustainable tourism development also on a 5 point Likert scale. The last part of the questionnaire included questions about socio-demographic such as gender, age, level of education, occupation and personal monthly income level together with spatial information – living distance from the main tourism activities and temporal ones – the length of residence and the period of research.

### **2.3. Analytical procedure**

For the main aim of the research, statistical procedures were applied using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, version 23.0). In order to segment local residents according to their environmental awareness cluster analysis was used. It is a technique of segmentation that minimizes the distance between members of each cluster but maximizes the distance between the cluster centres' [Weaver and Lawton, 2001: 445]. This method offers explicit evidence that the respondents and their opinions are not homogeneous [Aguiló & Rosello, 2005: 931]. In K-means cluster analysis, the number of clusters is chosen by the researcher. K-means cluster analysis has been used in accordance with previous researches [Andriotis & Vaughan 2003; Aguiló & Rosello 2005; Inbakaran & Jackson 2006; Barquet, Brida & Osti 2010; Vareiro, Remoaldo & Cadima Ribeiro 2013]. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO) of sampling adequacy was used to test the validity of the data. Besides, Cronbach's alpha coefficient was applied to test the reliability of the scale. In the beginning, univariate statistics were calculated for questionnaire items. Then, in order to divide residents into segments, K-means cluster analysis was carried out where two, three and four segments solutions were obtained. Three segments solution was chosen because it described data variability the best. In the end, once clusters were identified, key socio-demographic characteristics and items that describe their support toward different ways of further tourism development were examined using ANOVA and t-test.

## **3. RESULTS**

Table 2 presents the local residents' socio-demographic profile. Female share in the sample was 57.1% and 42.9% were male. The age groups were represented as follows: 51.7% from 18-34, 25.7% from 35-49, 18.0% from 50-64, 4.6% from 65 years old. Therefore, 77.3% were young and middle-aged people (18 to 50 years old). The education structure showed that more than 47% of respondents are undergraduate and graduate residents followed by those who finished high school (38.7%). The smallest group of local residents are those with only

elementary school. 27.1% of residents are students, while 22.6% work in the private sector. One fifth of the local residents work in the public sector. The majority of the respondents, 80.9%, had monthly incomes under 6,001 HRK.

**Table 2. Respondents' profiles**

Demographic characteristics	Frequency	Percentage [%]
Age		
18-34	691	51.7
35-49	344	25.7
50-64	241	18.0
65 and over	63	4.6
Gender		
Male	764	42.9
Female	575	57.1
Education		
Elementary school	47	3.5
Secondary school	518	38.7
Undergraduate and graduate	635	47.4
Postgraduate	139	10.4
Occupation		
Public sector	277	20.7
Private sector	303	22.6
Private businessman	106	7.9
Housekeeper	64	4.8
Student	363	27.1
Retired	87	6.5
Unemployed	124	9.3
Other	15	1.1
Monthly income in HRK*		
under 3.000	540	40.4
3.001-4.000	215	16.0
4.001-6.000	327	24.5
6.001-8.000	168	12.6
8.001-10.000	58	4.3
10.001-	31	2.2

\*1 HRK = 0.13 €

Source: Authors' research

Table 3 shows the results in the relation to the responses to 5 attitudinal statements associated with the level of agreement of local residents towards environmental tourism impacts. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.820, indicating that the number of variables and the sample size was appropriate. The value of Cronbach's alpha coefficient was 0.817 suggesting satisfactory internal consistency and reliability of the scale.

**Table 3. Overall responses of local residents' environmental awareness [in %]**

	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std. Deviation
Tourism affects sea pollution	33.4	36	22.3	6.6	1.7	3.37	1.003
Tourism affects air pollution	27	34.4	25.9	9.4	3.3.	3.93	.985
Tourism increases waste production	37	39.1	17.8	4.6	1.5	3.72	1.061
Tourism destroys local ecosystem	22.5	34.1	30.6	10.2	2.7	4.05	.930
Tourism causes the uncontrolled use of resources	11.7	36.2	33.6	14.3	4.3	3.63	1.023

Source: Authors' research

According to Table 4 and Graph 1, it can be concluded that three different segments (clusters) of local residents were isolated.


**Table 4. Mean scores of clusters according to the local residents' level of agreement and ANOVA**

Statements	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	F ratio*	p
Tourism affects sea pollution	4.63	3.73	2.55	724.952	.000
Tourism affects air pollution	4.60	3.40	2.21	1114.631	.000
Tourism increases waste production	4.68	3.87	2.86	537.038	.000
Tourism destroys local ecosystem	4.41	3.39	2.22	802.258	.000
Tourism causes the uncontrolled use of resources	3.88	3.20	2.43	219.011	.000

Source: Authors' research

As it can be seen, local residents express different attitudes regarding environmental tourism impacts (Graph 1). On the one hand, Cluster 1 includes local residents who have higher scores on statements regarding environmental tourism impacts. On the other hand, local residents belonging to Cluster 3 have opposite opinions compared with those in Cluster 1, whilst residents being part of Cluster 2 seem to be rather indifferent.

**Graph 1. Plot of means for each cluster**



Source: Authors' research

**Table 5. ANOVA and t-test results for individual variables by segments**

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	p
Age	1.77	1.75	1.75	.766
Gender	1.42	1.42	1.48	.373
<b>Education</b>	3.69	2.64	2.27	<b>.001</b>
Occupation	4.17	3.91	4.12	.311
Personal monthly income	2.30	2.30	2.38	.564
<b>Living distance from the main tourism activities</b>	3.27	2.58	2.32	<b>.049</b>
<b>Length of residence</b>	2.68	1.35	1.72	<b>.082*</b>
Period of research	2.60	2.70	2.72	.222
<b>Support for current tourism development</b>	2.23	2.88	3.09	<b>.002</b>
<b>Support for sustainable tourism development</b>	3.71	3.26	2.16	<b>.000</b>

\*p<0.1

Source: Authors' research

As it can be observed from Table 5, variables age, gender, occupation, personal monthly income and period of research are not statistically significant. Thus, they will be excluded from further analysis. Three isolated segments are named as follows: Environmental carers, Environmental indifferent and Environmental unconcerned (Graph 2).


Cluster one is called “*Guardians*” and includes 198 local residents or 15% of respondents. These residents have high scores on the statements regarding the environmental impacts of tourism which means that they agree that tourism has negative environmental impacts on tourism destination. So, they totally agree that tourism affects sea and air pollution and that it increases waste production, destroys the local ecosystem and causes the uncontrolled use of resources. 60% of them have a high level of education (undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate level), have longer length of residence in Dubrovnik (more than 30 years – 37.2%), live in the Old town of Dubrovnik or near it (59.9%) and disagree with a current tourism development (42.9%). They totally agree that tourism should be sustainably developed (62.8%).

“*Nonchalants*” is the name of the second cluster. This cluster includes 44% local residents (587 local inhabitants). These residents have middle scores on statements meaning that they are indifferent regarding environmental tourism impacts. They are mostly undergraduate and graduate educated residents (50.08%), live between 11 and 20 years in Dubrovnik (32.4%), mostly live within 3 km from the Old Town (43.6%), are indifferent regarding current (41.9%) and sustainable tourism development (36.7%).

Cluster three is given the label “*Blinds*”. It includes 41% of respondents. These residents have low scores on given statements meaning they do not agree that tourism impacts on destination environment. They are lower educated residents (high school – 47.5%), live mostly from 1 to 20 years or more than 30 years in the Dubrovnik area but far away from the centre of tourism activities (more than 3 km from the centre of Dubrovnik) – 44.9%. They support current tourism development (73.3%), but just 36% of them support sustainable tourism development.



**Graph 2. Empirical model**



\*TD=Tourism development

Source: Authors’ research

## CONCLUSION

Tourism destination attractiveness is highly dependent on natural resources. Due to uncontrolled, unsustainable tourism development, these resources are becoming more endangered which raises the question of monitoring and researching tourism impacts imposed on them. The main purpose of this paper was, by analysing local residents’ attitudes of tourism impacts on natural resources and environment, to define different segments of residents considering their socio-demographics, spatial and temporal characteristics as well their support for current or sustainable tourism development which can serve as a foundation for environmental policy making.

The findings show the existence of three different segments, namely, “Guardians”, “Nonchalants” and “Blinds” therefore several points have to be outlined. First, the research has stressed the heterogeneity of local residents based on their attitudes towards environmental tourism impacts. Second, the paper developed a local residents’ typology taking into account their socio-demographics (level of education), living distance from the main tourism activities, length of residence, support for current or sustainable tourism development. Segment of local residents who are aware of negative environmental impacts and do not support current tourism development but sustainable tourism development (“Guardians”) are minority (15%). That indicates that 85% of local residents are unaware or indifferent regarding negative tourism impacts on natural resources (“Nonchalants”-44% and “Blinds”-41%).

In the light of this, the outcomes indicate the absence of local environmental policy. Modification of local residents' attitudes towards tourism environmental impacts in order to save and protect natural resources and to maintain the level of destination attractiveness will be realised through the creation of an adequate local environmental policy. The findings provide the basis for local authorities to take into account current situation and to take adequate actions such as environmental education for "Nonchalants" and "Blinds" (85% of respondents) to achieve long-term sustainable tourism development. Also, the cluster of "Guardians" should not be ignored. They have to be further motivated and encouraged to participate passively and actively in the process of environmental policy creation.

However, the findings should be considered in the light of their limitations. The main limitation of this paper is the fact that this study was a part of a broader research so questions about sustainability in tourism and environmental tourism impacts were limited. Further, due to the use of convenience sampling results are not generalizable and should be taken as indicative ones. Future researches should pay more attention to broad the number of statements regarding environmental impacts of tourism and also try to use some of the probability sampling techniques in order to be able to generalize obtained results.

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## ESSAY

# NOTES TO THE WORK OF JÁN ČAPLOVIČ: „SLOWAKEN IN UNGARN“

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### Abstract

Ján Čaplovič belongs to the most prominent European intellectuals, polyhistorians and encyclopaedists of the first half of the 19th century. The focus of his scientific and publishing activities consisted mainly of legal, national, national-economic and ethnographic works in which he drew from the wealth of ideas of enlightenment, rationalism, physiocracy and Josephinism. His theoretical works, mainly on ethnographic research, are based mainly on numerous field studies and journeys throughout the Habsburg Empire. Thanks to them he perfectly understood the Slovak nation, and influenced by the French enlightener Montesquieu, he characterized the Slovaks as a separate nation. He compared them to the English, in the conditions of then multi-ethnic Hungarian state. This Čaplovič's ethnographic parallel is the main subject of the submitted study notes, because it attracted attention at the time of its creation. From a methodological point of view, the notes are based on an analysis of a historical text and a comparative principle.

**Key words:** *Ján Čaplovič, national awakening, ethnography, Slovaks, English*

### 1. FAMILY OF ČAPLOVIČ AND JÁN ČAPLOVIČ

Ján Čaplovič (1780-1847), an intellectual of enlightenment and national awakener, was amongst the most educated personalities, from the large family <sup>1</sup>. His

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<sup>1</sup> In 2003, the National Biographical Institute of the Slovak National Library in Martin and Oravské múzeum P. O. Hviezdoslava in Dolný Kubín organized a seminar called Čaplovičs' in Slovak Culture, from which the genealogical, biographical, library and cultural-historical contributions were published in the Biographical Studies (2004), XXX, reg.

significance is proven by the fact from the recent past, when on the occasion of his 200 birth anniversary in 1980, UNESCO included him in the calendar of significant intellectuals. In this calendar people of world history and science are represented, and rarely there are also Slovak personalities there.

## **2. LIFE AND WORK OF JÁN ČAPLOVIČ**

Čaplovič's life destiny and his scientific and publication activities are well known, mainly thanks to the monography of Vendelín Jankovič: *Ján Čaplovič – Life, Personality, Works* (1945). From this and other publications it is clear that Čaplovič was author of over thirty monographs. He also wrote about four hundred professional and popular articles, published in about thirty Austrian, Hungarian, German, Czech and Slovak periodicals [Rizner 1929: 254-257]. This incomparable, quantitative fact made Čaplovič one of the most active professional writer and publicist in the first half of the 19th century in Slovak, Slavic, Austrian and Hungarian – Central European and even European relations and context. In this regard Viera Urbancová stated: *„More than 450 bibliographic units, represent this part of his life, and his whole work is remarkable synthesis and reflection of the then economic, political and cultural direction.“* [Urbancová 1975: 237]. Equally exceptional was Čaplovič's thematic focus, on whose mark Vendelín Jankovič commented: *„Indeed, his publishing activity covered almost the whole area of human culture and art. His works in fields of law and economy were related to his employment as a custodian of properties located in Schönborn. But Čaplovič's interest in books, magazines, literature and art, especially in music and theater etc., was much more important and remarkable. All Čaplovič's publishing activity was, in the true sense, a reaction to a given political, economic and cultural situation“* [Jankovič 1945: 22–23].

Čaplovič's biography, as well as his scientific, publicist and, last but not least, national awakening activities, are well-defined to Slovak professional culture from a number of entries, in a number of encyclopaedic dictionaries, from several studies of reputable historians and editors of resources in scientific proceedings and professional journals, from several references,<sup>2</sup> and entire articles in various academic and other syntheses, from Jankovič's constructive monograph, but also from a number of popular – educational journals and newspaper articles and contributors. Because Čaplovič published most of his work in German, less in Hungarian and Latin, and only sporadically in Slovak or Czech, scientifically commented re-editions of his work in contemporary Slovak language also has an extraordinary value for contemporaries. In this context, we must mention Čaplovič's anthology or a selection of his works *„About Slovakia and Slovaks“* (1975), which was compiled by Viera Urbancová and supplemented by the study: *„Ján Čaplovič in Slovak culture and national awakening“*.

## **3. ČAPLOVIČ'S PARALLELS IN THE WORK “SLOWAKEN IN UNGARN”**

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<sup>2</sup> Čaplovič, Ján... in *Encyklopédia slovenských spisovateľov I* (1984), p. 97, Obzor, Bratislava. Čaplovič, Ján..., in *Encyclopaedia Beliana III* (2003), p. 28, Encyklopedický ústav Slovenskej akadémie vied, Bratislava. Čaplovič, Ján..., in *Biografický lexikón Slovenska II* (2004), p. 101–102, Slovenská národná knižnica, Martin.

Based on these two main literary sources (Jankovič, Urbancová), we would like to approach, comment and update one of his most remarkable works, namely the monograph: „Slowaken in Ungarn“ (Slovaks in Hungary). Already Čaplovič contemporaries, his supporters and critics agreed that for this intellectual Hungary was like a small Europe, which was summed up in the memorable sentence – „Ungarn ist Europa im Kleinem!“ From our point of view, the most interesting fact is that when Čaplovič compared Hungary to Europe, he considered and presented the Slovaks as the most prosperous nation - in the position of Hungarian English. Čaplovič devoted to proving this premise for over thirty years, practically from the end of Napoleonic wars in 1815, until his death in 1847, interpreting this issue in the works: „Slowaken in Ungarn (1818-1820), „Ungarn ist Europa im Kleinen“ (1825) and „England and Ungarn. Eine Parallele“ (1842, second edition 1846). Although Urbancová gave the Čaplovič's work: Slovaks in Ungarn<sup>3</sup> a subtitle: „Semi-joke and Semi-serious arguments that the Slovaks are Hungarian English“ . Let the readers of these lines to make their own picture and decide what is semi-joke and what is semi-serious:

1. Englishmen are experienced ships' boys and sailors – Slovaks are experienced rafters, Čaplovič sees the difference in relation to the water element only, in the fact that Englishmen return home on boats, whereas Slovaks from waterways come to their homes on foot.

2. Englishmen are enterprising businessmen – the Slovaks also have their traditional business (safron trade, linen trade, trade with butter, lacemaking, trade with oils, bag makers, honey combers, glassmakers, tinkers, harness makers, manger makers, sieve makers, Liptauer sheep cheese makers), which had become known and sought after throughout the Habsburg Monarchy, in Europe, especially in the Balkans occupied by the Ottoman Empire, further in Asia, especially in Siberia, but also in overseas.

Hereby Čaplovič noted that the Slovak merchants and craftsmen were open-minded and educated, possessed a topographical, historical and homeland knowledge. Moreover they appeared to be polyglots, when apart from, Slovak, they could speak Hungarian, German, Romanian and Serbian languages. Many of them could also speak Latin, and exceptionaly also English and French.

3. Englishmen are resourceful producers - Čaplovič appreciated the developed manufacture industry in Slovakia, but especially the high level of the so called domestic crafts and textile production (drapery, linen, millinery,), wood industry (wheelwright, barrel making, manger making, sieves making, shingles making, sticks making, carpentry, artistic woodcarving), food industry (cheese production, sheep cheese production, bakery, viticulture), metallurgy and mining ( blacksmith, iron production, feeloes making, mortar making, weaponry) and also chemical industry (gunpowder making, potash-nitre making).

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<sup>3</sup> The part of Čaplovič's work „Slovaks in Hungary“ was published in the Hesperus in 1818 (č. 49, 55, 57, 59) and in 1820 (No. 19, 21, 22, 23), while the author sent it to a literary competition announced by the editor of this periodical Kristian Karol André. Čaplovič already that published extracts from his work with the title Erinnerungen aus Slawonien in Pressburger Zeitung (No. 81, 82, 85, 87, 88) – it was before 1816 year. The whole Čaplovič study was translated into the Slovak language by Viera Urbancová and she published it in book „About Slovakia and Slovaks“ in 1975.

4. Englishmen are skilled and hardworking farmers - in this chapter Čaplovič first focused on describing the natural conditions of agriculture in Slovakia, which were particularly in its mountainous regions negatively affected by the poor and barren soil, the harsher climate and weather conditions and the insufficient road system. Slovaks nevertheless successfully developed agriculture, namely cereal growing and viticulture and in the livestock production, cattle breeding. Čaplovič raised the issue of sheep breeding, mountain farming and cheese making.
5. Slovaks as well as Englishmen, often travel in large or small groups and settle in better regions - Čaplovič devoted this to the question of the high birth rate among the Slovaks, and the resulting process of rapid population growth, which was determinant of the first mostly socially motivated emigration of people from Slovakia and the construction of new Slovak colonies in the south of Hungary, pointing to one of the national features of Slovaks, which he called Slovak cosmopolitanism.
6. Englishmen have nice and good women... - he also considered the Slovak women to be nice, good and healthy, physically and spiritually, harmoniously developed women, according to Čaplovič, the most obvious of them were from Turiec region.
7. Englishmen are good pedestrians - Čaplovič noticed that the Slovaks also enjoy walking, while in the past they become fast and reliable couriers, in this connection he referred in particular to Slovak merchants, craftsmen and handicraft journeymen who took on their own feet long and challenging journeys as they travelled through Habsburg monarchy, and often wandered beyond its borders; similarly, the Slovaks and Englishmen were excellent carters and coachmen.
8. Englishmen like to bet - Čaplovič noticed that passion also for Slovaks, from his time compacted to the characteristic phrase: „I bet you...“ , he included here also popularity of the enchanting guess work and in England, Hungary and in Slovakia, betting was already connected with horse racing.
9. English people enjoy watching the fire - the Slovaks also like looking into the fire, and in their homes and cottages they prefer open fireplaces to closed furnaces.
10. Englishmen people like to look not only to the fires, but also in the bottom of the glasses ... (they like to drink an alcohol) - the Slovaks also never miss a chance for entertainment, especially family events (weddings, christening parties, funerals, birthdays) and great holidays (Christmas and Easter, Shrovetide Carnival). Traditional pig slaughtering cannot be without alcohol (they drink typical alcohol as borovička-gin, čerešnovica-cherry brandy, žitná - rye brandy, vinovica - wine brandy, medovina - mead, or honey brandy), they also like beer and wine, they are happy to visit pubs and inns; Čaplovič compared ways of eating and food in both English and Slovak cuisine, especially focused on the frequent use of potatoes and bacons in both ethnic groups.
11. Englishmen are good soldiers - Čaplovič described recruitments in Slovakia, Slovaks did not want to be recruited, but when they entered into the army, they were excellent and courageous soldiers, especially in the famous Upper Hungarian regiments.
12. Englishmen are passionate hunters - the Slovaks, if they were allowed by the strict laws of the feudal system included in smaller regional rights, also loved hunting very much and were excellent shooters and hunters.
13. Englishmen like wrestling - the Slovaks wrestle mostly at holidays, on fairs, and in pubs, often to half-dead, or dead. The most common pretence is just for the fun, but the motive is also the jealousy of rivals in love. The Slovaks wrestle furiously with the fists, the Slovak slap in the face (facka) became notorious. The craftsmen



and tradesmen even use a variety of stick techniques for their defense, but they usually wrestle only for passion, which is especially popular among young men.

#### 4. THE IMPORTANCE OF ČAPLOVIČ PARALLELS

Although Čalovič's work: „The Slovaks in Hungary“, cannot deny some contemporary aggradation of apologetic and slovakophile tendencies, he as the first one pointed out to high spiritual and material culture of the Slovaks, more complex in European relations with unprecedented acceptance“.4 Čaplovič's research method was interesting too, when in the characterisation of the Slovak nation he formally combined ethnographic research with a humorously led fiction style, creating an engrossing story about the Slovaks, within educational along with entertaining genre of literature.

For this reason, the first monograph about the Slovaks had more journalistic than scientific attention, although it was based on ethnographic material, but less on historical, geographic and statistical facts. In conclusion, I guess I had to explain why Čaplovič pronounced and defended the thesis that „*Slovaks are in Hungary the same as the Englishmen in Europe*“ [Urbancová 1975: 8].

Čaplovič admired the English and England because of that at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, in the context with the defeat of Napoleonic France, it became the world's first superpower and imperial colonial empire. It can be said, that Ján Čaplovič also succumbed to the widespread anglophilia, and here it its necessary to look for the origins of his analogies, comparisons and parallelism. They at last led to and resulted in Čaplovič's work written in German language „Slovaks in Hungary“, which aroused interest in the professional and scientific circles of the then Europe and which has become one of the basic works of the Slovak ethnography. This fact was pointed out by Vendelín Jankovič, who had appreciated Čaplovič's work „*Slowaken in Ungarn for several reasons. Especially for his slovakophile tendency, his apologetic focus and his friendliness to the Slovaks*“ [Jankovič 1945: 61].

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<sup>4</sup> He won the first prize for the work „Slowaken in Ungarn“ in a literary contest in Hesperus and got 200 goldens in 1818. Ján Čaplovič was the member of Imperial Royal, Natural Science Society in Vienna from 1814. He became foreign contributing member of the Natural Science Society in Halle in 1815.

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