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THEORY OF POLITICS

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NORMATIVE COMMITMENT
OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

Basic thesis of the article is the clam, that contemporary development-trends of theoretical reflection about politics show ideological associations of a slightly different character and in dimensions separate from those previously connected with classical philosophy of politics. As in the classical form of reflection normative involvement indeed stemmed from care about common well being and urge to search for ideal order model and social organization, current trends of development of political theory – especially postmodernistic influences on social sciences – indicate new forms of bonds with political axiology.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

normative theory, political philosophy, postpositivist thought

Former, to date attempts (referring to the traditional, scientistic and naturalistic model of knowledge) to formulate an objective and independent perspective of the political sphere of social life has proved rather imperfect and encounters numerous cognitive barriers that are hard to overcome. Current criticism of this model of scientific inquiry based on a formalized and axiologically uncommitted reflection describe the faith in possibility of acquiring knowledge in a neutral manner as a form of scientific myth. As claimed by Mary Hawkesworth (2006: 48) in reality, the traditional model of political science tends to conceal axiologically committed part of the research performed in political science and does, in effect, reduce the scope of political theory itself. It also discounts axi-

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ological connotations of the presupposed assumptions, which precede any form of research in political science. Taking into account this dimension of political theory reveals its close connotations with philosophical, sociological and also psychological legacy.

In consequence, the assumption that the cognitive value of judgment formulated in accordance with established ethical interpretations does not posses the status of scientific reflection oriented towards the search of truth and acquiring objective perspective on reality, is currently decreasing in popularity and is being increasingly put into doubt. Bearing in mind the influence of postmodernism, the observation that reflection about politics (or, in broader sense, about society altogether) is not, in its core, objectively dispassionate, axiologically neutral and ideologically uninvolved analysis becomes increasingly obvious. Rather, it ought to be treated like an authorial interpretation which, in a process of the scientific 'treating' or academic discourse, at most reaches the shape of intersubjective perspective or diagnosis of the reality.

The origins of this trend can be traced back to the 1960s, when the broader interests of behaviourists on normative reflection became noticeable and arguments raised by Leo Strauss, Eric Vogelin and Hannah Arendt among others undermined modernist pillars of American liberalism (Gunnell 1993: 189–187). Up until that time, normatively-oriented scientists were decisively marginalized and their legacy most frequently ignored among academic community. Scientism was dominant to such an extent, that tradition of normative political theory "have not been inclined to take the description of political sciences at face value" (Dryzek, Honig, Phillips 2008: 7). In the course of research on local politics, as indicated by Peter J. Steinberger (1985: 3–4), behaviourism became a peculiar ideology of the political science, as directed by research patterns in Robert Dahl's studies on structure of governance in New Haven.

A pronounced change in attitude towards axiologically-involved reflection occurred after annunciation of manifesto of the postbehavioural political studies propounded by David Easton (1969: 1051–1061). Despite the fact, that desiderata of the new fields of empirical research contained in the above manifesto did not mean the withdrawal from the rigours of methodological regime, a postulated reclaim of the political science in its protection of humanistic values, decisively brought out the awareness of axiological importance od political theory. Another crucial change was an inclusion of the quality methods in the process of research (Dahl 2007: 122–124). Although an apparent mismatch between philosophy and scientifically formulated theory of politics persisted, as time passed, presumably

these tendencies allowed, to the high extent, for proximity of the normative theory and empirical tradition. B. Guy Peters (2005: 159–160) claims that current neo-institutionalism, combining considerations of the normative nature with description and clarification of conduct of political entities typical for behavioural approach, offers a multi-layered analysis of politics that includes numerous aspects, contexts and dimensions as well as forms of its manifestation.

The ideas of science freed from axiological involvement were finally disproved by criticisms raised in the 1980s and influences of postpositivistic ideas of political theories (Lane 1997: 159–160). Indeed, it was the merit of postpositivists to emphasize, that the noun experience, the verb to experience and the adjective empirical cannot be transferred from one theoretical system to another without the change in their meaning and connotations. From this perspective, the importance of presuppositions and their persuasive effect on the content of theories and research attitudes of postbehaviourists (Hawkesworth 1988: 184–194) was highlighted.

A contemporary reversion towards normatively involved reflection is not, however, a straightforward turn towards classical political thought, but is expressed in different, more sophisticated forms. Simultaneously, current premises of the return to axiological perspective are not only consequences of modifications of political practice, but are also the result of growth of theoretical polycentrism in political research. These issues are emphasized by Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996: 3) who claim that diversification and specialization of political research are phenomena indicating the crucial trends of evolution of modern political science. It seems that this tendency of highlighting axiological function of political theory can be related to three key trends: broadening of the term 'politics' on various spheres of social life and development in a subject range of political theory, distinction of new fields and research problems but also increasing opening of political scientists for meta-theoretical and philosophical contemplation and related normative reflection.

At the same time, tendencies towards broadening of the subject-range of contemporary political theory can be related with at least two phenomena. On one hand, they are a direct consequence of theoretical pluralism which, including a broad spectrum of various interpretations of politics, implies an elaborated form of separation in research field of political science. On the other hand, it is related to modifications in theoretical nature of refection over politics, which extends from traditional mid-range framework to the current – metatheoretical level of generalization. Both of these phenomena are undoubtedly connected

with a distinctive, for postpositivistic breakthrough, process of broader opening of political science for modern intellectual movements or philosophical ideas (Nocoń 2010).

Metatheoretical reflection also includes the idea of holistic political theory, creating something resembling a mummified political theory that combines the empirical and normative claims into one. This idea, despite its vestigial form, is still present in the contemporary political, discursive polemics (H. F. Weisberg 2003: 3). The attempts of its formulation in its integral-synthetic frames of metatheory, favours the tendencies towards politicizing of the broad catalogue of social life spheres through holistic conceptualizations of politics.

These tendencies, to generalize theoretical reflection in political science, are related with conviction that the essence of scientific knowledge relies on the creation of organized, consistent and holistic image of the world, and not only on description of detached fragments. In this context, political theory to the increasing extent formulates nomological theses searching for universal generalizations and not only historical and empirical synthesis. In this way, contemporary political theory is being enriched with speculative reflection that, compared with descriptive statements, undertakes the research based on conditional claims and hypotheses formulated a priori. This trend also created favourable conditions for broader opening of the theory on axiologically involved reflection. Undoubtedly, the social problems and turmoil have also contributed to, as Louis Herman calls it, the crisis of contemporaneity, which requires the return of political science to their roots in order to seek the truth. According to this American philosopher a research of that sort should be based upon empirical knowledge and broad generalizations formulated in accordance with multicultural global research that uses also historical legacy of political science. This research formula will allow for the search of more universal conceptions of contemporary common well being derived from a broad-ranged, methodologically diversified and simultaneously integral results (Herman 1998: 23–43).

Thereby, it does not only broaden the range of what is described as normative theory but also highlights its internal diversification. Catherine and Michel Zuckert (1997: 144) indicate three general forms of contemporary normative reflexion: one group of theorists is described as "revitalist doctrines" which returned to old traditions of thought and political analysis. Typical representatives of this group are Hannah Arendt, Alasdair McIntyre and Leo Strauss. Different group of theorists, who can be described as "restorations", attempts to recover more or less contemporarily acknowledged system of political thought

related to modern liberal philosophy. Works of John Rawls, but also Ronald Dworkin, William Galston and Robert Nozick play a special role in this enterprise. A third group of theorists are "the rebels" (overturners), radical innovators often perceived as enfant terribles of the academic community. Among them one can find postmoderninsts, deconstructivists, representatives of feminism and followers of the new form of theoreticising such as Michael Foucault, Jack Derrida, Richard Rorty and Iris Young related to those. Despite the fact, that all three groups of theorists differ significantly from one another in crucial matters, they are unified in their retreat from the main rules of empirical political science represented by Harold Lasswell or David Easton. Differences between traditional model of political science are visible in every three dimensions of intellectual activity of research. It entails a bigger openness for speculative reflection and impressionistic form of expression, a tendency to include normative involvement of political theory and reversal towards clarifying and axiological function of description in political science.

From this perspective, the intricacies in development of contemporary political theory do not mean a straightforward return to classical normative reflection. Axiological involvement of postpositivistic theory of politics does not, however, result from its metaphysical inclinations. It is especially apparent in the case of comparison between trends relating to philosophical classics with interpretative approach inspired by postmodernistic ideas. Steve Buckler clams that interpretationists make an assumption that the world becomes comprehensible thanks to discursively agreed conventions that have a nature of intersubjective convictions and do not posses any axiological premises. In this way, despite their approval of legitimization of research formulated within the frames of classical normative theory, they accept to some extent, positivistic criticism of its metaphysical foundations (Buckler 2002: 179–180).

Another persona indicating distinctness in postpositivistic reflection about politics is Ryszard Skarzyński (2004: 49–50). It can stem from the general worldview expressing the projective attitude towards reality based upon conviction that the role of knowledge and researchers is to enrich the social world with higher values. That sort of involvement is typical for different trends in philosophy. The second type of involvement is connected with comprehension of normativism as a peculiar theory according to which norms are universal factor setting benchmarks of governance and political order. Depending on assumptions of specific conceptions, the norms derive from forces independent from human will or are its expression. This distinction axiologically assigns the involvement typical

for normative political theory sensu stricte and also, in the broader meaning, the type of involvement which expresses the natural propensity of researchers to evaluate political actions with regard to the effects they have in practice.

At the same time, the fact both important and attention-worthy is that the latter, broader type of encompassing normativism reflects the way in which every political theory indicates limited axiological context. However, it is not so much connected with philosophical research as much as with ideological associations. Indeed, in its source, each vision of society simultaneously contains the image of its political organization, fundamental regulations of which can be directly or indirectly linked with determined axiological system setting down the ideological orientation of the given theory. It is emphasized by Murray Edelman who demonstrates in his analysis that political theories, similarly to all theories, can serve the purpose of clarification, as well as political aims. (Edelman 1997: 101). In this context, the most formalized figures of political theory, even those referring to positivistic-empirical perspective, can be judged in terms of their ideological overtone as far as the aspect are concerned. A good example of such practice are arguments formulated by Thodor Adorno and Maks Horkheimer among other, who argue a possibility of totalitarian connotations that are carried by positivistic philosophy. These researchers, while analyzing the ideological dimension of positivism indicate that characteristic, for this standpoint, scientistic perception of the world, imposes upon the society living within, the aims indicated by impersonal causal mechanisms over which they do not posses control. In this way people become imprisoned within mechanisms and social processes deprived of moral value (Buckler 2002: 3; Berlin 1991: 86–78).

In this way, a renewed inclusion of political theory into the sphere of ontological and epistemic, as well as normative postulates succeeds previous – relatively well-outlined – borders between theory, political philosophy and ideology (Goodin 1988: 17–27). From this perspective, a relation between political theory and ideological ground of political action are far from obvious. For instance, on one hand, the majority of researches agree that the directions of development of American political science was to a big extent influenced by pragmatism so characteristic for liberal culture of political democracy (Anderson 1983: 398). On the other hand, a broad stream of research showing connections between theory and political practice opts for their closeness. One of the most current research programmes in this field is the range of the influence of ecophilosophy and ecological social movements on politics in a global dimension (Graham 1998:

73–90). Based on these interactions, Kari Palonen (2005: 351–366) develops the thesis that theoreticians do not only play the role of ideologists, but also politicians play the role of theoreticians. It results from special competences of political actors that diagnose reality in their own categories.

These are the ideological associations of political science that cause their occasional identification with the politics itself. The acceptance of diversification of equally established theoretical approaches and the temptation of relativization of cognitive processes related to them, give a big possibility of political manipulation. In a complex conglomerate of different forms of clarification, in which a deeper orientation is possessed only by experts occupied with the precise sphere, it is much easier to accomplish such an interpretation of research results or the assumption of given theory, which could realize the function of legitimization of certain political enterprises. Such an abuse of theory in political practice is fostered by the science itself, which provides effective tools of sociotechnical influence of both politicians and public opinion. By the same token, social research provides the knowledge which practical value gives a serious potential of reification of the human being.

These relations are reasons standing behind the difficulties in execution of postulates to separate science from politics. At the same time, the involvement in political practice of political scientists is often perceived as a factor devaluating its expert credibility. It is not always the case however. It seems worthwhile to quote the right observation of Mirosław Karwat (2004: 15) who writes that such postulates are a peculiar display of discrimination against political scientists. When it comes to the lawyers, and even more so with physicians (doctors), practical experience is not only a foundation of their scientific credibility but also an essential element of their professional advancement in the world of science.

Philosophy, in accordance with new trends, again enters into direct reactions with political practice. These relations differ, however, from classical philosophy. They are the form of rational conversation, axiological involvement of which indicates the influences among other factors, on basis of political activity, especially its normative legitimization of a certain vision of social order (Smith 2007: 1–17). This manner of characterizing relations of knowledge and ideology is indeed in contradiction with traditional model of science. An example of critique of this state of affairs is provided by Jonathan H. Turner (2004: 4), who relates to the views, where ideological involvement of social theory can be the consequence of acquired interests of the creators or be a result of conserva-

tive tendencies resulting from formulation of generalizations based on reality accessible to the researchers, which to the biggest extent, results in maintaining the status quo, rather than search of alternative solutions. This observation compliments with the remark that theoretical reflection does not often have the nature of scientific theory, but also includes forms of expression belonging to philosophical discourse and ideological connotations. From this perspective, the problem of separation of social theory from its ideological context is reduced to formal difficulty of separation between theory and philosophy (Hauptmann 2005: 207–218).

This conviction characteristic for traditional attitude maintains scientistic relations between normatively oriented political theory and ideology. Independently from other factors differentiating these systems of claims, it takes into account that they both arise with completely different aims. Political theory is determined by reason, the urge to rationally strive for execution of values, which are not attributed to any interests of determined social groups. From this point of view, it is coined based on entirely different motives than ideology (O'Brien 1998: 77–90).

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THE ENEMY STEREOTYPE
IN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY – THEORETICAL
REFLECTIONS

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The concept of the enemy stereotype, which is permanently present in colloquial, journalistic, and academic discussions, has not been scientifically analysed so far. In this article, an attempt to provide a definition of "the enemy stereotype" as an independent linguistic being has been made. The stages of this term taking shape in the political reality have also been presented. The article has strictly theoretical nature, and is based on scientific achievements in the fields of research related to stereotypes and hostility. In the author's opinion, the analysis of the phenomenon of stereotyping carried out from a sociological, psychological, and linguistic point of view is necessary. A reflection on the issue of hostility in general, and on the image of the enemy in political activities in particular is also fundamental.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

enemy stereotype, enemy, stereotype, stereotyping

The concept of the "enemy stereotype", so often used in a colloquial language, has not yet been a subject of scientific research and precise definition. It is probably caused by the fact that the concepts of "stereotype" and "enemy" for many years have been functioning separately. The "enemy stereotype" as a separate term started gaining popularity with the dissemination of research about the hostility phenomenon in totalitarian and communist systems, when

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concepts such as "the objective enemy", "the enemy of the class", and "the enemy of the people" arose (Arendt 2008; Karolczuk 2010; Jakubowska-Branicka 2008). It was noticed then that the picture of the enemy, its image in the society, resulting frequently from tradition and socialization processes as well as being an effect of propaganda controlled by the authority, is associated with phenomenon of stereotyping. Therefore, a concept of "enemy" was more and more often merged with the term "stereotype", thus creating a separate term: "the enemy stereotype", which began to function commonly as an independent linguistic existence and it quickly found its way to press, political, and scientific rhetoric.

In an enemy stereotyping context, two research areas are important. One of them regards the stereotype issue. There is a rich, professional, foreign-language literature on this subject, primarily in English (Lippmann 1922; Dovidio, Gaertner 1986; Bar-Tal et al. 1989; Fiske, Taylor 1991; Stangor 2000; Bar-Tal, Teichman 2005; Wang 2006). Also in Poland, research on stereotypes was carried out, which resulted in the creation of a sequence of valuable studies. They reviewed the problem from different points of view, such as psychological, sociological, linguistic, or cultural one. It is sufficient to mention works of Adam Schaff (1981), Jerzy Bartmiński (1985), Ida Kurcz and Zdzisław Chlewiński (1992, 1994), Dominika Maison (1997), Mirosław Kofta and Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania (2001), and many others. However, political science and sociological literature dealing with stereotypes is mostly devoted to sexual, racial, or ethnic stereotypes. Little attention is given to political stereotypes, although contemporary propaganda measures increasingly use them. The second research area is connected with "an enemy" issues and includes quite a rich collection of scientific publications on this subject. Noteworthy are works authored by: Hannah Arendt (2008), Michał Głowiński (1993), Iwona Jakubowska-Branicka (2008), Edward Karolczuk (2010). It is necessary to point out that these works largely analyze the issue of the "enemy" in the totalitarian propaganda. Various research within different fields of study on stereotyping the rival, opponent, or enemy focused first of all on a psychological and sociological analysis of the stereotype of "other" and "own". An example of this can be found in the works of Andrzej Mirga (1984) or Jacek Sobczak (2005). Therefore, studies which would merge the above-mentioned areas of research and precisely define the term of the "enemy stereotype", showing its functioning in political reality stereotype, are missing. These deliberations are an attempt to fill this gap.

STEREOTYPE PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY
OF DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES

Walter Lippmann already noticed that social awareness is on one side the stereotypes of public opinion, and on the other side the visions imposed by propaganda. The use of stereotypes in the political and social life, leading to the suspension of criticism, the exemption from thinking through expressive classification and evaluation of phenomena as well as hampering an objective assessment of events carried out by the recipient (Gostkowski 1959: 39–84), became an excellent tool to influence the society. Stereotyping constitutes, in fact, a subtle way to eliminate the enemy, camouflaging genuine intentions, because it enables to create the enemy's image in a way which discourages declared and potential supporters (Reber 2000: 708). Stereotype, through its social, black and white, and emotional nature is a handy simplification of the overview of reality: it makes it easier to describe briefly the events of which the man is a witness or about which he is informed (Jeziński 2007: 198).

Many definitions of a stereotype, created by researchers from different scientific fields, were included in the subject literature. It is widely assumed that the stereotype constitutes a collection of individuals' or social groups' beliefs about the characteristics of other individuals, groups of people, or social facts (Nelson 2003: 27). In addition, a group of permanent elements characterizing a stereotype is indicated: it is an evaluative judgement, it has an emotional tone, it is relatively durable, inflexible, and not always in accordance with the actual state of affairs to which it refers. A stereotype most often assumes a form of related judgements and behaviours which are present in the awareness of a specific social group (Sasińska-Klas 2010: 10).

THE STEREOTYPE IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

In sociology, the issue of a stereotype, and mainly all its possible dangerous consequences, was brought up by an outstanding Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (2002: 300). He treated a stereotype as a pathological symptom in social awareness and emphasized that the stereotype is a simplified, unilateral, extremely exaggerated image of certain community, which treats all its members in an undifferentiated way, irrespective of their individual qualities. He claimed

that a stereotype was most often created on the basis of individual experience with representatives of communities, which are then generalized and in an unauthorized way transferred to regard the entire community. According to P. Sztompka, a positive and negative stereotypes may be present in the society, and while the first ones do not raise objection of groups which they concern, negative stereotypes constitute a real danger as they may lead to discrimination, if not elimination of stereotyped groups from social life. Using "the scale of public rejection", P. Sztompka depicted how stereotypes may become a cause of persecution and even the extermination of a social group. He pointed out the particular danger of stereotypes in case when they result in clearly negative evaluations of the described group, as well as when such negative characteristics are treated as irremovable, because they are associated with a very nature of the group, independent of individual efforts of its members. Negative stereotypes of this kind become superstitions, which complemented with an additional element, i.e. emotions of resentment and hostility towards others, may lead to the separation of these groups and the enlargement of social distance, and finally even to total segregation, i.e. customary or legally guaranteed isolation. This is followed by signs of worse treatment of the members of other groups, the reduction of chances to access education, profession, political rights and other valued goods, only because somebody is a member of a group subjected to superstition. Such an action is known as discrimination. The next stage which may appear as a result of stereotypes is a direct attack towards discriminated communities. Their members become subjects of harassment, persecution, displacement, vandalism and acts of physical violence. From there it is now close to extermination, i.e. the elimination of individual members of the group, and then even the entire different community. This mentioned "scale of public rejection" introduced by P. Sztompka shows how dangerous for the perception of different groups stereotypes are, the example of which is Holocaust carried out by the Third Reich authorities (Sztompka 2002: 301–303).

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STEREOTYPE

A significant contribution of psychology into the issue of stereotyping is an individual approach to stereotypes, indicating that they can exist in individual people's minds irrespectively of whether they are, and to what extent, shared by others (Kofta, Jasińska-Kania 2001: XI–XV). Therefore they are treated as

elements of mutual culture (a sociological trend), but also as components of a person's individual, psychological 'equipment', determining to a substantial degree what meaning does this person assign to other people's actions. In accordance with this approach, stereotypes are in a close relation to motivation processes and emotions, the evidence of which can be found in the dependency that the sense of low self-esteem fosters the tendency of a negative perception of others (Olszyk 2013: 35).

Psychologists' scientific research in the context of stereotypization resulted in the creation of two trends: a cognitive trend, and a psychodynamic one. A cognitive approach came into view in the end of the sixties of the 20th century, and today it is the dominant approach. The main element of this approach is an argument that stereotypes are not only beliefs regarding the social reality, but also cognitive tools, influencing the processes of attention, memorizing pieces of information and retrieving them from memory, the processes of the interpretation of other people's behaviour and drawing conclusions about characterological outlines and attitudes lying at the basis of such behaviour (Kofta, Jasińska-Kania 2001: XIII). Therefore, they constitute mental representations relating to social categories, introducing certain order in the perception of social environment and enabling to select, from the excess of complex information, these pieces of information which are the most important for relations between groups.

In research on stereotypes, the psychodynamic approach came into view at the point when it became clear that the very process of socialization, learning the social roles, does not sufficiently explain the fact that people brought up in the same culture differ in stereotypes held. The purely psychodynamic approach highlights the mechanisms of maintaining the positive self-identification as the main function of stereotypes. The approach emphasizes the role of motivation processes, in which stereotypes meet a person's mental needs, such as a positive self-esteem and the reduction of feelings of inferiority (Adorno et al. 1950: 51).

THE STEREOTYPE IN LINGUISTIC RESEARCH

Comprehensive research on stereotypes is also carried out by linguists, who focus mostly on their communicative functions. The tool of these functions is language, as one of features of a community, being the basis for understanding its tradition

(Quasthoff 1998: 11–30). Stereotypes thus enable communication within a given cultural community, provide a specific code allowing to understand the meaning of a message regarding relations between groups, included in literature, painting, or film, but also create certain barriers in intercultural communication. From the linguistic point of view, stereotypes are considered to be a specific category of culture patterns, and the research on them focus on the reconstruction and interpretation of sources, as linguistics only have the possibility to look into long-lasting, traditional stereotypes which permanently entered the language, but which are not fully recognized at times. This is through language that stereotypes are introduced into the social circulation (Kurcz 1994: 189), therefore language is their carrier and transmitter. Consequently, stereotypes have verbal nature, they are expressed, preserved in a language, and linguistically transmitted (Chlewiński 1992: 12; Schaff 1981: 68).

The above attempted analysis of the stereotype from the sociological, psychological and linguistic point of view indicates that these views are complementary. Only after taking all of them into account, the true nature of the analyzed phenomena can be seen. Talking about the stereotype one should remember that it is a certain social fact (Kofta, Jasińska-Kania 2001: XXI) – a part of a community culture, a collective system of assumptions on the nature of the social world, accepted by certain groups about other groups, and also a psychological fact – a belief placed in the system of a specific individual's judgements about the world, associated with the individual's emotions and self-image, something which facilitates a person's orientation in the social world. A stereotype is also specific lingual formation, which is verbalized precisely through language, and the language is responsible for the introduction of a stereotype into the social circulation.

THE ROLE OF STEREOTYPE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Stereotypes penetrating wide social circles via media, as already mentioned, influence the development of an opinion about the own group and attitudes towards other groups as well. The evaluation, schematic, tendentiousness, emotionalism and tendency to generalization make an effective propaganda tool from stereotypes in social and economic life, and first of all in political struggle. Contemporary interest in the enemy stereotyping results from the fact that the rhetoric of hate, enemy discourse, became in a great measure the language of

contemporary authority, not only totalitarian or authoritarian, but also of elites in democratic systems.

Propaganda activities, using stereotypes in the political life, motivated by "the defence of public interest", the counteraction of the loss of economic sovereignty, the loss of religious and cultural identity, manifest themselves mainly in discrediting political enemies. Among factors affecting the fact that a given message may become a beginning of a new stereotype or may consolidate it (Młyniec 1997: 211), there are mainly: a degree of media credibility in the society, a transmission technique, emotional popularity of contents, transmission time and place, knowledge of culture, mentality and the past of people to which the message is directed. These factors' coexistence usually causes that propaganda treatments are effective. The scope of "rational crux" of stereotypes is also significant, i.e. the truth of facts being the basis of their genesis, as well as an intellectual factor. Higher education level increases criticism of incoming information and the need of specific facts being presented (Młyniec 1997: 213).

In fact, in all systems stereotypes are used in a political propaganda[1]. However, a system in which negative stereotypes are exposed, while simultaneously blocking the propagation of positive stereotypes, is usually closer to a totalitarian system. The exposure of negative stereotypes is aimed at shifting human attitudes towards sharp, simplified evaluations and judgements. They can be formed by a partly real threat from – allocated in the society awareness – groups, but they can also be artificially generated by ideology and propaganda (Olszyk 2013: 16). Stereotypes, as important social facts in the political life, are used not only to build and maintain the community of views functioning in the elite or political class environment, but are also used to exaggerate divisions between privileged and discriminated groups.

Researches showed that the closeness of presidential or parliamentary elections results in the activation of the majority of stereotypes in combination with searching for information about the origin of people aspiring to the authority

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[1] A political propaganda is intentional, carried out by persuasion and manipulation methods, emotional-intellectual impact on the awareness of individuals and social groups in order to modify and possibly change their attitudes and political behaviour, according to the interests of political entities and political authority. Therefore, it consists of a mass dissemination by determined means, symbols, slogans, ideas, views, and political doctrines as well as sociopolitical theories. It is also the platform of political fight between the entities seeking to induce real society support, while simultaneously discrediting their political opponents (Sobkowiak 1999: 459; Kuśnierski, Frydrychowicz 1980: 42).

(Grzesiak-Feldman 2006: 20). During election campaigns, being a kind of arena of political rivalry to fight for the support of voters, stereotypes enable to show the enemy in a negative light, to charge them with responsibility for all crises and failures. Therefore, they constitute an excellent tool of persuasion and manipulation. Aggression, hate and hostility appear very often during election campaigns, they are almost a permanent, repetitive element of electoral propaganda. It is associated with the appearance of enemy figures, with which one must fight for the deficit welfare, which is the authority.

AN ENEMY OR AN OPPONENT

An essential element of "the enemy stereotype" term is the enemy/opponent concept. Dictionary definitions describe an enemy as a person or group of people, hostilely disposed towards somebody, who fight against someone/something and act destructively to cause someone harm. An enemy becomes the one who raises distrust, from whom dislike or hostility are sensed towards "us", "our" interests, or who ignores them and accomplishes his/her objectives by "our" cost (Universal Dictionary 2003: 512). The enemy's entity is perceived as a real or imaginary threat to achieve objectives by other groups, and it is accompanied by various aggressive behaviours, anger, frustration, sometimes even hate.

Important – from the point of view of these deliberations – is to distinguish the concept of "the enemy" from "the opponent". The appearance of "opponent" category in rivalry situation is a natural phenomenon and constitutes an essential part of the political life. An opponent is a person or a group which, by virtue of their views and a place taken on the political scene, becomes a natural competitor of another group, representing other values and worldview in the struggle for socially desirable goods (e.g. authority). Such an opponent, as already mentioned, is an entity (person, group, other state, etc.) which ranks as a rival by virtue of their views, revealed values other than presented by remaining entities involved in rivalry. With an opponent there is a discussion, whereas with an enemy one only fights, rejecting dialogue, compromise, agreement. An opponent is a partner who tries to win in accordance with rules. An opponent can become an enemy in the situation of exacerbated rivalry, when his/her actions are driven by negative emotions, malice, aggression, the lack of respect of existing law and *fair play* principles being in force during rivalry.

An enemy's entity is perceived as a real or imaginary threat to achieve other groups' objectives, accompanied by diverse aggressive behaviours, anger, frustration, sometimes even hate. The enemy is a stranger, who created in the past, creates or may potentially create a threat to "our" groups, he/she is somebody devoid of all arguments, who in the public life should be disavowed, neutralized or even destroyed with all available means. Application of this category is used to discourse identity, it enables to unite social groups around the state authority, to sanction and to elevate governing elites. Fighting with an enemy entity one does not count costs, using even those means which are not in accordance with the principles of fair competition. It is hard to conduct precise semantic distinction between the enemy and the opponent category. However, it could be stated that the difference is in the degree of reluctance, so the opponent would be a tempered version of an enemy (Głowiński 2009). While one must fight with the enemy, with the opponent – in certain circumstances and after certain assumptions – it is possible to talk, thus there is a certain common ground for agreement. Therefore, every enemy is an opponent, but not every opponent is an enemy (Olszyk 2013: 60).

HOSTILITY IN POLITICS

The enemy concept is very wide and it concretizes always in a determined political situation. In history, individuals, social organizations, social relations, subjects and natural phenomena, as well as creations of human imagination were presented as enemies. The choice depends on historical conditions, tradition, theoretical and program assumptions of a given political authority and immediate political needs. For democrats, the dictators and absolute monarchs are enemies, for atheists – all deities, egalitarians fight the oligarchy, communists are against private property and classes. The enemy is presented as being deprived of rightness and, at least, morally suspicious. Meanwhile, it is possible to become an enemy when a truth is proclaimed, as far as one infringes someone's interests (Karolczuk 2010: 11–12). In political activity, for many years the racial, ethnic and religious criteria were main factors which were taken into consideration when describing the enemy. Although politicians generally avoid them in official speeches, they function in a colloquial awareness and appear in specific situations of social tensions, where they are smuggled towards citizens in a camouflaged way. Nowadays, along with the society atomization, an enemy concept has been

intensified, it is possible to be an enemy on the political, economic, racial, or cultural level, etc. – the more reasons to make an enemy from somebody, the better – owing to that it is possible to gather around oneself effectively undecided social layers.

Considering the enemy issue from the historical perspective it is necessary to point out that the concept was not explicit in different ages, for different researchers and participants in the political life as well as for various social forces. States often searched for outside enemies in order to facilitate paralyzing all inner enemies. Not all enemy concepts should be regarded as justified, both for political and moral reasons. In ancient Greece, through the procedure of ostracism the "enemies of democracy" were exiled. Persians' enemies of Greeks were portrayed in the art in the shape of various monsters. In ancient Sparta, enemies were sought in unapologetic Helots[2], for which young Spartans organized annual bloody hunts. In ancient Rome, leaders drew up lists of inner enemies which were regarded as dangerous and were allocated to liquidation – outside enemies were described as barbarians. In Middle Ages, heretics and witches personified enemies, and they were accused of demolishing feudal social order (Karolczuk 2010: 157).

In the beginning of the development of capitalism, Niccolò Machiavelli sought the enemy in everyone who threatened, in his opinion, the perfect political system, i.e. the republic. He assumed that all people are evil, and they will assuredly prove to be such if only they will have an opportunity, and the ruler will not stop them. Therefore, the ruler's goal is to protect the state against enemies and in order to achieve this objective, the ruler can have at his disposal all available measures for the elimination of enemies threatening the republic. Thomas Hobbes (2005) views are also noteworthy. He propagated a natural genesis of the enemy, he believed that the fight between people was a natural state which accompanied mankind from the very beginning. He assumed that a dominant feature of human nature is the aspiration to accomplish egotistical interests, tendency to aggression and constant battle with others ("a man is a wolf to his fellow man"). Therefore, everyone is an enemy for everyone and it is a natural situation, resulting from the fact that a man has unrestricted freedom

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[2] It was one of Sparta's society layers, consisting of conquered land residents, without any laws, and being a basic workforce of the Spartan village.

and no authority limiting him from the outside. The only way to stop the war of everyone with everyone is to relinquish the individual freedom by the conclusion of social agreement (Olszyk 2013: 54).

However, an English philosopher, a political scientist and economist John Locke (1992: 167) believed that personal interests did not determine whether somebody was an enemy, but a violation of the laws of nature did. Therefore, the enemy is the one who breaks the laws of nature, who tries to deprive another man of freedom or subject him to absolute authority; it is somebody who steals private property, applies unjustified authority on an individual, rejects or explicitly distorts the justice as well as conspicuously uses the law to protect people committing rapes or doing harm. Moreover, the enemy is the one who tolerates or protects other enemies, and the worst enemy is the one who stands against the political organization of civil society.

In the 20th century, the enemy and friend concept in the politics was presented in detail by a German political scientist Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)[3]. Schmitt saw the nature of politics in the unceasing division of society into friends and enemies by authority, into "own" and "other". The arousal of fear, hate and mutual suspicion in the society among various social and political environments was a consequence of such a belief, as well as an aspiration to the gradual limitation of freedoms and liberties of groups perceived hostilely on the way to their total elimination. According to him, seeking for the enemy and its definition constituted the aim and meaning of political activity. Moreover, C. Schmitt paid attention to a substantial role of using myths in the political struggle, peculiarly in the creation of a negative image of own enemies (Dobrosielski 2007: 108–109). A political enemy, in Schmitt's view, does not have to be morally bad, does not have to constitute an economic competition; the enemy is fighting – or at least ready to fight – group of people which stands in the way of other, similarly organized group. In case that currently there is no threatening group, if that will be beneficial for the political situation, one can and even should make efforts towards the "creation" of such enemy. According to Schmitt, it is possible

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[3] Specialist in the field of state and international law, social philosopher and theoretician of the law, theoretician of the authoritarian state, co-originator of so-called political theology. His views turned out to be highly useful for Nazis of the Third Reich, because the enemy ideology became one of the most essential elements of Nazism. It was used to solve social matters, as well as an implementation of politics conquests. His enemy conception was presented in their works (Schmitt 2000, 2008).

to announce the enemy in every matter, and its concept is used to discourse identity, it enables to unite social groups around the state authority, to sanction and to elevate governing elites. It is only necessary to take advantage of existing racial, religious, worldview, economic, ethnic opposites or others in order to use them as a basis to transform into political opposition as well as to divide people into friends and enemies (Karolczuk 2010: 78–81). A war, although it is not an aim and meaning of the politics, constitutes a natural consequence of real differences as well as proves determination and consequent will to fight the enemy. Therefore, the war is an ultimate form of hostility fulfilment.

All ideologies created as a basis for a totalitarian system referred to demagogic promises of a bright future. The achievement of this aim was, in fact, impossible; hence there was also a need to indicate "the guilty" of delays in its implementation. The enemy category was suitable for this treatment perfectly, since the authority, as already recalled, could arbitrarily appoint successive groups bearing responsibility for failures, and hence strengthen bases for its legitimization. Moreover, the indication of threats from the enemy part increased the level of fear in the society, and in consequence a support for the strong authority, which took responsibility for solving problems and ensuring order, broadened. Pointing successive individuals guilty for the failures of the state, and the fact that these individuals were at the same time its citizens, was for some highly satisfactory, as it released them from a sense of responsibility for their fate and made them feel comfortably, passing the burden of responsibility to others. Therefore, the totalitarian propaganda was particularly attractive for these social groups who felt ruled out and helpless (Olszyk 2013: 57).

Research on the enemy concept, also in the context of totalitarianism, was conducted by Hannah Arendt, who is an author of "the objective enemy" concept. The objective enemy is not an individual or group whose dangerous thoughts should be provoked or whose past justifies suspicions, but an individual who is "a carrier of tendency" (Arendt 2008: 180–181). Two structures are located in the enemy figure: a figure of "the real enemy", that is the one who indeed proclaims views contrary with those officially regarded as being in force (or who takes such actions), and a figure of "the objective enemy", i.e. individuals or groups recognized by the authority as harmful, while this harmfulness has perhaps a potential nature. Therefore, the authority's aim is to prove this possible harmfulness and convince others to their arguments. The concept of "the objective enemy" focuses on "objective" indication of "objective" and "potential" harmfulness of an individual or social group determined as such. One does

not have to prove guilt of such enemy, it is enough to regard the stigmatized individual as potentially able to commit an act incompatible with the authority expectations (Jakubowska-Branicka 2008: 241). Therefore, the objective enemy concept does not include the objective element, real guilt. It constantly insults a second man until everyone knows that this is an enemy so they could destroy it in a self-defence.

The "objective enemy" concept is rooted in a totalitarian vision of the world expressed in totalitarian ideologies, dogmatic by design, which in spite of their content always rely on confronting good with evil; in addition, the good is defined by compliance with propagated ideology, and the evil by any criticism of this ideology (Jakubowska-Branicka 2008: 242).

However, in the Marxist theory, a concept of "enemy of the class" and "enemy of the people" functioned as terms describing a man belonging to a class antagonistic to proletariat, and acting against it. According to this theory, an enemy is a result of features projection and elite aspirations. In other words, the enemy image is an image of oneself, one's own aspirations and dreams. Therefore, everyone who opposed the existing authority became a class enemy (in reality or in imaginary way), thus constituting a threat to its function. A simple consequence of the creation of an enemy to be the main propaganda figure was radical militarization of its language – the enemy runs psychological war, therefore it is necessary to counteract all its actions, which seem to have peaceful nature (Głowiński 1991: 65).

A literary theorist, and an author of numerous works devoted to language in times of the People's Republic of Poland, Michał Głowiński claims that an enemy figure is a basis of the entire communist propaganda. Generally speaking, without an enemy figure there would not be a propaganda communist discourse. An enemy determines a way to perceive the world, as well as ways of thinking and speaking. When there are no real enemies or when they are not threatening or affecting reality, it is necessary to create them artificially, to invent them. Without an enemy figure there is no newspeak[4]. When the enemy figure descends

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[4] Newspeak is a term created by George Orwell in order to determine the official language of Oceania – totalitarian state from the anti-utopian *1984* novel. A new language was drawn up as the tool to control thoughts of citizens, because from one side it provided a means to express worldview in accordance with the official ideology of totalitarian state, on the other it prevented to formulate any independent thoughts, and consequently it caused an uncritical view at sociopolitical reality surrounding citizens. Therefore, newspeak is a language of political propaganda, which in advance makes impossible for self-reliance

into a further perspective, or even disappears, the newspeak stops functioning (Głowiński 1993: 358–359). Without an enemy it simply cannot exist. The enemy reality does not have any meaning. On the contrary, it is generally an imaginary figure, with greater or smaller awareness, intentionally created.

Today, in political activity considered in the categories of fight, the figure of the enemy is still present. Such a fundamental, but not only, enemy is a direct competitor in elections; it is everyone who in a realistic or a potential way may threaten the achievement of the political objective. Therefore, all political orientations, these so far exercising authority and those which are in opposition, become real or potential enemies; also national minorities, immigrants, international finance, foreign capital, national and foreign institutions, other nations, states, groups of states (e.g. the European Union), other cultures, worldviews, faith, races or sexual orientations, can be perceived as entities recognized as hostile (Olszyk 2013: 60).

An enemy figure in political rhetoric, especially election rhetoric, is usually drawn up clearly and assumes a specific shape, because the leader wants to prove that he/she is able to identify not only the evil, but also its perpetrator, as well as to pass a feeling that a given party distinguishes from other political offers, and therefore it is worthwhile to give it a vote. Symbolic stigmatisation of the enemy is supposed to integrate the leader's own party ranks and gather negative sentiments of his/her own electorate, focusing them on the aim of the attack. Moreover, presenting political opponent as "the enemy" is aimed to trigger in voters a sense of threat, and as it is known, the aggression, hostility, and fear are effective stimulants for action. Hate, and the fear of danger are very strong incentives used on a wide scale in the election propaganda (Kołodziejczyk 1993: 240).

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and citizen's freedom thinking, assumes false and lie, as well as the existence of only legitimate reason, crossing the dialogue out. Newspeak was created as a tool to enslave minds and thus was used by totalitarian states. With the help of newspeak propaganda machines created a new reality, in which the official ideology permeated every life aspect and there was no exception from it. M. Głowiński is an author of in-depth newspeak analysis, who listed the following newspeak characteristics: univalentness, coexisting of slogans and stereotypes, magic of the word, arbitrariness (Orwell 2010; Głowiński 1991).

DEFINITION AND THE STAGES OF THE ENEMY STEREOTYPE DEVELOPMENT

Theoretical analysis of the issues related to the "stereotype" and "hostility" permits to form a separate term, "enemy stereotype". It is therefore concluded that an enemy stereotype is a schematic, strongly coloured emotionally, negative image of an individual, groups, institutions, states, etc., perceived as a threat for existence or the achievement of other entities' objectives. The enemy stereotype is most often a controlled phenomenon (it constitutes a result of persuasion and manipulation), aimed to present an enemy in the worst light in order to eliminate them from the game. Measures which support creating a negative, stereotyped image of the enemy may be: negative (malicious) criticism, labelling (naming individuals, groups or social categories, so-called "sticking small labels"), and polarization (creating ambiguous opposition "we" – "they", which enables to reduce the value system to the opposites "black" – "white", what in turn creates a division into "our" – good, positive, and "their/other" – bad, negative, additionally reinforced by valuation and aggressive language.

Enemy rhetoric and rhetoric of hate become largely a contemporary authority language, also in democracies states. Societies of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Polish society, abandoned the socialism as an ideology delineating the system slowly and in stages. Principles characteristic for the market economy and a democratic political order took place of socialist principles. Mental patterns, historical experience and habits formed in the previous period did not lead to rapid changes in the social awareness (Marody 1991: 256). Long-term social and political crises contributed to frustration and seeking for new prescriptions; the resistance of tradition against modernization took place, and also the victory of memory over thoughts about the future. The sense of social risks, characteristic for the Polish society, had its source in the lack of transparency of authority's actions on the everyday activity level. Lack of a direct contact among groups, restricted information and frustration resulting from an economic and political situation undoubtedly contribute to distance between these groups and the perception of them in terms of threat categories (Sosnowski, Walkowiak 1979: 209). Enemy discourse, present in the development of the enemy stereotype, constitutes rhetoric of absolute rationale, which means that good arguments are always provided by "our" side, "we" are entitled to them unquestioningly, and malice as well as aggression become a dominant factor in statements. Fully absolutized opposites are applied, the world is black and white, and there are

no indirect stages. "Our" arguments comprehend everything that we regard as good, whereas "they" are deprived of all rations. Those rations have different national, political, religious grounds, and cannot be a subject of comments or reflection, they are only obvious. The rhetoric of exclusive and absolute rationale precludes any discussion, not only with those which are on the other side, but also amongst own supporters.

In order to determine the content of the enemy stereotype, as a universal language category used in political activity, it is necessary to focus attention on common elements used in different situations and circumstances for the structure of such stereotypes.

Creating an enemy stereotype is a consequence of dichotomous worldview, the world is perceived in terms of "own" – "other". Enemy stereotype arises and develops on the basis of the stereotype of "other", which is complemented by an auto-stereotype of the own group (Sobczak 2005: 97). Therefore, the stereotype of "other" does not say much about those who are its subject, but provides relevant information about the group which developed the specific stereotype of "other" (Mirga 1984: 64–65). Formulation of the definition of "other" is the essential condition for building the group's own awareness and auto-definition. Teresa Hołówka (1986: 169) recognizes it as follows: "[…] in a universal uniformity only *others* – a group located on a peripheral of our *world*, which for unknown reasons can see, hear, feel, thinks and behaves differently than *we* makes a breach. This dissimilarity is an intellectual and moral defect and constitutes a source of *evil*". Stereotype features are developed on the basis of the impact of group values in "own"–"other" relation. This dichotomy reveals a Manichaean world vision reflected in language, which is aimed to assign social phenomena names to the category of good or evil. Speech in this language (newspeak) is treated as a tool which determines thinking and behaviour of individuals and groups. The adoption of this Manichaean vision of reality as real will probably result in a belief that "they", exactly by virtue of placement in a negative perspective, are worse than "us". The next step is to recognize the category of "them" as an enemy. The important fact is that "own" and "other" categories are not created by an individual itself, but by a group or groups of which this individual is a member, and that "own" and "other" is experienced in the process of perception of signs of the judged individual's external reality. These are among others: language, attire, ritual, ceremony, speech, as well as public activity revealing different or identical objectives, values and cultural patterns (Hołówka 1986: 58). Another stage consists of the generalization of the enemy figure, which is applied to the enemy

stereotype description, and consequently the collective responsibility concept is regarded as right (Jakubowska-Branicka 2008: 248). However, it should be noted that the stereotype of "other" is not always negative. If the relations of the group which forms a stereotype with the group it evaluates are more distant and weaker, the probability that positive stereotype will be formed is greater. However, if connections between these groups are closer and deeper, the probability of a negative stereotype increases.

The stereotype of "other" does not have to be, although most often is, a negative stereotype showing negative features. However, the enemy stereotype is always a negative one. An enemy is a stranger, who creates or potentially may create a threat to the group that develops a given stereotype.

Among factors that form the enemy stereotype an important role seems to be played by elements which are characterized by the relations of enemy to faith or specific religion. Therefore, these expressions are an essential part of the enemy stereotype: *heathen*, *atheist*, *mason*, *heretic*, on the other hand: *clericalist*, *papist*, *Islamist*. A lot of elements also refer to the intellectual potential of the enemy. These include, among others: craftiness, forethought, economy, wisdom, as well as laziness, vindictiveness, nastiness, mismanagement. Moreover, external features have great importance: haughtiness, dirt, garrulousness, being phlegmatic, meanness. Quite often the mystery of the enemy is emphasized in stereotype context, the lack of clear information as to their appropriate objectives and intention. Hence, such expressions also appear: *hooded supporter*, *illiterate enquirer*, *and troublemaker*. It is associated with the conspiratorial vision of the world of groups which create the stereotype. One who does not share their ideas or who is on the opposite side is no longer only an enemy, but – further – is the one who incessantly plots, creates mysterious arrangements, acts to the detriment of Nation, State, Church, and above all – against Polish interests. Among the enemy stereotype elements many are ordinary insults and offensive expressions, such as: *rascal*, *liar*, *minion*, *traitor*, *agent*, *thug*, *puppet*, *swindler*, *madman*, *idiot*, *etc*. Often the very definition of racial, sexual, political worldview or national affiliation, already coloured negatively in an emotional way, becomes an essential part of the enemy stereotype, e.g.: *Bolshevik*, *nigger*, *nip*, *fag*, *commie*, *cacique*, *anti-Semite*, *Jew*, *Fritz*, *Rusky*, but also *Polack*, *Czesky*, *Pom*, *or Yankee*. These nicknames are aimed to disqualify an enemy in the public and international opinion (Olszyk 2013: 64).

It is crucial not to forget that an important part of the process of creation of the enemy stereotype is an appeal to fear, using anxiety in order to terrorize the

society, and thereby enforce certain behaviour. Canalization of fear and social frustration is carried out by aggression contributed to weaker ones, e.g. to members of minority groups included in other nationalities, becoming "a scapegoat". Strangeness arouses fear, and this in turn causes negative evaluation in some measure by design, without looking closer at "others". That anxiety excludes rational action and supports reactions based on "emotional automatisms", because it redirects human thoughts from a careful analysis of a given issue towards plans of release from it, what as a result causes greater submissiveness (Pratkanis, Aronson 2003: 182–189). Therefore, fear is a huge psychological power, which conducts human thoughts and energy towards the elimination of the threat, making an effective tool of manipulation in the social and economic life, but first of all in the political struggle.

The creation of a relatively precise definition of the enemy stereotype, the indication of the stages of its formation and the presentation of its role in political struggle is, in the author's opinion, very important for researchers in various fields of knowledge, especially for those who analyze political (election) discourse. It describes a given society, its anxieties, traditions, mentality, and ways of reaction in critical situations. It is also a precious source for the recognition of psychosocial basis of many political phenomena in the field of international relations as well, playing an important role in diagnoses and political studies.

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RECONCILING INCREMENTALISM WITH POLICY CHANGE.
THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The aim of this article is to explain current definition and application of punctuated equilibrium theory, which is as influential as any conceptual framework concerning policy process in political science, stimulating thought and research over the last two decades. Baumgartner and Jones borrowed the concept from studies of the evolution of species, but – as author shows – without operationalized definition, and turned it into a metaphor that can have mostly pedagogical use.

Author explains how punctuated equilibrium is useful for analyzing policy change in political systems other than the United States, but in the European political systems, political parties and their preferences must be taken into account. It is also presented how punctuated equilibrium is in fact a much-improved version of the incrementalism theory, rather than an application of biological insights to politics. Author differentiate successful application of the punctuated equilibrium in the description of the policy process from the explanation of Baumgartner and Jones about how those identified patterns in modern democracies were caused.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

theory of politics, policy process, public policy, policy change, punctuated equilibrium theory

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INTRODUCTION

The theory of punctuated equilibrium was originally developed on the basis of studies of the evolution of species, formulated in 1972 by Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould in response to the gradualism. It is unusual, as most of the theoretical approaches that political science has incorporated originated from other social sciences – concepts such as inquiry-principal-agent theory from economics, culture from anthropology, socialization from psychology and sociology, and so on (Prindle 2012: 39).

The assumption of punctuated equilibrium was that species arise very quickly, almost abruptly. This concept entered political science in the 1990s – at first to explain patterns of the American voting and elections (Prindle 2012: 28). The theory of punctuated equilibrium in political science attempts to explain the simple observation – policy processes are characterized by stability and incrementalism, but incidentally result in a change on a grand scale. However, Baumgartner and Jones cut the concept of Gould's punctuated equilibrium away from its operationalized definition and turned it into a metaphor that can have mostly pedagogical use (Prindle 2012: 32).

Far-reaching changes are taking place in one or more policy areas, when public understanding of current political issues is revised. Policies and government strategies are sometimes dramatically changed, but in most cases function in a manner similar to those from the past. Political area is understood as identical to the concepts of policy subsystem, i.e. section of public policy characterized by distinctiveness and a minimum internal cohesion, e.g. the area of health policy or the area of environmental protection.

The ambition of the theory of punctuated equilibrium is to explain both stable and inconsistent elements in the policy process, while according to the authors, earlier theories and models were designed or effective only in explaining one of the above elements. It can be argued that the theory of punctuated equilibrium has acquired status of commonly perceived as useful in explaining the essence of the policy process. However, in the Polish science it is used relatively seldom. It is only broadly mentioned by Ewa Nowak (2014: 77–94), although, this notion is translated into Polish in the way that is difficult to accept.

Incrementalism was the dominant paradigm for the description of the policy process from the 1950s to the 1980s (Dahl, Lindblom 1953). It was argued that policymakers do not survey all the possible choices to achieve the most desired results. The weakness of the theory of incrementalism was revealed during this

first broader empirical research that tried to turn incrementalism into an empirical theory reinforcing Lindblom's view. While conducting an analysis of the functioning of government agencies, Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky recognized the existence of decision rules strengthening the incrementalism, but also two types of non-incremental changes: temporary discontinuation of applying the rules or the introduction of completely new rules in the place of earlier ones (Davis, Dempster, Wildavsky 1966). The process of creating a budget is usually an incremental, though capable of responding to the needs of the economy and society, but only when it produces an adequate pressure on the participants in the process (Davis, Dempster, Wildavsky 1974: 427). Incrementalism does not enable to explain the phenomenon of radical changes in the political subsystems. It even excludes their existence, which is in contradiction to the empirical research or even the routine observation.

In their book, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) investigated a variety of policy areas through decades, and each time found a pattern of relatively long periods of stability broken by relatively short periods of significant activity, or in other words long-term incrementalism broken by short-term punctuations. From this time on, independently situated scholars frequently conducted empirical research demonstrating this ubiquitous pattern of policymaking. It is reasoned to say that punctuated equilibrium has been as influential as any conceptual framework in political science stimulating thought and research over the last two decades.

It could be observed that policy process in a routine manner usually leads to changes on a limited scale, while in larger intervals is a subject to shocks resulting in a radical departure from previous political mechanisms. And the existing policies had been already made in several research frameworks in the United States, although without convincing empirical proof. The ambition of the theory of punctuated equilibrium was also to extend the above observation basing it on a double foundation – institutionalism at the macro level and bounded rationality at the micro level. Punctuated equilibrium emphasized one assumption of bounded rationality – the short span of human attention, which afflicts political authorities as well as individuals. In the theory of punctuated equilibrium, particular consideration was given to the previously neglected elements: defining political problems and agenda-setting. Process of changing the definitions in the public discourse, and advancement and fall of political problems on the political agenda reinforces or undermines the existing policies (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 156). Therefore, the theory of punctuated

equilibrium is also sometimes described as the innovative combination of two approaches to the public policy – focusing on "policy communities", and those focusing on the process of agenda-setting (Cairney 2012: 175–176). Subsystem approach suggests that interest groups operate in a more restricted setting than traditional group theorists would present, acting at the meso-level of the polity in decision-making systems organized around discrete programs and issues (Worsham 1998: 486).

The paper is organized as follows. To begin with, the relations between political change and bounded rationality are explored. Simon's concept of bounded rationality is the key assumption in the punctuated equilibrium's explanation of policy process. Then, the two important phenomena in the theory are analyzed: policy monopoly and policy image. Both are crucial in maintaining stability and limiting changes. Before concluding, there is a review of the most interesting developments in the application and adaption of the theory in political science.

POLITICAL CHANGE AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY

Herbert Simon (1957, 1991) expanded the concept of bounded rationality distinguishing two types of information processing in decision-making: serial and parallel. The individual has only the ability to serial processing of information, i.e. can consciously devote attention to only one thing at a time. Another issue may be the subject of analysis and decision only after the (successful or not) attempt to cope with the previous issue. Organizations demonstrate greater diversity – some process individual information in a serial manner, but others are capable of parallel processing – dealing with many issues at the same time. Bounded rationality, understood in short as the awareness of cognitive limitations that policy-makers are subject to, was already the basis for the theory of incremental deciding within the framework of the budget process (Wildavsky 1964).

Originally, political systems at the macro level – similarly to the individuals – have only the ability of serial processing. The creation of partially autonomous policy subsystems allowed to engage system as a whole in parallel processing. Dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of issues of concern may be subject to analysis and decision at the same time within the appropriate expert communities (Jones 2001). Delegating issues to subsystem does not rule out changes

– group negotiations, coordination of interests and responding to a changing environment of a subsystem result in modifications, although to a limited extent. Political serial processing excludes radical change.

When parallel processing model in the specific subsystem ceases to function, the issues become the subject of serial processing, which is the domain of macro-level political system – identified in this paper as the political authorities on the highest level (usually one or two-chamber parliament and the government or president). Most commonly, political authorities deal with one, at most, several problematic political issues at the same time. In such conditions, these must be the issues of great importance, occupying top positions on the political agenda. In the theory of punctuated equilibrium, factors that affect the elevation of the issue to the top of the agenda are: the emergence of new, influential political actors interested in the issues of concern, change of the issue definition and increased media and public attention (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 159). Moving issue to the top positions on the political agenda at the system level is necessary, but not sufficient for the radical policy change. The decision making process, initiated by changes in the agenda, is long and often unpredictable – it may end without a decision, understood in a positive way, or with a decision distant from the expectations of political actors that were involved as advocates for change. The individual decision-making constantly use the same attributes that allows to structure alternatives until it is externally motivated to modify attributes (Jones 2001).

Transformation of the environment is a process with many obstacles. Involvement in political decision-making process raises transaction costs. Actors in the political system must bear these costs in order to respond to signals from the environment, which also tend to be vague and ambiguous. Costs can be twofold: cognitive – political actors must recognize the signal in order to be able to devote their attention, interpret signal and prepare solutions; and institutional – where the rules of the political system are usually thought to maintain the stability of the system (Jones, Baumgartner 2005). As a consequence, the issue is more probable to reach political agenda than to result in a particular political action. Indicators of agenda-setting, such as draft legislation, the deliberations of parliamentary committees and media reporting, are of much less leptokurtic character than the basic measure of the outputs of the political system (budget). Similarly to the original version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, in the punctuated equilibrium theory radical change has its source outside of the sub-system, while small changes are routinely made within the subsystem. Periods

of change are a necessity for the political system that allow for adapting to the environment and preventing from transformation into rigid Leviathan (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 157).

In many cases, crises such as natural disasters initiate the policy process by focusing attention of the political authorities, media and public on issues that are far down on the agenda. Such initiating events may also become a dramatic symbol of the problems that have already begun to arouse more interest (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 140). Environmental disasters like oil spills, etc., have had such significance in the last decades.

Baumgartner and Jones recently introduced the general notion of friction, indicating why political actors react disproportionally to incoming information (Jones, Baumgartner 2005; Jones, Sulkin, Larsen 2003). Friction implies that political actors sometimes do not react at all, but at other times overreact and suddenly pay a large amount of attention to the issue (Walgrave, Varone 2008: 391–392).

POLICY MONOPOLY

Discussion on political issues is usually carried out within the policy subsystems, created by the substantive criteria, not at the macro level. Each of the subsystems can be dominated by one interest group or may become a field of competition between a few interest groups. Borders are not fixed – subsystem may disintegrate and be absorbed by another subsystem, or a part of subsystem may develop into a new subsystem. If one interest group and one category of interests dominate the subsystem, such situation is referred to as the political monopoly.

Political monopoly is built by a community of experts/professionals operating within the bureaucracy, parliamentary committees and interest groups, working outside of the sphere of public and media interest. This community decides on more or less important issues within the subsystem. Sometimes, however, certain issues "light up" – in terms of Baumgartner and Jones – and become a subject of attention of the macro level political system (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 158). Long periods of stability (balance) and periods of radical change (punctuations) within the same institutional structure can be explained by the process of agenda-setting. It is also worth noting that although the individual events could begin the period of radical change, that period does not have to be short-

lived – once losing its equilibrium, subsystem may not recover for many years (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 280–281).

Policy monopoly in the terms of the punctuated equilibrium theory can be described with the help of the classification of political networks created by Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 251). Continuum of different types of relations between interest groups–public authorities extends between the two extremities: the policy community and the issue network. In the issue network, number of members is significant, barriers to entry are low, meetings occur on an irregular basis, relationships are unstable and there is often presence of a conflict. Policy monopoly in punctuated equilibrium is similar to the policy community: it consists of few members (most are excluded), mutual relations are close and stable, meetings between the members of the community are held often, and members of the monopoly share, at least at a basic level, a common understanding of policy problem and conviction about the best methods of solving it. One of the conditions for membership in the monopoly is to follow the basic rule – potential disputes are resolved within the community, not outside of it. Member of the monopoly should also support policy implementation. Policy monopoly, although closed and trying to "hide" from the eyes of the media and the public, is not synonymous with the so-called club politics or iron triangle, as the policy process was commonly described in the postwar period (Heclo 1978: 88). In this case, it refers to narrow elite at the macro level, rather than monopolies at the subsystem level.

Institutional divisions and overlapping competencies between institutions lead to a specific political dynamics between subsystems and macropolitics of parliament and the president. The inter-institutional dynamics usually paradoxically blocks the possibility of change, but sometimes has contrary effects and increases the scale of change. Shifts in the configuration of the dominant interests in the subsystem require the mobilization of considerable resources. That is not easy, but if happens, political actors, who have supported the existence of the status quo (directly or indirectly) so far, possess the motivation to engage in the process of change, accelerating and intensifying it. In countries such as the United States – with a federal structure, deep separation of powers and obscure jurisdictions at the same time – the number of political actors, who may be involved in the operation of the subsystem is significant, which further increases the size change (Baumgartner, Jones 1993). As Kingdon (1995) stated, there are many different policy entrepreneurs, many possible policy venues, and always many competing policy images available in the "primeval policy soup".

Political opponents can choose one of three strategies to remove the political monopoly of the subsystem. They can try to focus public attention and lead to interference of political authorities from the highest level into the subsystem. Alternatively, they may throw a kind of challenge to a monopoly within the subsystem by modifying the dominant political image. Often, however, the only real option is to search for appropriate decision-making venue. They strive, by trial and error, to find a venue that will be more sympathetic towards their demands and interpretations. As growing competences of public authorities and tendencies of decentralization increased the number of decision-making venues, it has become more difficult for the political monopoly to maintain isolation from the environment (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 43). It must be added, that not only interaction between policy images and policy venues brings about major policy change – actors within venues also determine whether change will be produced (Walgrave, Varone 2008: 387).

Punctuated equilibrium theory does not exclude the far-reaching diversity in terms of mechanisms of functioning of the various subsystems. Worsham (1998: 487–489) identified three basic types of subsystems, based on perceived differences in the ability of actors within the subsystem to block demands for change: dominant coalition, transitory coalition, and competitive coalition. Dominant coalition politics are similar to the classic iron triangle, in which legislators, government personnel, and special interests together decide about the public policy in a particular policy area. Transitory coalitions are created through the fracture of the dominant coalition into several proto-coalitions, which happens when the hidden interests of some members of a dominant coalition become more important to them than the interests they share in common with other members. Competitive coalition politics occur when traditionally dominant interests are challenged by a new coalition. In some cases, previously minority interests are able to achieve the control of the subsystem, in others, the new coalition involves outsiders from another subsystem.

POLICY IMAGE

Policy monopoly is not only the institutional structure dominant in the political subsystem. Monopoly to legitimize its position needs ideas or the so-called policy image. In the theory of punctuated equilibrium it is not personal; it does not concern the individual politician, but problematic issues and ways of their imag-

ing for the media and the general public. Policy image should be predisposed to a simple and direct communication to the environment (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 5). The political balance in the policy area is the result of the dominance of a particular policy image, supported by the power of a public authority and stabilized relations between the political forces (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 19).

Explanation of the theory of punctuated equilibrium also refers to the feedback model (Baumgartner, Jones 2002). In periods of balance there is a negative feedback – a power of policy monopoly and attractiveness of the policy image created by the monopoly block the subsystem's responsiveness to the requests for changes. In periods of radical change there is a positive feedback – small changes in the objective conditions relating to issue may lead to a radical change of policy, if it is at the macro level of political agenda. Here, the authors suggest an analogy to earthquakes – caused by the accumulation of small changes inside the globe. Ultimately, it is one minor change within the Earth that causes a drastic movement of tectonic plates beneath the Earth's surface and natural disaster.

Policy image is made up of a core based on empirically verifiable information and additional element that allow image to influence the emotions of the recipient. Each policy or political agenda is multifaceted and affects thousands of people in different ways. Therefore, if the policy is associated with one political image and has a generally positive meaning, it is a key to success of the policy monopoly. The image of political issues highlighting its technical, routine nature and incomprehensibility for non-specialists, discourages the participation of external actors and limits media coverage and public opinion attention. Therefore, it is also particularly attractive to political monopoly. Similarly desired is the image which indicates that the political problem was solved in principle and only specific elements relating to implementation remained to be realized.

Opponents of the existing political monopoly usually try to present a far different policy image of the issue. For example, in the past, in the area of energy policy, monopolies effectively depicted the image of cost efficiency and availability of energy produced from coal. In the last decades, opponents were able to present the image of atmospheric pollution resulting from coal processing, weakening the existing monopoly. It is important for opponents to appeal to universally accepted values, which can reach the attention of the environment. In the 90s, the list of the most important values for the US citizens included: progress, patriotism, sovereignty understood as an independence from external domination, justice and economic growth (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 7). In other

political systems, catalogs of such values are shaped differently, and all these catalogs will be subject to change over time.

The change of political image in the punctuated equilibrium theory is a prerequisite for radical change (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 161–162). That is explained by changes in attention – cognitive limitations result not only in reducing the number of issues that an individual can deal with. He is also not able to fully understand multi-element and permanently changing issues. The individual focuses on the selected, most significant element or its attribute. If the part or the whole of an attribute that is the focus of attention changes, the whole perception of the issue changes as well. That leads to a change of the methods of dealing with the issue. Changing the image means highlighting the most important elements or attributes of problematic issues, which are different from the previous ones. Cognitive limitations allowing political actors to perceive the issue only through the prism of one or more of the most important features result in a radical transformation of the interpretation of the problem and, consequently, in a radical change. The fact that individuals or organizations change earlier decisions, sometimes even completely withdrawing from them, does not result from sudden drastic changes in preferences or irrationality understood as the inability to make decisions according to one's own preferences (Jones 2001).

Dissemination of the new image can attract new political actors to the subsystem. More important political venues in the political system (in countries with federal or decentralized structure, as well as within the European Union) lead to more opportunities for the political entrepreneurs. If the federal government is not responsive to the presented expectations, there is a possibility of attempt to place it on the agenda of state (True, Jones, Baumgartner 2007: 162), region and the European Union, particularly since each of decision-making venues has a specific set of rules of conduct and different levels of openness to the participation of outside actors. It is frequently called "venue shopping".

The key element of most policy images and political problems is the answer to the questions – who is to blame for the emergence of the problem and who is responsible for solving the problem. Rarely, there is a general consensus that allows for a clear answer. Given the limited capacity of attention, struggle for dominance of the policy image between groups within a subsystem is not a question of proving that opponent's arguments are wrong, but is rather a question of drawing attention to other arguments, facts, or attributes.

CRITICAL RECEPTION OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM

During the evolution of punctuated equilibrium it was noted that policy change can be caused by variety of factors: elected officials, legislative committees, wars, new technologies and scientific changes, radical economic change, and reformist mobilizations by interest groups and coalitions opposed to policy monopolies (Repetto 2006; Givel 2010). Similarly diverse are factors contributing to the resistance of punctuations, which have been identified as: policy entrepreneurs, courts and rule of law, policy monopolies, bounded and not comprehensive rationality, lack of acceptance of new policy ideas tied to a public policy, and the fragmented political system in which only selected political jurisdictions may adopt significantly new legislation (Givel 2010: 188)

Worsham (1998: 486) noticed that before interest groups attempt to move an issue from the realm of parallel processing (sub-systems) to the realm of serial processing (the macro level) (Baumgartner, Jones 1993: 20), they engage in efforts to reshape the realm in which parallel processing occurs. These efforts, as well as additional factors, may cause particular subsystem equilibrium to waver – to move from one variant to another in an attempt to accommodate new pressure – that proves that subsystems are more flexible and varied than previously recognized. Therefore, the notion of wavering equilibrium was presented by Worsham. Prindle declared a proposition to rename the concept – "punctuated incrementalism" instead of "punctuated equilibrium" – because in his view the theory of policymaking articulated by Baumgartner and Jones is actually a much-improved version of the incrementalism theory, rather than an application of biological insights to politics, as proved earlier by Howlett and Migone (2011). Two aspects should be differentiated – descriptive and explanative. Successful application of the punctuated equilibrium in the public policy (descriptive model) does not necessarily prove the explanation of Baumgartner and Jones about how those identified patterns in modern democracies were caused (causal explanation) (Prindle 2012: 37–38). There are scientific studies, i.e. Pacific Northwest forestry policy, U.S. state tobacco policy, or U.S. auto efficiency policy proving that substantial outside alteration does not always lead to punctuation (Cashore, Howlett 2007; Givel 2010). Givel (2010: 196) even suggested that this warrants a revised description of the current "public policy-punctuated equilibrium syllogism".

It must be also taken into the account that the political system of the United States is one of a kind open and pluralist. Punctuated equilibrium is useful for

analyzing policy change in other political systems (Baumgartner, Jones 1993, 2009; Breunig, Koski 2006; Jones, Sulkin, Larsen 2003; Repetto 2006; Wood 2006, Worsham 1998), but further conditions should be added. In the European political systems, political parties and their preferences must be taken into account, or as Walgrave and Varone put it directly: "no parties, no change" (Walgrave, Varone 2008: 388–389). Focusing event, new image, new policy venue and much attention do not inevitably produce change. In European systems, there is a need for a suitable policy venue in which parties could play their usual role and intermediate in an elite compromise that shall translate into a major policy change. Moreover, probability of a policy change may be influenced by the date of general elections. Parties are autonomous actors and can act as veto players, defending their preferences, even those, which are against the mainstream (Walgrave, Varone 2008: 391–392) – and it was proved that shifting preferences is not easy for parties (Walgrave, Varone, Dumont 2006). Parties do not wait for external factors to induce changes – there are planned and gradual changes through the electoral cycle. In 2009, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) revised the theory and stated that punctuated equilibrium can occur through "disruptive dynamics" created by interaction between political parties, interest groups, elected officials, and legislative committees.

CONLUSIONS

Focusing on political institutions, mobilization of interests and bounded rationality, punctuated equilibrium helps to explain the dynamics of interactions between institutions and groups. Taking into account the limitations of public institutions, constantly increasing public competences and an endless amount of problems looking for a place on the political agenda, punctuated equilibrium builds a model of multi-level political system of comprehensive internal connections.

Political system is able to function thanks to the creation of the partially autonomous policy subsystems that allow to engage system as a whole in parallel processing. Stability in the subsystems is preserved by policy monopoly which consists of a few members (most are excluded), where mutual relations are close and stable, meetings between the members of the community are held often, and members of the monopoly share a common understanding of policy problem. What is the most interesting – policy monopoly is closed and trying to "hide"

from the eyes of the media and the public. Interplay between policy monopoly and policy image is crucial – ways of imaging problematic issues for the media and the general public allow to keep macro-system away from the subsystem.

As pointed in this article, punctuated equilibrium is useful for analyzing policy change in political systems other than the United States, but in the European political systems, political parties and their preferences must be taken into account. Although punctuated equilibrium was created in opposition to the previously dominating theory of incrementalism, that is, in fact, a much-improved version of this theory (long-term incrementalism broken by short-term punctuations), rather than an application of biological insights to politics. Analyzing the theory of punctuated equilibrium we have to differentiate successful application of the punctuated equilibrium in the description of the policy process from the explanation of Baumgartner and Jones about how those identified patterns in modern democracies were caused.

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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON RAISON D'ÉTAT

Joanna Sanecka-Tyczyńska*

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The concept of raison d'état (reason of state) is very popular in Poland, and it will apparently remain relevant as long as the Polish state exists. The idea is commonly used in official statements by politicians, political journalism, and in various government documents. Raison d'état is an ambiguous concept, which results from simplified and often popular opinions on what is and what is not the raison d'état. Conceptual chaos, intuitive judgments and notions appear to be the reason why political scientists are discouraged from systematized and in-depth studies on this political category. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses definitions of raison d'état and the accompanying problems. The second one deals with the theoretical aspect covering the subjective, objective, temporal and spatial scopes of the concept. Two new definitions of raison d'état were mentioned which diminish the importance of the nation-state at the expense of international organizations. The third part presents methodological approaches in studies on raison d'état understood in two ways: as a system of vital interests of the state and as a category of political thought.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

reason of state, political theory and methodology, political thought

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Raison d'état is an ambiguous concept, which results from simplified and often popular opinions on what is and what is not the raison d'état. Conceptual chaos, intuitive judgments and notions appear to be the reason why political scientists are discouraged from systematized and in-depth studies on this political category. The concept of raison d'état (reason of state) is widely used in official statements by politicians, political journalism, and in various government documents.

Characteristic constituents of raison d'état are sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, protection of security, national identity, and the country's development capacities. What serves raison d'état is foreign policy, the choice of allies, coordination of operations of state authorities, and acceptance by citizens. Furthermore, raison d'état is a very important norm because it applies to the central agencies of state authority as "a postulate for specific conceptualization i.e. molding of activity consisting in governing the state's policy; it functions as a theoretical element of social practice" (Stemplowski 2013: 15). It specifies the hierarchy of political objectives and means of achieving them, including those that cannot be negotiated with foreign entities.

In the Third Republic [of Poland] the idea of raison d'état is still alive and it will apparently remain relevant as long as the Polish state exists. The global economic crisis, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 considerably reinforced thinking in terms of state interests. Both in Western Europe and in Poland questions began to be asked again about the fundamental responsibilities of the state as a political organization. The Polish discussion on the international aspects of raison d'état in 2015 was full of acute political disputes concerning particularly Polish-Russian relations in the context of Poland's membership of NATO and the European Union.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses definitions of raison d'état and the accompanying problems. The second one deals with the theoretical aspect covering the subjective, objective, temporal and spatial scopes of the concept. Two new definitions of raison d'état were mentioned which diminish the importance of the nation-state at the expense of international organizations. The third part presents methodological approaches in studies on raison d'état understood in two ways: as a system of vital interests of the state and as a category of political thought.

RAISON D'ÉTAT IN THE CONCEPTUAL NETWORK
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Conceptualization of political science terminology is an important element of political theory. Its goal is to define and interpret terms that constitute the conceptual network of political science. Many political science concepts have a multifaceted character, therefore it is necessary to explain their meanings and research perspectives that they imply. While studying raison d'état, we encounter etymological and definitional problems. They are connected with defining the meaning of raison d'état, while the main problems in this research area stem from the failure to understand the constituents: "reason" (raison) and "state" (état), which may appear archaic at present. Raison d'état is indisputably a whole with a complicated structure (Jabłoński 2010; Stemplowski 2007: 237)[1].

The category of raison d'état belongs to the group of so-called essentially contested concepts. The "contested concept" is a term first used by Walter B. Gallie and indicates the contents of something that is so abstract, ambiguous and indeterminate that its full meaning can be grasped only through a concept that admits of different ways of understanding, i.e. different conceptions of a concept (Gallie 1956: 167–172)[2].

The idea of raison d'état evolved as the state and political thought developed. It underwent various stages: early absolutism (until the mid-17th century), its mature form (until the French Revolution), and entered the stage of the developing nation-state. At present, raison d'état is understood first of all in connection with the problems of governing the state, based on its interests (Stemplowski 1997: 102).

Raison d'état is usually defined as "regard for state interest" or "state interest" or, as Machiavelli put it, "the precedence of state interests over other norms". Some scholars define the concept of raison d'état in terms of "permanent and overriding interests of society and nation, which constitutes a state, without which it would be impossible to achieve other goals", which a community seeks to attain. According to Z.J. Pietraś, "raison d'état is a historically variable system

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[1] Raison d'état, as a term often used in popular language, was introduced into political language in the 16th c. by the Florentine historian and politician Francesco Guicciardini.

[2] The authors of articles published in the study *Kryterium etyczne w koncepcji racji stanu* [Ethical Criterion in the Concept of Raison d'État] successfully tried to specify the definition of the concept of raison d'état through the ethical criterion.

of fundamental internal and external interests of the state, implemented in an uncompromising way" (1989: 42; Meinecke 1957: 25–27).

An interesting exemplification of the approach to raison d'état (as a norm for those in power) was offered by Ryszard Stemplowski. According to his view, the conception of raison d'état (specifically: a UE member state) is "a doctrinal postulate of pursuing the state's policy – by the authority of executive power with constitutionally defined governing competencies in this area" – which: expresses the identity of the sovereign, including its vital interests; it is based on the hierarchy of goals and means of achieving them, including goals that cannot be negotiated with foreign entities (goals to be implemented in the EU); it implements constitutional values and principles; it is systematically updated and is publicly justified (Stemplowski 2013: 15).

Raison d'état can be defined based on different criteria. Firstly, the criterion of importance (defining of fundamental interests and secondary ones), secondly – the criterion of content (political, economic or security interests, etc.), thirdly – permanence of interests (permanent and changing), fourthly – the criterion of spatial location of state interests and correlation with other states. In the international dimension, the bipolar division of the world was challenged in the early 1990s, in the internal dimension the question of internal sovereignty arose: the attitude of the state to citizens, the attitude of citizens to the state; and the value system on which state institutions would be based (Jackowska 2008: 294; Rzegocki 2008: 38–40).

The extreme complexity of the concept of raison d'état stems from two principal issues: (1) the conceptual structure of raison d'état comprises raison d'état itself and its many references to specifiable factors and its accompanying phenomena at a given time and place; (2) the concept does not occur by itself but in conjunction with the state and state authority.

The analysis of definitions of raison d'état that are present in (Polish and foreign) political science literature allows us to determine different interpretations of it. Most often, there were definitions describing raison d'état as: the reason for existence of the sovereign state; action according to realistic rules; the necessity of using special measures; ensuring of the security of the state and citizens; seeking of objective rules, determinants of foreign policy; justification for immoral actions by the authorities or the people, and discrepancy between ethics and politics.

The foregoing definitions have two features in common. First, they connect raison d'état with the state as its fundamental and only carrier; secondly, they

explicitly suggest that the issue is the state's most important values and needs although they (the definitions) do not specify them. It would be impossible, anyway, mainly because of the highly individualized character of this category and its variability in time and space.

The problem of conceptual analysis in political theory is the multiplication of semantic subtypes. This is also the case with the concept of raison d'état. In foreign literature, there are two new definitions of raison d'état that belittle the importance of the nation-state and emphasize the strategic dimension of raison d'état. The first one stresses the international "basis" of the state – participation in international organizations, alliances, etc. According to K.D. Wolf, the government seeking greater and greater independence can implement the strategy for "democratization through internationalization", which may be perceived as the so-called new raison d'état in the age of globalization and democratic government. It was demonstrated that at present the governing elites use international institutions to gain more clout on the domestic political scene in order to win over the internal opposition to the policies they (the elites) prefer. An example can be the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (Wolf 1999: 333–335; Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 147–155; Musekamp 2011: 120).

The other conception is the so-called reason of the world or raison du monde, closely linked with the globalization process. According to Philip G. Cerny, the state's raison d'état is being replaced by the "transnational, globalizing raison d'état" called "raison d'état of the World". While the state still has an invaluable role to play, this mission has to be manifested in international relations rather than internal policy. The states, especially the strong ones, formulate – apart from state interests – also transnational, increasingly global goals (Cerny 2010: 5 et seq.; Harrison, Boyd 2003: 34)[3]. Cannot we call worldwide peace and prosperity the raison du monde?

As R. Stemplowski rightly emphasized, it is necessary to examine raison d'état in two ways. On the one hand, it was, is, and will long be identified with a set of existential interests of the state and the motive for operation of the forces governing a particular state. On the other hand, the process of evolution of the idea of raison d'état as a result of the formation and development of supra-state structures in particular regions of the world began. The contemporary states

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[3] It is closely connected, first of all, with the globalization of economy. A manifestation of this tendency are the conceptions of increasingly strong international integration.

are not yet anachronistic but they are no longer obstacles in the political and economic integration of the states (1997: 112–113)[4].

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF RAISON D'ÉTAT

The theoretical aspect of the study of raison d'état is associated with the subjective, spatial, objective, and temporal scope of the concept, and with the definition of the function of raison d'état. In theory, the subjective scope of raison d'état embraces the sole "carrier" (subject) of raison d'état, which is the state. In practice, the subject is complex: with the state we associate the forces that govern it, which in fact define and pursue raison d'état. These are constitutionally defined chief state authorities run by those responsible for state policy. In democratic states, the content of raison d'état may be influenced by "nonstandard subjects", such as civil society acting through non-government organizations, the media circles, and religious associations.

Taking into account the state as the subject of raison d'état, it should be stressed that raison d'état as a separate political category is a result of the formation of the modern state. It is a state-centric category and that is why it is not correct to identify raison d'état with national interest (Rykiel 2006: 37). The concept of raison d'état lays emphasis on the state as the political organization of the sovereign (political nation). It comprises the content of both national and public interests. Raison d'état is always one, and the conception of national interests presupposes that they are many, which requires additional conceptualization already at the fundamental level. In the democratic state, the understanding of raison d'état usually dissociates itself from two positions: (1) legal relativism (for the sake of state interest it is admissible to break the law), and (2) moral relativism (raison d'état as a moral justification for the state's actions) (Groszyk 1997: 108; Stemplowski 2013: 27).

The spatial scope corresponds to the objective scope because raison d'état is pursued at the territory of the state to which it refers (internal affairs), or in the international arena in relations with other states. Therefore, raison d'état should not be confined to one of the two aspects in question. The two complement each other: in the international relations the problem of the state's existence, its

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[4] A similar duality in understanding raison d'état is discernible in contemporary political thought in Poland.

sovereignty or subjectivity is decided, while stable internal development often determines the power of the state in the international arena.

The objective aspect of raison d'état defines which interests the scope of raison d'état comprises. Scholarship agrees that raison d'état includes primary, superior, most important or universal interests of the state (Kukułka 2000: 222 et seq.)[5]. Unquestionably, the state's "vital" interests comprise the state's existence, security and its internal political system, as well as national identity, stability, and development prospects. This interpretation means that raison d'état includes only some part of the most important national interests. Kazimierz Łastawski defined raison d'état as a value expressing "the actually existing nationwide interests". Moreover, Łastawski also points out the changing implementation context of these interests and the influence of raison d'état on the state's strategy (Łastawski 2009: 27–28).

A detailed specification of interests that are included in raison d'état is difficult for many reasons, a significant one being methodological orientation. Scholars professing the realistic paradigm prefer "concrete" interests associated with the state, first of all national security, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. Proponents of a liberal (idealist) approach will eagerly add other values: freedom, human rights, living standards, or the like. Consequently, there is no one intersubjective definition of raison d'état (Zięba 2010: 97; Ponczek 2004: 406).

The contemporary raison d'état (national interest) undoubtedly comprises diversified interests that can be classified into five major groups. The first group covers the interests that are closely related to the country's existence in the international arena, its sovereignty, unthreatened territorial integrity and coherent identity, and also the shaping of state-oriented, national and social relationships. The second group concerns system-related interests, i.e. establishing a democratic, stable and efficient social and political system, respect for human rights, self-governance, and the like. The third group relates to the optimum socio-economic development of the country, ensuring a continual improvement in the citizens' well-being. Sustainable economic development, economic sovereignty,

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[5] In Polish literature on the subject the best known is J. Kukułka's typology, which distinguishes three types of national interests: (1) existential (inter alia – territorial integrity, security, certainty and survival, development, identification, adaptation); (2) co-existential (concerning, inter alia, sovereignty, participation in the international system, cooperation, the position and role of the state); (3) functional (manifested, inter alia, in the activity of participants, their efficacy and efficiency of actions).

demographic growth, and social and civilizational progress are some of the major challenges faced by a nation's leaders. The fourth group of interests involves strengthening the country's international position, which allows it to increase its abilities to improve internal security and to play prominent international roles. This can be achieved by joining international treaties of various types and scopes, and by establishing good relationships with neighbouring countries. The fifth group covers the broadly defined issues of national security, comprising a number of aspects to be distinguished by applying an objective criterion. These include political, public, socio-cultural, economic, energy-related, military, ecological and cyber-safety aspects.

Apart from the objective, subjective and spatial scopes, the theoretical aspect of raison d'état also covers the temporal scope. According to Ryszard Zięba's analysis, in literature on the subject there are three main approaches to understanding the temporal scope of raison d'état. Firstly, emphasis on the permanence and long-term of interests and values represented by raison d'état. Secondly, the assumption that raison d'état is comparatively stable, and it evolves after the alignment of powers in the state has been redefined or after distinct reshuffling in the international environment. Thirdly, stressing of the historical variability and evolution of interests that make up raison d'état. In this last approach, raison d'état has a definite temporal dimension and embraces interests relevant at a particular moment in history (Zięba 2010: 94)[6].

The last, but not the least important issue is to define the function of raison d'état in relation to the state's policy and actions. Six fundamental functions of raison d'état have been distinguished: (1) explicative (declarative) – it enables understanding intentions and actions taken by politicians; (2) justificative – it serves to justify political actions; (3) decisive – it facilitates evaluating the situation and defining allies and enemies in the international arena; (4) motivational – it inspires political actions and prompts the formulation of future actions; (5) integrative – it unites people around specific interests and goals; (6) strategic – it contributes to formulating long-term goals of internal policy and to creating a foreign policy strategy.

Some scholars distinguish two additional functions: one that creates the future universalization of the idea of raison d'état, and one that moulds public debate. The first defines the new paradigm of raison d'état – opposed to the

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[6] In Poland, in the last decades, it became necessary to re-formulate the content of raison d'état twice: in 1989–1990, and in 2004, right before Poland's accession to the European Union.

traditional one, developed in the period of sovereign nation states. In the context of the second "new" function, various subjects (actors) of discourse (political elites, society, religious associations, the media, etc.) are pointed out that, by presenting diverse concepts of raison d'état, influence other participants in the debate and are also influenced at the same time (Groszyk 1997: 108–113).

METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF STUDYING RAISON D'ÉTAT

Scholars who study raison d'état will probably encounter methodological challenges connected with the choice of a methodological approach. In the scientific literature, three main methodological approaches can be distinguished. The first – normative, when politicians and scholars formulate the future and desirable objective scope of raison d'état, i.e. the fundamental interests and goals of the state. The second one – declarative, when scholars analyze political declarations of the center of power in the state. This is an empirical approach that examines declarations, i.e. the advocated conceptions. This research attitude leads to the conclusion that raison d'état is the system of the highest political justifications for the undertaken or intended actions. The third methodological approach is called realistic. It is represented by scholars who do not confine themselves to analyzing political declarations or programs but try to reconstruct raison d'état, based on the actual actions of the state. They conclude that raison d'état is a historically changing system of fundamental external and internal state interests implemented in an uncompromising way. The last approach appears to be the most useful, guaranteeing the complete identification of raison d'état. It should be also remembered that the dynamics of international relations requires that politicians constantly analyze and create new views based each time on the changing reality (Pietraś 1989: 39–40). It is the task of the scholar to capture this dynamics.

A similar distinction was made by Paul Seabury, who considered the State's interests in normative and descriptive terms. In normative terms, the State's interests form a set of objectives which the State declares to pursue through international relations, while in descriptive terms, they relate to the objectives which are sought to be accomplished at a specific time, i.e. the actually-pursued goals (Seabury 1963: 85–86).

In political science inquiry, raison d'état can be treated in two ways. Firstly, in the traditional terms, as the only binding norm or directive in the activities

of state authorities (it is necessary to analyze government documents, strategies, legal acts reflecting raison d'état). Secondly, as a category of political thought, because any other party defines and formulates their concept of raison d'état in their own way (to fully know the problem it is necessary to analyze not only the evidence of political thought but also its traces, i.e. decisions made by politicians who were active in the political arena or participated in the exercise of power).

As far as the second approach to the national interest is concerned, it should be emphasised that the notion of "political thought" is understood as "any form of reflection on political reality, regardless of the development level, internal cohesion, systematisation, theoretisation or concretisation". It emerges as an outcome of political thinking, which is reflected, among other things, in the formation of ideas. When the reflection on political reality is detailed enough and organised, and contains a certain theoretical component, it can go through the following three development stages: ideology, concept, and programme. The world of ideas at a given point in time is an amalgamation of several political thoughts displaying various degrees of development. To describe them, we often resort to abstract notions (such as the national interest) which are actually coined by scholars in order to organise and investigate a given subject of study (Paruch 2004: 15–16, 24–25).

Upon the second interpretation, an indisputable problem and challenge will be to indentify which elements make up the raison d'état in the political thought of a party, because politicians eagerly resort to ultimate concepts, usually arbitrarily understood, such as "national interest" or "raison d'état".

In contemporary Polish political thought, there are different conceptions of raison d'état. The concepts like raison d'état or national interest were often excessively used by politicians and political journalists, without settling the issue whether the state should pursue a liberal or statist economic policy; whether it should be a monarchy or a republic, whether to carry out a pro-German, pro-American or pro-Russian policy.

Referring to the category of raison d'état, it is possible to prove the theoretical rightness of each of the foregoing options. A proponent of statism will prove that the state's increased control over the economy is necessary for reasons of state; a free-market liberal will prove that state control leads to economic stagnation, thus negating raison d'état. A supporter of monarchy will prove that raison d'état is best fulfilled by a non-party monarchy while a republican will demonstrate that raison d'état is best understood by a sovereign people because no one will take care of their interest better

than that people. In international politics, many political, economic, cultural or historical arguments can be shown which by turns justify Poland's strategic alliance with the United States, Germany, Ukraine, or with Russia. The differences in understanding raison d'état are fundamental, not reducible, and have two reasons. Firstly, if we define raison d'état as a result of reflection on the condition of the political world, the principal problem are differences, characteristic of the human mind, in perceiving the same facts by different people. These contradictions did not have to stem from ill will but from focusing on other elements regarded as crucial, or from a different assessment of the actual alignment of powers. Secondly, the definition of raison d'état is influenced by many axiological factors. Each political view is determined by the values and convictions of the person that espouses it.

In contemporary Polish political thought, out of the plurality of views on raison d'état there emerge many interpretations of what it is and how to implement it. A politician who uses the category of raison d'état has a specific model of state and society in mind, which he regards as exemplary and as the ultimate goal. To a Catholic politician, this will be a vision of a religious and traditional Poland, in which modern economy harmoniously combines with tradition; to a liberal politician – modernization and individual freedom; to a left-wing politician – the vision of a secular and economically anti-liberal country (Wielomski 2010: 84).

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

We understand raison d'état as a system of the state's existential interests pursued in an uncompromising way, about which there should be a consensus of the main political forces in a state. Raison d'état can also be treated as a separate value or category of political thought, around which visions of the state are built, covering internal and international politics. While analyzing the theoretical and methodological aspects of raison d'état, it should be said that it is characterized by unclear definitions, very broad content, temporal variability, difficulty in defining the catalog of state interests that make up raison d'état, and by different theoretical and methodological approaches. All this discourages scholars from studying this category. Paradoxically, this multidimensional and multifaceted feature combined with the special Polish way of understanding raison d'état may make it attractive in terms of research.

Interesting from the standpoint of the theory of raison d'état is its contemporary evolution towards transnational raison d'état. Inevitable globalization processes and the activities of international and transnational organizations and institutions lead to the universalization of raison d'état. In the course of this evolution, the way of understanding such concepts as sovereignty or state security (indispensable constituents of raison d'état) changes. Sovereignty is replaced by the concept of subjectivity while security acquires an ever new objective scope.

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ATHENÆUM
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THE SYMBOLISM OF POPULISM

*Andrei Taranu**

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The vast majority of the papers on populism describe this political phenomenon as one which is very difficult to explain and to analyze due to its discursive versatility and behavioural chameleonism. Furthermore, I would argue that the term populism covers more political and social realities than one single term would normally concentrate from a semantic point of view. I focus more over the psychological roots of populism which can be observed in the political symbolic field. In that manner, I consider that political symbolic, as part of the behavioural theory, can be a better tool for unveiling the populist discourse than the usual techniques of political analysis.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

democracy, populism, behavioural theory

Politics is, as shown by Lucien Sfez, a business of symbols, because it is based on legitimacy (Sfez 2000). And legitimacy is an abstract reality that can be demonstrated only by political majority and the support of public policy rather than by specific or economic interests. For this reason, the struggle for legitimacy is probably more likely to take place in the realm of image and discourse than in the area of public policy. That is, politics – almost everywhere in the Western world and in other places as well – has become dependent of the electoral campaigns that slowly take over the whole public space, not only during elections (whatever they are) but also before and after the election. Basically the political space has

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become one of constant electoral campaigns, that is to say a sandbox where image and symbol take more space than political action itself, which aims mostly to take steps and innovate through public policy or through channeling public support for large projects, such as sending people to Mars or eradicating hunger from the planet.

This permanent campaign generated, as Guy Hermet points out, the emergence and strengthening of a new string of political parties, namely the populist parties (Hermet 2007). These parties are, as shown by the last decade and a half, not able to govern, but are able to mobilize societies and to gather enough votes to represent a real threat to main-stream political parties. And when we say they are not able to govern, we can give examples: Pym Fortuyn in the Netherlands, or the FPO in Austria, who came to power (in Austria they even gave the prime minister), did not produce any notable things in government, and were forced to retreat relatively quickly. But even in these conditions, populist parties continue to attract a wide electorate that is sufficiently large so as to control or at least influence most government. Take the case of Holland, where the Christian Democrat Conservative government was forced to enter an alliance with the Freedom and Justice Party of Geert Wilders, or Austria, where parties following contradictory ideologies (socialists and conservatives) were forced to ally themselves in order to isolate the populists, who were the kingmakers in the election. Thus, there was a certain political instability which led to early elections and that, in turn, led to a new electoral campaign.

The vast majority of works about political populism describe this phenomenon as being very difficult to explain and analyze due to its versatility in discourse and chameleonic behavior. In addition, I would add that the term "populism" describes many political and social realities, maybe more than one single term can concentrate semantically. Therefore, many analysts of the phenomenon like Guy Hermet (2007) or Gianfranco Pasquino (2008) try to introduce the term "populisms" instead of "populism", in their search to find a clear definition as to how this phenomenon could be defined. Some authors (Frölich-Steffen et al. 2005: 4; Mudde 2004: 541; Touraine 2007: 38) defined populism as a system of "post-industrial" parties leading to the sense of "post-classical". Others (Decker 2006; Knight 1998; Viguera 1993) defined it as a specific style of doing politics, that has a different discourse for each society, but that shares an intimate structure of behaviour and ideas.

Therefore, before assuming one definition, we should consider describing the main political elements that are regarded as populist, no matter the region where

it is encountered: 1. despise and even hate towards the elites; 2. a strong anti-corruption rhetoric; 3. anti-system discourse based on the appeal to the people as a whole; 4. cultural (or religious) conservatism; 5. economic egalitarianism; 6. rhetorical anti-capitalism; 7. assumed nationalism; 8. xenophobic behaviour and speeches; 9. contradictory public policies (when in government); 10. a foreign policy and an alliance system that is also anti-system (Krastev 2009).

Of course these are all pieces of a puzzle, and they are not found everywhere in the same formula, or with the same intensity at the same time. But each of these elements can be considered as expression of populism. And perhaps this is why the term "populisms" seems more correct than "populism" as a generic term.

Despite the rather large differences in behaviour and speech, there is a defining core that allows to take into account the multiple forms that can be embodied by populism. Canovan (1999) defines this common core as "a call to the people to unite against the established power structures and dominant ideas and values of society". The other definition belongs to Cas Mudde (2005), who tries to get a synthesis of populist discourse and he defines populism as an ideology with a diluted core that aims to devise society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the "pure people" against the "corrupt elites", arguing that policy should be the expression of the general will of the people. In a populist democracy nothing is more important than the general will, not even constitutional laws.

Increasing scientific interest about this subject reflects a growing presence of the populist discourse in the empirical reality of the global political landscape. This is also because it is happening in areas that appear to have nothing in common, and in the most unexpected forms. And yet the identity elements of populism seem to unite different social and political areas. We can generally distinguish three types of populism and they are largely considered to be quite different: the Latin American, the West European, and the Eastern and Central European discourse. We will try to show how the discourses and the political actions for the latter two are linked, which shows in turn that political discourse is becoming more and more globalized.

In Western Europe, the success of radical right populist parties like the National Front in France, or the Freedom Party in Austria, which have a stable base around 10% starting from the 80s, has intrigued researchers. They built theories and analyzed this phenomenon, but their theories were not suited to describing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This does not mean that essentially CEE parties had very different discourses, but that they were

adapted to the political and social realities of their region. Parties like the Social Labour Party and the Greater Romania Party in Romania, Vladimir Mečiar's People's Party in Slovakia and others had both a nationalist and xenophobic discourse, dividing society between the "right people" and the "corrupt elites" like in the West, but they are related to different situations and to different targets.

Radical right-wing populist parties have had relatively comparable scores on both sides of the former Iron Curtain in Europe in the early 90s. Despite this common trait, most authors tend to focus their analysis on Western populism, avoiding the perspective of pan- European populism and a thorough examination of populism in post-communist countries. What little literature exists attempting at comparative studies on populism in this regard is deeply divided, as some authors focus on the intrinsic difference between populism in CEE and Western Europe, while others emphasize the risk of drawing artificial distinctions between the East and the West and generating different categories and realities, arguing that the phenomenon is pan-European. This latter group believes that the growing success of populist discourse in both parts of the EU is generated essentially by a common dissatisfaction of Europeans with democracy.

If we focus on the definition of populism pointed out earlier, these two approaches are not necessarily contradictory. In other words, there is a "common analytical core" (Panizza 2005), or a structure that can be found in populist discourse in both the East and the West. However, because populism appears on two fundamentally different political backgrounds: the well-established democracies of Western democracies and the post-communist East, we do need to analyze these different strings on both sides of the former Iron Curtain.

Before analyzing the various expressions of populism in Europe, it is necessary to define more precisely the "common analytical core" that Francisco Panizza (2005) uses to draw together these various forms of populism. Under his approach, populism is a speech against the status quo, which simplifies the political space, symbolically dividing society between "the People" and "the Others". "The People", under this perspective, is not an abstraction that is necessary for any democratic theory, but a unitary and homogeneous body, defined by its opposition to its enemies. The latter consists primarily of the political and economical elites that usurped political power, and of minorities that threaten the identity and homogeneity of "the People".

A defining characteristic of populist discourse is what Paul Taggart calls "the intrinsic chameleonic quality of populism" (Taggart 2000), which varies accord-

ing to the specific realities in which the discourse takes place. In other words, there are always "signifiers devoid of content", which can take a variety of forms. According to Canovan (1999), the power structure of the state (or region) is essential in the formation of a specific populist discourse as populism is above all a reaction to the power of elites and the dominant political discourse. Therefore, by following this trail, we see a much better opportunity to identify specific forms of populist discourse in CEE and in Western Europe.

Depending on the definition of "the Other", we can find differences between populist discourse in the East and the West: for instance, while in Western populist rhetoric "the Other" is described as an external threat, an invasive structure threatening the homogeneity of the people, a category in which immigrants and those who are calling for economic or political asylum are included, "the Other" in CEE populist rhetoric is often an insider that has been a part of society for a long time, but that is not part of the nation as such, e.g. ethnic populations like Roma, Jews, and Hungarians (for Romania and Slovakia, for example). More precisely, in Eastern Europe populist discourse tends to be more inclined towards exclusion, having open racist and xenophobic overtones. As Cas Mudde (Mudde 2005) pointed out, anti-Semitism and racism are more widespread and accepted in CEE societies and, as a result, they are a more obvious part of radical political discourse while "populist political parties and even main stream parties […] are less willing to act against racist or nationalist extremism than in the West" (Mudde 2005: page?). On the other hand, the argument for exclusion of radical right parties in Western Europe is based on economic speech ("immigrants steal our jobs") or sociological one ("they refuse to integrate"), becoming a form of political correctness of xenophobia.

While Western Europe has a long tradition of anti-establishment populist discourse, the elite being defining for those holding political power – and as Vilfredo Pareto's theory points out – the economical power as well, CEE anti-elites discourse is often associated with national-communism. In most cases, anti-elitism in Central Europe is often directed against the main party of the left political spectrum, especially the one considered the successor of the former communist party. The Polish case of the Order and Justice party of the Kaczynski brothers is extremely relevant, because it came to power with a profoundly anti-communist discourse a decade and a half after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Another fundamental difference between populisms of the Western post-communist countries is that, generally speaking, perhaps with the exception of Forza Italia (currently Popolo della Liberta) in Italy, politi-

cal parties in Western Europe usually recognize the political legitimacy of its political enemies, or, in other words, take into account political pluralism as a necessary component of a functioning democracy. Chantal Mouffe takes the view that "the opposition monopoly against the established order" (Mouffe 2005) of populist parties in the West gives them the aura of adolescent rebels against the democratic order, allowing at the same time for them to be largely ignored as such. And they too are forced to respect the democratic order, which (they claim) is at the center of their ideology. Precisely because they hold so much to the people's will, they are unable to afford to question democracy, although they would like to impose their principles upon it. As Michael Shafir (2011) points out, "the image that non-populist politicians are trying to cultivate is one of the reluctant politician, whose entry into politics is considered a necessary evil which also demands his sacrifice. It follows then, that politicians who are non-populists are *systemic* at least in appearance. […] they no longer aim for targets that would destroy the existing political system, but on the contrary, claim that their objective is to maintain a genuine democracy".

This is not necessarily the case of post-communist Europe, where center-right parties tend to have a similar populist discourse like their extremist nationalist counterparts, such as Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary, or PDL and PRM in Romania. In their discourse, "left" part of the people is their main political opponent, and it is often regarded as an illegitimate representative of the nation, because it is associated, at least symbolically, with communism. Viktor Orban, leader of the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary, is a good example for this trend. After losing the 2002 elections in Hungary, he stated: "We, who are gathered here today, we are not and never will be in opposition. The Nation cannot be in opposition" (Tamas 2009). Even though it is officially a center-right party, Fidesz will adopt more and more populist perspectives, using the concept of nation in an extensive, even totalitarian sense, where representative democracy – the legitimacy of each elected person – is abandoned. Also, because of the banalization of the link between populism and nationalism in CEE, the center-right parties cannot distance themselves from and never truly have condemned the populist radical right, and are more open to forming coalitions with them (see again the Hungarian case, also Slovakia in 2012).

According to Panizza (2005), populism thrives in "times of crisis and distrust" as a result of the "failure of existing social and political institutions to limit and regulate political themes in a relatively stable order" (page?). In other words, populism is the most seductive ideology (or alternative) when the institutional

system is unable to resolve the imbalances caused by general change or a specific crisis in the political, economic, or social spheres. This happens also because the number of unsatisfied demands and expectations grow in times of crisis and populist parties provide an explanation for the emergence of problems in the figure of "the Other" and an apparent solution which is to truly restore popular sovereignty.

In this sense, populism also offers to fulfill a vital function of representation, to "narrow the gap between representative and represented" (Panizza 2005), at times when traditional parties fail to do so. Populism is, therefore, not only an effective demand for change in the economic or social, but also a fever that reveals a "democratic malaise" (Mény, Surel 2002).

Most CEE states have adopted a multi-party democratic system somewhat abruptly after a long period of following the one-party model or a military dictatorship (for Poland), which led, in fact, to the reproduction of the one-party model to competing political parties, each being more interested in the political game than in building policy that is adapted to their societies. Moreover, by routinely adopting European programs to better integrate in the EU, these parties have "forgotten" how to make programmatic politics and been interested only in accessing power. Their societies then seem to be taken "hostage" by populist discourse, the only one which is directly addressed to them. Hence, the democratic malaise appeared once mainstream parties could no longer perform a service for the community, but only to support the interest groups around them.

In this analytical framework, the rise of populism in Western and in post-communist societies can be linked, at least partially, to accelerated social and economic change that people had to face in the last 30 years. All the EU, new and old, had to cope with an increasing pressure generated by the opening of the economies to international competition, Europeanization, the transition to a post-industrial economy, and an aging population. Not only have these changes generated high social costs, but they also meant that severe constraints were put on the ability of the state to address these costs, which led to a considerable reduction in welfare. In this context, populist parties were able to build their discourse on discontent caused by these changes by targeting the "losers" of globalization in the West and the "losers" of transition in post-communist countries. But populist discourse did not propose solutions to the economic crises, it only tried to find guilt in the "profiteering political elites" (Mudde 2007). In general, especially in CEE, populist parties are adepts of an ultraliberal economic model,

similar to the American one, and some western populist parties have the same economic principles as well.

Of course, economic differences between the East and the West continue to be extremely important, even though both face similar social and economic situations due to the economic crisis. But the political changes are more different. Populism appears in Western Europe in a time of redefinition of discrepancies between party systems operating within the democratic well-known landmarks. On the other hand, populism appears in CEE at a time in which democracy and political identification are in the process of being invented. This difference can be defined by using the concept of inheritance: while most Western European political systems are based on a legacy that is fundamentally democratic, in CEE countries the system is based on an authoritarian legacy, often called "communist" or "national communist". Through the concept of inheritance, beyond the specific elements, we can also speak of a "crisis of representation" in both parts of Europe.

Populism in Western Europe was often viewed as a side effect of the depoliticization of public action and the increased importance of consensual politics in contemporary democracies. According to Mouffe (2005), Western populism stems from the predetermination of liberal values over democratic ones, and from an end of adversative politics in Western democracies. The crisis of representation is the key here, because those who disagree with the establishment's main parties consensus feel that they have lost the ability to influence representatives according to their wishes. Citizens feel that politicians have a different agenda, driven by political correctness and multiculturalism, while their own problems lie elsewhere. In this sense, populism is a symptom of a dysfunctional democracy: it occurs because the principle of popular sovereignty has been neglected, and that, in the words of Canovan (1999), is a principle that is "reaffirmed as a populist challenge".

On the other hand, depoliticizing political action can not explain the specifics of populism – especially since there is no such depoliticization – in CEE, in particular, its mass character and its drive for the exclusion of "undesirables". Firstly, politics in the new EU Member States can hardly be described as consensual. Although there was a covert consensus, at least concerning foreign affairs and economic policy in the 1990s, most CEE party-systems have rapidly become extremely and adversatively polarized around socio-cultural values. The cleavage communist/anti-communist stayed the main driver of Eastern European policy for a long time but was expanded to include the element of minority exclusion.

For example, in Poland, when the Kaczynski brothers were holding power, communists, Jews, and gays have played roughly the same role of "enemies" of the people.

Sigmund Freud shows that the identification process is a psychological process that is fundamental for forming the self (ego), but that this process is rather social than personal, because it takes place as a process of assimilation of external models and it takes place during the whole lifetime (but especially in the first part) through a series of processes of comparison and assimilation of identities (Freud 2010). The process described by Freud is complicated and we will not discuss it here, but what is important is that there are three types of identification: 1. primary identification (between personal self and the given self, where given – that is the name provided by society), 2. narcissistic identification (of the young man) and 3. partial (secondary) identification: with a leader or a social or cultural model. This third identification interests us most, because it belongs – according to Freud – to the adults, to people with a conscience, who are being seduced by models whom they tend to copy. It is a projection of the group upon its leader and a projection of its leader upon his loyal subjects. And in a society that has passed through decades of moral infantilization (as shown by Pascal Bruckner) and the assumption of the star system model, the middle class individual has a much greater appetite for identification with his hero, which can be a real leader or just an ideal type.

In this process of identification both group affiliation and group trust are forged, which gives comfort, solidarity, and finally an identity (geographically, affiliation, emotional attachment, etc.). But at the same time, the relation to "the Other" is formed, the one who is not part of the group and does not share the same identity and who is often not willing (or is not wanted) to integrate. Thus, the alien (as in the sense of otherness to the group, not necessarily in the ethnic sense) turns into the enemy, into the one who is not like us. This identification process is best explained by Umberto Eco: "Having an enemy is important not only to define our identity, but also to procure an obstacle, to measure ourselves and our value-system against it, and to show by confronting it, our own value. Therefore, when there is no enemy, one has to be constructed" (Eco 2011). Of course, this is an experience that the vast majority of human individuals go through during their social and psychological formation. But Pascal Bruckner gives us a very interesting hint, namely that in recent decades more and more adults in the West refuse to assume the social responsibilities incumbent to modernity and because they have to, in order to do so, deny reality in a certain

sense, it leaves them increasingly attracted to the negative discourse of populism (Bruckner 2005).

Two social phenomena overlap: on the one hand, we are witnessing an ever-increasing impoverishment of the middle class and at the same time, a growing infantilization of this social group (still the widest in contemporary society), both compared to the previous generations, who were socially more active and economically optimistic. Both these processes, apparently contradictory, are not to be understood on a personal level, but one can see that there are longer and longer periods of unemployment, there is a deprivation and a lack of average welfare, a lack of an economic and political project, and they all tend to generate sympathy for populist discourse.

Populism starts, as most ideologies do, by referring to myths and political symbols, especially negative ones. The major symbol is the Alien/Enemy that can take many forms, depending on the adopted cultural and historical model: it may mean the Muslim, the Roma (Gypsy), the Polish, or the Corrupt, the Rich, the Poor (the one who does not want to work) etc. By relating to the Alien /Enemy, populist currents on the left and the right pay the price of a democratic election being transformed into a battle between a majority of the people against a minority that is branded as the cause for which the majority cannot retain its true original identity. All populist currents are nationalistic, no matter what doctrine they claim to follow, thus nationalism and Euroscepticism become the emblems of contemporary European populism.

It must be said that nationalism as a political principle is not the same in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe. R. Griffin (2003) is the one who coined the term "ethnocratic liberalism" to describe this paradoxical form of European populism, that enthusiastically embraces a liberal system of political and economic competition, but considers at the same time that only some members of an ethnic group as being full members of society. The nationalism assumed by the National Front in France, the Northern League, the Flemish Block and others involve a rejection of the ideas of multiculturalism, proposing some kind of nostalgia for a mythical world of racial and cultural homogeneity. In other words, right-wing European populism brings into question a nationalism that is centered on an ethnic community and tradition, and is often the advocate of xenophobia and authoritarianism in regards to immigration and free movement of persons. For example, the Flemish Block proclaims its sympathy for the former apartheid system in South Africa claiming the "Eerste eigen volk" (our people must come first), leading to a complete separation of Belgium:

Flanders for the Flemish, Wallonia for the Walloons (Francophone), Europe for European whites. And the Flemish model is not unique, as similar principles were promoted by Haider in Austria and by Bossi in Italy during the last decade. We see that this kind of populist reaction is not just against the ruling elite but also against all those who are in one way or another considered foreigners.

The most obvious elements of this form of populism is anti-immigrationism, and in principle, it is considered the most important. But anti-immigration must not be understood as having only an economic basis, reducing the success-formula of populist fear mongering only to the loss of workplaces or higher taxes in order to pay social allowances for the poor of other countries. This issue does occupy a specific place in populist discourse, but the essence of this discourse is rather cultural and political than economical. The fear that populism tries to provoke is similar to that of Oswald Spengler at the end of the First World War: the fall of European culture under the domination of the far East, only the actors have changed.

In contrast, Central and Eastern nationalism is more complex, being both endogenous and exogenous: it reacts both to internal factors (national, ethnic, or religious minorities) and to external factors (especially to the "Russian threat"). From this perspective, nationalism had (and still has in some countries) a positive connotation especially in societies that have lived for over four decades in a "dissolution of the nation-state into an internationalist socialist order" (Minkenberg 2002). Therefore, appeal to historicism and national memory is constantly a part of post-communist populist discourse. What is interesting is that most CEE societies still value European integration, but continue to appeal to specific national characteristics and religious cultural differences. Populist-nationalist leaders in Romania like Corneliu Vadim Tudor and László Tőkés worked together in the European Parliament (declaring their belief in European values) and simultaneously build ultranationalist identity discourses related to a philosophy of ethnic separation.

By becoming a source of symbols and myths, contemporary European populism is undergoing a fast transformation into a real doctrine (even if it features many national flavors) and it does so by first challenging the mainstream ideologies of the last century and offering an alternative to them.

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SYNERGETIC MODIFICATION OF J. DAVIES' MODEL FOR SIMULATION OF "SUDDEN" FORMATION OF PROTEST ACTIVITY

Nick Polyovyy*, Dilara Gadzhyieva**

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The paper assesses suitability of J. Davies' model for simulation of protest activity. The authors make an attempt to show proximity of J. Davies' model and synergetic paradigm of the order parameter. The authors' modification of J. Davies' model was given to display dissipative formation of short-term protest activity. Special role of current expectations and beliefs of population in formation of a protest was noted. In proposed modification of J. Davies' model the authors offer to consider ratio of negative expectations and related political reality. The model is verified by materials of Ukrainian political process of the last two decades. In this article, the authors show fundamental consistency between retro-prediction of the model and real course of protest activity processes in Ukraine.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

model of J. Davies, synergetic modification, protest activity, simulation of formation of protest activity

The one of sufficiently urgent problems in modern world is consideration of fluctuations of socio-political activity, which last in time period from several months to a year. From the viewpoint of long time intervals these fluctuations are considered "sudden" and usually skipped by researchers because of its *a priori* "unpredictability". An important part of social and political activity is, undoubt-

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edly, protest activity, which may be defined as non-professional political activity, political opposition to the ruling government. For example, with certain fluctuations manifestations of such activity occurred in independent Ukraine often enough to be recognized as a phenomenon of political life. However, due to the abovementioned reasons, patterns of deployment and attenuation of "sudden" protest activity have not yet been determined.

It is obvious that in the absence of clearly proven regularities of socio-political process, the researcher is forced to build searching simulation model which will enable to test accuracy of certain hypotheses and reproduce, with some limitations, course of studied process.

Based on precisely convincing arguments of I. Prigogine and other supporters of synergetic interpretation of social and political processes, we may expect that at the moment of "sudden" formation of a protest, an action of certain order parameter comes into being. At the same time, quite promising example for constructing a model that could adequately reflect the processes of protest activity's formation is represented by J. Davies' theory, devoted to research reasons of social revolutions (Davies 1962: 5–19).

Thus, the purpose of this article is to construct a modified "model of revolutions" by J. Davies, based on the synergetic interpretation of protest activity's formation and its verification by materials of Ukrainian political process for independence period.

We recall that J. Davies defines revolution as "an armed uprising of civil population, which leads to power a new ruling group, which has wider support of masses". According to J. Davies, from the viewpoint of history, revolution is a relatively new phenomenon (Davies 1962: 6). It should be noted that, in fact, J. Davies defines as a revolution that phenomenon, which in Ukrainian political science tradition is usually classified as coup (*Енциклопедія*…: 326–330; *Політологічний словник* 2005: 635). There is quite a rich tradition to study the phenomenon of revolution, in terms of which J. Davies' understanding of revolution is a bit simplified, but comprehensive review of definitions of revolution goes beyond this work, because our task is more local – to construct synergetic model of protest activity's formation. The work of J. Davies gives us one of the convenient basic tools to research this issue.

Let's consider the nature of J. Davies' model. The starting point of his reasoning was inspired by views of A. de Tocqueville and K. Marx on the phenomenon of revolution. According to J. Davies, A. de Tocqueville was the first theorist who believed that revolution occurs after a long period of economic growth;

K. Marx, by contrast, put forward the theory that a revolution is caused by objective reasons such as economic crisis and recession. The model proposed by J. Davies, in some measure, combines descriptions of these theories concerning onset of a revolution.

J. Davies believed that his theory was the best to consider "progressive" revolutions or, as he called them, revolutions intended to achieve maximum equality and freedom. He put forward an example of the 1917 revolution in Russia, the revolution in Egypt in 1952, and the Dorr Rebellion in the US in 1840–1842. J. Davies doubted that his theory may be applicable to revolutions which he called "reactionary", such as the victory of Nazism in Germany, or the rebellion of the southern states in 1861 in the US. Moreover, he argued that for establishing of the alleged universality of this theory, researches of several unsuccessful revolutionary movements should be conducted, such as the sepoy revolt in India in 1857, or the "Boxer Rebellion" in China in 1900, and also reasons why the "Great Depression" has not led eventually to a revolution in the US should be identified (Davies 1962: 7–12). Obviously, J. Davies was interested not in that particular riots or unrests, but in events that turned or could turn into a revolution.

According to J. Davies, revolutions often occur when people experience a sudden worsening of living standards after years of improvement. The basis of J. Davies' theory is unexpected economic regression that comes sooner or later and is not accompanied by appropriate adjustments in the downward growth rates and expectations of people. Thus, according to J. Davies, "[…] revolutions with the greatest probability occur when a long period of real economic and social development is altered by a short period of sharp decline […] The real condition of socio-economic development herewith is less important than general expectations about recent progress that stopped, but can and should continue in the future" (Davies 1962: 5). To illustrate his theory, J. Davies offered a simple drawing (Draw. 1).

As we see at the Drawing 1, the whole life of a larger or smaller community or an individual is accompanied by certain state of economic security and certain expectations of future economic situation. The solid line at the drawing shows the dynamics of economic development in a certain period of time, and the dashed line shows the dynamics of expectations from economic condition. Usually, the line of expectations of future economic fate is higher than the line of current economic situation, since it is the hope of a better future that forces people to resort to certain activities. Indeed, the hypothetical intersection of

Draw. 1: Model of social "revolutions" by J. Davies

The line of a real situation is marked by a solid line; the expectations' line is dashed.

these two lines and exceeding of economic condition of the expectations' line would mean at least disheartening of a person or social community in life and most likely suicidal intensions. Over a certain period of time, according to J. Davies, expectations continue to grow, based on the previous trend of social development. The decisive factor in this case J. Davies saw in well known inertia of individual and public consciousness. A slight excess of the expectations' line over the line of actual economic situation does not bother anyone and does not cause fears, as far as real economic growth "catches up" these expectations very soon. During economic crisis, which may be based on any reason or combination of reasons – from fundamental cyclical reasons like Kondratiev's cycles to local speculative reasons, there is a sharp decline in economic growth. When the gap between expected and actual levels of development reaches a certain limit, a revolution ignites. Thus, the theory J. Davies combines psychosocial and economic perspective, and psychological characteristics act as intermediate variables.

So, when there is too big gap between expectations and real sense of reality, disappointment comes, which leads to frustration and aggression, which, in turn, lead to revolution.

According to P. Selle, J. Davies' concept is a variant of the theory of aggression by G. Dollard, applied to political sphere. As we know, G. Dollard argued that frustration always leads to aggression, and the latter is a kind of blockage that

prevents purposeful action. So, in the theory of G. Dollard we may find a hidden reference to the fact that behavior of revolutionary-minded masses has very strong irrational features (Селле 2009: 373–374).

We shall note that from the point of J. Davies, poverty itself is not a sufficient reason for a revolution. In many poor countries people spend their physical and mental energy only for survival; that means that they are unable to engage in any activity not related to survival. In less extreme conditions we see more initiatives at local level – limited political activity, or what J. Davies called direct social activities in small groups. According to J. Davies, this scheme was typical for the US during most of their history (Davies 1962: 13).

The prerequisite for revolution, in J. Davies' terminology, is the appearance of material and psychological "excess". Thus, if there are socio-psychological conditions, any revolution may be started by relatively poor and by relatively rich. J. Davies also stressed that in order to start a revolution, rebels, whose social origin and economic condition may be quite different, should unite. However, he does not clearly define conditions necessary for successful organization of the united opposition. J. Davies absolutely logically notes that a revolution could fail because of organizational and structural mistakes. If the ruling strata is united enough to exercise resistance, it will be easy for them to suppress a revolt of poor. J. Davies also argued that gradual effective reforms may reduce social tensions to such an extent that in social structure, formed as a result of those reforms, revolts will become practically impossible.

J. Davies' theory was criticized in considerable literature that was generalized by P. Selle (Селле 2009: 376–384). In our view, much of the criticism of J. Davies' theory (Селле 2009: 376–384) is primarily connected with too large-scale political transformations, which the author tried to describe in his theory. This claim forced the author of the theory and his critics to refer to rather infrequent events, which the true revolutions are. Indeed, revolutions occur rarely and are accompanied by such a number of related phenomena and processes in various spheres of political life that to prove the crucial role of non-compliance between reality and expectations is extremely difficult. If we add to this historicity, and, therefore, certain mystery concerning particular facts of most real revolutions, we can see that there is a broad field of assumptions and fantasies both for supporters of J. Davies' theory, and for his opponents.

In our opinion, the J. Davies' model has greater prospects in a bit narrower sense, mainly in understanding of the theory of protest activity at a fairly short time periods. One of J. Davies' critics, in order to adequately simulate the appear-

ance of Russian Revolution of 1917, asked absolutely rightly exactly what period (from 1860, or 1905, or 1914) should be taken into account to consider the ratio between expectations and economic growth in the Russian Empire? (Селле 2009: 380–381) Obvious absence of a single answer this critic connected with a solid disrepair of a model as such. In our view, this flaw only shows J. Davies' model disrepair for simulation of real, extremely complex and large-scale revolutions. We may add that a slow synergetic order parameter that determines long-term political stability (described in Polyovyy 2014) is much better applicable as a synergistic basis for such revolutionary events.

It should be noted that by essence, J. Davies' model, based on one compiled index – in fact, an order parameter – may be attributed to the synergy models. Characteristically, J. Davies' model appeals to a kind of "micro-factorial" approach, as the views and expectations of individuals collectively lead to significant social and political changes, which are also inherent to synergetic interpretation of processes. Obviously, at the time of its creation, this terminology was not a part of the scientific discourse yet.

We will outline outgoing principles of offered model of "sudden" protest activity. Note that in J. Davies' model a linear function is used to depict the beginning of economic growth and expectations of all relevant trends. It seems more correct to use the exponential function to determine prolonged trend for change of both expectations and certain defects of real politics. The fact is, as proven by psychologists, a habit decreases pain (in a narrow and in a broad sense) barrier of a person. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, a habit for certain negative phenomena in socio-political sphere, on the one hand, gradually includes them in general background of political life, and, on the other, causes further increase of corresponding negativity due to lack of sharp public reaction on it. So, through a feedback mechanism gradual adaptation to negative socio-political phenomena adds new impetus to the development of these phenomena, what, in turn, adds new impetus for adaptation, and so on. This situation in future leads to the need of more serious disturbances to "trigger" a mechanism for protest activity; this promotes the growth of socially acceptable injustice of power towards people (in everyday language – the increase of "power impudence"). The most revealing is an example which, however, goes beyond purely political sphere; it is a dynamic of Ukrainian population's attitude to corruption for almost last 20 years. Its gradual spread, in our opinion, is associated with a kind of custom – unrequired "lagniappe" to officials turns into almost mandatory and not just "lagniappe", but

after the fact (after 20 years of addiction) created "justification": "it was always accepted", "everybody take it", and so on.

Thus, a human habit gives exponential nature to dynamics of expectations as well as to the real change in political sphere. The correctness of this approach is supported by the fact that one of the basic functional dependencies for modern logistics is exponential function as well. It should be noted that, as will be shown below, for political life of modern Ukraine last two decades have been characterized by mostly negative dynamics, which creates the possibility to construct a model of protest activity. At the same time, we should not reject capabilities of positive dynamics (such as economic growth in J. Davies' model) and the need to change the structure of our model with preserving of exponential dynamics. Based on the abovementioned considerations, we believe that more adequate reflection of J. Davies' model is its modification shown at Drawing 2.

However, it should be recalled that at the relatively small intervals exponential function tends to be linear (may be approximated as linear).

In our opinion, it is a totally fair assumption about existence of certain connection between the process of formation of protest activity and the relationship between expectations and reality in the life of society. However, it should be recalled that J. Davies' model critics pointed out, among other things, the difference in economic condition of various social strata in normal growth conditions

Draw. 2. The modified model of J. Davies with the use of exponential function

The line of a real situation is marked by a solid line; the expectations' line is dashed.

and within sudden economic downturn, and the inability to figure out this difference with practically suitable accuracy. Critics of J. Davies also absolutely fairly drawn attention to the fact that in his theory different social strata should unite during the crisis (it is a compulsory condition for revolution by J. Davies), and pointed on objective difficulties facing a researcher clarifying the possibilities of this association, because of different perceptions and different degree of differences in expectations and reality. Indeed, the differences in perception of a crisis at the moment at point A or point B in Draw. 2 will be different. For those who are at point B, the differences in expectations are critical and create frustration with further association to fight against the government; for those who are at point A, the difference of expectations and actual reality is not critical and do not cause strong feelings able to bring these, apparently poorer, segments of population to the active joint anti-government actions.

So, differences in socio-economic situation of different groups of population make impossible or extremely rare a situation in which there is a possibility of merging several segments of population in order to protest against current government. However, this inability makes possible to assume that in the basis for association of various segments of population in political protest should not be an economic factor. As we stated in other work (Польовий 2011a: 190–217), synergetic interpretation of political process does not contradict the assumption about decisive role of worldview and perception of politics by individual and public opinion. Actually, such an interpretation in some way supports the theory of J. Davies. But it seems right to assume that in order to form a political protest activity, a stimulating and unifying factor for a diverse population should become public perception of political reality and their own expectations from it.

This ratio – between the perception of current political reality and tactical expectations from it – is, in our opinion, a synergetic order parameter that determines the formation, expansion or, conversely, narrowing of protest activity in modern political process. The dynamics of this order parameter determines the content of protest activity's model we have created. Drawing 3 shows the synergetic dynamics of this order parameter, which for greater clarity is split similar to the model of J. Davies to the line of expectations from political reality and real state of affairs in politics.

Note that in the case of expectations from politics in our model, as in the model of J. Davies, we consider current, so to say, tactical people's expectations from politics. An important element of these expectations is the rationality of expectation subjects, which detailed examination was carried out in (Польовий

Draw. 3. Dynamics of the synergetic order parameter, which determines formation of a protest activity

On the vertical axis (y) there is deposited the degree of negativity of expectations and the situation in a particular political process.

The line of a real situation with some negative phenomenon is marked by a solid line; the line of negative expectations is dashed.

2011a: 111–132). This implies that an ordinary person does not expect from politics an instant change "for better", and understands – as the general state of affairs in politics – a certain slowness of political changes (such as changes associated with complex multiple formation which is state before the individual). A common person also understands own benefit (or more often the lack thereof) from certain actions of political power.

Should be noted that understanding of politics by population, in our view, is logically guided by wisdom principles, set out by Robert Axelrod on the results of theoretical analysis of the game of "prisoner's dilemma" (Axelrod 2006). These principles, among other things, imply the requirement of a certain "short-sightedness" – usually only coming consequences is thought over, that, in practice, for example allows to be elected a mayor of a big city for a man who declared many promises only before elections and handed out a little buckwheat for elderly persons.

Regarding the second element of the proposed order parameter, we should note the following. Based on the known phenomenon of perception of imagination as a true reflection of reality (Польовий 2011a: 190–217), it should be clarified that under a real state of affairs in politics, perceived by an individual, we understand only information about current political events known to this

individual, which she/he for some reasons took for granted. In detail, the problem was considered by Jean Baudrillard (Бодріяр 2004). The point is that in case of non-professional political activity, with which we are dealing within the problem of protest activity, an individual has no opportunity to spend a lot of time to check information about politics she/he receives (often there is even no physical capabilities to do so).

Thus, formation of certain correlation between course of "rational" and tactical expectations of individual from politics and information about political events taken by this individual for granted determines, in our opinion, the deployment of protest activity. It should be noted that a reason for deployment of protest activity in modern Ukraine is negatively colored phenomena and processes. So it is about expectation and perception of information concerning negative aspects of certain political phenomena and processes. At Draw 3 on the vertical axis (y) there is deposited the degree of negativity of expectations and the situation in a particular political process.

An important difference between our model and J. Davies' model is postulation of fundamental variability of expectations' subject in political field, which corresponds to the natural changing of political priorities in a country: during election campaign – attention is given to the elections; during tax or pension reform – to political decision in the relevant field, and so on. We remind that scientifically proven limitation in number of items which a person may analyze simultaneously (Miller 1956: 90–92; Reznikova 2007: 162) confirms our assumption.

Another important point is validity of the model. As far as we speak about tactical wisdom, it is expected that proposed model is able to reflect the formation of protest activity in a country which scale is comparable with Ukraine, through the time interval comparable with 1–4 months. At the end of this term, significant changes in current political situation should be expected (in perception of population), that leads to the emergence of new factors-priorities.

Let's verify proposed model hypothesis on some of the most characteristic events of a political process of Ukraine's independence era.

Some of the brightest and most undoubtful events in terms of raising the level of protest activity are considered to be the events of "Orange Revolution". Avoiding failure of this term, we will actually consider events at the beginning of the "revolution" and those that preceded it. The main subject for public consideration, obviously, was the presidential elections in Ukraine. Due to certain reasons and under certain influence of main rivals' party forces, opinion of population regard-

ing the nature of political action sharpened on the question of possible deals with counting of votes. Moreover, population, having the experience of previous 1999 presidential elections, elections to local authorities and to the Verkhovna Rada at least in 1998 and in 2002, was potentially ready for some information about possible shortcomings of the vote counting – within "usual" 3–4 percent.

It should be noted that in formation of this expectation the most "educational" role, in our opinion, belonged to local elections, because in these elections was much easier, for the needs of certain forces, to manipulate by data (in a result of a bit weakened control on the "background" of Parliament race) and the results were clearly seen to the public. So, "taught" population rather calmly and without suspicions estimated closed results of the main candidates in the first round of voting. Almost immediately after voting in the second round on November 21st, 2004, rumors about massive falsification in counting began to spread. Note that it was a question of 15–30% falsification; that information transmitted through the media, whom trusted a certain part of population, such as through the "5th Channel" and the site "Ukrainian Truth". We should also note that real 100% evidence of falsification was not brought against. It was not even necessary to trigger the mechanism of activation of protest activity, as the trust to opposition media and communication was sufficient for getting this information for faith by significant part of population. So, the main question at that political moment was concentrated on scope of election falsifications, that got into a condition when, on the one hand, "usual" 3–4 percent of "error in calculations" were expected, for which, again, people get accustomed; and, on the other hand, political realities (in the sense of perception consciousness, which has been described) showed 15–30 percent "error" that was quickly identified as falsification. In our opinion, this discrepancy was enough to cause frustration of politically active citizens, who would massively go to Maidan or start hot discussion at their places of residence (Кульчицький 2005: 54). So, described in our model mechanism of formation of protest activity, which effect added the influence of variable factor of political stability, as described in other works (Польовий 2011а: 217–244; Polyovyy 2014).

Pay attention that protest activity began to decline in two weeks after the start of the Maidan, as frustration about the results of counting discrepancies with expectations was overcome exactly by protest activity and time. The rest of the events, related to the curtailment of the Maidan, litigation, packet voting in Parliament, are aloof from unprofessional protest activity, so obviously are not covered by this model.

Another example to verify our model is provided by events around drafting and adoption of the Tax Code in the second half of 2010. It is known that at the very start of legislative registration of tax reforms it was clear that the government will try to limit small and medium businesses. Thus, people's expectations from the draft Tax Code were filled with certain negativity.

Negative expectations knocked against published governmental proposals in the form of the Tax Code Draft. Actually, in view of the fact that the volume of both the Draft and adopted as a result the Tax Code is about 43 printed pages, i.e. about 700 pages of printed text, there were doubts whether all representatives of business were able to read this project physically. But the basic, most annoying, provisions of the proposed project were quickly spread through the media.

As a result of strong differences between expectations and reality proposed by the Draft, according to our model, which was confirmed by the practice, a serious frustration emerged among middle and, most important, small business and bare initial trend for the "Tax Maidan". Thus, the beginning of the "Tax Maidan" is also embedded in the proposed model of protest activity.

We should immediately note the difference between Tax Maidan and Maidan of 2004. In the first case, interested parties were only small and medium businesses, in the second – almost the entire population of Ukraine. Concerning the Tax Maidan, we note that even a cursory analysis shows that the change in the tax system to the state "hits", in the end, public consumers of small business products through forced price increases. But it should be recognized that the average dimension of people in Ukraine (it may be expected that any people could make the same) appeared wise in sense of R. Axelrod, i.e. contemplated only one step forward and decided that taxes for business do not concern people, or concern, but not enough to rise to protests. So, protest activity that emerged in full compliance with our model covered only certain stratum of society.

Tax Maidan, thus, confirms both the adequacy of our model and one of the initial hypotheses – the basis of politically significant protest activity should consist of general political preferences, which may not be significant from a historical, long-term perspective, but are seemed meaningful and vitally important for the present existence of a person "here and now". Additional confirmation of this thesis are the events of the first half of 2011 in North Africa and the Middle East: with the weakness of flowing synergetic factors of political instability (Польовий 2011b: 16–27), sudden comprehension (rather "quasi-awareness") of extreme injustice of own political regimes, some of which were so over decades,

made it the number one problem for a large number of people, which overthrew those regimes.

Finally, events of 2013 related to the beginning and deployment of Euromaidan in Ukraine also fit into the proposed model: after meetings on Maidan on November 21st, 2013, even harder rivals of V. Yanukovych's regime understood the extreme weakness and dispersion of that protest, that is why almost everybody was ready for certain negative scenario of gradual displacement of protesters from Maidan. It should be noted that the weakness of the protest was based on the same life wisdom by Axelrod: almost nobody saw a direct connection between their lives and signing or not signing of association agreement between Ukraine and the EU. However, almost the entire country, or at least half-Kyiv (which is enough for serious protest actions) was frustrated by unusual and apparently unjustified violence during displacement (actually overclocking) of protesters from Maidan on the night of November 30th, 2013. This was exactly that element of appearance of sudden gap between negative expectations and negative reality. After that, many more people have imagined connection between their own lives and preservation or curb of existing political regime, what coincided with acceptance or rejection of Yanukovych's failure to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Actually, these people formed the basis of Euromaidan.

Concerning the course of Euromaidan, it should be noted that although real motives of relations between V. Yanukovych's regime and Euromaidan for nearly three months so far conceived not clear, but it is possible to notice that every next crossing of the limits of expected and accustomed violence (from the viewpoint of population) against protest (demonstrative attempts of overclocking, kidnapping and torture of activists, adoption of "dictatorial" laws of January 16th, the first shootings on the Hrushevskyi street, etc.) heated protest activity, adding new pretexts for frustration of protesters and their supporters throughout the country.

Thus, we could argue that the model of protest activity proposed by us is verified and suitable for study of relevant short-term political processes. Note that this model reflects only the situation of protest activity's formation and may be limitedly used to describe further development of cooperation, such as the protesters and government.

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LIBERTARIANISM
AND OBLIGATORY CHILD SUPPORT

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian theory of distributive justice. I demonstrate that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice as represented by Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick. However, the main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the "finders-creators ethic", as represented by Israel M. Kirzner. To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

libertarianism, distributive justice, obligatory child support, finders-creators ethic, homesteading, entitlement theory

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly believed amongst libertarians that the institution of obligatory child support as an instance of uncontractual positive duty is incompatible with the fundamental tenets of the libertarian doctrine. As Walter Block puts

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it, "a basic premise of libertarianism is that there are no positive obligations" (Block 2004: 275). The strongest formulation of this ubiquitous idea concerning children's rights was formulated by Murray Rothbard in his widely acclaimed book *The Ethics of Liberty*. Starting with the purely negative concept of right as an area of human action that no one is allowed to interfere with, Rothbard demonstrates that "any positive duty that coerces a man to perform an act for another's sake is an infringement on the former's liberty and property rights and as such is unacceptable in the free society", hence "the parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or educate his children, since such obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon the parent and depriving the parent of his rights" (Rothbard 1998: 100). What is more, in the case of parents who do not want to work (or do not want to work so much) and generate income, the state forces them to work under a threat of property seizure and imprisonment what makes obligatory child support a form of involuntary servitude, i.e. "a condition in which the victim is forced to work for another by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process" (*United States v. Kozminski*, 1998). This very feature of obligatory child support is what libertarianism opposes particularly vehemently. As Murray Rothbard says: "If there is anything a libertarian must be squarely and totally against, it is *involuntary servitude* – forced labor – an act which denies the most elemental right of self-ownership" (Rothbard 2002: 78).

In the present paper, I investigate the following research question: *What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with?* To solve my research problem, I first analyse the reasons for which obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice. I identify two main reasons of this incompatibility: 1) obligatory child support is not an instance of a duty that stems from creation of peril; 2) obligatory child support is not a contractual duty in a sense of the property title-transfer model of contracts. I claim that the background reason of this incompatibility is what I call the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account* that is presupposed by the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice. Hence, for obligatory child support to be compatible with libertarianism, the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account* has to be jettisoned and replaced with the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account*. This, however, is possible only if the libertarian theory of distributive justice is construed in an unorthodox way. The main thesis of this paper is then the following assertion: *Obligatory child*

support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the "finders-creators ethic".

To investigate my research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium (Arras 2007: 46–71; Daniels 1979: 256–282; Daniels 2011, Dominiak 2012: 143–156; Dworkin 2013: 185–222, Haslett 1987: 305–311, Rawls 1951: 177–197; Rawls 1999: 17–18). Generally speaking, the method of reflective equilibrium aims at putting our considered judgements, principles and background theories into a state of coherence. However, since social institutions are embodiments of our beliefs, they also can correspond with theories, doctrines, or principles. In this sense, an institution can be compatible with doctrines or theories. Since "institutions are stable and recurring patterns of behavior" (Huntington 1965: 394), it follows from the concept of institution that the thesis of compatibility or incompatibility of a particular institution with a given theory or belief should not hinge on the incidental, extraordinary, whim-dependent or pathological behaviours that occur within the purview of an institution. Quite to the contrary, the analysis should focus on stable, recurrent, default and normal elements of an institution.

POSITIVE DUTIES, THEORY OF CONTRACTS, AND OBLIGATORY CHILD SUPPORT

In his seminal paper on the topic, *The Law of Omissions and Neglect of Children*, Williamson M. Evers considers four sorts of legal duties existing in Anglo-American law in terms of which parents' obligation to support their children could possibly be interpreted: a duty to help the government, a status-based duty, a duty that stems from creation of peril, and a contractual duty. According to the libertarian political philosophy, for a positive duty not to violate individuals' rights it has to be either a duty that stems from creation of peril or a contractual duty. The first two types of duty are incompatible with libertarianism for obvious reasons: 1. the government is either as such incompatible with anarcho-libertarianism or compatible only as a minimal government with the minarcho-libertarianism, i.e. in neither case duties to help the government are justified; 2. if you oblige A, who peacefully works in a given profession (or who adopts a given social role), to perform some positive actions he does not want to perform, you prevent him from pursuing this profession, and at the same time you prevent innumerable others from voluntarily dealing with A (employing A,

buying A's services or goods, etc.); you thereby initiate aggression against A and innumerable others.

Hence, according to the libertarian political philosophy, for a positive duty not to violate individual rights it has to be either a duty that stems from creation of peril or a contractual duty. The first case, as far as it corresponds with the libertarian principles, presupposes that for a positive duty to occur, the obliged person has to put somebody in danger by committing an invasive act. As Williamson Evers points out, "the criminal law punishes persons who put into motion some force that invades individual rights and who then neglect to halt the force which they originally set in motion" (Evers 1978: 3). If you push somebody into water, you have a positive duty to rescue him or you will be guilty not only of infringing upon his bodily inviolability (pushing him into water against his will) but also of homicide (if he drowns in effect of your already illicit act). What is the basis of positive duties in these types of cases is that "the creator of the peril has effectively committed an invasive act" and that the obliged person is the same person as the person who has created the peril: "the duty of the perpetrator to aid the imperiled in such cases is to be distinguished from a more generalized duty that is sometimes advanced, namely, a duty of everyone to aid imperiled" (Evers 1978: 3), which is unjustified on libertarian grounds.

Some libertarians hold that bringing a child into being is a situation analogous with putting this child into danger and so that it places positive duties on parents. Stephan Kinsella writes: "the libertarian could argue that the parent has various positive obligations to his or her children, such as the obligation to feed, shelter, educate, etc. The idea here is that libertarianism does not oppose 'positive rights'; it simply insists that they be voluntarily incurred. One way to do this is by contract; another is by trespassing against someone's property. Now, if you pass by a drowning man in a lake you have no enforceable (legal) obligation to try to rescue him; but if you push someone in a lake you have a positive obligation to try to rescue him. If you don't you could be liable for homicide. Likewise, if your voluntary actions bring into being an infant with natural needs for shelter, food, care, it is akin to throwing someone into a lake. In both cases you create a situation where another human is in dire need of help and without which he will die. By creating this situation of need you incur an obligation to provide for those needs" (Kinsella 2006).

Unfortunately, this analogy is entirely tenuous. First of all, for a positive duty that stems from creation of peril to take place, an invasive act or "trespassing against someone's property" has to take place first. But getting pregnant is not

an invasive act. Nor is it "trespassing against someone's private property", since there is nobody yet whose private property could be trespassed: the child and its private property is only called into existence by getting pregnant; there is no child floating in the air whose private property is violated by getting pregnant. Second of all, as the Non-Identity Problem (Parfit 1987: 351–379; McMahan 2004: 445–475; Glover 2004: 429–444; Steinbock 2011: 83–92; Singer 2011: 109–119; Dominiak 2013: 46–52) demonstrates, for this very child with its "natural needs for shelter, food, care", the only option was either to exist with these needs or not to exist at all, and since we do not consider the life with needs not worth living or worse than non-existence, the analogy with "throwing someone into a lake" is again broken. By throwing someone into a lake you worsen his situation, otherwise he would not complain or there would be no issue at stake; by getting pregnant, on the other hand, you do not worsen anyone's situation, you create life. Hence, obligatory child support cannot be justified as a duty that stems from creation of peril.

The second possibility is that obligatory child support could be an instance of a contractual duty. Unfortunately, this theory also meets insurmountable difficulties. Referring to the fact that "some persons believe that the obligation to support children stems from a contract or implied contract between the parents themselves or between the parents and children" (Evers 1978: 5), Evers claims that the attempt to interpret a duty to support one's minor children as a contractual duty is implausible for two main reasons.

First of all, it is usually the case that people do not sign contracts to support their children, therefore what we can talk about here is just an implicit contract. But the problem with implicit contracts is that "deriving obligations from implicit contracts looks very much like simply imposing obligations on others by force. Then we are no longer talking about contract and consent but about might defining right" (Evers 1978: 7).

Second of all, even if a contract to support one's children were an explicit and formal one, no transfer of property title would take place in such a contract: "it should from the first be clear that no transfer of property title has occurred in such alleged contracts, and that therefore they should not be legally binding" (Evers 1978: 5). From a libertarian point of view, as it is clearly expressed by Murray Rothbard in *The Ethics of Liberty*, for a contract to be binding it has to involve a real property transfer between parties. Mere promises and expectations cannot be legally binding, even if they assume a formal and explicit character. For a contract to bind, there has to be some property that one party conditionally

transfers to the other party so if the other party did not fulfil her part of the contract, she would be in an illegitimate possession of this property; in other words, she would initiate an invasion of the property rights, thereby creating a reason to seize her property as a compensation for the violation. Rothbard writes: "In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been *transferred*, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that the other party's property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent of the former (implicit theft)" (Rothbard 1998: 133).

By the same token, for obligatory child support to be a contractual duty, there has to be first some property transfer *to the payer* of child support to legally oblige him to pay child support *to the receiver*. It means that child support would be obligatory in the libertarian social order if and only if it were the case that child-support avoider would thereby come to the position of being in an illegitimate possession of the obligee's property. On the other hand, if we were to recognise a contractual duty of child support where there was no real transfer of property title involved, we would end up with "the promised expectations model or the present mixed content of the law of contracts" (Evers 1977: 5) that legally enforce promises and thereby violate people's property rights.

Why enforcing promises violates people's property rights? A person who makes a mere promise does not violate anyone's property rights, does not initiate aggression and thereby is not an aggressor; she merely enjoys her property rights to her vocal cords and brain. On the other hand, if we hold a person who is not an aggressor liable for breaking a promise and take of her property as a compensation to a promisee, we initiate aggression against the former's property rights.

Hence, since if obligatory child support is to be a contractual duty, there has to be first some property transfer *to the payer* of child support, the question arises: What kind of property could it be and who would be the parties of child support contracts? The only natural candidate for the answer to the first part of the question is that this property would be the child itself. As to the second part of the question, there are two possibilities: either parents and children or only parents would be the parties of child support contracts.

If we construe child support contracts as contracts between parents and children, we fall into contradiction. Children cannot act as consenting agents until relatively late in their lives. Without the ability to act as consenting agents

they are unable to conclude contracts. The moment at which they acquire this ability is the moment at which they stop being children and so the moment at which paying *child* support to them is not logically possible any more. So, if we wanted child support contracts to be contracts between children and parents, we would make these contracts objectless by the very act of signing them. Even if one argued that this contradiction is only an apparent one, the fact that we could not conclude child support contracts until relatively late would utterly undermine the very idea and purpose of child support. This possibility is then excluded.

So, we are left only with the second possibility, namely, that these are parents who could be the parties of a child support contract. However, if we assume – as it is assumed in the current legal systems – that both parents are owners of the child, we end up with the promised expectation model of contracts. If both parents own the child, there is nothing which the child support payments could be exchanged for and the promised expectations model of contracts is the only option available to us. Imagine, for instance, a child support contract modelled on the actual child support law. Parents who consider securing their children's material situation in the case of divorce oblige themselves to support financially their children in such a manner that the custodial parent will incur the costs of bringing them up whereas the non-custodial parent will transfer, let's say, 20% of his income to the custodial parent in order to share 50% of the care costs with the custodial parent. Does any transfer of property titles between parties of the contract take place here? Of course not. The only transfer of property title is between parents and children. They transfer their property to children by supporting them, both before divorce and after it. But they do not transfer any property titles between each other. Hence, what we are dealing here with is a sheer promise: the mother promises the father to support their children in the case of divorce and the father does the same.

Therefore, it seems that the only possibility for obligatory child support to function as a contractual duty (as well as the only possibility for obligatory child support to be compatible with libertarianism) would be the situation in which only one of the parents would be the exclusive owner of the child. Then the owner could conclude a contract with the other parent stipulating, e.g.: "Hereby I transfer the title to half of my property in the child to the father and the father obliges himself to pay child support to me in exchange for the title". However, can such a construal of child ownership (*Exclusive Child Ownership Account*) be justified within the libertarian political philosophy? This is the question of the libertarian theory of distributive justice.

CLASSICAL LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CHILD OWNERSHIP

According to the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, one can become a legitimate owner of a thing only in two ways: either by homesteading a previously (at the moment of homesteading) unowned thing (by mixing one's labour with the thing, occupying it, transforming it, etc. – there is an ongoing debate as to the question of what homesteading consists in), or by receiving a previously owned thing through voluntary transfer from the previous owner (in exchange for something else or as a free gift). As Robert Nozick points out, the appropriation of a holding may take place only in these two ways:

A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.

A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.

No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2 (Nozick 2014: 151).

There are, thus, only two possible general ways in which the mother could become the exclusive owner of the child (a more radical thesis that the father could be the exclusive owner of the child seems utterly doomed to failure): 1. she could homestead the child; 2. she could receive it as a free gift or in exchange for something. To answer the question if the mother could be the exclusive owner of the child on the basis of the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice we have to analyse these two options in turn.

First, the mother cannot become the exclusive owner of the child by homesteading (i.e. transforming, occupying or mixing her labour with) it since for homesteading to take place, the resources that are homesteaded (i.e. transformed into something else, occupied or mixed with labour) cannot be owned. Only when the resources are unowned one can homestead them. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe says, "the homesteading principle means the first-use-first-own rule regarding unowned, nature-given resources" (Hoppe 2006: 413–414). Obviously, there are no previously unowned children floating in the air, waiting for somebody to homestead them. Quite to the contrary, children are produced from gametes that are already owned by both parents. So, the resources that are transformed into the child are already owned. Therefore, the mother cannot become the exclusive owner of the child by homesteading it.

One could try to argue that it is possible that the father could abandon his gametes, thereby making them unowned, and that only then the mother would homestead the gametes and produce the child. That would be the case of becoming the legitimate exclusive owner of the child. Unfortunately, this reply is much weaker than it seems at first glance. Its weakness consists in not realising that in the libertarian social order children are also resources that can generate profits on their owner's behalf. Therefore, the abandonment of children in the libertarian society, although theoretically possible, would be praxeologically improbable – the same as praxeologically improbable is the claim that people will start abandoning their real estates tomorrow. But let's analyse this reply in detail.

As I mentioned above, in the libertarian social order there are no positive duties except duties that stem from creation of peril and contractual ones. By the same token, there are no duties connected with being a co-owner of the child except these two types. Therefore, the father who does not sign a child support contract can be a co-owner of the child and have no duties (no costs) connected with this ownership. On the other hand, if one wants to abandon one's property, one has to notify others of this fact. As Walter Block points out, this necessity of notification "follows not from any positive obligation whatsoever, but rather from the logical implication of what it means to abandon something. You cannot (logically) abandon something if you do not notify others of its availability for their own ownership. At most, if you do not undertake any noti-fication, you have not abandoned it, but rather are simply the absentee owner over it […] you are still the owner of it, and are (temporarily, for the moment, even for the rest of your life) not using it any more. You have, in a word, not yet succeeded in abandoning it. In other words, abandoning property is not something you *can* attain merely by wishing for it; merely by no longer using it; merely by no longer exercising the tradition ownership rights over it" (Block 2004: 279). Therefore, the father who wants to abandon his gametes has to notify others (the mother) of this fact. However, such a notification means extra costs. Therefore, by being a co-owner of the child, the father does not incur any costs, whereas by abandoning the gametes he incurs some extra costs. Hence, what the above reply essentially boils down to is the assertion that the father having a choice between two ways of not taking care of the child would choose the more expensive one. This sounds implausible. Moreover, taking into consideration the aforementioned fact that being a co-owner of the child can bestow profits on

the father (the mother might one day want to buy his part of the property title, the father can demand remunerations for agreeing to the mother's decisions concerning the child, both parents can put the child up for paid adoption, etc.) whereas abandoning the gametes can involve extra costs (the father could one day change his mind as to the child ownership), the plausibility of this reply plummets drastically. Basically, because in the libertarian social order children are also resources, it is, generally speaking, better to have them than to abandon them. A father who would prefer to costly abandon his property instead of holding it, would be an extraordinary case that does not have a bearing on the question of institutional compatibility.

Second, it seems then that the mother could become the exclusive owner of the child *via* transfer of the gametes (or a part of the property title in the child) from the father. This is perfectly conceivable and even presupposed by the above argument: since children are resources, so do gametes; if the father does not want to have the child, he can sell his gametes (or his part of the property title in the child) to the mother (he can even make a gift). What is though highly improbable is that the same man who just effectively demonstrated – by selling his property title in the child (or gametes) – that he does not want to have the child, would even though be willing to pay child support to the child/mother, i.e. would be willing to buy back the property title to the same child for his child support payments. Although it is theoretically possible, it is praxeologically improbable and makes the case for the claim that obligatory child support is compatible with libertarianism to hinge on the whims of protean individuals and extraordinary cases.

As this analysis proves, except extraordinary and highly improbable cases, the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice does not allow for the existence of the institution of obligatory child support. The reason for that is that classical libertarianism presupposes what I call the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account*. According to this account, a default (standard) situation is that both parents own the child. It can be the case that for some extraordinary reasons (for instance, the death of the father) only one parent would be the owner of the child, however normally, as far as the *institution* of family and child ownership is concerned, the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account* is valid and default theory of child ownership. This idea is confirmed by such outstanding libertarians as Murray Rothbard or Walter Block. According to Rothbard, when a child is born, "the parents – or rather the mother, who is the only certain and visible parent – as the creators of the baby become its owners" (Rothbard 1998: 99). In turn, Block

points out that the mother does not homestead the child alone but "with a little initial help from the father" (Block 2004: 280). Therefore, it has to be concluded that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of redistributive justice. For the institution of obligatory child support to be compatible with libertarianism, the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account* has to be jettisoned. However, since this account is presupposed by the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, then the whole theory would have to be reformulated. Is libertarianism capable of such a reformulation? This is the question of the alternative construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice.

FINDERS-CREATORS ETHIC, LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND CHILD OWNERSHIP

In what way the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice has to be construed to allow for the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account* and compatibility between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism? I claim that such a construal can be provided by the Israel M. Kirzner's theory of finders-creators ethic and entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner 1997: 60–85; Kirzner 1973; Kirzner 1979; Kirzner 1985; Kirzner 1989).

According to the finders-creators ethic, an entrepreneur or producer do not transform the existing resources but create them, or their value, *ex nihilo*. An entrepreneur – thanks to his intelligence, talent and labour – discovers a potential use of the existing resources and by implementing his discovery, he creates something, a resource or value, that did not exist before his discovery. Therefore, after an entrepreneurial discovery, there is both an old, previously existing resource, and a new one, created by the entrepreneur. Kirzner writes, "until a resource has been discovered, *it has not*, in the sense relevant to the rights of access and common use, *existed at all*. On this view it seems plausible to consider the discoverer (of the hitherto 'non-existent' resource) as, in the relevant sense, the *creator* of what he has found" (Kirzner 1981: 395–396).

Hence, according to Israel M. Kirzner, next to the original acquisition of holdings and transfer of property, there is the third way of appropriating things: a creation. "It should be noted that ownership-by-creation is quite different from ownership-by-just-acquisition-from-nature. Ownership by acquisition occurs against the prior background of *given* unheld resources. Acquisition is, in fact,

a kind of 'transfer' (from nature to the first holder). Ownership by creation, on the other hand, involves no notion of transfer at all. The finder-creator has spontaneously generated hitherto non-existent resources, and is seen, therefore, as their natural owner" (Kirzner 1981: 396).

Imagine the following scenario. A lumberjack cuts down a tree that belongs to him. A carpenter comes into lumberjack's timber without the latter's consent and makes a wardrobe of this timber. Who is the owner of the wardrobe? On the basis of classical libertarian theory of distributive justice, it cannot be the carpenter since he violated both the principle of justice in transfer (lumberjack did not consent to the transfer of his timber to the carpenter) and the principle of justice in acquisition (timber was not an unowned resource). As Stephan Kinsella points out, no libertarian would "hold that creating an item using raw material owned by others gives the thief-creator ownership of the item" (Kinsella 2008: 39). In turn, on the basis of the finders-creators ethic, it is the carpenter who is the owner of the wardrobe. Even though without the lumberjack's labour and timber there would be no wardrobe – the same as without the carpenter's work there would be no wardrobe either – the lumberjack cannot be the "creator" of the wardrobe in the sense of finders-creators ethic since he did not effectively discover a hitherto unknown use for timber (timber as a wardrobe); what he "created" is timber; he discovered a new use for a tree (tree as timber). It is the carpenter who effectively discovered that timber can be the wardrobe and therefore he is the "creator" of the wardrobe.

The finders-creators ethic introduces, therefore, an alternative construal of the principle of homesteading. The classical libertarianism understands homesteading as appropriation of unheld resources. On the other hand, from the finders-creators ethic vantage point, the appropriation can also take place by "creation of an entirely new dimension of the holding – something not only, not previously held, but also something that did not, in the relevant sense, exist previously altogether" (Kirzner 1981: 402). Hence, the classical libertarian theory of original acquisition is characterised by the "decided lack of enthusiasm for the possibility that many cases of original acquisition may qualify, at least in part, for justification under the finder-creator, finder-keeper ethic" (Kirzner 1981: 402).

Therefore, from the finders-creators ethic point of view, the carpenter, as the creator of the wardrobe, is as a matter of logic the first-comer to the wardrobe, the original appropriator of the wardrobe; before he created the wardrobe, there had not been the wardrobe yet to first come to or to homestead. Obviously, the

lumberjack still has property title to his timber. But on what basis should he has it to the wardrobe? Has he received it through the rightful transfer of holdings or through original acquisition of holdings? Before the carpenter made the wardrobe, there had not been this wardrobe yet for anyone to have property title to. Nor did the carpenter transfer property title to the wardrobe to the lumberjack. Of course, nothing of this sort happened in the first place either when the carpenter seized the lumberjack's timber. But no one holds that the lumberjack lost thereby the property title to his timber. However, since there is no timber any more, only the wardrobe, the lumberjack has a right to be compensated for his timber (plus for all other negative consequences of unlawful action of the carpenter). He has though no right to the wardrobe as such. As Kirzner points out, one can argue in objection to the finders-creators ethic "that if I discover new, hitherto unnoticed value in my neighbor's property, that additional value ought, on the finders, keepers ethic, be mine *without* any transfer of property at all. To the extent that the 'new value' can be consumed without violating the rights of the neighbor, this seems not unreasonable. In general, where consumption of the newly discovered value cannot occur without violating existing rights, it will be in the interest of the discoverer to buy up *those* rights, in order to enjoy the new values which *he* has discovered" (Kirzner 1981: 411).

By the same token as in the lumberjack–carpenter thought experiment, even though without man's labour and sperm there would be no child – the same as without mother's labour and egg there would be no child either – a man cannot be the "creator" of a child since he does not effectively produce a new resource or value as far as his gametes are concerned; he does not create "an entirely new dimension of the holding – something not only, not previously held, but also something that did not, in the relevant sense, exist previously altogether". What he creates is sperm; his body transforms other cells such as spermatogonia into sperm, adding thereby "an entirely new dimension" to his spermatogonia. It is a woman who transforms a sperm and egg into a child, adding thereby "an entirely new dimension" to gametes – "something not only, not previously held, but also something that did not, in the relevant sense, exist previously altogether", and therefore it is a woman who is the "creator" of a child. Whatever the moment of the beginning of human life we assume on the continuum ranging from conception to birth, it is the labour of mother's body that produces a child from the father's and mother's genetic material. Hence, as far as the finders-creators ethic is concerned it is the mother who is the creator of the child and thereby its exclusive owner.

It is then clear that the finders-creators ethic presupposes the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account*. According to the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account*, it is not possible for a man to become an owner of a child in a "natural" way. On the basis of the finders-creators ethic and the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account*, contrary to contemporary political regimes, being the genetic father (or genetic mother) of the child has no bearing on the property title to the child. As I demonstrated above, what matters is who adds "an entirely new dimension" to the gametes, who transforms the genetic material into a child. In the case of natural pregnancy, it is always a genetic and biological mother and therefore she is the creator, the original appropriator of the child; in the case of *in vitro* fertilisation and surrogacy, it is, depending on the theory of the beginning of human life, a scientist or biological mother (not genetic one), unless a contract with the *in vitro* fertilisation clinic or surrogate mother stipulates otherwise. So, whatever the case, the genetic father of the child is not a "natural", original owner of the child; he is a late-comer. Second of all, because a genetic father is a late-comer who, regardless of his motives, beliefs or aspirations, cannot originally appropriate a child, there is only one legitimate possibility left for him as to the child ownership, namely, he can appropriate a child through transfer of holdings. Hence, the praxeological constraints that would be placed on the genetic parents by the finders-creators ethic and the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account* would determine "stable and recurring patterns of behavior", according to which *if a man wants to have a child, he has to receive property title to a child from its mother who is its exclusive original appropriator*. It means that whatever man's motives and beliefs are, receiving the property title to a child from its mother would constitute for him an inevitable means *if* he wanted to achieve an end of having a child. Since a man could acquire property title to a child from the mother only in one of the two ways: 1) he could receive it as a gift; 2) or he could exchange it for his property, the second scenario would of course be the case of the spontaneous emergence of obligatory child support. Although the exact and detailed form that obligatory child support would adopt under conditions of unorthodox libertarianism is beyond our comprehension, we can predict with a perfect certitude that *if* it developed, it would function as an exchange of property titles between the mother and a man.

Because, as I mentioned earlier on, the only possibility for obligatory child support to function as a contractual duty, as well as the only possibility for obligatory child support to be compatible with libertarianism, is the situation in which just one of the parents is the exclusive owner of the child, it is now obvious that

on the basis of the unorthodox libertarian theory of distributive justice (finders-creators ethic), it is perfectly possible for obligatory child support to function as an explicit contractual duty in accordance with the property title-transfer model of contracts. If the mother is the exclusive owner of the child, she can transfer her property title in the child to a man in exchange for man's property title to his money (or other property); as a result of the transfer, he becomes a co-owner of the child and she appropriates his child support payments. Hence, Williamson M. Evers' criticism "that no transfer of property title occurs in such alleged contracts, and that therefore they are not legally binding" is valid only as far as we espouse the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice and the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account*: if a child is originally co-owned by the parents, there is nothing to exchange the child support payments for. But as far as we espouse the unorthodox libertarian theory of distributive justice (finders-creators ethic) and the *Exclusive Child Ownership Account*, Evers' criticism does not apply.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I analysed the problem of compatibility between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism. I demonstrated that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice since the latter presupposes the *Conjoined Child Ownership Account*. If children were naturally a property of both parents, child support contracts would degenerate into promised expectations model of contracts which is inconsistent with the libertarian doctrine. On the other hand, the institution of obligatory child support is compatible with the unorthodox libertarian theory of distributive justice, namely with the finders-creators ethic. According to this approach, the mother is the creator of the child and thereby its exclusive owner. It is then possible for child support contracts to function within the property title-transfer model of contracts. Therefore, the main thesis of the paper, namely that o*bligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the "finders-creators ethic"*, has been confirmed.

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ROLE OF EMOTIONS AND COMMITMENT IN AN INFLUENCE OF REMEMBRANCE NARRATIVES: REPORT FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The report presents results of the experimental study on relationships between arousal of emotions and commitment, and an effectiveness of the government's remembrance policy. In measurements, the team manipulated emotions inspired in a narrative (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) and participants' commitment to popularization of a narrative (no commitment vs. low commitment), and it observed how different conditions influenced independent variables: memorization of information, attitude change and real-life behavior. Besides presentation of collected data, the report also includes brief introduction to the theoretical background of the study (especially theoretical hypotheses which verification was project's objective) and a short discussion of final results.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

government's remembrance policy, politics of memory, emotions, commitment, experimental political science

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE STUDY

The main objective of the experimental study was an observation of relationships between arousal of emotions and commitment, and an influence of remembrance narratives. Moreover, its aims were the initial validation of theoretical hypotheses on the effectiveness of the government's remembrance policy and the development of existing knowledge on the remembrance as a political asset. Realization of the study was possible thanks to the establishment of research team which included investigators specialized in political science, contemporary history, psychometrics and social psychology. Therefore, it may be considered as an innovative attempt to introduce experimental methodology into political science's approach to narrating past experiences.

In the study, we used own general definition of the government's remembrance policy, which we have constructed with reference to relevant features of individual memory (Crawford 2006: 226; Grosswald Curran 2003: 321–322; Hoskins 2007: 246–247; Kattago 2001: 28–30; Koczanowicz 1997: 259–260; Labanyi 2008: 120–121; Maruszewski 2001: 117–118; Smith 2003: 56–59; Uldricks 2009; Westen 2008: 41–49). We recognized it as an act of intentional narrating past events and interpretation of them by a government, which objective is to influence on political identity of a society, social-shared knowledge – beliefs, ideas, and values – or political attitudes and behaviors, thanks to management of collective memory's contents and/or emotional involvement of a recipient. The policy includes two basic strategies – remembering and forgetting of events – which application results from a government's decision concerning which narratives are essential for political identities and may inform a society in the present or in the future (Gillis 1994: 15; Misztal 2010: 26; Singer, Conway 2008: 279–285). Therefore, we understand it as an instrument of social influence and a peculiar type of political communication (Cialdini 2003).

In the arrangement of measurements, we focused on two theoretical hypotheses on the effectiveness of the remembrance policy. Firstly, we recognized that it is emotional, so its possible influence is dependent on the use of emotions in a narrative (Levenson et al. 1990; Schwarz, Clore 1983; Turner 2007: 170). This hypothesis can be developed on three different levels: (1) emotions transforms citizens' attitudes in compliance with a vector of narrative (Landau et al. 2009), (2) application of different emotions causes opposing results from citizens' well-

being and cooperative behaviors to grief, anxiety, or aggression (Fredrickson, Losada 2005; Baumeister et al. 2001), and (3) positive emotions inspire creativity, activate learning processes and reduce stress, while negative emotions cause defensive fight-or-flight response and limit recipient's openness to new ideas (Boyatzis et al. 2013: 160–164; Barsade, Gibson 2009; Boyatzis et al. 2014; Porges 2001). Secondly, we considered the policy as based on commitment, so its effectiveness can increase if popularization of narratives inspires establishment of relationships between recipients and their active participation in story-telling (Kiesler 1971, 1977; Kiesler, Munson 1975; Burke, Stets 2009). Therefore, we assumed that presence of committing acts influence both attitudes and behaviors of recipients and it makes them more prone to persuasion (Schwartz et al. 1980; Rao, Monk 1999), which is an objective of the remembrance policy.

Thus, the realized research project was based on a new approach to the government's role as a narrator of past experiences. Moreover, its goal was not a description of employed strategies or instruments of the policy, but an observation of narrative's influence in controlled, laboratory conditions. Therefore, its results have an explanatory value and they can be used to explain a role of the remembrance as a political asset, but concurrently these observations may be used as suggestions how to realize the policy in practice.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The experimental study was realized in December 2014 and January 2015 at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and its Medical School in Bydgoszcz. We recruited 364 male and female participants (age: 18–29, average age: 21 years old) representing different branches of science: social science, life science, physical science, and formal science. The research sample was selected accidentally, because the recruitment procedure was based on voluntary participation in the experiment. Therefore, we do not recognize results as representative for the population, but as an observation realized in conditions which imitated specific character of the government's remembrance policy.

In the study, all 364 participants were randomly assigned to six experimental conditions based on the research design. We used two dependent variables: arousal of emotions (neutral vs. positive vs. negative), and arousal of commitment (no commitment vs. low commitment), and we observed differences in three independent variables: memorization of information, change of attitudes

towards the remembrance policy, and real-life behavior of participants. We used three short films about the 1945 Augustów Roundup to manipulate arousal of emotions – the first was emotionally neutral, the second had additional inspirations of pride, while the third had additional inspirations of sorrow[1]. We also asked participants to write a short informative text about the presented narrative (no-commitment condition), or to write a short persuasive text which promoted the narrative[2] (low-commitment condition). Thus, every participant was randomly assigned to watch one of three films and to write one of two short texts related to the topic of presented story.

During the realization of the project, we not only directed (after testing their contents) three short films about the 1945 Augustów Roundup, but we also created two unique research tools. The first was the test of knowledge on Communist Crimes in Poland, which included 11 questions, selected after pretest with 101 participants. The second innovative tool was the attitudes towards the government's remembrance policy questionnaire, that was constructed on the basis of pretest with 449 students from Toruń and Kraków. Moreover, we asked ten experts in the fields of political science and history to evaluate question's relevance. As a result, we established two parallel versions of the questionnaire (A and B) with 17 items each, including two reverse questions each. During measurements, participants were asked to express their support for presented statements on the seven-level Likert scale[3]. The tool covered cognitive, behavioral, and emotional sides of attitudes (Böhner, Wänke 2004: 15–18).

All realized experiments had the same scenario. After confirmation of the will to participate in the study, students were asked to share basic information (sex, age, academic major) and to assess their interest in history and politics. Secondly, they completed the first copy of the attitude questionnaire[4], followed by the Need for Closure questionnaire (Kossowska 2003; Kossowska et al. 2014), and the test of knowledge. Thirdly, a film was showed. Fourthly, participants

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[1] Films were realized by Marcin Wziętek (Nowy Warsztat) and they starred Jarosław Felczykowski (Wiliam Horzyca Theatre in Toruń) as a narrator.

[2] 19 participants wrote a short persuasive text against the suggested thesis, therefore, we recognize them as a group who experienced reverse low commitment.

[3] In the study, we used the following format: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – rather disagree, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 5 – rather agree, 6 – agree, 7 – strongly agree. Total minimal score in the measurement: 17 points; total maximal score: 119 points.

[4] Participants were randomly assigned to start with version A or version B of the questionnaire.

were asked to fill out the manipulation check form and to answer four simple questions about presented narrative. Fifthly, they were asked to write a short informative or persuasive text. Finally, participants completed the second copy of the attitude questionnaire. All measurements lasted less than 45 minutes. After seven days, students were informed about a possibility to sign a petition to the President about commemoration of the Roundup, what enabled us to observe their behavior in real-life.

MEMORIZATION OF INFORMATION

In general, average result in the measurement of memorization was 3,62 points per four possible (90,50%). We observed differences between particular questions: a name of the hero's organization (average: 0,93 points), a number of victims (average: 0,80 points), a name of the hero of narrative (average: 0,91 points), and a place of events (average: 0,97 points). Moreover, we noticed that sex, age, interest in history and politics were irrelevant for the result of memorization test, while participants with more developed knowledge on Communist Crimes had higher results in this test. We also observed interesting differences between students with different academic majors: the highest average results had students of pharmacy (3,89 points), security studies (3,86 points), and cognitive studies (3,83 points), while the lowest average results had students of social work (3,30 points) and biotechnology (3,33 points). Moreover, we noticed that participants who experienced pride or anger stronger, and who found a film more touching, tended to better memorize information.

As we predicted, participants assigned to the emotionally neutral condition had slightly higher average result in the memorization test, and they scored 3,67 points (91,75%), while both groups with additional arousal of emotions scored 3,60 points (90,00%). More interesting are differences in particular questions – in the case of an organization's name inspiration of emotions caused better memorization (neutral: 0,90; pride: 0,95; sorrow: 0,95), while in the case of a number of victims the neutral version was significantly more successful (neutral: 0,88; pride: 0,75; sorrow: 0,78). The hero's name was slightly better memorized by students who watched film with additional arousal of pride (neutral: 0,91; pride: 0,93; sorrow: 0,91), and in a question on a place of events we did not noticed differences (neutral: 0,98; pride: 0,97; sorrow: 0,97). Moreover, there were no significant dissimilarities between results of groups assigned to start with different ver-

sions of the questionnaire or assigned to no-commitment or low-commitment condition; however, students who experienced reversed commitment had more problems with answering these four questions (average: 3,16 points), especially the item related to a number of victims (average: 0,63 points).

ATTITUDE CHANGE

In the first measurement, the average score in the attitude questionnaire was 73,90 points, what suggests moderate support for the remembrance policy, while in the second measurement, the average score was 75,82 points, what shows that presentation of the narrative caused a move to rather positive attitude towards the policy. Therefore, we observed that a support – on average – increased by **2,60%.** In general, the change was more visible in attitudes of female participants (3,20%; male: 0,69%) and it was not correlated with age. In the case of academic majors, we observed more significant change in attitudes of students of pharmacy (6,32%), social work (6,00%), cognitive studies (5,52%), education studies (5,52%), and management (4,66%), while it was irrelevant in the case of students of mathematics (0,30%) and economy (0,40%).

The highest increase was present in groups highly interested in history (4,96%) and not interested in it (4,58%), while a decrease occurred only in a group highly not interested in it (-2,82%). In the case of interest in politics, the highest increase was present in groups not interested in it (5,91%), rather interested in it (5,31%) and highly interested in it (4,34%), while a minimal decrease occurred in a group highly not interested in politics (-0,08%). Moreover, knowledge on Communist Crimes could not be used to predict attitude change – only participants who scored less than two points per eleven possible showed less support for the policy (-10,08%), while the highest increase occurred in group who scored two points (4,42%) and in group who scored seven and more points (3,72%). These results suggest that the remembrance policy should not focus only on citizens interested in history and politics with more developed knowledge, but also it should target these citizens who do not express their interest in the past and who are less educated in the national history.

In the experimental study, we noticed the highest average increase of support in a group of participants who were assigned to watch a film with additional arousal of pride (3,54%, +2,59 points), lower increase in a group assigned to the emotionally neutral condition (3,10%, +2,34 points), and the lowest one in

a group that watched a film with additional inspirations of sorrow (1,15%, +0,83 points). Even more noticeable differences were present between participants who experienced low commitment (3,42%, +2,57 points), lack of commitment (2,37%, +1,75 points), and reversed low commitment (-3,19%, -2,00 points). It is clear that observed attitude change was not radical, but we have to emphasize that it was a result of just watching one short film and writing one short text, and discussed changes occurred in only half an hour.

Combination of two dependent variables' influence also lead us to valuable observations. The most favorable – in terms of attitude change – was presence of positive emotions (pride) and a committing act (4,60%, +3,42 points), while without arousal of commitment watching this film caused significantly smaller increase (3,05%, +2,22 points). Even more visible is difference between presence of a committing act in the case of a film with additional inspirations of sorrow (low commitment: 2,49%, +1,85 points; no commitment: 0,66%, +0,48 points). However, in a group assigned to watch an emotionally neutral film, slightly higher increase was observed in no-commitment condition (3,33%, +2,52 points; low commitment: 3,13%, +2,42 points). Moreover, neutral version reduced impact of reversed low commitment (-1,30%, -0,80 points; pride: -1,98%, -1,33 points; sorrow: -5,44%, -3,25 points).

REAL-LIFE BEHAVIOR

Only four of 348 participants[5] decided to share the petition to the President. Two of them (seven days before) watched a film with additional arousal of sorrow, one – a film with additional inspirations of pride, and one – an emotionally neutral film. Moreover, two of them were assigned to write a short informative text, and other two – to write a short persuasive text. Therefore, collected data cannot be used to verify how different emotions and presence of commitment may influence political behavior of recipients of the remembrance policy. However, it legitimizes a statement that inspiring just low commitment is not sufficient to change recipients' behavior, and that it cannot be recognized as an

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[5] 16 participants did not share with us their contact details, so they could not be informed about the petition.

effective strategy of political mobilization of citizens. In the follow-up study we will introduce high commitment condition, where participants will be asked to not only write a short persuasive text, but also to present it in the front of other participants – as a result, we want to verify if high commitment may be used to manipulate citizens' behavior thanks to remembrance narratives.

Nevertheless, the experimental study delivered some information about a relationship between narrating past experiences and recipients' behavior. We noticed that a result of the attitudes questionnaire may be used to predict respondent's actions. In the case of participants who expressed their positive or highly positive attitude towards the government's remembrance policy, the expected behavior was six times more likely than in the case of all participants. Therefore, we assume that further studies (and replication of this study in different conditions) will confirm that citizens who support a government as the leading narrator of the national history are more likely to engage themselves in promotion of narratives and commemorative actions.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Presented results of the experimental study cannot be recognized as a final validation of theoretical hypotheses on relationships between arousal of emotions and commitment, and the effectiveness of remembrance narratives. However, they lead us to few interesting and valuable observations. Firstly, presence of emotions do not reduce educational role of story-telling. Secondly, use of positive emotions increases a narrative's influence on recipients' attitudes. Thirdly, presence of a committing act intensifies impact of emotions, and it can be used to reduce negative outcomes of arousal of negative emotions. Fourthly, results of the study confirmed that the combination of positive emotions and low commitment is the most effective strategy of story-telling. Fifthly, we noticed that the influence of remembrance narratives is not limited to citizens who are interested in history and politics and a story can also inspire less involved recipients.

We hope that the realized project will be a beginning of long-term investigations of the government's remembrance policy, its influence and effectiveness. It offered an insight into using the history as a political asset, but it rather inspired new questions than finally answered already existing ones. It is clear that it delivered valuable data, which can be used to explain how the remembrance policy works, but it also showed how many different variables should be considered

in further studies: from types of narratives, through various levels of commitment, to the role of recurrence of an act of story-telling. We believe that this project was a very first stage of empirical verification of predictions in laboratory conditions.

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

GERMANY'S ARCTIC POLICY – BETWEEN ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY

Joanna Grzela*

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

In the last years, as a result of climate changes, plenty of transformations have taken place in the High North. Consequently, ice cap of the Arctic is melting at a very fast pace, and that means significant rise of sea levels as well as decreasing animals' habitats. On the other hand, disappearing Arctic ice is opening new areas of exploitation for humans. The Arctic might also soon become the world's most important reservoir of clean water and food. The warming is leading to changes in ecosystems, arousing a number of enquiries about territorial division of the region, its preservation and utilisation. The changes taking place in the Arctic pose a challenge on many levels: economic, social, security, and environmental protection. First of all, economic (access to probably the biggest deposits of oil, gas and precious metals in the world) and ecological (environmental protection) interests are clashing there. The North Pole, although with varying intensity, is becoming present in foreign policies of many countries. On the Old Continent, it has been noticed by the whole European Union as well as particular countries. One of them is Germany. Germany is interested in the region from the economic and ecological perspective.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

Arctic, Germany, Arctic policy

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INTRODUCTION

The icy North Pole has always been an interesting area for scientific research. Today, it focuses the international community's attention due to significant changes in its landscape. The Arctic, unlike other geographical regions, is the area of rapid and intensive climate changes caused by industrialized and developing countries. They have led to many transformations in the High North. Consequently, the ice cap is melting faster than estimated, which means the rise of the sea level and shrinking habitat for many species (Symonides 2008: 31–32). The phenomenon, though, may enable navigation in the sea routes on the Arctic Ocean, which consequently will intensify international trade and influence the direction of its development. The ice-free period in the Arctic is to increase from 30 days in 2010 up to 120 days in the 2050s. It is therefore possible that the Northeast Passage, known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), as well as the Northwest Passage, stretching from the Atlantic along the northern coast of North America, will become navigable for a few months in a year. The new northern navigation routes shorten the distance between Europe and Asia, which draws attention of many countries.

Melting of the ice cap in the High North changes its geostrategic position. As the interest in the Arctic grows, there is an increase in the region's geopolitical value. Scientists, politicians, and journalists make various speculations concerning the future scenario for the High North. In this international discourse, it is very important not to lose sight of the region, as the ongoing events may bring major consequences not only for the Arctic countries, but also for the whole international community (Heininen 2004: 207).

The High North is the region of exceptional opportunities and challenges. Identifying new relations between the Arctic and the rest of the world is crucial from both political and scientific perspective, as they become an important part of global geopolicy (Osica 2010b). We are witnesses to the growth of a new region, in the political meaning, exemplifying an important tendency in international relations (Osica 2010a). The course of the events is being observed by many countries of the world. Their policy towards the Arctic remains currently *in statu nascendi* (Kubiak 2009). However, the ongoing environmental, geopolitical, and geoeconomic changes and their consequences make it inevitable for the European diplomacy to refer to the problem. It is connected with both hopes (concerning the exploitation of mineral resources, mostly gas and oil, and new sea routes above the Arctic circle) and fears regarding the perspectives of the

further peaceful development of the region, and also the scope and character of the international cooperation in the region. In this way, the remote Arctic becomes the centre of interest for countries seeking unlimited deposits of mineral resources, natural resources, and new navigation routes. On the Old Continent, it has been noticed by particular countries as well as the whole European Union (Łuszczuk 2010: 156).

Due to the global warming and rapid melting rate of the ice sheets, the Arctic is becoming increasingly important for the international community in geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geoecologic terms. It has also become the focus of Germany's policy. Germany has decided to outline its aims and interests in the High North. Their priorities are compatible with the Arctic states' strategies. They focus mostly on civilian issues in international relations, but military aspects are equally important in the context of rescue actions and navigation safety. Generally, a number of principal issues can be distinguished: sovereignty and safety, development of transport and economy, exploitation of natural resources, protection of the environment and indigenous population, management and rescue (connected with potential sea accidents), scientific research, and international cooperation (Heininen 2011).

BEGINNINGS OF GERMANY'S INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC

Germany's interest in the Arctic dates back to the 19th century and concerns polar research. German scientists have been exploring both Poles since the mid-19th century. Carl Koldewey was the leader of the first German expeditions to the High North in 1868 and 1870. Georg von Neumayer carried out the exploration of the Antarctic region as the president of the International Polar Commission and one of the founding fathers of the first International Polar Year. Alfred Wegener, in turn, created the theory of continental drift (also known as Wegener's Theory) and in the early 20th century conducted a number of expeditions to Greenland.

In 1974, after the Federal Republic of Germany had joined the Arctic Treaty, the preparations to coordinate polar research by one institution were started. As a consequence, the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) with its official office in Bremerhaven was established. The German Democratic Republic had its own program of scientific research. In 1957, German scientists joined the expedition to the Antarctic organised by the Soviet Union. Consequently, a research centre

of Georg Forster was established. After the reunification in 1990, polar programs of both countries were joined under the aegis of the AWI.

The AWI's polar research makes the Arctic an interesting area of scientific relations. The institute has the leading position in interdisciplinary scientific research focusing on climatic changes, biodiversity, melting of the sea ice, as well as oceanographic, biological and geological changes. Its objective is to inform the public and policy makers about the potential local and global consequences of climate changes in the Arctic. The institute operates a number of research stations in polar regions, e.g. on Svalbard (French and German collaboration), or on Samoilov Island in the delta of the Lena River in northeast Siberia (Russian and German collaboration[1]). Moreover, it runs six research ships, including Polarstern, the icebreaker. The AWI employs about 900 scientists and its total annual budget amounts to EUR 100 million.

The Federal Institute of Geosciences and Natural Resources is another renowned participant of polar research. It examines geological structure of the Arctic and estimates polar resources. The main objective of the institute is to provide the Federal Government with information concerning accessibility and transport of mineral resources (*Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic*, 2012: 14).

Tradition, quality, and the scope of German polar research have initiated the political engagement of Germany in the Arctic. As underlined by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century and a key foreign policy task. Especially since the disappointing climate summit in Copenhagen in late 2009, a stronger role for foreign policy in international climate policy has been called for – climate diplomacy" (Wyciszkiewicz 2011: 19; *Climate Change – A Foreign Policy*…, 2011; *Climate Diplomacy. New Approaches, 2*013).

The increase of political and economic importance of the Arctic region led the Federal Government to outline guidelines for the Arctic policy. The document was adopted in September 2013, and entitled *Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.*

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[1] In August 2013, AWI scientists embarked on a three-year research project with Russian partners trying to answer the questions of how the ecosystem is influenced by climatic changes and what consequences they carry for the Arctic region and Europe. The project's budget is estimated to be EUR 7 million.

INTERESTS AND AIMS OF GERMANY'S ARCTIC POLICY

The guidelines of Germany's Arctic policy are highly universal and should be perceived in a wide perspective including the European Union and NATO's approach to the High North. German interest in the region is three-dimensional, i.e. economy, ecology and safety related. Germany is interested in the development of transport and scientific research, as well the control of sea routes along the northern coast of Europe. On the one hand, the country contributes to the protection of the Arctic environment and ecosystems, but on the other, it is committed to exploit geoeconomic opportunities of the region. This dual interest can be seen in the title of the *Guidelines of the Germany's Arctic Policy*: "Assume responsibilities, seize opportunities".

At the conference entitled "Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change" organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011, Guido Westerwelle, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, outlined three goals Germany would like to achieve in order to make research and economic exploitation more compatible with one another. Firstly, research in the High North should be as free as possible and conducted with minimum bureaucracy. Secondly, the strictest environmental standards must always be observed and enforced in order to protect the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic. And thirdly, there must be clear rules of liability for any damage to the environment of the region (*Safeguarding the Future…*, 2011).

Similarly, at the "Arctic Dialogue" conference in Bodø (Norway) organised in March 2014, Axel Berg, the German Ambassador to Norway, claimed that Germany is committed to set standards concerning the protection of the environment, exploitation of economic potential and energy resources of the region (as they hold advanced technology for exploitation). The country aims to guarantee freedom of navigation and scientific research, as well as safety and sustainability of the region. These aims are to be achieved by close cooperation with all the countries of the Arctic region, especially with Norway, which shares the same view in almost all issues of foreign policy (*Ambassador Dr. Axel Berg Speech*, 2014).

The Arctic remains of special interest for Germany, as it is the country of the biggest export, the biggest economy in the European Community, and with the largest population. Its economy is highly dependent on the import of energy resources. Currently, 58% of German gas and oil come from Russia and Norway, the countries which have already reached for the Arctic deposits (Steinicke 2014:

133). Exploitation of the Arctic resources may increase sustainable energy and minerals supplies for Germany as well as for the European Union. Except for gas and oil, German economy depends on the import of minerals, including rare earth elements, which are necessary for the development of "green technologies" (e.g. to produce wind turbines). Germany also invests in exploitation and is ready to provide knowledge and technology necessary to extract raw materials deposited below the Arctic ice. Harsh weather conditions and technical challenges require advanced technologies and know-how. This, in turn, creates opportunities for German companies which cooperate with companies in Russia and Norway in terms of seeking energy sources, exploitation and use of gas reserves. For instance, the German company Linde supplied Statoil, the Norwegian energy company with technology for recovering liquefied gas in the Snøhvit (*Snow White*) field, discovered in 1984, on the Barents Sea (*Snøhvit Job…*, 2002). Another example is Wintershall, the company which operates within two ranges, i.e. exploration and production of natural gas and oil, and which cooperates with Statoil in the Arctic. It also cooperates with Russian Gazprom (*Gazprom and Wintershall…*, 2013). Two other German companies, E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF, are involved in gas exploitation in the Yuzhno-Russkoye field, situated in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomus Okrug. Russian Krylov State Research Center in Saint Petersburg, one of the world leaders in research for the marine industry, cooperates with the Nordic Yards shipyards in Wismar and Rostock-Warnemünde, the world leaders in specialised shipbuilding. In April 2013, they signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, as well as a number of contracts for specific projects, involving the joint work on the design and construction of complicated and technologically advanced ships to customers in Russia and Europe (*Krylov Research Center and Nordic…*, 2012).

Germany also backs opening new shipping routes from Europe to Asia (90% of German export relies on sea transport, therefore the marine sector is of crucial importance for the trading relations with the rest of the world). Germany has the third largest merchant marine in the world (approximately 3600 vessels) and the world's largest fleet of container ships. The shipbuilding industry is one of the strategic branches of German economy. Their shipyards create a niche market requiring highly advanced technologies in order to provide icebreakers and vessels to ship liquefied gas in the Arctic conditions. German shipyards expect orders to increase as they provide drilling platforms, high-tech vessels used for gas and oil exploration as well as for installation and servicing offshore

wind farms (Gerlach 2014). The Northern Sea Route in the Northeast Passage[2] may create new opportunities for German shipping thanks to shorter travel times, less fuel use and lower costs (German cargo ships are using the routes to deliver goods to West Siberia) (Norton 2009; Phalnikar 2009). Navigation companies hope to use the Northeast Passage to transport goods between Europe and East Asia. The new routes may bring 40% savings in comparison to traditional navigation routes across the Suez Canal. Shorter distance reduces fuel use (which has ecological effect), lowers personal costs and fees. Reducing the number of days at sea results in increased income and potentially bigger profit[3]. What is more, piracy remains a discouraging factor in navigating across the conventional routes, with a 100% increase in insurance costs for vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal only in the period from September 2008 to March 2009 (Campbell 2012). On the other hand, financial profits of ship companies connected with shorter travel time may not be high due to logistic and technical challenges. Shippers must take into account unpredicted and violent weather conditions, e.g. ice storms, extreme temperatures (which may negatively influence on-board devices), or undetectable ice blocks. These obstacles may naturally close some parts of the region and cause costly delays in transport. Navigating in the Northern Sea Route may currently be less profitable due to Russian commission fees based on the volume of cargo ships. Throughout the biggest part of the year, sailing in the NSR waters must be assisted by Russian atomic icebreakers. In late July 2012, Putin established the Northern Sea Route Administration, a federal treasury institution whose aim is to provide icebreaker service for other vessels. The payment is determined in accordance with the legislation on natural monopolies (*Vladimir Putin Signs Law on…*, 2012; *Northern Sea Route Administration*, 2014).

The development of the Arctic natural resources and increased shipping may endanger natural environment, security and health of the indigenous people. Germany recognises the special situation of the Arctic peoples and campaigns for

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[2] The Northeast Passage – shipping route connecting Europe with the Pacific Ocean, along the northern coast of Eurasia, traversing the Barents Sea, Kara Strait, Kara Sea, Vilkitsky Strait, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, Da Longa Strait, Chukchi Sea, and Bering Strait. In the summer of 2009, two German merchant ships, Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight, were the first non-Russian vessels to navigate along the Northern Sea Route to Russia and further to Rotterdam.

[3] The NSR shortens the travel from Shanghai to Hamburg of 6400 kilometres in comparison to the route across the Malakka Strait and Suez Canal. The ships sailing from Yokohama to Rotterdam cover the distance of 21000 kilometres if they go through the Malakka Strait and Suez Canal. The route across the Arctic could shorten the distance up to 13000 km.

the protection of their right to a free and self-determined life in their homeland. Although shipping and maritime transport are still rare in the Arctic, the Federal Government supports the necessity to follow strict environmental standards to regulate navigation in the region (*The Arctic*, 2013). The need for environmental protection and ensuring sustainable development are strongly emphasised in the German policy. The government insists on establishing protected areas in order to preserve biodiversity of the High North. The Arctic may be treated as the "system of early recognition". Melting ice causes the increase of global warming and the rise of sea levels. This, in turn, brings interest in climate changes and their observable consequences that may affect the German coast of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, especially the port of Hamburg. Referring to that problem, Germany initiated a number of national and international programs[4] to combat global climate changes, e.g. through limiting the use of conventional energy resources and thus protection of the environment and reduction of global warming (*Council Conclusions on EU Climate…*, 2011; *Climate Change – A Foreign Policy Challenge*, 2011). The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research has emphasised that "ensuring sustainable development requires comprehensive basic knowledge and deep understanding of the key processes at work. This is critical as the risks for the Arctic ecosystem and society arising from climate change and commercial exploitation are largely unknown. The same applies to the feedback effects on the global climate" (*Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic*, 2012).

The course of events in the Arctic may influence the architecture of trans-European security together with Russian and the USA's strategies. Military conflict between the countries of the Arctic regions is rather unlikely. However, as in any place in the world with ongoing international conflicts, theoretically, military and political forces may become involved. Berlin, in cooperation with Oslo, aims to develop its own military activity in the High North. Together with the EU and Norway, the Federal Government makes efforts to broaden its influence in the Arctic. According to the German Ministry of Defence, the Arctic Ocean is "the most profound maritime challenge of the near future", which may lead to "resurgence of territorial disputes" (*German Foreign Policy*, 2010).

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[4] In July 2011, following joint British and German suggestions, the EU Foreign Ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) admitted that climate changes must be treated as a threat to economic growth, prosperity and stability. The Council called all the EU institutions to address climate diplomacy at all levels.

On the other hand, Germany imports energy resources from Russia and thus is disinterested in the conflict. Additionally, it emphasises the need of international regulation of potential sources of conflict in accordance with the binding laws. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to ensure that the region will remain "common heritage of all mankind" and that the five countries bordering the Arctic will admit that other countries may access the resources of the region (Schwägerl, Seidler 2011). The Arctic should only be used for peaceful purposes and the Federal Government supports preventive actions which are taken to avoid conflict by building trust and cooperation[5]. However, Rolf Einar Fife, the chief international law expert in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claims: "No one other than the coastal nations should be concerned about the question of overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic" (Schwägerl, Seidler 2011).

Germany, nevertheless, foresees possible NATO interventions in the Arctic. The fact that four out of five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean are NATO members may mean that in case of territorial disputes with non-NATO member countries, the Transatlantic Alliance may get involved (*German Foreign Policy*, 2010). Moreover, Germany points out to the risk that the Arctic may be nationalised by five coastal countries when the sea ice melts, providing access to the sea floor. Similarly, Rüdiger Wolfrum, an expert on international law and a judge on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, claims that the perspectives are unfavourable for German scientists and their polar expeditions. "The German scientists will probably have to put up with considerable restrictions", he said. He also emphasised that if the rate of territorial claims remained unchanged, the sea floor, with a few small exceptions, would become largely nationalised (Schwägerl, Seidler 2011).

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs admits that recent events in the Arctic are a corporate matter. The view was shared by Michael Zenner, the German Federal Republic Ambassador to Denmark at the "Arctic Shipping Routes: Challenges Ahead" conference in Copenhagen in April 2014. In his speech, he emphasised that the High North has a tremendous impact on global climate. Temperatures in this region rise faster than in other parts of the world, which

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[5] Germany regularly participates in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), which is to ensure peaceful cooperation around the Arctic, especially in rescue actions. It is an informal structure for meetings of top army officers of all member countries of the Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States), as well as other countries interested in the region: France, The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany.

has a great impact on people and environment, even those far from the Arctic. The results of scientific research are necessary to understand these changes. He postulated that non-Arctic countries should also have the right to access the Arctic resources. Moreover, he emphasised that the coastal states have the right to regulate and authorise maritime research in their zones and they are also obliged to support international cooperation in this matter (*Speech of Ambassador Michael Zenner…*, 2014).

Germany has been presenting its views concerning the High North issues in the forum of the Arctic Council since 1998, when it was granted an observer status. The Federal Government opts for increasing the number of observer countries in the Council and appointing others, e.g. the European Union. Moreover, it advocates institutional strengthening of the regional cooperation. As an EU member country, Germany supports the EU policy in the Arctic and emphasises the idea of coherence on the Arctic issues, i.e. in terms of foreign policy, security, scientific research, environmental protection, energy and resources, industry and technology, transport and fisheries.

Germany has been observing the transformation process in the Arctic with great interest and has successfully undertaken the public debate in this issue as can be documented by a number of initiatives and conferences concerning the region. The international conferences organised in Berlin by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with other countries of the Arctic region (i.e. the conference with Norway and Denmark in 2009, with Finland in 2011, and with Norway in 2013) have been an important forum for the debate concerning the region. Another Berlin meeting titled "Sustainable Shipping in the Arctic – Prospects for International Cooperation" took place in April 2014, and related to transport issues in the Arctic.

CONCLUSION

Until recently, the Arctic has remained of little importance for political scientists. Nevertheless, political analysis of various and complex phenomena taking place in the High North has become increasingly vital and necessary. Political and climatic issues are closely related. The discovery of natural resources in the Arctic and the ongoing climate changes which have led to the opening of new northern sea routes have resulted in the increased interest in the region. Therefore, the international dialogue on the issues of military presence in the context of security,

exploitation of natural resources, protection of the environment, development of navigation and tourism, continuation of scientific research must be the order of the day. Considering its size, the Arctic begins to have a disproportionate impact on the world. It has become the key region whose changes may be connected with complex social, political and economic issues of global importance.

Non-Arctic countries have been preparing fundamentals of active policy concerning the High North by purchasing or constructing vessels able to break the ice of the Northern Sea Route, planning transport, operating research stations (whose task is to assess climate conditions or potential natural resources) and conducting studies referring to politics, law, and diplomacy in the Arctic. Germany remains one of them. The country has a long tradition of engagement in the Arctic issues due to its polar research. Today Germany is interested in the region from the economic perspective, i.e. as a consumer of Arctic resources and a stakeholder of opportunities brought by melting ice sheets. On the other hand, Germany notices environmental risks caused by transformations in the High North and supports long-term goals of climate protection on the international level. The Federal Government aims to ensure the freedom of scientific research, navigation and access to potential energy resources of the Arctic. It also intends to guarantee that the strictest environmental standards are respected and a polluter will be liable for any damage to the environment, as well as that efforts of particular countries will be focused on eliminating conflicts and increasing security and stability of the region.

Realistic diagnosis of the Arctic matters forces Germany to take such decisions and actions that guarantee efficiency. Pragmatism of Germany's Arctic policy relies on understanding economic and ecological importance of the High North. Utilitarianism can be seen in terms of sustainable supplies of natural resources. In this case, Germany has chosen the northeast vector. Two coastal countries of the Arctic, Russia and Norway, are the most important energy suppliers and they are referred to as two main subjects of cooperation in Germany's Arctic strategy.

To conclude, Germany in the Arctic is a spectator rather than an actor. Its future policy in the High North has been designed with characteristic pragmatism. Although Germany lies outside the Arctic region, it pays particular attention to global problems of natural environment and, therefore, should be involved in international discussions and actions concerning the Arctic. However, despite the declared engagement in polar matters and the willingness to strengthen the position of observers in the Arctic Council, Germany failed to

appoint an Ambassador to the Arctic like other non-Arctic observer countries (France and Japan). Carefully created guidelines and their flexibility prove that in practice Germany's activity in the Arctic depends on the EU engagement and is carried out within the EU policy.

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RUSSIA'S ENERGY COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN THE NEW ERA

Mo Guo*

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

Last year (2014), after years of negotiation, China signed a gas supply contract with Russia, which is a milestone of Sino-Russian energy cooperation. This contract gives us a chance to review the development of Sino-Russian energy cooperation and relations in the past 15 years. By analysing this long history, we found that today's achievement is the result of diverse determinants.

It is necessary to understand these elements and consider energy cooperation against the background of economic development, international relations and world governance, so that we can understand how the energy deal was made and what it means to both countries in different aspects.

For both countries, today's progress is the consequence of internal needs and external pressures. Russia seeks for new market and tries to avoid political and economic risks. China needs strategic reserve and a proper political partner. More importantly, both sides hold the consensus that the energy cooperation could bring effect on political level.

They set an example of how big powers cooperate and how they solve disputes. The high level of political and strategic consensus has played an essential role in this cooperation. This politically-oriented characteristic contributes to today's breakthrough, however, on the other hand, it could also bring unstable and fragile factors.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

Sino-Russian relations, energy cooperation, Russia's Energy Policy

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THE NEW CONTRACT IN 2014

In May 2014, the president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin visited Shanghai to attend a key summit of Asian states that included delegates from nearly 40 countries and international organizations.

It was Putin's first visit to China since President Xi Jinping took office. Against the backdrop of the sanctions of western countries caused by the crisis in Ukraine and the closer relations of Russia and China in the recent years, expectations were high that this visit could make big progress in the practical cooperation of many fields. Although the officials remained silent, it was already an open secret that Putin's visit was "with a gas supply deal on the agenda" (BBC 2014a).

However, things were not as easy as people expected. On the night of May 20th, the press revealed that there would not be an expected gas contract signing during Putin's visit, due to the price difference (Zhang 2014). On that day, Russia and China signed more than 40 cooperation documents without the gas deal. It was such a disappointing night for both countries – regardless of all the clues and hints that had suggested a big breakthrough, nothing really happened, again, like always.

Then the surprise came in the morning. Russia and China signed the long-awaited gas supply agreement on the last day of Putin's visit. This last-minute deal is expected to deliver some 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year eastward to China's burgeoning economy, starting around 2018 (BBC 2014b). According to the media, "the two countries will invest more than $70 billion on the world's largest construction project, with Russia providing $55 billion up front and China $22 billion for pipelines on their respective territories" (RT, 2014). "This is the biggest contract in the history of the gas sector of the former USSR", said Putin, after the agreement was signed between state-controlled entities Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) (Reuters 2014a). Moreover, the gas contract marks the new era of energy trading of two countries: there was no natural gas (except LGN) trading before between the strategic partnerships.

The dramatic and volatile story shows the difficulty and complexity behind the negotiations. Putin described the Chinese as difficult and hard negotiators, noting that "talks went on until 4 a.m." (Reuters 2014b). "Both sides were in the end pleased by the compromise reached on price and other terms", the president's words are the only details we knew about that night. Not surprisingly, no official price was given by both countries but it is estimated to be worth over $400bn. Sources say that the price is around $350–$380 per thousand cubic meters, which

would benefit both China and Russia, as it is cheaper than Asian spot market LNG prices and slightly above Russia's break even costs (Reuters 2014).

The secret price and unveiled details of the negotiation raised doubt and discussions in the press and among the people. Although there were different voices about the price and policy making, the mainstream in China still expressed a positive attitude towards this epochal contract. From Russia's side, people seem satisfied with their new big client and their choice to tie up with China, particularly in the face of the tense situation with the West.

It is obvious that this gas supply agreement is not simply the result of business and trade struggle. Actually, any kind of energy cooperation is not only about business, especially between China and Russia, but rather it contains many issues, such as international security, political strategy, regional politics, and global governance. It is the many connections between these two countries that have led to today's achievement. Therefore, to better understand how the energy deal was agreed and what it means to both sides, one has to keep the foresaid elements in mind and put the energy policy into the context of international relations and politics.

We cannot deny that the gas contract reflects the close relations between Russia and China, and so do the doubts, questions and secret interactions behind the contract, from which we can learn more about the partnership between these two powers.

According to recent official documents and representations, relations between Russia and the People's Republic of China "are developing successfully and have reached a new level of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation" (Kremlin 2014) This sets the tone of bilateral relations and the basic direction of future development; however, the consequences behind the headline are far more complicated.

HARD AND TORTUOUS DEVELOPMENT: FROM 2001 ONWARDS

Russian-Chinese relations are always the focus of the world. As two main powers in the current multi-polar world, Russia and China have become closer and closer since their strategic partnership was founded.

China and Russia are in its best years at the moment. Before Vladimir Putin's visit to Shanghai in 2014, in October of 2013, Prime Minister of the Russian

Federation Dmitri Medvedev visited China for the 18th routine meeting between prime ministers since 1996, and signed many agreements with China. Just as Putin said to the press earlier that year when China's new leader Xi Jinping chose Russia for his first visit abroad, the Russian-Chinese relations "are the best in their centuries-long history" (ITAR-TASS 2014).

Looking back, diplomatic relations between Russia and China rapidly improved after the dissolution of the USSR and the founding of the Russian Federation in 1991 when Russia and China signed a Joint Statement on the foundation of relations, in which the two countries pledged to "establish good-neighbourly, friendly and mutually beneficial relations" when the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China. In 1994, their bilateral relationship was defined as a "constructive partnership", and the description of the relations in 1996 turned into an "equal and reliable, strategic partnership of coordination towards the 21st century".

A special moment of Russian-Chinese relations was marked on July 16th, 2001, when the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed "The Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation between Russia and China", a programmatic treaty to confirm the strategic partnership of coordination, aiming at "establishing a foundation for the long-term comprehensive development of relations and strategic interaction between the two countries within an equal and trust-based partnership" (Portyakov 2010: 2–4). In the same year they joined with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The complementary agreement between China and Russia on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary signed in 2004 ended the territorial disputes that had lasted hundred years, and were seen as the last issue of conflict between Russia and China.

Today, Russia and China have a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership", the highest level they have ever reached since 2001. Interaction and communication at the top level between the two countries has become more frequent. Having the same position on many issues, like anti-terrorism, anti-separatism, and ethnic issues, the two permanent members of the UN Security Council have consensus on most of the intense global issues which have a huge impact on the world. In the latest Ukraine crisis, although China kept their word at the beginning in terms of concern about their relations with Ukraine and hot topic domestic issues, Beijing allied with Russia by claiming that they oppose sanctions with Russia over Ukraine (Reuters 2014b).

Besides, both countries deepened their co-operation through the contexts of G20, BRICS, and the SCO, and this enhanced their influence on global governance and at the geopolitical level.

From the economic aspect, Russia and China have seen a dramatic increase in the total trade value in the past decade. According to statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics of The People's Republic of China, the total value of trade between Russia and China jumped to 89.2^{bn} dollars in 2013 up from 10.6^{bn} dollars in 2001 (National Data 2014). The first Russia–China crude pipeline, built in 2010, started to work in 2011, representing the development of energy trade during these years.

China has become the biggest trade partner with Russia today, and according to the plan of two countries (before the gas deal of 2014), the bilateral trade value will reach 100 billion dollars per year in 2015, and 200 billion by 2020 (Chinanews 2013).

However, in comparison with the very frequent political interaction and high consensus at global governance level, the trading component is somewhat different. It is noted that today's 90 billion dollars in trade value between Russia and China, the so-called big achievement of rapid development, accounts only 20% of the total trade value between China and America. We could say that political consideration in this scenario is more important than really practical economic development for both countries – at least the facts give this impression. There are countless frame agreements and memorandums as well as joint declarations between Moscow and Beijing that have been signed since 2001, but many of them are just concepts and political declarations, or propaganda, which are not that pragmatic and efficient especially in terms of the economy.

The idea of oil supply from Russia to China was first proposed in 1996, when Yeltsin signed "the energy cooperation agreements between China and Russia" during his visit to China (People.cn 2014). In 2001, Yukos first proposed an Oil Pipeline project, which would help transfer Yokos's oil to Daqing, a northern Chinese city. However, the project stalled in 2003 because of the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Then in 2006, after the agreement providing Transneft with 400 million dollars for constructing a pipeline from Skovorodino to China signed by CNPC, the pipeline started to be built. It was not until 2011 that the first Russia–China crude pipeline came into full use.

The situation is even worse in terms of gas trading. The starting point for gas cooperation was the agreement in 1996, which proposed the idea of transporting gas from the Irkutsk to China. Then the long and tortuous negotiations started.

During the past 17 years, the two countries have signed a series of framework agreements, and have established an energy negotiation mechanism at the vice premier level, but still without a conclusive end. Many reasons have caused these marathon negotiations, but price is generally acknowledged to be the biggest obstacle. Briefly, the two "close partners" did not want to compromise in the negotiations. It is clear that they both long for a final deal, which matches the status quo of their intimate relations at the political and strategic level, nevertheless the procedure lasted 17 years.

In the opinion of Shoichi Itoh, a large part of the Sino-Russian energy partnership is rhetorical rather than substantial (Itoh 2010). Thanks to the 2014 gas supply contract, we should re-evaluate energy connections between China and Russia in the new era of Sino-Russian relations.

Since 2001, China's imports of crude oil from Russia are getting better. In 2001, China imported 1.8 million tons of oil from Russia, and received 5.3 million tons in 2003. The first time oil trading reached 10 million tons was in 2004, and this climbed to 16 million tons in 2006, which was the record during the 2000s. As a result of the crude oil pipeline being put into use between China and Russia in 2011, oil imports reached the 20 million tons level. In 2013, China imported 24.35 million tons of oil from Russia, which made Russia the 4th largest oil trading partner of China (China Energy News 2014). Although imports from Russia account for 7.8% of the total oil imports of China, these are at present far behind those of Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran (Guangzhou Daily 2014).

In order to expand trade, China created a new mode: Loans-for-Oil. In 2009, China and Russia signed a series of commercial contracts including a big deal for Loans-for-Oil. According to the contract, China Development Bank and CNPC offered a 20-year-loan to the state company Rosneft and Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft, of approximately 15 billion dollars and 10 billion dollars respectively. In response, indebted Rosneft would supply 15 million tons of oil to China each year, and Transneft had to finish the first phase of the construction of the Sino-Russian pipeline by 2009 (Pipeline and Gas Journal 2009). The Loans-for-Oil strategy met the demands for both sides: Russia received funds while China secured oil supply. This method is still working today not only in terms of Sino-Russian oil cooperation, but also in deals with other partners.

As the disputes being gradually resolved, it seems that the energy cooperation between China and Russia was changing into a highway from the previous bumpy rough roads. In 2013, Russia signed with China a $270 billion deal to double the oil supply to China (Reuters 2013). According to the contract, Rosneft

will export 360 million tons of crude oil to China in the following 25 years (Qian 2013: 72–73). Also in 2013, CNPC bought a 20% stake in OAO Novatek's $20 billion Yamal liquefied natural gas project, aiding the Russian gas supplier's bid to raise financing (Bloomberg 2013).

To conclude, the situation of energy cooperation between the two partners is improved in the past five years. Contract has been signed, oil is being transported, and the gas is on the road – the tough days have passed. All of these are closely related to Russia's energy policy and the world situation.

A GENERAL TREND?

Energy trade is a complex business which is inseparable with a nation's strategy and policy. Examining Russia's energy policy towards China is a direct approach to understanding energy relations between Russia and China. Nevertheless, there is no single Russian energy policy in practice despite the notable Russia's energy strategy until 2030 (ES2030), a key document for Russia's energy sector (Aalto 2012: 5). Published in 2009, the directional document is an updated version of Russia's energy strategy until 2020. The ES2030 reviews the previous document and considers its effect, sets new strategies, and predicts the future of energy needs, energy production, and economic development. ES2030 describes Russia's energy strategy in terms of turning to the east: "By 2030, the proportion of Eastern energy markets in the Russian energy export of liquid hydrocarbons (oil and oil products) should grow from the current 6 to 22–25%, while natural gas exports should grow from 0 to 19–20%" (ES2030 2009). In contrast, the proportion of exports to the West will decrease in order to remove dependence on the Western market.

Without a doubt, China as a key player of Eastern energy market is involved in ES2030. In the "going east" strategy, natural gas is a significant component for its implementation since Russia owns the largest natural gas reserves in the world while its development eastward just begins.

Shinichiro Tabata and Xu Liu explained three objectives of Russian oil and gas development in the Far East and East Siberia: exploitation of oil and gas fields to replace those in West Siberia, diversification of Russia's oil and gas exports, and economic growth in the Far East and East Siberia (Tabata, Liu 2012: 156–180). West Siberia, notably the Tyumen oblast, has been at the heart of Russia's energy production since the mid-1970[s] (Tabata, Liu 2012: 156–180). That area produces

60% of Russia's oil and about 90% natural gas, according to statistics in 2012 (EIA 2013). As the needs of the Western market have stagnated in recent years, coupled with China's rising consumption in the East, production in the West Siberian fields is projected to decline. In the future, untapped oil reserves in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Arctic may play a larger role. Eastern Siberian oil and gas area cover an area of approximately 3.3 million square kilometres. Russia has started exploring these untapped resources. Though it is not clear about the accuracy of these estimates, the Eastern Siberian area is definitely a secret weapon for Russia: "the region's potential was increased with the inauguration of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, which created an outlet for East Siberian oil" (EIA 2013). In the Far East area, the prospects are more stunning. Sakhalin Island, the biggest island of Russia with complicated history and territorial disputes, is the home of a number of large oil and gas fields. "Only in Sakhalin were foreign companies allowed to join the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in Russia" (Tabata, Liu 2012: 156–180) – this special policy is designed by government to encourage development in the Far East.

It is not a secret that exports of oil and gas are of crucial importance to the growth of the Russian economy and its finance (Gaddy, Ickes 2010). Russia's economy is highly dependent on its hydrocarbons, and oil and gas revenues account for more than half of the whole budget revenues. According to the EIA report, "oil and gas revenues accounted for 52% of federal budget revenues and over 70% of total exports in 2012" (EIA 2013).

As energy exports are so important to Russia, they are trying to protect and solidify their trade and transportation to secure a healthy and stable cash cow. Unfortunately, the price of energy is floating (or falling), and the tendencies for supply and demand are not in Russia's control. Energy security has become a troublesome case for Russia. There are too many determinants that influence energy trading between Russia and Europe. Avoiding risk is a reasonable choice in this situation. Therefore, Russia has the strong will to diversify its oil and gas exports. The East and the Asia-Pacific area geographically are natural alternatives for Russia.

Productivity and reserves are also essential conditions, while the needs of the market are the reason for Russia's eastward shift. Except for the security dimension, market needs play a crucial role.

The global market has changed a lot in recent years: "Russia's oil and gas exports in the future are stagnating demand in the European market" (Tabata, Liu 2012). The rising proportion of China's demand is another change. In 2012,

China became the second largest oil consumption country in the world while its partner Russia took second place for oil production (BP 2013). Moreover, China is also the second-largest net importer of oil in the world, while China also became a net gas importer in 2007 (BP 2013).

By 2013, more than 55% of oil consumption of China relies on imports, and 24% of gas comes from other countries (BP 2013). The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that China's dependence on imported oil will increase to 80% by 2030 (Downs 2010: 146–175). This emphasizes the huge potential of China's market.

There are so many instabilities in the trading between Russia and Europe. In particular, the current situation between Europe and Russia might make things even worse. With the insecure European market and an enlarging Chinese market, Russia's decision to switch to the east seems reasonable and feasible.

However, we should note that European countries still dominate and will dominate Russia's energy trade, its huge demand still is and must be Russia's priority target at that moment. To exploit the market in the Asian Pacific does not mean that Russia will abandon the European market. It is a daunting task for Russia to adjust their structure and strategy while grasping both the west and the east market at one time.

Realizing the importance of energy and the geopolitical position in East Siberia and the Far East, the Russian government has started to focus on these areas. So, the tilt to East Siberia and Far East meets Russia's internal needs for regional development.

China invests more in Siberia today. Officially, the Outline of the Regional Cooperation between Northeast China and the Russian Far East Area and Eastern Siberia has started its implementation. With its strong economic power, China's influence in the Siberian area is increasing. The local economy of the Far East has become increasingly reliant on Chinese goods, services, and labour. In this situation, bilateral cooperation in the energy field is undoubtedly logical.

This brings us to the question of China's role. What can China offer and what Russia will gain through this cooperation? A simple answer is, money for energy. However, there are more elements behind the contract. Russia's energy is seen as a safe and convenient supply to China, but it is not that necessary at that moment, because China has already cultivated a series of energy suppliers, including natural gas, LNG, crude oil, and even coal. In this context, Russia's energy is more like a strategic preparation for China. From the perspectives of energy security and long term strategy, Russia's energy could help China

to diversify their supplier and reduce the cost of imports, since geographically Russia is the nearest supplier to China. Moreover, China's unremitting endeavour to enter the upstream of Russia's energy industry has caused fear for Russia. For China, only by entering into Russia's upstream can she ensure that the oil and gas from their partner are reliable and stable. So, deepening the cooperation with Russia could bring more opportunities for the following cooperation upstream.

In today's situation, Russia has lost its advantages and initiative. The pressure of the West has forced Russia to seek a new market and make a fast strategic shift. The oil price keeps falling. Most importantly, Russia's economy is in recession. Ranking No.8 in GDP globally (World Bank 2014), Russia is gradually losing its edge, especially in comparison with China. Today's China has become the biggest trade partner for Russia, while Russia only ranks No.9 amongst all of China's trade partners (National Data 2014). Clearly, Russia needs more in the relations. The balance between Russia and China has changed. Just as James Bellacqua suggested, Russia is increasingly becoming the "junior partner" in the relationship (2010: 1–12).

This brings us to look at those negative elements that restrict the development of cooperation and influence the energy export policymaking of Russia, especially in the energy sphere.

First of all, China has many other partners in the energy sphere. As mentioned before, today China imports oil mostly from Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran; imports natural gas from Central Asia through a pipeline; and imports LNG from Qatar, Australia, and Malaysia. Russia is not in a dominant position.

Secondly, these two strategic partners have some dubious and ambiguous approaches to competition in the Central Asia area. Both countries intend to bring Central Asia into their energy plan, and that is exactly what they are doing now. Russia still see Central Asia as its sphere of influence, but "Beijing is also interested in new markets for China's good and in Central Asia's energy supplies"(Trenin 2012).

Finally, the "China Threat" is being talked about in Russia. There is awareness of the increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia's weakening position as compared to China (Kaczmarski 2013: 5). In the energy sphere, China tries to go into Russia's upstream while Russia has been reluctant to admit Chinese investment in upstream gas market. Someone describes this as an "equity stakes dilemma" (Skalamera 2014: 12–17). The mistrust of two countries is like a landmine in the process of cooperation and policymaking.

Luckily, the Kremlin seems to hold an optimistic view and see China as an opportunity more than a threat. Putin has recognized that "China's growth is not a threat and Russia needs to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy" (Putin 2012). Since the economic crisis, Russia started to think about deeper and pragmatic cooperation with China. That is why negotiations and cooperation sped up in recent five years after slow development since 2001.

To sum up, it is a general trend for Russia to seek further cooperation with China from the aspect of strategy. Moreover, it is a compulsory choice as well: Russia needs China, and Russia has to make deals with China as they have no other alternatives.

CHINA'S VIEW

The new gas supply agreement has triggered a huge wave of discussion in China's press and internet. People have been talking about the secret price, the history of the negotiations, and the ups and downs of Sino-Russian relations. Except trying to solve puzzle of price, another focus has been the debate of the pros and cons of this deal. Did China win or lose?

The question is obviously caused by the secret price, as this was seen as the major difficulty among those long negotiations. Many experts and journalists have offered their own guesses about the price to evaluate the profits and loss associated with the final contract. And interestingly, they have drawn totally different conclusions. Some think that the final price is a success for Russia (Rusnews.cn 2014); while other think that the price is closer to China's lowest expectations (Xiaocui 2014). The majority believe that the final price is higher than the price Central Asia offers to China, while lower than the price that the European market gets from Russia. We should know that the price could be defined in many ways, and it is a complex formula with many variables. Actually, it is meaningless to limit the discussion to the circle of calculation, the more important factor is to evaluate it at the level of strategy, and detect the information behind the numbers.

Another concern is the timing of this contract. Liang Fang, a researcher in China, has questioned China's policymaking in this cooperation in consideration of the current bad political and economic circumstances for Russia. He analysed Russia's situation after the Ukraine Crisis and the sanctions of the West, and pointed that it may not be a good timing for China to sign this contract. If China

had dragged on the talks longer, they could have totally dominated the situation and made a better offer (Liang 2014). This kind of voice represents a sort of concern about this gas contract.

At the superficial level, China has the emerging needs for energy; they also focus on energy security and future reserves. Moreover, in consideration of serious air pollution in recent years, China desires to acquire cleaner energies like natural gas. How could the negotiation last more than 10 years if two sides were both hungry? Why this brings many questions to China and why the tiny gain and loss were discussed? The bilateral mistrust created obstacles for the pragmatic cooperation.

From Itoh's view, diplomacy and negotiations between Moscow and Beijing have been difficult, owing largely to Russian concerns about fuelling China's economic growth to its own geopolitical detriment: "although cooperation with China in the energy field has a huge potential, Russia has yet to make the most of this opportunity due to its own deep-rooted geopolitical mind-set" (Itoh 2010).

From China's side, the concerns and mistrust mainly come from Russia's xenophobia and their attitude towards the world political arena. In the global arena, China hesitates when coping with Russia's aggressive acts. In Ziegler's opinion, China is a rising power, but "its foreign policy has been oriented toward preserving the status quo, fostering the conditions for strong economic growth and social stability domestically" (2010: 83–145). Trenin thinks that the mutual support in global issues and regional problems has its limits (Trenin 2012).

Therefore, it is reasonable for China to keep cautious when they deal with Russia.

POLITICALLY-ORIENTED ENERGY COOPERATION: RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WORLD

There are various indications that today's energy cooperation between China and Russia has a kind of strong politically-oriented characteristic. Both Russia's energy export policymaking and China's view have strong strategic and political indications behind the scene. Interestingly, it is the political concerns that caused the low efficiency in the past, and it is the political needs that make the deal happen today.

It is widely believed that the Ukraine crisis has pushed Russian energy towards China (Katakey 2014). But as previously described, the whole story is

not so straightforward. As close comrades, China has no possibility of opposing Russia directly, while in consideration of the very frequent military and agricultural cooperation with Ukraine, China has kept its word and avoided expressing a clear view and has abstained from voting in the UN. Surprisingly, China's ambiguous attitude has been interpreted as a kind of support. Putin thanked China because Chinese leaders "have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context" (Putin 2014). This is how China became involved in the Ukraine Crisis and became Russia's supporter, though not undertaken directly.

Paradoxically, when Putin came to Shanghai in 2014, China changed its previous "neutral" attitude. In the joint statement, some messages pointed to the Ukraine Crisis and Russia's rivals: "The sides noted the need to respect historical heritage of countries, their cultural traditions and independently chosen public and political system, the system of values and ways of development; counteract interference in domestic affairs of other countries, give up the language of unilateral sanctions, organize aid, fund or encourage activity aimed at changing a constitutional system of a foreign country or its involvement in any multipartite association or union" (Joint Statement 2014). Needless to say, China's clear attitude satisfied Russia, who is now increasingly isolated by the West.

Weighed and balanced, China has tried to obtain some support from Russia in terms of territorial issues and regional tension as well as possible concessions in energy negotiations by giving a hand to Russia. It is hard to say whether it works or not, but at least, in 2014, when Russia was in crisis and had to find partners to face the West, and when China was forced to face pressure because of Diaoyu Islands and with Philippines, the unsmooth energy talks hitched the ride of strategic allying.

Given the truth that energy trade between Russia and China is politically-oriented, we should consider the role of China and Russia together in terms of global governance.

The world has changed into a new multi-polar order since the Cold War ended. Russia's influence on the global stage has been undermined since the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Serious domestic problems and emergencies like power struggles, the Chechen War, and the economic crisis have erupted. In spite of this, Russia has still tried to preserve its impacts and never underestimated its rights and opportunities to be a powerful force in the world. From the religious perspective, Russia's strong Messianism makes it more

active and responsible. On the other hand, the glorious USSR and its imperial history has given them a sort of self-pride and narcissism.

This idea is also present in the foreign policy of Russia: "Rapid acceleration of global processes and growing trends in global development need a new vision of priorities in Russia's foreign policy, taking into account Russia's increased responsibility for setting the international agenda and shaping the system of international relations" (Foreign Policy Concept of Russia 2000: 1–14).

With the economic globalization and multi-polar nature of the world structure, Russia needs to find a new way to remain engaged in international relations. Joint and in cooperation with China, Russia seems not alone in the complicated and fast changing international situation. Or clearly, as many have argued, the balance that Russia wants to keep is in terms of the relations between China, Russia, and the USA.

If Russia and China maintained sound bilateral relations, it could build a positive counterweight among the big powers in the world. More importantly, it is not a conflict or competition but a new mode of development in the new order, which is constantly stressed by the leaders of two countries.

China, unlike Russia, sticks to its peaceful development policy without interfering much with international issues. With the continuous changes of the world situation and rising national strength, China has realized that "global governance and global security includes issues such as the stability of the financial markets, terrorism, the environment, food safety and non-proliferation, which is essential to China's further development" (Jisi 2011: 68). In the energy sphere, the stable supply, the safe transportation, and the increased number of cleaner resources are relevant to regional peace and global situation. This pushes China to be more active in multilateral institutions (Jisi 2011).

Clearly, some common interests in the energy sphere and common concerns in security do make these two countries closer and in greater need of each other. Moscow and Beijing understand that they can make a contribution to world stability and maintain a balance with the USA, or the West. They need to gain their space and their common sphere of influence in the fast changing world. Just as Putin talked about Russia's cooperation with China on the global stage: "The commonality of our approaches to fundamental issues of world order and key international problems has become an important stabilizing factor in world politics" (ITAR-TASS 2014).

Everything between Russia and China is under the background of political consensus, which is an example of how major nations get along in geopolitical

issues. So is the energy connection. If there were no geopolitical consensus, and no sense of global governance, today's gas deal as well as the comprehensive Sino-Russian energy partnership would never exist.

Without a doubt, politically-oriented energy trade works today. It relies on the current global political situation, on the Russia's needs and China's role, also on the tradition and history of bilateral relations. Although there has been mistrust and problems between the two countries, that kind of mistrust would never cross the bottom line of the "unprecedentedly high level of partnership" (Xinhua News 2013). But it could hurt if we focus too much on political level.

There is a long way to go for both countries to gain real, equal, and mutually beneficial energy cooperation. China should avoid taking the partnership back to the "comprehensive unconditionally friendly", as China had been with the USSR. After all, the previous ideological alliance between China and Russia did not bring good outcomes. For Russia, when dealing with Sino-Russian energy trade, they should not see it as a "Chinese Card" to threaten the West or establish closer diplomatic relations with Beijing. Moscow should know that what Russia really needs are stable trade relations, which are sustainable and beneficial.

CONCLUSION

Referring back to the 2014 gas supply contract, after years of negotiation, Russia and China finally reached an agreement on gas pipeline construction and natural gas supply. This is the biggest energy contract so far between Russia and China, and could reset the pattern of energy trade in the world. As big powers in the world that have shared a similar history and have been very close in the past, Russia and China's breakthrough in terms of energy cooperation has far-reaching impacts, and is worthy of research in the field of energy policy, as well as international relations.

This long awaited gas supply agreement symbolizes that Russia's energy cooperation with China has entered a new era: a cooperation based on a high degree of political consensus and common interests, aiming at a pragmatic mutual beneficial outcome. Today's progress is the consequence of internal needs and external pressures.

From the perspective of Russia, it needs to seek other markets to avoid the potential risks of the European market, and grow their economy especially in the less-developed area in the east. China, in contrast, is a country with a huge

demand for clean and stable energy supply, which could help Russia to diversify its export structure, and more importantly, give it support to exploit and develop Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Strategically, the energy cooperation between Russia and China might be a strong resultant force to ensure energy security and to balance the powers at the regional level as well as global arena. The economic needs are the roots; the partnership is the guarantee, while the changes to the global political situation are the driving forces.

They set an example of how big powers cooperate and how they solve disputes. Moreover, at the same time, they have specific features where high levels of political and strategic consensus have played an essential role in this cooperation. This politically-oriented feature has stimulated today's big achievement, and will direct following deeper development. Nevertheless, the political connection could restrict energy cooperation as well. We need to note that the partnership still includes unstable and fragile factors: mistrust and competition to some extent influence the energy trade. Therefore, there is a long way to go for these two big countries to maintain a rapid pace to implement and to push forward their burgeoning energy cooperation.

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EFFICIENCY OF THE EU SOFT INSTRUMENTS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF EASTERN NEIGHBOURS
THE CASE OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Beata Piskorska*

——— **ABSTRACT** ———

The subject of analysis is the assumption that the concept of soft power may be used as a theoretical basis for the interpretation of the EU influence on the less stable regions facing the spread of international conflicts. On the basis of current events and the high degree of instability in the region, it should be stated that such instruments are not efficient when it comes to Russia. In order to prove the above mentioned assumption, one needs to define the nature and specificity of the EU as soft power in the post-Westphalian international order. In the context of the use of such instruments, the analysis will also cover the manifestation of their implementation and efficiency in the EU policy towards Ukrainian crisis.

Thus, it is essential to answer a few research questions. Firstly, what is the specificity of the EU in post-Westphalian international order? Secondly, what means does the EU have at its disposal and is it able to achieve its objectives and meet expectations which the international environment has towards it? Lastly, how can we assess the efficiency of the soft power instruments used by the Union in specific region of Eastern Europe, particularly during Ukrainian crisis?

——— **KEYWORDS** ———

the European Union, soft power, Ukraine, eastern neighbours, Eastern Partnership, crisis on Ukraine

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The European Union in 21ˢᵗ century wishes to play a global role adequate to its political, economic and diplomatic potential of 28 member states on the international arena. Thus, the European Union needs appropriate instruments which will help it become "stabilizer" and "promoter" in the closest neighbourhood. One of such instruments is connected with its huge economic position. However, it has been weakened by economic crisis. Others refer to its foreign policy which since its early days has been playing less significant role (Piskorska 2012: 108–109). Additionally, the EU political position, for over 60 years since its formation, has been affected by the lack of military dimension (hard power) when it comes to the integration process, and by the prolonged lack of Member states' consent concerning the EU shape in the context of hard power. The EU has never aimed at using military solutions based on a traditional understanding of power in the realization of its own foreign policy. One of the main objectives being set out now is the spread of the area of political and economic stabilization, promotion of democracy, particularly in the neighbouring regions by means of the instruments of so-called soft diplomacy.

One of the most dynamic areas of the EU interest, the one that stability and safety of the whole continent relies on, is the region of its direct neighbourhood – Eastern Europe. It was already noticed in the European Security Strategy accepted on December 12ᵗʰ, 2003, on the eve of the greatest enlargement, that changed the vision of a peacefully united continent (Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, 2003). It contains a statement that "integration of accessing states increases safety but at the same time the EU is closer to the restless regions […]. The EU task is to promote the formation of the ring of well-governed states to the east of the EU and alongside the coast of the Mediterranean and the EU may be linked to those states by the relations based on cooperation" (Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, 2003). The EU objective in relation to its eastern neighbours focuses on the benefits resulting from economic and political cooperation as well as solving political problems there. Similar objectives were reinforced in 2008 in the presented Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, 2008). It was confirmed that Europe has safety interests outside its direct neighbourhood. The proof of this was Eastern Partnership established in 2008, which assumed the change in relationships with the EU eastern neighbours[1].

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[1] The aim of the Eastern Partnership is to reinforce well-being and stability in these states and

Recently in the area of Eastern Europe one can notice the regress connected with sharing common European political, economic and moral values. Transformations in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and implementation of the project of Euroasian Customs Union are of crucial importance for the whole EU. However, the most significant problem that the EU faced in 2014 was the Ukrainian crisis. Since the fall of 2013 the Russian and Ukrainian conflict has forced the Member states to accept a common position on the issue of stabilization of the Ukrainian problem.

The subject of analysis is the assumption that the concept of soft power may be used as a theoretical basis for the interpretation of the EU influence on the less stable regions facing the spread of international conflicts. On the basis of current events and the high degree of instability in the region, it should be stated that such instruments are not efficient when it comes to Russia. In order to prove the above mentioned assumption, one needs to define the nature and specificity of the EU as soft power in the post-Westphalian international order. In the context of the use of such instruments, the analysis will also cover the manifestation of their implementation and efficiency in the EU policy towards the Ukrainian crisis.

Thus, it is essential to answer a few research questions. Firstly, what is the specificity of the EU in post-Westphalian international order? Secondly, what means does the EU have at its disposal and is it able to achieve its objectives and meet expectations which the international environment has towards it[2]? Lastly, how can we assess the efficiency of the soft power instruments used by the Union in specific region of Eastern Europe, particularly during Ukrainian crisis?

the EU security at the same time. Proposal was developed before the broad range of fields of bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation including energetic safety and mobility of citizens.

[2] In the implementation of the EU foreign policy soft measures dominate, such as diplomatic actions, economic cooperation, encouragement or the use of the media. But at the same time, there are also instruments present which express the EU lack of acceptance for international patterns of behaviour, which violate the law such as Russia's policy towards Eastern Ukraine.

SPECIFICITY OF THE EU SOFT POWER IN THE POST-WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Defining the EU political potential has been the source of international relationships researchers' interest since the moment of union's establishment. One of the criteria of its perception is connected with its values and ideals. That is why the EU was most frequently viewed as a civilian power (Duchêne 1973; Telò 2007: 58–64), soft power (Hill 2010), normative, and even prudent and silent power (Manners 2002: 242–243), smart power (Nye 2011)[3], ethical power (Aggestam), post-modernist superpower (McCormick), silent mediator (Nicolaïdis), mild power (Merlini 2002: 19–30), or a small one (Toje 2011: 43–60)[4], neo-medieval empire (Zielonka). U. Beck described it as a peaceful empire. In the European languages, the term power appears as: German 'macht', French 'puissance', Russian 'derzhava', Spanish 'poder' (Tocci 2008: 3).

Apart from traditional conceptualization of the Union in the past within the confines of a narrow interpretation of military power *vs* civilian one, numerous authors assign the EU with the adjective "soft" as its strong attribute in the world's politics, treating it as a unique model of "civilizing" international relationships without the need to use force. The concept of the EU as a civilian power put forward by F. Duchêne refers back to the ability to affect the international system, to propose its own model of stability and security with the use of political and economic means instead of military power (Duchêne 1973: 1–21). H. Sjursen (Sjursen 2006: 170) treats the EU as a power built on normative bases described as civilizing or civilzation power, which means that it is not so much a civilian power (in the sense of the lack of hard instruments at its disposal), but also normative, civilizing and ethical power in the international system. As a so-called small power, the EU tries to avoid confrontational behaviour, instead preferring promotion of diplomatic actions, values and exerting influence thanks to its cultural attractiveness. Moreover, its objective is to carry out mediations with third parties, encourage international law and introduce regulations in

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[3] Smart power is defined as effective combination of both hard and soft power, according to J.S. Nye it was a clever, prudent and witty power.

[4] Term 'small power' created by R. Keohane in the area of international relationships describes the space between small states and huge powers. According to him, the EU may be rather compared to other small powers such as Sweden or Argentina, rather than *great powers* such as China or Russia.

environmental issues, fighting terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Toje 2011: 54).

The elements of the EU soft power may be also observed in the category of normative power. This term was developed and further clarified in the literature of the subject by I. Manners. He treated the EU as an actor of foreign policy aiming at shaping, initiating and spreading – in other words – normalizing principles and values in the international relations without the use of coercive measures (Manners 2002: 240). He thought that the EU refers to the five basic norms written down in the Union treaties such as: peace, freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights (Piskorska 2013: 6–10). He supplemented them with additional four norms of slightly lesser significance: social solidarity, lack of discrimination, permanent development, and good governance. Similarly, in the opinion of French political scientist Z. Laïdi, the Union is a normative power because it aims at "building world's order based on law-binding principles which may undergo re-negotiation or predictibility of behaviours" (Laïdi 2008: 4). In other words, the Union assumes management over sovereignity, influence over power, multilateralism over a state, law over force, and attraction over compulsion (Gnesoto 2012: 99–100). The Union is a leader of creation of new principles of universal importance. One of the examples may be the Kyoto Protocol on the climate changes and the International Court of Justice. R. Cooper pointed to the term "post-modernist Europe", describing it as an actor rejecting force as a means to solve internal problems, giving prefferrence to integration over confrontation in politics, negotiations over conflict, and convenience of purposefulness and attractiveness of its attributes in the international environment (Gnesoto 2012: 100).

Following this line of thought, it shall be noticed that the EU, thanks to its power of attraction, is an influential political and economic actor mobilizing external states, especially neighbouring ones, to introduce desirable democratic and economic reforms (Young 2010: 1–13). This influence and its legitimization may be measured by the number of official documents signed by the EU and third states within confines of implemented foreign policy, that is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, bilateral Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy, and other political instruments created under Eastern Partnership. The EU objective which can be found in all these documents is to strengthen relations with neighbours on the basis of common values such

as democracy, respecting human rights, rule of law, but also establishing the Charter of Fundamental Rights under the EU.

Following R. Kagan's argumentation, normative image of the EU in international relationships stems just from the weakness of the EU military abilities (Kagan 2002). According to Ch. Hill, it is only when these two terms are put together that they become the closest to the concept of soft power by J. Nye (Hill 2010: 183–184). As it was emphasized by R. Kagan, the EU normative power results from its perception as a peaceful and non-military actor – "the island of peace" especially towards its neighbours.

Regardless of the differences in interpretation of the term 'soft power' in the context of the role of the EU in worldwide, it refers to the influence on international environment by means of political, diplomatic, legal, and economic instruments instead of hard power (Ociepka 2008, Mellisen 2005, 2007, 2011)[5]. In the latter case, the EU sources are *de facto* very limited (Sjursen 2006: 235).

Soft power is the term which lies somewhere between attractiveness of culture and politics, and convincing, seducing, automatic attraction of others to a given action by the method of providing arguments in order to voluntarily act together and challenge new obligations and laws. American researcher of international relationships, J. Nye is considered to be a founding father of the term 'soft power'. In early 1990s, in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, he initiated both scientific and political discourse relating to further specification of the phenomenon of power in the context of its soft nature (Nye 2004a, 2008). In connection with the current reneissance of the soft power concept among politicians and researchers, the author summarizes the above theory as opposed to "hard power – military and economic one" (Ociepka 2012: 130). It substantially differs from hard power, being the ability to use hard stimuli in the form of carrots and sticks in economy and military activities, which may make someone follow our demands (Parmar, Cox 2010: 1–3)[6]. Thus, it meant the exploitation of ideological and cultural potential of a given state on which its credibility and attractiveness is built. The EU attempts at basing the image of positive power in the global politics using its potential in conflict transformation through association agreements and other forms of partnership, on the condition

[5] Classic public diplomation of the US was informative activity using the tools of traditional and cultural diplomacy addressing foreigners.

[6] According to Nye, both hard and soft power are crucial in fighting terrorism but "attractiveness is far less costy than compulsion…" Nye J.S. (2004a). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* New York.

that its partners are willing to accept its model as soft power. Needless to say, it is worth pointing out that the EU more and more frequently turns to the use of the instruments reserved for both terms – soft and hard power, now referred to as 'smart power'.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SOFT POWER INSTRUMENTS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY

The EU model as a soft power is to assist the efficient implementation of its foreign policy objectives, and above all, to create peaceful transformations in and outside Europe. According to Nye, shaping others' preferrences through the use of the force of attraction lies in attractiveness of political and cultural values, ideas and visions, especially these of universal nature (as opposed to those "parochial" ones) and foreign policy, managed in accordance with commonly accepted norms, traditions and values (Nye 2004b: 111). While assessing the efficiency of soft power instruments and attributes in the EU foreign policy especially towards a now unstable Eastern Europe, it is vital to have a closer look at the EU objectives and measures it wants to undertake to restore the stability.

Commonly accepted sources of the EU soft power now include: attractiveness of the multi-level EU institutions and internal policies in international environment, protecting citizens, human rights, willingness to reform governments and laws, public diplomacy, economic power including acting as a mediator and international donor, the fact of being the source of greatest foreign and humanitarian aid, promoting stability – engaging in operations of the Common European Safety and Defence Policy all over the world, the EU diplomacy – the European External Actiion Service being the biggest diplomatic service globally[7]. The EU also attempts to encourage so-called young democracies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in the course of electoral revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Egypt, and Tunisia (among others, it sends its observers, is a negotiating party to terminate a conflict or withdraw Russian troops from the occupied areas).

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[7] The EU diplomacy was reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon through sanctioning of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security (now HR is Federica Mogherini) and stable structures of cooperation.

Although there is no clearly specified strategy – some sort of comprehensively strategic document in which so-called "soft" nature of this organization in the world would be characterized, it may be assumed that the European Security Strategy, accepted by the EU Council in December 2003, and especially its review executed in December 2008, points out to the numerous new areas in which the EU should increase its attempts with the use of slightly milder instruments engaging soft power. The proof of the most visible use of soft instruments in the EU foreign policy is the European Neighbourhood Policy sanctioned at the beginning of this century (Piskorska 2012: 125–129), and since 2008 the Eastern Partnership acting directly for the EU eastern neighbours. The objective of this policy is democratic governance based on the EU democratizing potential, Europeanization, so-called normative pressure and social learning, more profound economic and transboundary cooperation[8], and stabilization and safety of neighbouring states. However, the latest events in Ukraine have revealed that all these instruments have become inefficient to fully realize the EU objectives in the soft power realm[9].

One of the EU soft power instruments is the program of Eastern Partnership initiated in 2008 by Poland and Sweden, following the five-day war between Russia and Georgia. It assumed the EU signing of association agreements and deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Since its start, the project was perceived by Russia as an open attack on its influence zone, especially that it did not exlude the entering of these states into the NATO zone. The vision of those states coming closer to the EU clashed with political (and in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, also military) Russia's opposition. It may be said that the progressively aggressive Russian politics in the region has weakened the importance of the European soft power, changing the system of power inside the Partnership states. Ukraine lost Crimea and was involved by Russia in the state of open war, Georgia has not been able to win back Abkhazia and South Ossetia (now under Russian control and occupation), Armenia was forced by Russia to choose the integration under the Eurasian

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[8]   The aim of economic cooperation is the access to common market or other commercial benefits (e.g. connected with the process of obtaining a partnership in WTO; DCFTA with EP states).

[9]   The Ukrainian crisis, which began with the government's rejection of signing the association agreement just before the 3rd Summit of Eastern Partnership in Vilnus on November 28–29th, 2013, resulted in a series of disastrous events. It started with peace demonstrations of pro-European integration students in the Independence Square in Kiev (since that moment known as Euromaidan) suppressed by the then government under leadership of ex-president of Ukraine, W. Janukowycz.

Customs Union. Azerbaijan manouvers between Russia and the West but it clearly favours Russia as its priority (which was proven by weapon spendings equal over 5 billion US dollars). Moldova has become really sensitive to Russian pressures due to the situation in the Transnistria and Belarus has never given a sign to treat the Eastern Partnership as a real alternative. Having analyzed the current situation, it becomes clear that current political program requires verification (Bonikowska, Szczygielski 2014: 3).

In the context of the situation in Ukraine, the states of Eastern Partnership will not be able to deepen pro-European course of transformations[10]. Russia maintains efficient instruments of influence in the form of possible reinforcing its military presence in Transnistria and in this way exerting pressure on both Moldova and Ukraine; gas pressure (after initiation of the supplies of "blue fuel" from Romania, Russia still covers about 80% of the demand for gas in Moldova), or blockades of around 20,000 workers' arrival. Additional ban on the import of some food products and threats of terminating contracts of free trade with Russia constitute a serious setback for the economy of the Eastern Partnership states.

What does that mean for the implementation of the EU's soft instruments within the Eastern Partnership, particularly before the forthcoming 4th summit of the Eastern Partnership in Riga? Will we face the comeback instruments of force in the implementation of security policy on the international arena in connection with Russia's hard politics? It turns out that the European states still represent various interests and not all of them treat the Ukrainian problem as a priority, especially that the southern borders of the continent also face considerable instability. In the nearest future, we can expect further tightening of negative instruments by the Union and the USA – economic sanctions towards Russia. The Ukrainian crisis has wider consequences for international policy. The course and character of this conflict prove that patterns and rules of the current international orders waver.

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[10] Belarus may be slightly open to the relations with the EU (partly due to the EU–Ukraine – Customs Union in Minsk and breaking of the diplomatic impass in the contact with the West), but this will be another attempt to gain partial independence from Russia rather than actual modification of the course. Azerbaijan and Armenia are still too tightly related to Russia in the field of safety to tighten political relationships with the West (the issue of Russian weapon supplies and Kremlin's guarantees to sustain *status quo* in Nagorno-Karabakh). Georgia, already associated with the EU, will soon face the increased military pressure of Russia in Southern Abkhazia and South Ossetia because Russia has announced the formation of a new military alliance with separatist republics. It is also difficult to expect a brand new change for plus in Moldova.

Almost 6 years after the formation of the Eastern Partnerhip in 2008, now there is a necessity of its redefinition because of the challenges it faces, and above all, Russia's attempts to change the geopolitical map in the area, which in Russia's opinion, belongs to its zone of influence. Russia perceives the EU policy towards the common neighbourhood as a game of zero sum for its geopolitical dominance. That is why Russia uses measures the aim of which is to punish the ambition of the Eastern Partnership states to come closer to the EU and by means of violence Russia puts forward its own offer of entering the Euroasian Economic Union.

EFFICIENCY OF THE SOFT POWER INSTRUMENTS USED BY THE UNION DURING UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Starting with political instruments, Europeanization of the Eastern Partnership states is essential from the point of view of phenomena taking place in the EU neighbourhood. In spite of the strong imperial tendencies of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia still seek closer relations with the EU[11]. The first political part of the association agreement with Ukraine was initialled in March 2012 and signed 2 years later in March 2014. Ratification by the EU Parliament and Ukrainian Parliament took place on September 16th, 2014, and the agreement entered into force on November 1st, 2014[12].

Signing the economic part of the association agreement (DCFTA) on June 26th, 2014 encountered certain difficulties. As a result of Russian influence on the dialogue between Ukraine and the EU concerning the agreement, the ratification was put off till December 31st, 2015, after the ratification by 28 parliaments of the MSs. DCFTA may become effective as the whole or partially in the temporary mode in 2–4 years after obtaining the consent of the Parliament and the unanimous EU Council decision (Merabishvili 2014: 1). DFCTA means removing duties for 95% of goods imported from Ukraine and sustaining export duties to Ukraine[13].

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[11] Moldova and Georgia initialled association agreements at the summit of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnus in November 2013.

[12] In December 2014, President B. Komorowski signed the act on ratification of association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.

[13] 'In the run-up to the Eastern Partnership's Vilnius Summit in 2013, Russia's leadership argued vociferously that the EU–Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) would

As far as security matters are concerned, the EU does not participate in solving conflicts in the eastern states (including Ukraine) by means of military instruments. Several times it acted as a mediator and advisor. This situation has changed with the spread of the EU and formation of the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU interests in the neighbourhood were defined in the Union documents, among which there are forecasts of "fighting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction with respecting the international law of solving conflicts" (Council of the European Union: 2003). The test for the efficiency of the EU military instruments was the Russian and Georgian war in 2008. The Union succeeded in reaching the agreement but eventually it was not able to execute it. The Ukrainian crisis thus affects the need to work out a new, realistic safety strategy for the EU. In 2012, the decisions were made to prepare a new strategy till June 2015.

Additionally, the conflict in Ukraine revealed the crisis of the EU's idea that is a fundament of the EU, without which it cannot become a reliable global actor. The EU tries to adapt to new conditions of safety in Eastern Europe and perform actions promoting stabilization of Eastern Ukraine basically by means of soft instruments such as consultation and negotiations. On July 22nd, 2014, the EU sent to Ukraine a special monitoring (civilian) mission on behalf of CSDP. Kálmán Mizsei became its leader on June 24th, 2014. Unfortunately, he did not take part in diplomatic negotiation aiming at the termination of the conflict in Minsk in February 2015. The leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia became the negotiating parties.

The above episode is the evidence of inconsistence and lack of unanimity of the EU member states towards eastern neighbours. Unfortunately, it shall be stated that the EU member states do not express a uniform opinion when it comes to Russia and they mostly rely on the realization of their own interests, mainly economic ones. The European Union has entered into a geopolitical

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damage both Russia's economy and trade between Russia and Ukraine. The governments of Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych insisted on setting up a trilateral mechanism, which would include the European Union, to address these concerns and to re-negotiate the EU–Ukraine agreement. The European Commission did not agree to re-negotiate an already negotiated bilateral EU–Ukraine agreement in a trilateral format, especially given the objections of the third party. Instead, the Commission preferred to discuss the Russia's concerns directly with Russia. Despite its initial reluctance, the European Commission did agree to start trilateral talks regarding the EU–Ukraine DCFTA in July 2014, in parallel with the gas negotiations that began earlier'. See: G. Merabishvili, *Triangular Geopolitics in Europe's Eastern Neighbourhood*, http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20Commentary%20GM%20Triangular%20Geopolitics.pdf .

struggle with Russia without having at its disposal – or even desiring to have – the corresponding military force (which was Russia's trump card in Armenia's case) or mercantilistic power (which derailed Ukraine's Association Agreement) (Makarychev, Devyatkov 2014: 1–2). The EU's eagerness to strengthen its geo-political muscle and challenge Russia in its so-called near abroad is a result of at least two related factors that suggest fragmentation within the EU rather than its consolidation. The first is the growing activism of Poland and Germany as co-shapers of the new political landscape in Eastern Europe. The second is the predominance of European, particularly German, economic lobbyists in the policymaking process (Makarychev, Devyatkov 2014: 2).

Sustaining the tension serves the West's belief that the crisis cannot be settled on their own terms. The EU itself lacks consequence towards Russia, which is proved by the lack of the EU states' consent to the degree of further sanctions laid upon it. The sanctions' results were not far-reaching and acute: they mainly struck single people and companies, the biggest players (such as Gazprom and Rosnieft) can easily "circumvent" restrictions thanks to advantageous contracts with Chinese subjects. Paradoxically, countersanctions laid upon Russia on the West are socially more severe, for example the ban on the import of Polish apples. This has led to the substantial reduction of the goods on the Russian market and, consequently, to the rise of prices of some products including food.

At the same time, the Union carries out activities aiming at rising Russian costs of exercising policy which violates the law through the use of both positive and negative economic instruments such as three degrees of economic, financial and visa sanctions, or termination of economic contracts. Moreover, it tries to support Ukraine financially paralell with the miliatry support of NATO actions (September 5th, NATO summit – support of the Eastern EU flank, so-called "spearhead", being ready early in 2015)[14].

The EU attempts to build its soft power on the values, but as J.S. Nye warns, "political values such as democracy or human rights may be a strong source of attraction but it is not enough to only share them" (Nye: 2004). The European values strongly influence the conscience of EP societies but this aspect may become buried if the EU does not open to EP societies. It is necessary to clearly

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[14] A new "spearhead" force could be deployed within days to cope with emerging threats. This "spearhead" force, estimated at around 4,000 troops, is meant to be ready by 2016, but with eastern NATO allies nervous at Russian actions in Ukraine and Islamic State controlling large areas of Syria and Iraq, member states want something on the ground a lot faster.

refer not only to the concept of "neighbourhood" but also to the united Europe in which the Union would create prospects for the states which are most advanced in internal reforms. The progress in negotiations concerning visa facilitations are the first step in this direction.

Moreover, the EU is the greatest donor of developmental and humanitarian aid all over the world, which also increases its soft power in relation to its eastern neighbourhood. In March 2011, the document entitled *A New Responses to the Changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy* was accepted, in which the EU willingness to strengthen democracy and human rights in the regions of eastern and southern neighbourhood as well as increase in the transfer of aid measures through the organizations of civilian society is particularly visible.

In the years 2014–2020 the Committee plans to spend 83,2 billions EUR (100%) on the instruments of external aid including developmental one (European Commission, 2014). It spends 15,7 mln EUR (19%) on Pre-accession assistance (IPA); European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 21,9 mln EUR (26,3%), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 23,4 mln EUR (28,1%); Partnership Instrument (PI) – 1,1 mln EUR (1,4%), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – 1,8 mln EUR (2,2%); Instrument for Stability (IfS) – 3,1 mln EUR (3,8%); Humanitarian Aid (HA) – 9,2 mln EUR (11,1%); Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – 3,1 mln EUR (3,8%); other actions and programmes – 3,5 mln EUR (4,3%) (European Commission 2013: 21).

Table 1. Commitment appropriations in the area of external activities (EU budget 2014)

Instrument	Mln EUR	%
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	2192,2	26,3
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA)	1578,4	19,0
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	2341,0	28,1
Partnership Instrument (PI)	118,9	1,4
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	184,2	2,2
Instrument for Stability (IfS)	318,2	3,8
Humanitarian Aid (HA)	920,3	11,1
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	314,5	3,8

Table 1. cd

Instrument	Mln EUR	%
Other actions and programmes (including decentralised and executive agencies)	357,3	4,3
Total	8325,0	100,0

Source: European Commission 2013: 21.

However, it is emphasized that not only financial support is vital but also opening up to societies and putting emphasis on bottom-up democracy. It shall be also remembered that humanitarian and developmental aid is the "European alibi" which avoids greater engagement into connections of eastern states with Europe, which may be only realized in the prospect of supporting their reforms even at the cost of worsened relations with Russia. The basis is to create advantageous conditions for foreign investment of the European companies on eastern markets.

Summing up, it may be assumed that the EU carries out the policy based on the values and attractiveness, that is, on soft power. Russian Federation to a larger degree uses hard power in the post-Soviet area and by means of threat or money regulates the relations among the states exploiting "frozen" conflicts in the region. This provokes questions about the efficiency of foreign and safety policy of both subjects and the strategy of dealing with post-Soviet states as far as the regulation of military conflicts is concerned.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the EU policy as soft power in the international environment has entered into the current discussion of the role and dynamics of the power in the global politics. It has revealed that the Union rejects hard instruments such as military power and bases its activities mainly on international law (international conventions) and actively promotes multilateral cooperation. The Union's mission to "civilize" international relationships is the evidence for the current spread of these ideals using political and economic benefits to transform other ones.

Thus, it shall be emphasized that the EU soft policy is the proof of occurence of new tendencies in the international relationships. Firstly, not only hard power but also soft power is (and will be) necessary and sufficient condition to become

a superpower in the realm of international relationships. Secondly, soft power stems from and is based on respecting provisions of the international law, multilateralism and its promotion. Thirdly, the resources of the EU soft power are considerably greater than those of other subjects of international relationships as compared to the United States, because the codes of conduct and basic values shared by it are of bigger universal value.

However, because of the low efficiency of the realization of the EU role in the international environment, numerous experts claim that the concept of the EU as soft power is the effect of the weak EU foreign policy. It is to substitute other instruments of affection but also to mask its own infirmity. Because of this, the EU basing its activities solely on soft power becomes unable to act as a stabilizer and creator of the international order. And even if it uses such instruments, they work only for a short period of time. European values promoted by the EU are not enough supported by concrete actions which leads to low efficiency of declared objectives and the decrease of reliability of the EU policy towards international partners and legitimization of political support for its foreign policy. Moreover, it shall be stated that soft power is more and more often perceived as a reverse of power, which in the case of the EU rather constitutes a philosophy or long-term political strategy (the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy).

Due to rather blurred border between various kinds of the EU power in international relationships, quite convincing is the argumentation that the Union needs formulating a separate strategy of "soft power". There is no uniform strategy of the Union to use the instruments of foreign policy in the contemporary era of the civilization power.

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EUROPEANIZATION OF SLOVAK POLITICAL SYSTEM DURING THE ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

Europeanization acted at all stages of society development in Slovakia, with varying degrees of intensity and in various forms, since the signing of the association agreement with the European Union. A significant impact was already in the stage of transition, when the consistent implementation of the Copenhagen criteria insist by the EC/EU help to return to the path of democratic development in Slovakia. However, it wasn't just about the application of the generally accepted principles of parliamentary democracy, but also on the active impact of the EC/EU institutions within the existing opportunities provided by the signing of the Association Agreement. A qualitatively new stage began after completion of the Copenhagen criteria and the opening of negotiations, which was to implement *acquis communautaire* into the internal legal order of the country. At this stage, clearly dominated the process of Europeanization "top-down", i.e. the adoption of standards, laws of the European Union, to make country compatible with other countries of the EU. After the entry of the Slovakia into the EU, a two-sided process of Europeanization: "up-down" and "bottom-up" has started.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

European Union, Europeanization, Slovak political system, transition, transformation

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CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF THE ISSUE OF EUROPEANIZATION

Europeanization is a relatively wide concept primarily standing for an approach to the study of mutual interactions between the European Union and a domestic political system. The term *Europeanization* is used in several contexts and refers to changes in individual member or candidate countries arising in the domestic economic and political system under the influence of the European Union. The term *conditionality* reflects this process from the point of view of the European Union; it describes the conditions required from the countries seeking to establish a closer relationship to the European Union or aspiring to become its member.

A specific form of an Europeanization issue was demonstrated in the relation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that overthrew their totalitarian regimes and expressed their interest to join the European Union. The countries were required to complete the transition, the process of establishing the grounds of parliamentarian pluralist democracy and market economy in order to be accepted to the community of free democratic countries associated in the European Union. As the state ownership of capital goods prevailed in these countries, privatization implying the establishment of market relations and market economy development was an important task to accomplish.

The European Union provided these countries with help from the very first steps towards democracy. However, a problem arose when the readiness of these countries to join the European Union was discussed. Several authors study the question whether the Europeanization was active since these countries' transition or whether it starts implying after they have joined the European Union. We believe that the conditionality of the European Union was, even if indirectly, influencing the countries since the early stages of the transition and had an immense impact on the form and formation of a political system, political parties system and, naturally, economic system. We attempt to demonstrate this fact following the analysis of the transformation process in Slovak society.

The research on Europeanization was mainly orientated on adapting institutions and the constitutional and legal framework to the rules and procedures resulting from the changing European environment (Brusis 2005: 27–28). It focused on the changes in domestic political institutions, processes and specific policies of the European countries in relation to the requirements of the EC/EU. Over the last two decades of research and generalisation of experience gained

by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, many valuable results have
been achieved, particularly in the study of the impact of Europeanization on the
political system of individual countries.

The term of Europeanization is closely related to the European integration
process and to the way of how this complex process affects different spheres of
policy in the countries associated with this process, or how far it affects framing
the new European political structure. These processes can overlap to a certain
degree and affect the policy at all levels. Perceived in this way, the research had
been neglected for a long time and the study on national political systems was
conducted separately from the research on the European integration (Fiala et
al. 2009: 20).

This fact was emphasized in the work of S. Hix and K.H. Goetz who wrote:
"For a long time, the importance of the European integration in the develop-
ment of indigenous political systems appeared to be empirically negligible and
therefore it was not categorized as a monitored element of research. At present,
a significant scope of research has been revealed in which the change and con-
tinuity of domestic (national) political systems would become a determinant
depending on the form, direction and speed of the European integration process"
(Hix, Goetz 2000: 2).

The European integration consists of two mutually connected processes: on
the one hand, political competences are delegated to the supranational level in
order to obtain specific political results; on the other hand, a new structure of
political institutions – including the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
– at the European level is established. Delegating powers has the influence on
the policy outcomes at the domestic level as well. These effects are visible, for
example, in public administration where the European integration can lead to
the introduction of a new style of work; to origination of the new relationship
between the executive and the legislative power; to creation of new links between
parties and voters or groups of voters which could affect individual parties as
well as party systems.

Europeanization of policy can trigger a domestic change at three levels: a)
institutional adaptation, b) changes in the structure of domestic opportunities
(due to a new distribution of power and resources between domestic actors),
c) change of the framework of expectations in the domestic policy. For this
reason, the European Union policies can directly dictate a change in an insti-
tutional framework; they can also modify the institutional context of strategic
interactions; or they can seek to change the institutional framework indirectly

by influencing the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors, who align their strategy accordingly (Knill, Lehmkuhl 2002: 255–263).

The process of Europeanization can be controlled by the European Union or by domestic actors and can be induced by dual logic: the logic of appropriateness (actors are motivated by internalized identities, values and norms), or the logic of consequences (maximizing the power of actors acting rationally). Europeanization can arise only under the influence of external stimuli, i.e. conditionality corresponding to the dynamics initiated and controlled at the EU level. The European Union can set the conditions as well as rewards or penalties for domestic actors based on their adaptability. The second approach is represented by the model of social learning stemming from the logic of appropriateness. It is based on domestic elites identifying with the EU requirements and adopting the rules by their own will and according to the belief that they are legitimate and represent the most appropriate solutions to domestic problems (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005: 8).

Europeanization conceived in this way is basically only one alternative of the transformation of political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. the model of the so-called external transformation. Internal transformation is a process aiming at building a functional and consolidated democracy and market economy and, therefore, it is generated by internal motivation of society willing to implement the necessary reforms. This factor might not be a necessary condition of external transformation. During the accession negotiations with applying countries, internal transformation was gradually replaced with external transformation, i.e. with transformation required from outside the country with the aim of accommodating political, economic and legal environments of the candidate countries to the EU requirements. V. Hloušek and M. Pitrova claim that this transformation is not followed by a broad public discussion and is seen as a "technical" rather than "political" problem (Fiala et al. 2009: 103–104). This argument can be only partially accepted, because after the accession to the European Union, seeking compromises among domestic elites is necessary. Several authors consider the democratic transition of countries in Central Europe and Europeanization to be processes marked by many analogous features, sometimes the transition is directly or indirectly equated to this democratic consolidation (Ágh 2004; Kubicek 2003).

V. Hloušek does not agree with applying the concept of Europeanization to the phase of transition. According to him, it represents imitating the Western European patterns in shaping a democratic political system, but it is not an

immediate response to the stimuli related to the development of the EC/EU (Hloušek 2004: 101–102). Therefore, he assumes that at the stage of transition we cannot talk about the processes of Europeanization or conditionality as these start after the transformation into the phase of consolidation. I do not perceive defining such strict borders to be adequate since these processes interrelate and as the experience in Slovakia indicates, Europeanization had occurred already during the period of transition. Based on the transitological paradigm, defining the stage of completing the transition and the shift to the stage of democracy consolidation is quite a difficult task. Frequently, the EU membership or proximity to the EU membership is provided as a criterion.

The EU influence on forming the democratic institutions in Slovakia can be divided into three stages. The first stage concerned fulfilling the political demands representing the elementary precondition to obtain an invitation to the opening accession negotiations to the European Union. The second stage covered the period of the accession process after signing the Treaty of Accession between the European Union and the Slovak Republic and it reflected approximating to the laws of the European Union. The third stage began after Slovakia joined the European Union and became a full member participating in shaping the policies of the European Union. Relations during the first two stages are asymmetrical, dominated by a direct vertical impact of Europeanization and conditionality (top-down), in the third stage, the process is bilateral, marked by mutual influencing (both top-down and bottom-up).

Europeanization could be responsible for creating a cleavage in the EU member states, dividing the parties into pro-European and anti-European. However, such cases are quite rare. As a rule, the concept of the attitude towards the European Union is, to a greater or lesser extent, reflected in the programme lines and policies of most relevant political parties. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the importance of investigating the impact of Europeanization on political parties. It is important to examine the indirect impact of Europeanization on individual political parties – on their programmes, structure, and practical policies. Simultaneously, two processes affect the functioning of political parties in European countries, both caused due to the process of European integration. "Firstly, the environment of national (domestic) political systems, which parties primarily exist in, is transformed; secondly, styles of policy making are modified" (Fiala, Hloušek, Suchý 2008: 49). Therefore, demands required from political parties in regard to promoting their political intentions were increased.

The basic framework for studying the impact of Europeanization on political parties was proposed by R. Ladrech who allocated five areas of examining the impact of Europeanization on political parties. They are related to changes in the political programme, organisational changes, the formula of party competition, the relations between the parties and government, and the relations beyond the national party system (a new perspective of transnational cooperation between political parties) (Ladrech 2002: 396–400).

THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF INDEPENDENT SLOVAKIA

The process of transition of the political system of Slovakia has began in the framework of the joint State, Czechoslovak Federal Republic, since the beginning of the 1990s. Part of democratic transition was also equal position for both Nations in a common State. Since the new political elites failed to find a mutually acceptable compromise, the Federation broke up and two separate States were created. The Slovak Republic also as an independent state came into existence on January 1st, 1993. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic was ratified, legislative and executive bodies were approved but many institutions were still missing. There came a complicated epoch of the division of the property common with the Czech Republic and creation of necessary state bodies and institutions. After the establishment of the independent state there appeared new tasks which were mutually multiplied and intertwined: it was necessary to build missing institutions of the state, a state apparatus, to apply for international acknowledgement and membership in international organizations, to create embassies, to meet international obligations and look for proper forms for further transformation of economy.

In accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the law-making power was taken over by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which assumed the competences of the Federal Assembly. The power of the government was given to the governments of the successor states and in Slovakia a new government was created after the election in 1992. The central institutions in the Czechoslovak Federative Republic were based in Prague, which was the capital of the federation, while in Slovakia there were only national bodies which were under the power of the federal bodies. After the split of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, it was necessary to transform these institutions

to have all the power and responsibility that concerned mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Justice, Foreign Trade, etc.

It was necessary to elect a president as the head of state. In accordance with the then valid constitution, the National Council elected the president of the republic upon the proposal of at least 8 MPs while it was necessary to achieve 3/5 majority, i.e. 90 votes. In the second round of the presidential election, Michal Kovac won, nominated by LS-HZDS.

The fact that Slovakia was a successor state of the CSFR played an important role in the process of entering the international organizations, signing international agreements, and the acknowledgment of Slovakia by the world community. Despite it, Slovakia had to go through the whole procedure like a new state in the map of the world. It had to apply for the acknowledgment by other states, and it had to make diplomatic contacts, build embassies, and be accepted by international organizations.

A very positive signal was that the Slovak government proved the continuity of foreign policy of the CSFR focused on the participation in the Euro-Atlantic structures. At the beginning of 1993, Slovakia became a member of OSCE, the North Atlantic council for cooperation, which was a kind of preparation for entering NATO. On January 19th, 1993, United Nations accepted the Slovak Republic that completed its international legal approval. Based on the recommendation of the correspondents of the parliamentary assembly, it was accepted to the Council of Europe.

EXCLUSION OF SLOVAKIA FROM THE PRE-ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU

The most powerful political subject in this period was populist and authoritarian Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by charismatic personality V. Mečiar. After the election in 1994, HZDS created a coalition with the nationalistic Slovak National Party (SNS) and leftist subject, the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS). The coalition usurped all political power in society, breached principles of parliamentary democracy, scandalized the opposition, infringed the rights of national minorities, in particular of the Hungarian minority, and infringed human rights. In economy, they asserted non-transparent privatization of State-owned enterprises to the persons close to the Government coalition.

The political regime turned away from a path of democratic consolidation and departed towards the authoritarian regime.

After the establishment of independent Slovakia, the Mečiar's government promised that it would continue the foreign political orientation of the former Czechoslovakia and publicly declared its interest in the entry to the Euro-Atlantic structures, which was supported by people. On October 4th, 1993, the Slovak Republic signed an association agreement with the EU about joining, which the National Council ratified on December 15th, 1993. In February 1994, in Brussels' seat of NATO, Mečiar signed a framework document about joining, the project Partnership for Peace.

An important condition for becoming a member of the EU was fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which comprised the requirements in political, economic, and legal fields. To the political criteria belonged the necessity of the country to dispose of institutional stability as a guarantee of a democratic system and legal state, as well as to respect human rights and protect minorities. In the economic field, it was necessary to create a market economy, which would be able to compete with the pressure in the EU. The last condition was an acceptance of the communitarian law of the EU and the ability to implement it in practice. Reports about fulfilling these criteria were regularly sent to the EU and annually processed by the European Commission.

Breaching of democratic principles in the process of transformation was the weakest point not only of domestic but also of foreign policy of the Government of the SR. In its report about the progress of Slovakia, the European Commission expressed serious reproaches connected with the instability of the institutions and insufficiencies in democracy. On the basis of this evaluation, the European Council did not recommend to begin accession negotiations with Slovakia in Luxembourg in December 1997. Thus, the Slovak Republic was excluded from the group of 6 candidate countries, and it fell out from the first wave of enlargement of the EU. The relations between the EU and the SR were regulated by the individual Partnership for Entry, which was focused on those Copenhagen criteria in which Slovakia was weaker (Figeľ, Adamiš 2004: 10–11).

The next failure was the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8th, 1997, where a decision that Slovakia would not be invited to entry negotiations to NATO was accepted. It was proved at the end of 1997 when NATO signed protocols with the new member states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Slovakia was missing because it did not fulfil the criteria mainly connected with democracy.

In this phase, there was also a visible conflict line of the relations of political parties and the EU. Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) declared its interest to enter the EU, but it could not ensure it. It ignored the notices of the EU bodies and by its activities actually decelerated the entry to the EU. On the other hand, the opposition parties presented themselves as pro-European and argued that they could overcome the democratic deficit and ensure the entry to the EU. Before the election in 1998, the opposition concentrated mainly on this agenda. At that time, the idea of the entry to the EU had a big support of people of Slovakia and the worries about the failure were shared by 54 per cent of the population (Bútorová 1998: 168).

K. Henderson attributed the policy of rejecting the criticism of the European authorities by LS-HZDS in 1994–1998 to the "false Euro-optimism" that was a Slovak variant of Euroscepticism (Henderson 2005). On the contrary, all opposition parties presented their policy as pro-European, being able to overcome the deficit of democracy and ensure the Slovak access to the EU. Prior to the election held in 1998, the opposition based its reasons on the fact that it was able to manage Slovakia in the accession process. The fact played a key role in mobilizing Slovak voters.

The institutions of the EU used the strategy of traditional diplomacy through which they appealed to the government, other official institutions and pointed at insufficiencies and deformations. For this purpose, the opposition used also the Association Council and parliamentary committee. It showed the government by its attitude that the negotiations with the EU would not be open without removing the problems. However, the Government did not react. The second strategy was that the institutions of the EU addressed people and the opposition and supported non-governmental organizations, which mobilized the public. Their effort was focused on the preparation and performance of the election in 1998 (Malová, Láštic, Rybář 2005: 42).

The EU played an important role in overcoming the authoritarian tendencies and returning to the way of democratic transition. By excluding Slovakia from the group of the countries which were supposed to start the negotiations in Luxembourg in 1997, the EU clearly declared that either Slovakia removed deformations of democracy, or it would not become a member state of the Union. It had a decisive impact on public thought and activation of political powers, unification of all democratic powers which mobilized themselves and succeeded to oust LS-HZDS from the government and start renewing of democratic principles, international prestige of Slovakia, and a new period of negotiations with the EU.

Europeanization was shown already before the signing of the accession agreements in the period of transition of society and it directed the transformation process in Slovakia and forming of political parties and a party system as well.

THE RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE WITH THE EU

Before the election of 1998, the Government of Mečiar has approved an amendment of the election, Act No. 187/1998 Coll., on the basis of which four election districts were cancelled and there was created only one whole state district within Slovakia with one list of 150 candidates. The amendment excluded the possibility of submitting a common candidate list for the coalition parties and it required 5 per cent of votes for each party of the coalition. As a consequence of this restriction, the creation of any coalitions before the election would be groundless. The created coalitions reacted to the situation in such a way that they registered as independent political parties. In this way, both Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and Party of Hungary Coalition (SMK) were established. Among the opposition parties counted leftist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) and right before election there was created a new political party – Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). Also in the election in 1998, the opposition parties' coalition created a broad coalition of SDK, SDL, SMK, and SOP, which gained 93 mandates in the National Council of the Slovak Republic and M. Dzurinda became Prime Minister.

The high representatives of the Union highly appreciated the democratic course of the parliamentary election and positive signals from Slovakia. The same evaluation was given to them also in NATO, in Brussels, as well as in Vienna, because Austria was the presidential country of the EU at that time.

The period after the parliamentary election in 1998 was a beginning of the new quality of relations and more intensive political dialogue between the SR and the EU. The priority of the new Slovak government and the Parliament was to achieve a positive recommendation of the Regular Report of the European Commission which reflected the state of fulfilling short and middle-term priorities of the Partnership for the entry. Therefore, the government focused on proper fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria in domestic policy, which was the most criticized area.

The first step was a harmonization of the election law with the finding of the Constitutional Court, the amendment to the Constitution, and the approval

of the presidential election in general election. In May 1999, the first general presidential election in Slovakia was held and thus, the 15 months period of the vacant presidential office was finished. The presidential election was a stabilizing factor of functioning of the political system. In July, the NC SR passed the law on the use of languages of national minorities in official communication, harmonizing the relevant legislative with the Constitution of the SR, international norms, and the recommendations of the OBSE, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission.

On December 3rd, 1998, the European Parliament passed the resolution to the candidacy of the SR for the entry to the EU in which it recommended a flexible approach to the SR. The EP recommended the Vienna summit to re-evaluate the situation after the September parliamentary election and to issue a new report about Slovakia as the situation in Slovakia had considerably changed after the election.

The Council of the EU approved the general position of the SR without comments. It was generally agreed that the SR would not claim exceptions from *acquis communautaire* within individual policies of the Union and would require only a limited number of temporary periods that came mainly from the need of increase of the effectiveness of Slovak economy. As for the fulfilling the economic criteria, it was necessary to say that restructuralization and privatization of banks and strengthening of financial discipline of the entrepreneur sector belonged to very important decisions. As for the domestic market, a law on technical requirements and the correspondence of products as well as a law on public procurement were accepted.

ELIMINATION OF BACKWARDNESS AND OPENING
THE PRE-ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

Following the decision of the EC in Helsinki in December 1999, the SR together with five other candidate countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania) opened the negotiations about their entry at the introductory meeting of the Conference about the entry on February 15th, 2000. Here the SR presented a general negotiation position about the entry in which it submitted a realistic though an ambitious plan. Slovakia promised to harmonize its legislation with the EU law and create a relevant administrative capacity by the end of 2002. Slovakia chose January 1st, 2004 as a reference date for the acceptance and imple-

mentation of *acquis communautaire* and this date was also considered a reference date of the entry of the Slovak Republic to the European Union (Figeľ, Adamiš 2004: 16).

At the beginning of the negotiations, the SR declared that it fully accepted the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty defined in Article 2 of the Agreement about the EU and that it would be able to accept the *acquis* in the applied range in the time of the entry to the Union. It expressed its interest in the integration to the unified market of the Union and policies of the Community including joining the economic and currency union after the fulfilment of convergence criteria and the acceptance of common currency, the euro. The SR supported also the aims of the common foreign and security policy and expressed its interest to participate in the definition and formation of the European safety and defence policy. In the area of justice and domestic affairs, Slovakia expressed its interest in deepening cooperation in the borders control, in the field of asylum law and migration, as well as in the fight against organized crime, terrorism and drug smuggling already in the time of preparation for the membership (Figeľ, Adamiš 2004: 17).

The Slovak Republic did not plan to apply for alleviations from the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. However, it required transitional periods in those fields where it was reasoned by the need of improving the effectiveness of Slovak economy or ensuring great capital investments. Such applications were not only reasoned but also justified by a realistic plan of inevitable steps for the achievement of harmonization with the *acquis*. The transitional periods concerned mainly the value added taxes and consumption taxes, protection of deposits, compensation schemes for the compensation of investors, provision of short term capital and operations with the tools of financial market. A sensitive issue within the domestic market was gaining of agricultural and forest land as well as domestic estates by non-residents. As the key fields to be negotiated, mainly the issues of the domestic market, transport, environment, energetic, agriculture, regional policy, and coordination of structure tools were considered.

In December 2000, at the summit in Nice, an important document of the EC for enlargement, the so-called road map which defined a schedule of priorities of the EU in negotiations with candidate countries during the further three chairmanships – Swedish, Belgian and Spanish, was accepted. The SR had an intention to enter the EU together with other countries of the Visegrad group and therefore, it laid stress mainly on priority chapters of the Swedish chairman-

ship, i.e. the chapters of the domestic market (free movement of goods, free movement of people, free provision of services, free movement of capital) and on the chapters of the Law on Commercial Companies, the Environment and Social Policy and Employment.

The SR proved its negotiation potential as well as its real preconditions for the entry to the EU within the first wave of the enlargement in 2004. This fact was proved by the summit of the EU in Laeken (2001), which ranked Slovakia among 10 candidate countries which were supposed to enter the EU in 2004. In October 2002, the Regular Report of the European Commission was published. It evaluated the progress of the candidate countries in their membership preparation. The overall valuation of Slovakia was positive. The Commission recommended finalizing the accession negotiations with Slovakia by the end of 2002. The statement of the EC was approved also by the member states of the EU at a special session of the European Council in Brussels on October 24th–25th, 2002.

The October summit of the EU in Brussels represented an important break in the negotiations with the EU because it created the preconditions for defining the substantive position of the EU in the issues of financial character. The session of the European Council allowed the new members to get direct payments, defined the amount and modalities and their use, as well as the total financial package were considered the most important outcomes. The total sum of the financial package was determined for structural activities, to the total sum of 23 billion euro for all ten candidate countries.

"Other important moments of the negotiations were the decisions of the member states accepted at the Council of 18 November 2002 which concerned the date of the entry of the new members which was appointed on 1 May 2004. From the point of view of Slovakia, it is decisive that the payments to the EU budget will be made from 1 May and our income from the EU budget will not be shortened, i.e. in 2004 we will gain (except for market tools in agriculture) financial means for the whole 2004" (Figeľ, Adamiš 2004: 26).

Together with harmonization of the Slovak legislation with that of the European Union, it was necessary to change the Constitution of the Slovak Republic as well. The government coalition had to ensure the constitutional majority (3/5) in the NC SR for the approval of the constitutional law No. 90/2001 Coll., by which the Constitution of the SR is changed and amended with the force from July 1st, 2001, and the original Article 7 of the Constitution was enlarged. An important change was represented by the new Section 2 of this Article, in which it is stated: "The Slovak Republic can, by the international treaty, which

was ratified and promulgated by the law, or under this contract, transfer the exercise of its rights on the European Communities or the European Union. The legally binding acts of the European Communities and the European Union have precedence over the laws of the Slovak Republic. Accepting the legally binding acts which require implementation shall be made by the law or by the government regulation under Article 120, § 2" (Constitution of the SR 2009). This article introduced the institute of the so-called delegated legislation to the Slovak legislature. Under this provision, the law No. 19/2002 Coll. was issued, specifying conditions of approximation orders of the Slovak Republic Government.

The relationships between the SR and the EU are regulated in the Accession Agreement. The agreement comprises legal conditions of the entry of Slovakia and other 9 accessing countries to the EU, it describes all exceptions, treaties and transitional periods on which the accessing countries agreed in their negotiations with the member countries of the EU.

The opening of accession negotiations, the implementation of all chapters of the communitarian law into the legal system of the Slovak Republic meant a new epoch of Europeanization of the economic and legal systems. In this case, it was a direct conditionality when the EU required real changes in the legal and economic systems without which it was not possible to enter the Union. Slovakia became compatible with the countries of the European Union in the field of economy and economic policies which enabled free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. Except for the compatibility with the member countries, these legislative incentives created optimal conditions for the development of market economy, free economic competition, and removal of any legal or technical barriers for trade exchange.

ACCESSION OF SLOVAKIA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Significant success of the ruling coalition was achieved in international relations and foreign policy, where the foundations were laid in the previous term. At the Prague Summit on November 21st, 2002, Slovakia received the official invitation to join NATO, and on March 12th, 2004, in Washington, Slovakia and six other countries of the former Eastern Bloc officially became members of the alliance.

At the same time, since Slovakia met all conditions for accession to the European Union, the EU Commission recommended all ten accession countries,

among them Slovakia, with which negotiations were launched in Luxembourg. The Treaty of Accession was signed on April 16th, 2003 in Athens by Rudolf Schuster, President of the SR, Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, the Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, and Ján Figeľ, the Chief Negotiator for the SR accession to the EU. On May 16th and 17th, 2003, a referendum was held in Slovakia on the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union with the following question: "Do you agree that the Slovak Republic becomes a member of the European Union?". The plebiscite was attended by 2,176,990 people, which represented 52.15 per cent of all registered voters. 92.46 per cent of the voters expressed themselves for Slovakia's accession to the EU, 6.20 per cent were against. Thus the fact was confirmed that the vast majority of Slovak citizens support the accession to the European Union.

The National Council of the SR expressed its agreement with the Accession Treaty to the European Union on July 1st, 2003. The ratification documents were handed over to the Italian government on October 9th, 2003 to be preserved in the depositary of the Rome Treaties. Slovakia, along with nine other countries, became a member of the European Union as of May 1st, 2004.

The political and administrative structures of the Slovak Republic started to participate in the performance and development of common Union policies. Slovakia's political system became part of the political system of the European Union. It was necessary to create institutions providing necessary linking. Slovakia delegated their representatives to various bodies of the Union. The first Commissioner of the European Commission proposed by the Slovak side became the former chief negotiator, J. Figeľ. The Prime Minister became a member of the European Council and individual government ministers became members of various Minister Councils. In the general election, members of the European Parliament had to be elected, and Slovakia had 13 of them. MEPs are organized into parliamentary factions according to their political affiliation. Slovak political parties became members of the European parties.

The Permanent Representation of Slovakia to the EU (the so-called COREPER I and II) was created, further were developed the principles of representatives delegation to the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Slovakia occupies several important positions in the committees and directorates of the European Commission. The Slovak representatives became an integral part of decision-making, supervisory, executive, judiciary and advisory bodies of the Union. The European Union played an important role in shaping and changing the nature of political institutions in Slovakia, it had a forming

influence on the nature of the political regime in Slovakia. Through joining the European Union, the Slovak Republic gained many opportunities for fulfilling the public interest in internal politics as well as in all areas of foreign policy. Many important questions, orientated at the negotiating bodies of the Union, should be provisionally consulted by political parties which adopted a common position, and that is further promoted at the EU bodies. An important task was to develop an efficient and flexible mechanism of Slovakia's involvement in the EU policy-making and legislation. Considering the aim, a variety of provisions and government regulations were adopted, further were developed new coordinating bodies at the level of government, the ministries, and the National Council. Pursuant to law No. 253 of May 2005, the National Council set up the Committee for European Affairs, which is authorized to exercise its powers at considering and granting a mandate to the government during the EU negotiations. The Office of the Slovak Parliament created the Department for European Union Affairs and the Office of the Special Permanent Representative of the Slovak Parliament at the European Parliament and other EU institutions. Thus were created institutional conditions for regular and operational involvement of the National Council of the SR in policy-making processes in the country within the EU.

In December 2005, the Slovak government created the Ministerial Council of the Slovak Republic for EU Affairs that worked under the guidance of the Deputy Prime Minister for EU affairs. It became a coordinating, advisory, and expert body of the Slovak government for acting in the EU, and it coordinated activities of ministries and other central government bodies in EU issues. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR created a Section for European Affairs that participated in defining and implementation of current foreign policy objectives related to the EU and its member states. It actively cooperated with the Government Council for European Affairs, the National Council of the Slovak Republic, and other central government bodies. At the same time, the section organized and directed activities of the Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to the European Union and through subordinated territorial departments it governed activities of the embassies and consulates general in the states within the territorial scope.

The information system is an important element within the mechanism of cooperation in developing the Slovak opinions and proposals for legally binding acts and other acts of both the EC and the EU. The Government Office runs the information system of laws and legislative approximation and the Office of the

National Council of the Slovak Republic organizes the tracking system of the Slovak Parliament legislative process following the system of European affairs.

Slovakia delegated the EU with a number of economic policy competences, which are its exclusive EU competence. The member states in these areas were granted the exclusive competence to adopt the binding EU legislation. The concept of exclusive EU competences is based on the assumption that the processes at the EU level are more effective than uncoordinated actions of the individual member states. It comprises the customs union, establishment of competition rules which are essential for the domestic market functioning, monetary policy for the member states with euro currency, keeping marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy, and common commercial policy.

SLOVAK POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The adoption of a political party into the European political parties increased its prestige and credibility, as reflected by the fact that it is accepted by the Association as a full member, that such a political party respected and applied in practice the values, standards and ideals of its political party's family. Therefore, all relevant Slovak political bodies sought entry to some of the European political parties. The adoption into the family of European political parties, once the necessary conditions had been fulfilled, was presented as a success and increase of the international prestige of the political party. This indirectly assisted the process of maturation and shaping of political parties in Slovakia, which is also a very important factor. It was then just a matter of political parties and their elites how to realise this potential and where to find a place in the political spectrum.

The first contacts with the European political parties, the first attempts to join these parties and to start an effective cooperation were made in the 1990s. The conservative and socialist parties were successful in this field. The KDH party with its leadership under J. Čarnogurský was the first party that became an observer in the European Democratic Union (EDU) in August 1990. When EDU merged with the European People's Party (EPP) in December 1996, KDH obtained the status of an observer in EPP. It did not request the status of an associate member for a long time, as it did not prove the federalist character of the Union promoted by EPP. The party of Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) became the observer in the EDU in September 1993. In

1998, three political parties representing the Hungarian minority joined and formed SMK – the Party of Hungarian Coalition. SMK obtained the status of an observer in EPP in December 1999, and it gained the status of an associate member in June 2000.

SDK was created before the election to the National Council in 1998, when the original election coalition consisting of five political parties (KDH, DÚ, SDSS, SZS, and DS) was registered as a self-reliant political party, and thus a candidate in the election. Later, leader party M. Dzurinda created on the basis of SDK a new political party – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU-DS), which obtained the status of an observer in European People's Party in June 2002, and it became an associate member in May 2003.

HZDS attempted to communicate with left-wing parties, and later with conservative parties in the EU. Finally, it succeeded with liberal parties in 2009. Although the party declared its conservative nature and orientation that was reflected in the name of the people's party (ĽS-HZDS), in 2008 it succeeded in becoming an observer in the liberal Party of European Democrats (PED), forming a part of the faction of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

The SDĽ party together with the Social-Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) obtained the status of an observer in the European Socialist Party (PES) in 1995, and both parties became associate members in March1999. Since Smer became more and more popular and its preference was increasing, there was an option to integrate smaller left-wing parties with Smer. Before the election to the European Parliament in 2004, Smer had won support of its counterparts, left-wing parties active within the framework of the Party of European Socialists (PES).

Regular contacts between Slovak and European political parties played a key role in terms of cooperation from different points of view. The parties had their representatives in the bodies of the European political parties, participated in their assemblies and board meetings when EU issues and attitudes towards the accession countries were discussed. The parties had an opportunity to gain some experience and recommendations in terms of reforms and the most effective way of meeting the integration criteria. On the other hand, they had an opportunity to interpret and explain the situation in Slovakia and to win the support of European parties for their own political agenda. Mainly the factions or political clubs of the parties represented in the European Parliament could support or accelerate the pre-accession discussions that seemed to be very useful for Slovakia after 1998 (Leška 2015).

It was the first election held in 2004, shortly after Slovakia had accessed the EU. That means that Slovak political parties did not have much time to get ready for elections of such a type and they did not have much experience in this area. The election was carried out pursuant to the proportional representation with a closing clause of five per cent. The campaign had been considered very dull and not impressive, and it had not managed to address the citizens and mobilise the voter support.

SDKÚ and KDH had three MEPs, SMK had two of them, the governing parties obtained totally 46.6 per cent of the valid votes and 8 MEP mandates. As for the opposition parties, both Smer-SD and ĽS-HZDS were successful and obtained three MEP seats, and the opposition obtained 33.9 per cent of the valid votes. All three successful coalition parties were members of the European People's Party – European Democracy (EPP-ED), and they became members of their political factions in European Parliament. The deputies of Smer-SD became members of the Party of European Socialists (PES). As ĽS-HZDS had not been successful in joining any of the European political parties, its three deputies did not belong to any party.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be stated that the Europeanization or Supposition acted at all stages of development of society in Slovakia, with varying degrees of intensity and in various forms, since the signing of the association agreement with the European Union. A significant impact was already in the stage of transition, when the consistent implementation of the Copenhagen criteria insist by the EC/EU help to return Slovakia to the path of democratic development. It helped to remove elements of the authoritarian regime in breach of the principles of parliamentary democracy, human and minority rights, the privatization of State property, and the establishment of transparent procedures to apply the market economy.

However, it was not just about the application of the generally accepted principles of parliamentary democracy, but also on the active impact of the EC/EU institutions within the existing opportunities provided by the signing of the Association Agreement. (Pressure on the Government, the Parliament of the Slovak Republic in the framework of the Joint Parliament Committee; support for the democratic opposition and non-governmental sectors). Slovak political parties

entering into the European political parties since 1990s, political cooperation on the level of EC/EU was launched, the effort to reconcile national interests with those of the EU. (It was the first form of institutionalization). At the same time, the creation of a free trade area launched the cooperation of Slovak companies with EU companies, as well as businesses which indirectly exert influence on the formation of the economics of the countries as part of the EC. Europeanization also meant preparing for the possibility of drawing from the pre-accession funds PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA, requiring the fulfilment of certain conditions, and the creation of new institutions through which the funds had been taken. So began the first institutional changes under the influence of Europeanization.

A qualitatively new stage began after completion of the Copenhagen criteria and the opening of negotiations, which was to implement *acquis communautaire* into the internal legal order of the country. It was the stage of the most intensive impact of the European Union, which is called supposition, the purpose of which is to incorporate legal, technical and other standards into the internal conditions of the country in order to become compliant with the European Union and in order to be able to participate as a full member of the EU after the entry into all areas of cooperation. Slovakia managed to realise this stage in a short period of two years, as the accession negotiations opened later, then with other countries. The Slovak Government and individual ministries played at this stage a key role, because they prepared the draft of laws and the National Council of the Slovak Republic, although its control function was applied, stayed a bit in the background.

This stage of "supposition" was a stage of the adoption of Community law and implementation of its legal, technical and tariff norms into the legal system of Slovakia. At this stage, clearly dominated the process of Europeanization "top-down", i.e. the adoption of standards, laws of the European Union, to make country compatible with the EU so it could enter without hindrance in all areas of cooperation. After joining the EU, it was necessary to amend the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, and to build up the institutional structure in Slovakia, as well as to build up the representation of Slovakia in the Brussels institutions, and to create mechanisms that would allow the country to participate in the formation of the EU policy decisions and implementation of common European policies. After the entry of the Slovakia into the EU, a two-sided process of Europeanization: "top-down" and "bottom-up" has started.

The important role played the Slovak political parties, which have begun to integrate into the European Political Parties since 1990s on the principle of

partisan families and began close cooperation with them. They incorporated into their political programmes European issues, learned to combine national and European interests to work together within the framework of the European political parties and to formulate their attitudes towards European integration. The first elections to the European Parliament in Slovakia in 2004 were a test of their maturity and readiness to enter into the official policy of the EU, to get seats in the European Parliament.

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ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION AS CHALLENGE FOR POST-SOCIALIST GEORGIA

Zviad Abashidze*

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

Article is giving the information on basic situation on civic integration in Georgia. Georgia, as multi-ethnic country, is facing the obvious problems with civic integration. The biggest part of the minorities (Azeris and Armenians) are ill-represented and performed in Georgian public. Therefore, Georgian statehood stands against the severe problems of inclusion of minorities in public space. There are number of models of minority accommodation from the international perspectives and experiences. Georgia should choose one of them. However, there is no standard model of such issue. In every case, each country stands vis a vis peculiarities and 100% transplantation of any foreign model on local level is not relevant and adequate. Author, discussing the perspectives of civic integration, is arguing in favor of "integration" model against the "assimilation", "differentiation" and pure "multiculturalism". In case of "assimilation", the country will face the just claims from the minority side about losing their identities. If we adjust the model of "differentiation", that means to exclude the minorities from public life. Pure "multiculturalism" will stimulate the further fragmentation of the country. "Integration" model with some multicultural element seems more relevant and workable in Georgian realities.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

nation-building, ethnic minorities, civic integration

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"Nation" and "ethnicity" have been the concepts of disagreement and ambiguous understanding for post-socialist Georgian polity. Two "ethnic conflicts" (Abkhazia, South Ossetia[1]), secessionism and territorial disintegration experienced by Georgia after the dissolution of USSR contributed in many respects for taboo-making on civic integration and ethnic accommodation. From the one side, we see the ethnic fragmentation and pluralism of the country, and from the other, the obvious need for resolving such fragmentation. Accordingly, the level of alienation, which bears ethno-religious character, in Georgian reality is quite high.

The problem is turning out clear when we start to speak about the civic integration of compact populated minorities such as Azeris and Armenians. For most of the Armenian and Azeri Minorities the command of official Georgian language is very poor. Unlikely, dispersed populated minorities are relatively integrated segments of the society. The command of dispersed populated minorities (especially in urban areas), the competence in official language is incomparable high. At the same time, their economic and socio-cultural performance in general Georgian public sphere have been much higher. The problems mostly are coming whenever we discuss the compact populated ones. Most of the compact populated Azeris and Armenians do not reflect themselves as organic part of the "Georgian Nation". Total amount of such big minorities in general percentage of total population is about 11% (Geostat). These large groups live along with ethnic Georgians as parallel society. Therefore, the strong ethnic stigmas, inherited especially from the soviet past, are quite strong and vivid.

In given article, based on descriptive methodology, we will discuss the experience of ethnic fragmentation of Georgia and strategies of civic integration undertaken by the political institutions. In many respects, inclusion of minorities in general public is not the home task of the country; it is kind of international obligation under the frame of international institutions as well. Therefore, "the making of Nation" is the principal task for present as well as for future successful democratic consolidation.

There are principal research questions that are going to meet answers by our article: a) what is the role of historical context of such story; b) how do the political institutions react on internal as well as on external challenges of

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[1] Abkhazian and Ossetian cases are out of the article because of the present situation. These former autonomous regions of Georgia are recently out of control of Georgian state and recognized by few states (principally by Russian federation) as independent.

ethnic diversity; c) what are the possible strategies of ethnic accommodation in Georgia.

Of course, the article does not pretend to fully clarify the minority issues, it stresses only on general key points of the problem. Therefore, the final answers of the story is located beyond the article.

UNDERSTANDING OF ETHNIC DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEMPORARY GEORGIA

Public political discourse and the space of today's Georgia is distinguished with its multiplicity of ethnic categories and it is difficult to call it a vibrant political culture based on extensive citizen participation and on broad social and political consensus. The political culture of Georgia largely bears fragmented nature where the socio-political elements of the primordial and pre-modern type are not rare. Such reality does not really correspond to the processes and goals of the structuring of the idea of modern nation-state.

Of course, of creating such situation one can blame the political elites (including ethno-political elites), who are the main actors in determining the fate of the country. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the given elites operate in accordance with the specific historical heritage and the existing socio-political context, which, for its part, does not stimulate successful civic integration. Such circumstance has been broadly determined by the Soviet past and the experience of "nationality politics". Along with many problems, as the hallmark of the Soviet heritage can be named particularly strong ethnic stigmatization of society, overcoming of which was a difficult task for all multi-ethnic post-Soviet countries (Burbank, Cooper 2010; Suny 1989; Cornell 2001; Pipes 1954: 65; Brubaker 2005: 23–25; Hirsch 2005; Sakwa 1992: 25). Among these countries, having the problematic issues of ethnic and cultural character, Georgia remains one of the leading. Among all those stigmas, handed down to us by inheritance from the Soviet Union, comes out that the most complex one was the ethnic stigma. Overcoming the ethnic and cultural diversity especially hinder foreign policy factors and socio-economic context. In Georgia, the ethnic minorities have poor communication not only in the cultural and political, but also in economic terms. The national economic market has not been contributing to an intense relationship, competition and cooperation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in most cases we actually face isolationism of ethnic minorities,

and radical change for the better in near future is not expected. Despite the fact that in Georgia the legal framework is provided by many formal civil equality norms and the country is joined to all of the major international legislations which protect human rights, significant improvement has not been felt. We see that the formal legal equality norms alone cannot promote active civic activities and inter-ethnic integration (although without it at all it is unthinkable).

Civil integration prevents ethno-nationalist trends and myths, which have deep roots in the views of the majority of the population. These myths and perceptions play a crucial role in the realization of national self-determination and identity formation. Ethno-nationalist trends are strong not only among the ethnic Georgians, but also within the ethnic minority communities. The creation of ethno-nationalist tendencies has been contributed by several factors. These factors include historical past and legacy of the Soviet totalitarianism as well as the current socio-economic circumstances. In this regard, Soviet past is especially "distinguished", however, it has played a huge role, but we should not forget also about historical context until the Soviets. Probably rethinking of these two factors will help us to answer the questions: what was the base of origins of ethno-nationalist tendencies in Georgia and why is the integration of ethnic minorities so complicated? Of course, political elites have been contributing significantly to the situation, but as a rule, any political actor, intending to implement the particular political project, tries to acquire legitimacy for their actions. So, very often, these elites are slaves to such reality and, therefore, they are trying to strengthen their political projects with the ideas that are familiar and shared by the majority of citizens, adopted and approved by them.

GEORGIA FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

a) Medieval and modern narrations

Social scientists generally agree that the process of construction of group's own identity is held under conditions of vis a vis relationships with "others". The image of "others" is the cornerstone of the strengthening of one's own identity. The approach is especially adequate to the construction of one's "national identity", when one intends to defend its "authenticity" from "others". Therefore, as it is justly accepted in social sciences, the differentiation between "we" and the "others" is crucial in process of understanding the spirit and sense of nationhood.

It is broadly accepted by scholars as well as by public in Georgia that Georgians are one of the oldest cultural nations in the world, who through difficult historical developments used to try to defend the "civilized" space, from the very east boundaries, from barbarians. Such difficulties have been caused by Georgia's geopolitical situation, by means of borderline, i.e. intersection of European and Eastern civilizations. Therefore, the image of Georgians' centuries long struggle for independence and Christianity against the "uncivilized people" (Turks, Persians, Mongols, Arabs, Russians, etc.) broadly shaped their identity and sense of distinctiveness from the "others". Accordingly, to regard Georgians as a "new forming nation" is extremely "injustice" and is a form of "dis-knowledge of history". Moreover, if someone claims Georgians "Asiatic people" because of their ambiguous geographical location, it would be regarded as "disrespect" and "humiliation" of Georgians.

Theoretically, most of the contribution to understanding of "Georgianness" is expressed in 10th century by the medieval paradigm of "Georgia" by the hagiographic author Giorgi Merchule: "Georgia is consisted of lands where the Christian mesas and every preach are exercised in Georgian" (Merchule 2002: 4).

In 11th century, during the times the first centralized Georgian feudal state appeared, the modern name of Georgia in Georgian was acquired – "SAQARTVELO".

The ancient Sumerian word "eri", the Georgian synonym of Latin "natio", historically has had a little bit different meaning than "natio". The Latin "natio" during the Middle Ages was the equal of the Greek "genes", and meant "origination or birth". Only in modern era it adopted the meaning of political community. During the Middle Ages, the "natio" usually was associated with language, students' community, or nobility. For example, when the chronicles spoke on a "gathering of French nation", they implied the gathering of French nobility and clergy (Habermas 2001: 87).

Firstly, in Georgian "eri" often was associated with language community (for instance, in first translations of the Bible), but primarily under it, the secular community was implied, regardless of ethnic or other origins of its members. During the mentioned "'Golden Age", the "eri" became a term of common secular identity; regardless, it was nobility, peasants and etc. (excluding the King).

Such tradition remained in Georgia until the beginning of the 19th century, the period of Russian domination.

Russian empire totally abolished the local Georgian traditions and shaped it as a province of the huge empire, and put under the process of russification.

The notion "Georgia", as a political or cultural term, was completely cancelled from the vocabulary. The Independence Church of Georgia, along with state-hood, was abolished in 1811 and subordinated to the Holy Synod of Russia. In general, Georgia became an organic part of Russian autocracy and bureaucratic government.

In this period, in Georgia so called Liberal nationalism was originated, the main representatives of which are the Georgian intellectuals from 60ˢ of 19th century, leaded by famous Georgian intellectual and public figure Ilia Chavchavadze. Ilia Chavchavadze's narration on "nation" became the cornerstone of modern understanding of "Georgia".

Unlike the medieval tradition, Ilia Chavchavadze tried to formulate the new view of Georgia and constructed a kind of new paradigm of Georgia: "Mamuli, Ena, Sartsmunoeba", "Fatherland, Language, Faith". According to the Leibnizian tradition, for Ilia "nation" became a movement from past through present to future, in other words, "nation" was an above-mentioned "trans-generational responsibility". Followingly, Ilia formulated the concept of "nation": "Nation is a community shaped by history with common will and contribution, the decline of the nation starts at the period when the nation forgets about its past" (Chavchavadze 1941; Jones 2005). For Ilia, as well as for other intellectuals from the given period, especially vital importance had a defense and revival of language and the rediscovery of Georgian history in order to construct the ground for future independence of Georgian state.

b) First democratic Republic of 1918–1921

Despite the very ancient history of Georgians, the first precedence of the modern nation-state is the period from 1918–1921, the small independence time. That was first experiment of implementation of "Nation-State" project in Georgian realities. Therefore, in such experience we can see some utopian democratic ideas as realistic and profitable ones that brought the Georgian Statehood of 1918–1921 to Western space in case of democratic state-building.

The Constitution of first democratic republic of 1921 declared the "nation" ("eri") as the only source of legitimacy, regardless the fact of country's ethno-cultural diversity. The Constitution guaranteed civil and political liberties of the citizens including ethnic groups' rights, permitting them to use their language and other cultural ties publicly, including the Court and Parliament. Firstly,

Georgian Republic became a unitary-decentralized state having two autonomous formations within the state borders (Abkhazia and Muslim populated part). But, as an irony of the history, the Constitution had been working only for four days, because of the Bolsheviks' invasion and abolishing the independence of the country (Matsaberidze 1996).

According to Constitution making process of 1921, ethnic minorities were granted the rights of usage of their native languages (along with official) in Courts, local authorities, and other public offices in case of necessity. Constitution stresses on rights of cultural autonomies of ethnic minorities in terms of education, printing of magazines, journals, etc. But Constitution excludes the rights of territorial autonomy except of Abkhazia. Despite such broad rights, minorities languages were not granted the rights of official languages along with Georgian. Public/Political sphere did not recognize the ethno-cultural diversity of the country at the public level. It was remained and recognized at the private level. Polity was admitted as community of equal citizens. The main experience of 1918–1921 in terms of civic accommodation was the model of "integration" and "assimilation"; "differentiation" and "multiculturalism" were rejected.

Generally, the project was a combination of historical experience, current issues, and inclination to implement the Western ideas on local ground. Georgian political elites were inclined to approach the Western space and expressed their devotion to such direction in every step of their policy.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT THROUGH HISTORY. AZERI AND ARMENIAN CASE

Despite the fact that in the country for centuries different ethnic and religious groups (about 100) have lived side by side, they almost do not know (and if they do, badly so) the cultural values and achievements of each other. Given all this, we found it necessary in our study to make a brief historical review and to overview in what historical period and at which conditions the compact settlement of Armenians and Azerbaijanis has appeared in the country. The ethnic minorities are scattered almost all over the territories of Georgia, although ethnic minorities, which we consider within our study, live compactly mainly in two regions – in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli. Accordingly, based on the theme of our research, the subject of our interest is ethnic minorities who live in these areas – the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Armenians

Of the 248,929 ethnic Armenians living in Georgia, most of the population lives in Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Ethnic Armenians make up 5.7% of the total population (Geostat).

According to historical records, the settlement of Armenians in Georgia can be attributed to the ancient period. Although inhabited by Armenians compact regions where ethnic Armenians are almost absolute majority is more recent phenomenon and dates back to the 19th century, after the conquest of Georgia by the Russian Empire.

The war that began in 1928 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire ended on September 14th, 1929 with a peace agreement in Adrianople. In this war, Turkey was defeated. On the basis of 13 Article of the peace treaty of Adrianople, Georgian Muslims living in Georgia got the right to resettlement in area of similar religion, Turkey, for 18 months.

On the liberated from Turkish yoke territories of Georgia, as a result of religious policy conducted by Tsarist Russia, most of the local Muslim Georgians were forced to leave their native territories and move to Turkey (though some Georgian Muslims still remained in the region) (Zurabashvili 1989: 34–35).

In parallel, under leadership of General Paskevich, of Kars, Ardahan, Baiyazeti and Erzerum tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians, of Christian religion, were resettled on the territories of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. They inhabited exactly the territories devastated by the Georgian Muslims (Zurabashvili 1989: 37).

Azeris

According to the inventory of the population in 2002, in Georgia lives 284,761 Azerbaijanis (6.5% of the whole population), and 78.9% of them live in the Kvemo Kartli region (Geostat).

Most Azeris migrated to this region in the 16th and 17th centuries, during the migration wave from the Ottoman Empire. Although according to historical sources, still in 11th–12th centuries there was a completion of indigenous with nomads in this region.

The most successful and consistent in the politics of settlement with foreign tribes was Shah Abbas I, the Iranian ruler of 16th–17th centuries. As a result of his

policy, in some regions of Georgia and especially in Kvemo Kartli there appeared compact settlements of population of central and southern Iran (Zurabashvili 1989: 38–39). Communication between the already fragmented nomad tribes after them moving to the territory of Georgia was further weakened. Most of them assimilated with Azeris living closer. This bonding is facilitated also by the fact that they share a common language, similar social structure, some customs and, most importantly, religion. Over time, these ties have become stronger. And that is exactly the reason why the Muslim population of the Kvemo Kartli region perceives itself not as the Iranians or the Turks but as ethnic Azeris (Dundua, Abashidze 2009: 72–73).

MINORITIES BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC SPHERE

According to the empirical survey of 2009[2] (the situation may have changed little bit, but the results are still valid), 72,5% of Azeri respondents are occupied in non-public sector and their economical income is connected to private sphere. In comparison with Azeris, Armenians are relative higher involved in public sector. 23,5% of Muslim Georgians job occupation is public sector. In this case, the Orthodox Georgians are the leaders. Most of the questioned orthodox Georgians turned out involved in public sphere as the resource of economic income and job occupation (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

All respondents determine their identity according to their ethnic affiliations. The only exception are Azeris, whose identity mostly is connected to their religious affiliations, that is an indicator of high influence of Muslim cultural traditions in given community. Therefore, we can conclude that the principal base of "national identity" among the citizens of Georgia goes to ethnic lines and affiliations.

On the question, "What does it mean to be a Citizen of Georgia", with answer "Living in Motherland" (90,7%) Muslim Georgians occupy the leading positions. Such answers have also big place in Azeris' and in Armenians' answers. 83,6% of Azeris and 87,3% of Armenians regard Georgia as Motherland. That means that all questioned ethnic groups consider Georgia as Motherland and principal place of living affiliation. Azeris are mostly weakly involved in public-political sphere.

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[2] Author was personally engaged in the survey.

Only 0,7% of them regard themselves as active participants of civic-public living sphere (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

The case of marriage issues varies according to ethnic communities. Ethnic Georgians (as Orthodox as Muslims) prefer marriage with their ethnic co-brothers. The same situation is fixed with Azeris. Only big percentage of Armenians are indifferent in marriage issues and do not worry very much about their future fiancées' ethnic affiliations.

In inter-ethnic communication issues, ethnic minorities are leaders in comparison with ethnic Georgians. 64,4% of Azeris and 86,4% of Armenians are connected in everyday life with people of different ethnic affiliations. Only 37,2% of Georgians regard themselves as being connected in everyday life with citizens of non-Georgian ethnic originations (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

In information getting issues, most of the respondents from ethnic minorities' side are getting the information from the informal way and their trust to informal network is relatively high in comparison with official information sources. Except of Azeris, for most of the respondents the source of information is the information that are coming from the kins and friends. Among the media sources, for most of the population TV broadcastings are the principal source of information. As for the journals and newspapers, because of the lack of knowledge of official language only small number of Azeris use them as the source of information.

Most of the respondents from the ethnic minorities declare that they do not use the official language as work language. The reason of such answers from our point of view is that most of the polled population from the ethnic minorities side do not work in public offices and that is why the knowledge of Georgian as work language do not have big importance.

Most of the respondents have positive attitudes toward the official state symbols (flag, anthem, coats of arms). Surprisingly, only 83,2% of Georgians are positively minded to such symbols with strong Christian background, while 92% of Armenians and 94,3% of Azeris have absolutely positive attitudes to the symbols. It is possible that ethnic minorities do not express their true attitudes toward symbols. Otherwise, it is not clear why the Muslim Azeris have positive attitudes toward Christian symbols, while orthodox Georgians often express their negative perception of the state symbols (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

Among the respondents from the ethnic minorities side, on the question of character of relationships with other ethnic groups, the neighborhood type of relationships are prevailed (70%). Family type of relationships are relatively high

among the Armenians (5,9%). Respondents declare that, in most cases, their ethnic or religious affiliations are not the obstacle to be promoted in civic-public sphere, if the level of knowledge of official language is appropriate (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

In case of marriage and preferences of elections, ethnic Georgians mostly pay attention to ethnic or religious affiliations. 56,4% of them think that ethnic/religious attachments of the future marriage/political candidate is very important. Ethnic minorities did not express their special interest to candidates ethnic/religious affiliations during elections.

Georgian is the mother tongue only for ethnic Georgians. Most of the representatives of ethnic minorities are homogeneous in this case and regard their ethnic tongue as mother. Only for few exceptions of Armenians the Georgian (4,5%) and the Russian language (10%) is the principal tongue of usage (Dundua, Abashidze 2009).

MINORITIES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

On May 2nd, 2014, Georgian parliament adopted the anti-discrimination law that highlighted the needs of vanishing of all kind of discrimination and among them – vanishing of ethnic discrimination (Civil.ge 2014a). Previous Georgian juridical codifications (Constitution among them) more or less used to regulate the mentioned issue, but adoption of the law was a prelude to signing the Association Agreement with the EU. Therefore, the anti-discrimination law was not the pure intention of Georgian lawmakers. It was a clear outcome of international (in our case, European) influence. After adoption of the Law, on June 27th, Georgia signed the Agreement (Civil.ge 2014b) and on July 18th, Georgian Parliament ratified it (Civil.ge 2014c), which brought Georgia much closer to the EU space. The Agreement highlights the importance of defense of minorities and stands for peaceful resolution of conflicts, but the minority case is not the separate part of the Agreement and is strongly connected with Human Rights issues (MFA 2014).

Mentioned regulations influence directly or indirectly Georgian realities of ethnic minorities. CoE regulations are more crucial among them. Georgia is practically a part of any international agreement on Human Rights. However, Georgia still has the modest position on signing some of the European regulations and therefore, there is no full implementation of them.

For instance, the document such as the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages has been still outside of official recognition of Georgia, however, after the membership in CoE, Georgia took the obligation to sign and implement it. The case of such rejection is clear. If Georgia signs the Charter, theoretically, it will recognize 19 of local/minority languages officially and take special concern of their defense. In that case, Svan and Megrelian languages are most debatable among Georgian public and academics as well. According to many scientists, Svan and Megrelian languages have been formed as languages without official alphabet and recognition. For many scholars, Svan and Megrelian are only idiomatic branches of common Georgian language and their separate recognition is the obvious threat for Georgian identity and Georgian statehood in general (Putkaradze 2012). At the same time, along with such "languages", Georgia will possibly have to formalize the languages of all minorities – that, from the Georgian perspective, seems very alarming for territorial integrity. For instance, Armenian and Azerbaijani languages are not under any threat, because of the existence of Nation-State on their historical homelands with such officially recognized languages. Georgian side avoids the formalization of the rest of the languages except Georgian (exception is the recognition of Abkhazian language along with Georgian as official on Abkhazian territory), because of fear of possible further dissolution and disintegration. If we look at Georgia's post-communist story, such fear appears very legitimate. In regions where the minorities have the compact settlements (Armenians in Javakheti and Azeris in Kvemo Kartly, where they are ethnically in majority), the ethno-separatist trends are not totally vanished. Therefore, Georgian side argues on its moral arguments on such position and claims for maintenance of statehood. Many political scientists justly argue that for the Central-East European space the minority issues have not been the case of strategies of tolerance and integration. Because of unstable historical developments, late modernization and nation-state formation, the matters of minorities are a part of broader concept of security. Because of "security" dilemma, for many Central-East Europeans' understanding, minorities from given states are often linked with the enemies of their statehood and work according to their instructions (Rex, Sigh 2003: 3–4). Such situation expresses well Georgia's relationships with the Charter.

In spite of such situation, Georgia is a part of the European framework convention of minorities and actively implements its norms. The most obvious expression of such process is the adoption of "The National Conception of Tolerance of Civic Integration" by Georgian Government in 2008. The Conception is

the main normative base for further state strategy of civic integration and ethnic accommodation. Georgian Government has the obligation to report on cases of minorities before the CoE and other European institutions. According to such reports, there is significant progress in such issues, along with the obstacles. Such obstacles, according to the reports, are not the outcome of deliberate discrimination and oppression. Mainly such obstacles are common for countries with socio-economic problems and still weak democratic political institutions.

Georgia still has not fully filled the obligations undertaken before the CoE prior to the membership, connected with so called "Meskhetian-Turks" repatriation. However, the case is a part of official agenda of every Georgian government, without concrete deadlines and schedules (ECMI 2011: 120–125).

After the "Rose Revolution" of 2003, many changes occurred in political institutions including the regulatory structures of minorities. Actually, there is no single political structure and centralized competences on minority, there are several of them. The main coordinator of such structures is the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality, which occupies the main competences.

From the legislation branch, the Parliamentary Committee of Human Rights and Civic Integration is the core structural unit. There are several Committees indirectly involved in such issues as well, but they are dependent on the central one. National Minorities Council in Public Defenders office is the additional structural unit on such issue (ECMI 2011: 120–125).

In many respects, the competence among such structural units are mixed and there are no clear demarcation lines. Many international organizations require to create centralized political-structural units for better and effective policies, but in reality, the existence of such type of unit is absent, with no clear future (BTTK 2008).

PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIC INTEGRATION

It can be said that in post-communist Georgia state is unable to guarantee its two fundamental functions: provision territorial sovereignty and social contract. That is why Georgian statehood was unable to consolidate and integrate fragmented social space and transfer it into the vibrant civic space. Ethnic minorities, in fact, are mostly isolated from public-political sphere and exist under strong internal ethnic hierarchy. Actually, the situation is not satisfactory from the perspectives of civic accommodation. Ethnic minorities live along with Georgian dominant

group, but the impulses of cohabitation and cooperation are quite low. In fact, we have two parallel societies. Of course, there is some degree of cooperation between ethnic majority and minorities, but mostly such relationships are based on vertical lines of mobility and do not stimulate horizontal lines of communications. Ethnic minorities are ill-equipped with the instruments (low level of knowledge of official language, low level of information on public life, low level in creation of public goods, etc.) of successful public-political integration, that, in turn, do not give them chances to convert to active citizens of Georgia. The reality has been more intensified by the compact and rural housing of ethnic minorities with very low level of urbanization. Among the ethnic minorities who populate the urban areas the level of civic integration and sense of political loyalty to Georgian statehood is much higher. Rural populated ethnic minorities, thanks to low level of institutionalization and weak economic performance of the Country in general, mostly are separated from the core pivot of country's development. The fact has been adequately reflected in minorities' everyday life. Moreover, the minorities are populated along the borders with their ethnic motherland that gives them the additional stimulus to feel more affiliated with their ethnic co-brothers than with their political motherland. The level of loyalty of minorities to the countries of their ethnic origins is much higher. Unfortunately, political motherland is unable to guarantee the strong sense of civic/political loyalty and identity among their non-Georgian citizens.

As seen above, the formation of "nation" as a community of common solidarity grounded on civic affiliations is a one of the primary task of post-Soviet Georgia, where the "national" loyalty and "state loyalty" are contradictory phenomena, because of strong ethnic categories' presence in politics and public discourse.

But the problem is what kind of strategy the state has to adopt officially for successful nation-building: "assimilation", "differentiation", or "integration"? What kind of strategy would work better in order to construct strong "national" boundaries? We wrote on spirits of "assimilation" and "differentiation" strategies, but wrote nothing on "integration" strategy, which, from our point of view, is more workable and realistic than the other two. "Integration" is a strategy that tries to bring together under one political loyalty different segments of the society on one side, and to guarantee the minority culture existence and protection on another.

Therefore, from our point of view, firstly, Georgia has to formulate the new governmental strategies to provide the unity of the country under the civil-

ity and civil categories. Without it, it is really hard to imagine how Georgia will manage to become a consolidated democracy. Such unity surely must be completed with new institutional arrangements, which would be providers of free political participation. Without free participation, strong democratic institutional arrangements and network free market economy, which provide the intensive inter-communication among the different groups, it seems unrealistic to make Georgia strong, modern nation-state.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is obvious that the ethnic diversity for Georgia is not only an internal challenge, but it bears international character as well. For proper understanding of contemporary Georgian ethnic differentiation one must see that "history" (medieval, soviet, etc.) plays an enormous role in understanding the concepts of "ethnicity" and "nation". Therefore, there are several factors, which can work for proper civic integration issue.

Accordingly, we can indicate several factors that stimulate the ethno-confessional alienation process:

a) Low level of modernization and urbanization causes social closeness and too low level of social mobility.

b) Cultural and informative alienation. Because of closeness of cultural developments, one ethnic group is indifferent to its neighbor group's cultural achievements, and vice versa.

c) Factual economic alienation and primacy of manorial economy over the modern free market and goods exchange.

d) Civic alienation. Weak civic institutional network does not guarantee the vibrant cooperation on non-governmental level and, accordingly, articulation of private interests.

e) Alienation on political-institutional level. Weak democratic institution does not guarantee the conversion of ethnic groups into one strong political community.

From our point of view, Georgian State should take several steps to reduce the sense of the ethnic identity and stimulate the civic one among Georgian dominant ethnic group, as well as among ethnic minorities:

1) Creation of stable democratic environment is the primary task and base for further successful institutional development.

2) Improvement of the local self-government, in order to stimulate the development of political processes on local level and to strengthen the interests to be included into civic-political space.

3) Educational system should guarantee the relevant knowledge of official language among ethnic minorities, and especially among their youth.

4) Promotion of inter-ethnic cultural projects to encourage the ethnic groups to intercultural exchanges.

5) Strengthening the process of urbanization, in order to reduce the primordial affiliations of minorities and gradually replace them with relatively modern ones.

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RATIONALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND POLAND AFTER 1989

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

This article focuses on relations between Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after 1989. Before 1989, bilateral relations between these countries were very close. As of now, the behavior of North Korea toward Poland is based on a rational behavior. The Polish foreign policy toward North Korea is within the EU framework, which supports an evolutionary change in character of the North Korean regime. Poland is involved in North Korea through different fields, especially such as the humanitarian one.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

North Korea, DPRK, Poland, Rationalism Policy, asymmetry of relations

INTRODUCTION

The death of Kim Jong-il, the dictatorial leader of North Korea (North Korea is also called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]), on December 17th, 2011, leaves a number of questions unanswered for the future of North Korea. This event may lead to changes within the North Korean global strategy and its foreign policy. Back in the past, the fall of the communism already changed the foreign policy of the DPRK.

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In 1989, Poland[1] lost its status as a communist friend and its privileged position in contacts with North Korea. However, despite the change from communism to capitalism in Poland in 1989 and the establishment of relations with South Korea, relations between Poland and the DPRK remain at a fair level.

Poland still continue to support international efforts to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in particular through the Six Party Talks process, set up in 2003 to address international concerns over the nuclear activities of North Korea (Radio Poland: 2012). Polish authorities tried in the past to conduct regular political dialogues with North Korea. Since the 1950s, Poland has been also providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea. This paper aims at preparing a strategy concerning the future of relations between Poland and North Korea based on the fact that the DPRK is an actor of International Relations which maximize choices based on transitive preferences being a rationalist state. It is a decisive topic, which remains important, especially for the future of the North Korean nation which is at least partially dependant of the foreign assistance, including the Polish one. The paper aims also to prove the following issues: the DPRK is an actor of International Relations which maximizes choices based on transitive preferences. There are no anomalies in North Korea's strategic move in the case of its relations with Poland as the DPRK is a rational actor.

Following this introduction, this paper is organized into six substantive chapters. The first section begins with a discussion related to the methodology of this article. The second section is related to the theory of rationalism in international relations. The next chapter examines how social changes in Poland which took place in the 1980ˢ affected the diplomatic relations between both countries. The fourth and fifth chapters discuss economic and cultural relations between both countries. The final chapter is dedicated to the prospects for the relations between both countries and how to rethink the foreign policy of Poland towards North Korea in order to formulate a more appropriate policy which would bring advantages to both parties. Moreover, the paper is based upon Polish, South Korean, and North Korean sources. This article looks into the perspectives mentioned above, however due to the quite different topics mentioned it cannot be an exhaustive guide to North Korean–Polish relations.

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[1] The Polish People's Republic was the official name of Poland between 1952 and 1989. The country was renamed as the Republic of Poland in 1989.

METHODOLOGY

This article uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to analyze the mentioned topic. The whole is done in order to develop important observations and draw conclusions. On the other side, based on statistical data provided by the Polish Ministry of Economy, some elements are quantifiable and may affect the analysis of the considered policy. The paper aims at interpreting the policy of the two countries with a focus on diplomatic, economic, and cultural issues. The collection of data was also affected by the fact that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not disclosing its diplomatic information related to the last 25 years. Therefore some of the sources are based on interviews and Internet data. This article supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that the DPRK national interest was prevalent in the establishment of relations with Poland and that therefore there is an asymmetry in the quality of relations between both countries.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In international relations, scholars seek to explain how to interpret the behavior of nations and states (wars, alliances…). Any explanations are provided through theory. Within the last decades, new approaches dedicated to the theory of International Relations appeared. One of them is the Rational Theory of International Relations. Rational choice theory is rooted in the assumption of instrumental rationality. Rationalism is a behavior that can be optimally adapted to the situation. A rational actor is one who, when confronted with "two alternatives which give rise to outcomes, will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome" (Luce, Raiffa 1989: 50). Kahneman and Tversky, two Israeli-American researchers, developed a prospect theory to gather these patterns into a theory of choice. Two phases are distinguished. The first one is the reference point, the options available and potential outcomes. In the present case, the editing phase will be the post-Korean War period when North Korea used as much as it could opportunities provided by the Polish People's Republic. It is also important to underline that the outcomes depend of preferences, which are determined by each entity or state. The American political scientist Kenneth Waltz focuses on three sorts of factors related to security strategies: motivation of a state, its capabilities, and information it collects on the capacities and intentions of others.

The rationalist theory deduces the circumstances under which states will seek to cooperate or compete. It is a strategic choice theory for a state (in the present case, North Korea) facing an international environment that presents constraints and opportunities (Glaser 2010: 1). The second phase is the evaluation phase, which is described within a Utility model (applied in microeconomics) which can be associated to the behavior of North Korea. It will assume that the state will make rational decisions to maximize its gains within its relations with Poland. The potential gain for North Korea will be an inflow of foreign currency through different channels presented below.

RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND NORTH KOREA BETWEEN 1989 AND 2015

As an introduction, I would like to summarize the relations between both countries between 1948 and 1989 (Levi 2009: 345–363). Poland recognized the DPRK on the October 16th, 1948, and was one of the first states which diplomatically recognized the DPRK. The DPRK was the country which represented the Korean Peninsula in the communist world for the next 41 years. Due to historical reasons, during the period of the Cold War, Poland maintained limited but good relations with the DPRK. It is interesting to remark that Juliusz Burgin, the first Polish ambassador to the DPRK, was appointed only on December 24th, 1950.

Given the fact that Korean War, which occurred between 1950 and 1953, exchanges between both countries were limited to a marginal economical cooperation and mostly to the support of Poland to the DPRK related to the reconstruction of the DPRK. Poland provided a financial support (transport of medicine and food) and assisted the DPRK by taking about 1200 orphans and students who arrived in late 1952 (Krysowata 2004: 100–102). On June 8th, 1953, Poland became a member of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), which was supposed to oversee the repatriation process of prisoners of war from the Korean War. This organ was also composed by the Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Between 1953 and 1989, the cooperation between both countries was especially concentrated on cultural exchanges and some minor trade. According to Mieczysław Dedo[2], due to similarities (two wars which destroyed two capitals:

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[2] Interview with Mieczysław Dedo. The interview was held on April 4th, 2010. Mieczysław Dedo

Warsaw and Pyongyang) and common ideologies, many Polish songs and movies were presented in the DPRK and many North Korean movies were also available in Poland (Krysowata 2004: 98–122). As mentioned above, North Korea needed Poland rather than Poland needed North Korea due to its national and economical interests. The first stage of the relationship, from 1949 until 1953, could be also characterized as a period during which there were intensified efforts of Poland toward the reconstruction of the DPRK. The second phase of the relations, from 1953 to 1989, can be characterized as a period where the DPRK look for a financial support from countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. This was a period of turbulences and confusion where Poland was not in position of challenging the Soviet Union as did the DPRK. This was due to the fact that Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact at the difference of the DPRK, which did not join this organization.

The state of relations between both countries changed in the late 1980ˢ for internal and external reasons. First let's mention the internal reasons: when the dominance of the Polish United Workers' Party has been eroded and in 1989 Solidarnosc had triumphed in Poland's first partially free parliamentary elections since 1945, the DPRK showed its objections. Later Lech Wałęsa, a non-communist official, won the presidency in 1990. On an external basis, another fact which depreciates the quality of relations between Poland and the DPRK was the opening of official ties between Poland and South Korea on November 1ˢᵗ, 1989 (Szczudlik-Tatar, Mejssner 2014: 2). The relations between Poland and North Korea were strongly affected by this fact as North Korea considered this act as a betrayal. 6 years later, in 1995, Polish soldiers were withdrawn from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Within the next days, the Polish ambassador Ryszard Baturo was recalled by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after being 4 years in Pyongyang. North Korean authorities also recalled its diplomats based in Warsaw, as well as other North Koreans based in Poland such as North Korean workers, students, technical specialists, and sportsmen among others[3]. A major part of the small community of Poles based in the DPRK

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is a former Polish diplomat who was twice the Polish representative to the DPRK. Mieczysław Dedo passed away in December 2014.

[3] For example, until the end of the 1990s, a dozen of North Koreans were studying at the Gdynia Maritime University. Due to structural changes which occurred in Poland, all of them (including two North Korean agents who were responsible for their journey in Gdynia) left Poland from one day to the next. The reason for their departure mentioned by the DPRK embassy in Poland was their participation in military exercises in North Korea. They never came back to Poland. Nevertheless, on

was also forced to leave this country. Nevertheless it should be noted that the Polish journalist Krzysztof Darewicz was the only one Western reporter who was able to assist to the funerals of Kim Il-sung in 1994 (The New York Times 1994). It may be a symbol of the double ecke policy of the DPRK.

These relations changed after 1997. After some consultations between both countries, Pak Sang-am, a new DPRK ambassador to Poland, was appointed on July 19th, 1997. Pak Sang-am represented also the DPRK interest in Hungary (Iroda 1998). In 1998, he was removed from his position and sent back to North Korea. The former North Korean ambassador was replaced by Kim Pyong-il (Levi 2010: 33–49), a step-brother of Kim Jong-il, who was considered in the 1970s as an enemy of the North Korean leader (Levi 2010: 40–47). Kim Pyong-il being sent to Poland was considered as a threat for the regime. He was nominated as one of the youngest North Korean diplomats of the DPRK diplomatic corps.

Age of selected DPRK diplomats

Identity	Year of Birth	Country of Accreditation	Year of Accredita-tion	Age at the Accredita-tion	Time Spent as an Ambassador
Kim Pyong- il	1954	Hungary	1988	34	2 months
Kim Pyong-il	1954	Poland (the 4th country where he was based)	1998	44	16 years
Kim Kwang-sop	1952	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (until 1990) and Czechoslovakia (until 1993)	1985	33	8 years
Kim Kwang-sop	1952	Austria (the 2nd where he was based)	1993	41	21 years
Jon Hui-jong	1930	Cambodia	1968	38	5 years
Kim Jae-gyong	1934	Sweden	1974	40	2 years
Choe Su-il	1950	Pakistan	1991	41	4 years
Paek Nam-sun	1929	Poland	1974	45	5 years
Kim Hung-rim	1947	Sweden	1995	48	5 years

tMay 13th, 1989 (before the fall of the Berlin Wall), a Taekwondo match between the team of Poland and the DPRK took place in Koszalin. A few weeks later, the junior Polish team went to Pyongyang for the 13th International Festival of the Youth and Students, which was held in the capital of North Korea.

Identity	Year of Birth	Country of Accreditation	Year of Accreditation	Age at the Accreditation	Time Spent as an Ambassador
Pak Ui-chun	1932	Algeria	1980	48	7 years
Ri Won-guk	1931	Zimbabwe	1980	49	5 years
Paek Yong-ho	1945	Morocco	1997	52	3 years
Kim Guk-hun	1919	Cuba	1972	53	5 years

Document prepared by the author based on data collected from the various issues of "Vantage Point" (a South Korean research journal focused on North Korean matters)

On the Polish side, a Polish ambassador was one more time sent to Pyongyang in 2001, and Poland became one of the seven European countries with an embassy in the DPRK. Poland was then represented by Wojciech Kaluza. Between 2005 and 2014, each of Polish ambassadors who served in Pyongyang had a military background (many are retired officers or senior non-commissioned officers). Some of them told the author of this article that North Korean authorities pay a high esteem to foreign military officials. The last ambassador of Poland to North Korea was General Edward Pietrzyk, who previously served as the Polish ambassador in Iraq (2007–2010). Before him, Roman Iwaszkiewicz served and was a General of the Polish Army. Edward Pietrzyk was replaced by Krzysztof Ciebień in 2014, who is the first Polish civil ambassador since 2005.

Concerning diplomatic visits, in 2001, Radosław Sikorski, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland came to the DPRK for political consultations as a part of the strategy on relations between the DPRK and the EU (Seliger 2010: 180). These consultations were repeated in 2004 and 2007. On the other side, the DPRK delegation was sent to Poland in 2008 and between the 15th and the 17th October 2008, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Ryszard Schnepf was in North Korea for the celebration of the 60 years of relations between both countries. 3 years later, the DPRK deputy minister for foreign affairs, Kung Sok-ung, was in Poland on September 13th, 2011, in Warsaw. Between the 17th and the 20th September 2013, Filip Grzegorzewski, the director of the Asian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, paid an official visit to the DPRK.

In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. No meetings between representatives of Poland and North Korea took place until 2006. It is also important to mention that in spite of the limited "visible" cooperation between both countries, some hidden elements

remain unavailable to the public. North Korea is also trying to approach the Poles on the issue of establishing relations with capitalist countries, especially with Japan and the US. Moreover, some of the meetings related to the nuclear program of the DPRK were held in Warsaw. This diplomatic channel in Warsaw is one of the main reasons of the maintaining of relations between both countries in spite of the limited cooperation as we will see in the next point of this article. The role of the DPRK embassy in Warsaw can be compared (within its limits) to the role of the Chinese embassy in Warsaw, which secretly and partially organized the visit of Richard Nixon in Beijing in 1971 (Komine, 2008: 116).

Polish ambassadors to DPRK

Mieczysław Dedo	1986–1990
Ryszard Baturo	1991–1995
Mieczysław Dedo (chargé d'affaires)	1996–2001
Wojciech Kałuza	September 2001–December 2005
Roman Iwaszkiewicz	December 2005–October 2009
Edward Pietrzyk	November 2009–December 2014
Krzysztof Ciebień	December 2014– …

DPRK ambassadors to Poland

No ambassadors	1989–1998
Pak Sang-am	1997
Kim Pyong-il	1998–2015
Ri Gun	2015–…

Agreements and Protocols signed between Poland and the DPRK since 1989:

Type of Agreements	Signature Date
Trade and Payment Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK.	May 12th, 1992
Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on regulation of mutual obligations in clearing rubles in payment relations due to the alteration of the convertible currency payments from 1 January 1991	May 12th, 1992

Type of Agreements	Signature Date
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on co-operation of fisheries.	October 2nd, 1997
Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on validity of bilateral international agreements in relations between the Republic of Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	February 1st, 2007
Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on validity of bilateral international agreements in relations between the Republic of Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	June 15th, 2015

COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND NORTH KOREA

Both countries seem to have a special relationship at least when it comes to business. Indeed, the first and oldest foreign joint venture company in North Korea is Polish. It is a shipping company with offices in North Korea and Poland. One of 12 founders of the European Business Association (EBA) in Pyongyang was the Polish CEO of the company in Pyongyang. The foundation ceremony of the EBA was also attended by a visiting Polish business delegation headed by the Vice Minister of the Polish Ministry of Transportation. Additionally, according to Felix Abt, a Swiss businessman who was based in Pyongyang in the 2000s, Polish people were those who contacted him on seeking advice on how to do business in North Korea in the last 12 years more than by any other European nationality[4].

In a nutshell, the commercial cooperation between Poland and North Korea is highly limited to some minor activities, as we will see below. Poland is exporting meat, industrial machines and tools, clothing and medical supplies. Concerning North Korea, this country is exporting mainly raw materials and spare parts to Poland. The DPRK is also exporting to Poland some products which are produced by South Korean companies based in the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

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[4] Interview with Felix Abt, a Swisss businessman who was based in North Korea for over 10 years between 1992 and 2002. The interview was held on December 18th, 2014.

Starting from the mid-2000s, many North Koreans were also dispatched on rural areas of Poland, where they were learning agricultural techniques (Wojniak: 2006). Polish authorities are also donating farm machines to North Korean cooperatives (KCNA: 2008). The first discussions related to this topic were performed via a meeting between a North Korean delegation led by Kil Sang-bong, the vice-chairman of the Central Committee of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and the Polish Ministry of Agriculture in 2005 (KCNA: 2005).

Mieczysław Dedo, a former Polish Ambassador to North Korea, has always described his visits with the North Korean leadership as "nice", but emphasizes the difficult economic situation of the country. These difficulties coupled to the economical model of the DPRK which limits the exchange between the DPRK and foreign countries. As of 2004, the value of the exchanges between both countries was about 10 mln of USD. Concerning economic ties, they were always very limited. The current cooperation is limited to the activities realized by Chopol, a North Korean-Polish maritime shipping company which is still functioning. It is also worth to note that some Polish companies participated to international trade fair which took place in Pyongyang (Bobber 2011: 29). Edward Pietrzyk, the former Polish ambassador to the DPRK between 2009 and 2014, has also been seen in the past at some Fair Trade involving business in North Korea and at the main table of receptions between the diplomatic corps in Pyongyang and North Korean businessmen (Yang 2012).

Data regarding commercial exchanges for the years between 2010 and 2013 are presented below.

Polish Trade with North Korea (in mln of USD)

Year	Polish Export to the DPRK	DPRK Import to Poland	Trade Balance
2010	0,8	16,9	−16,1
2011	1,4	10,9	−9,6
2012	0,2	5,02	-4,8
2013	0,5	7,5	-7

Source: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

North Korea has also an outstanding debt owed to Poland since the 1970s, which is still unregulated. As of 2011, the DPRK owed to Poland a debt estimated at about 4.3 millions of USD (Bobber 2011: 29). From the Polish point of view,

during the Cold War it was seen as necessary to support a fraternal regime, and the financial returns were considered as unimportant. With increasing demands from the DPRK side for further support for post-War reconstruction and development of North Korea, the question of payment arose and there was some tension which particularly emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc (Yang: 2012). If North Korea is going to repay its debt, which is rather not possible in the foreseeable future, the trust toward this country may increase as its transparency. Reschedule the debt in exchange of reforms maybe also a solution to this financial issue.

DISPUTE BETWEEN POLAND AND NORTH KOREA

There are many disputes which are jeopardizing an amelioration of relations between both countries. One of them is related to the renting of parts of the DPRK embassy in Warsaw to various companies (Ciszewski Public Relations, 4Fun Media, The Venue among others) and Non-Governmental Organizations (for example the NGO "Czas na Muzykę") since 2008.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, North Korea has also dispatched hundreds of construction and agricultural workers to Poland, sending them to sites in several cities mainly in the northwest, south-east of the country, and in the suburbs of Warsaw. The total number of North Koreans working in Poland is currently more than five hundred. They live under the strict control of Polish-speaking North Korean supervisors (Levi 2010). As of 2014, they are living in different parts of Poland (Gdansk, Szczecin, suburbs of Krosno, Piotrowice among others). The North Koreans work for more than 10 hours a day. Their wages are deposited into a communal bank account controlled by the North Korean government in dollars or in zlotys, the Polish currency. More than the half their wages are deducted for the cost of food or so-called voluntary contributions. There are many such similar cases. As far back as 2006, the Polish newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza" covered the story of North Koreans working as welders in the Gdansk Shipyard, which was suffering a staffing crisis. They were supposed to be paid 600 Euros a month; however, after deductions, they were receiving only 15 Euros. The problem in Poland, as for many of the countries where the North Koreans are to be found, is that there are no legal restrictions regarding the employment of North Koreans, so as long as the North Koreans have work permits there is nothing more their host government can or need do.

The only possible legal basis for contesting the situation, for some of the workers at least, is Article 1 of an "EU Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings". These North Koreans are included in the utility model mentioned at the beginning of the article. The aim for North Koreans is to maximize their income in foreign currencies. The method is the utilization of its workforce abroad, which, in exchange of foreign currencies, is realizing a concrete job.

Moreover, in 2005, the American authorities accused North Korea of manufacturing high-quality counterfeit 100 USD bill notes. Many of these notes were manufactured under auspices of the government of North Korea and were exported through North Korean diplomatic representations. According to American officials, one of these diplomatic representations might be the Polish outpost, which was used to provide notes to potential customers, including Sean Garland, the leader of the Marxist-Leninist Worker's Party, an arm of the Official Irish Republican Army, who regularly visited the North Korean embassies in Russia and Poland.

In May 2011, three North Koreans were arrested in Ukraine for trying to smuggle 20,000 packs of cigarettes into Poland. There were supposed to be working at the North Korean embassy in Poland. All of them were protected by their diplomatic immunity.

In 2013, Andrzej Kompa, the owner of Kompa Investment Co., lent more than 2 million USD to the North Korean government through the embassy to carry out work on the building in 2005. The North Korean government never reimbursed the Polish businessman.

In spite of these (not always confirmed) misunderstandings between North Korean and Polish authorities, and because of the minor consequences of these facts, economic relations between both countries have a real potential. In the current economic situation, Polish companies face many challenges, they must find new markets and North Korea is an interesting option because its local tariffs are lower than in China and the North Korean market of wealthy people is increasing. Therefore, due to historical and constructive relationships and on its experience, Poland should be a pioneer in terms of prosperous relations with North Korea. Invest in North Korea should no more be considered as a risky adventure or a bet, it should be envisaged as a kind of new frontier of business development (Roussin, Ducruet 2010: 265) for Polish companies. However, major obstacles include North Korea's aggression behavior, its nuclear activities, some issues dealing with human rights record, and its illegal activities.

Nevertheless, we can hope that with the death of Kim Jong-il and the profound economic changes through the open policy of Kim Jong-un (You Ji 2014: 106), the new leader of North Korea, we will see a new path concerning the relations between the DPRK and foreign countries and I personally believe, these relations may result on a bright future for the North Korean nation. We also find that economic relations between Poland and the DPRK have a substantially greater non-commercial component through the cultural cooperation.

THE HUMANITARIAN AND CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND THE DPRK

With the activation of the Lisbon Treaty, signed by the EU member states on December 13th, 2007, the EU became apolitical unit with a defined strategy concerning North Korea. From this year, Poland has had to follow the EU directives regarding North Korea in some subjects, such as the nuclear crisis or human rights. However, there are some fields where Poland can act alone. This field covers the some of the interactions between both countries. In spite of the nature of the North Korean regime, a win-win game can be imagined through humanitarian and cultural cooperation.

Cultural diplomacy can be defined as follow. It is a set of actions which are based on the exchange of ideas, values, and traditions, whether to strengthen socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests. Cultural diplomacy can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector, or the civil society.

First, Poland is supporting North Korea on humanitarian issues (including financial support and dealings with humanitarian rights). Regarding humanitarian rights, the Polish Embassy in Pyongyang is regularly informing the DPRK government on its position on human rights. For example, in May 2008, when a DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister visited Poland for consultations, Krzysztof Ciebień, a former Polish consul to China and the current Polish ambassador to the DPRK, said that DPRK diplomats were open in its criticism of the human rights situation in North Korea. Regarding humanitarian assistance, Polish humanitarian organizations, such as Polska Akcja Humanitarna (PAH), are present over North Korea. It is one of the few aid agencies present in North Korea. The considered support is, however, partially monitored by North Korean entities and the previous mentioned PAH. This paper must also evocate the role of Joanna Hosaniak, a Polish woman committed to Human Rights in North

Korea. She is a senior programs officer with the activist group Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights.

The humanitarian support has a historical background. Since 1952, Poland has been assisting the DPRK in some efforts to grow its own capabilities of food production. Polish organizations sent large quantities of rural technologies and fertilizers and trained North Koreans (Levi 2010: 347–355).

Besides, Poland is also accepting North Korean defectors, some of them are living in different parts of the country. Some North Korean students who were based in Poland in the 1980s defected in 1989. Some others are living in Poland. However, one of the problem lies on the fact that some of the North Korean defectors do not speak Polish and therefore can find only physical jobs (Levi 2012). The South Korean community in Poland is also not big enough to provide full-time jobs to potential North Koreans defectors.

The DPRK foreign policy may change with the arrival of a new leader such as Kim Jong-un. This leader is realizing a policy which is different from the one which was realized by his father. The traditional North Korean planned and militarian economy is being emulated by more reform-oriented process. Therefore we can imagine that the North Korean leadership will promote some economical changes which may open North Korea and change the nature of the regime. This lack of economic expertise due to a closing to the knowledge transfer for sixty years as of now combined to long relations between both countries may have an impact on the nature of relations between the DPRK and Poland. Furthermore, since 2002, North Korean bureaucrats have been authorized to receive training from abroad in some economic-related subjects (Beck, Reader 2010: 45). Then what could be the role of Poland in such a configuration? In addition to NGO activities, some Polish universities may opt for an expanding of their engagements with the DPRK. We can also imagine that Polish economists may educate the future leadership of North Korea. Some Polish specialists (such as Grzegorz Kolodko, a Polish professor of economics and a former Minister of Finance between 2002 and 2003, who went to North Korea for education project purposes, or Jacek Mironski, who was an active participant to the conference entitled "Economic Reform and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK", which took place in Pyongyang in October 2005) may participate in the elaboration of a new DPRK leadership. These specialists may be motivated for educating about entrepreneurship, free markets and the linkages between economic and societal liberalization at the relatively open-minded Pyongyang University of Sciences and Technology, or through the Swiss MBA Programme

(Young-hur 2010: 45). The aim of Poland would be to provide some knowledge to North Korean specialists in order to enable them to change their country. In exchange we can imagine that North Korea may give Poland access to its raw materials (for instance, giving some long-terms concessions).

In terms of culture, the situation is different. Poland is participating in significant number of cultural events in the DPRK and North Koreans are also visible through contests in Poland. Polish movies companies participated to the 17th International Festival of Cinema of Pyongyang. In this festival, Poland has won many awards, including the prize for Best Film in the year 2000 for the film *U Pana Boga za piecem*. Some Polish producing companies participated to these event (Chronos and Poltel).

Meanwhile, many North Koreans were educated at the famous Leon Schiller National Higher School of Film, Television and Theatre in Łódź. Some of them participated to the conceptions of Polish movies. *Rex* and *Przygody Kapitana Clippera* (The Adventures of Captain Clipper), both Polish animated series, were prepared by a certain number of North Koreans who were educated in Poland (including Kim Un-chun, Chon Song-chol, Kim Dog-jong, Kim Kwan-son, Kwon Jon-kil, Pak Gwang-hyon – decorator; all of them worked on the preparation of the Polish cartoon *Rex*). Many North Korean companies are also still subcontracted to work for European producers of children films (Park 2010: 287).

There is also a DPRK–Poland Friendship Association with branches all over Poland. Members of this association are defending the North Korean political model. They are also translating into Polish the propaganda sent from Pyongyang. People who belong to this association are sometimes considered as "useful idiots".

At the spring festival (which gathers artists from all over the world) of Pyongyang, Poland is also sending some delegations (in 2002 from the Frederic Chopin University of Music of Warsaw and from the University of Music of Wrocław in 2003). During the 25th Spring Friendship Festival in April 2007 the Polish singer Danuta Stankiewicz won the contest. In 2012, Poland was represented by Joanna Ławrynowicz who participated to the previous mentioned festival between the 10th and the 18th April 2012.

On the other side, Poland is promoting young North Korean scholars who want to get an education in Poland. The North Korean students Choe Jang-hung and Ri Yu-jong won recently the Chopin Prize (KCNA 2012). According to Łukasz Graban, a Polish official responsible for Korean affairs at the Polish

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a soccer match between Poland and the DPRK is also planned in a near future[5].

Regarding educational exchanges, some projects are realized between both countries. For example, a Polish-North Korean dictionary of 530 pages was published on 7500 copies in 2012. This dictionary was jointly prepared by Polish koreanists (Małgorzata Terlecka, Tadeusz Korsak, and Magdalena Hornung) and North Korean scholars (Kim Song-il, Kim Min-chol, and Kim Jong-ho). This project was supported by the Polish Humanitarian Organization (Polska Akcja Humanitarna) and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. North Korean scholars who were involved in the projects were students from the Polish Faculty of the University of Foreign Languages of Pyongyang, which was established in 2005. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored computers for the Faculty of Polish Language at the Foreign Languages University in Pyongyang. Jo Song-mu (Jo Song-mu is a former North Korean orphan who was educated in Poland in the 1950[s] during his high school and university), the head of this faculty, received a Polish award as an expert on the Polish language in 2010 (Wojnarowski 2010). Some North Koreans were also granted facilities to study the Polish language at the Warsaw Centre of Polish Language and Culture for Foreigners. North Korean is also sometimes exhibited in Poland. Between the 2nd and the 6th September 2008, there was an exhibition in Warsaw which was dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the opening of diplomatic relations between Poland and the DPRK. Other exhibitions were held mainly in Gdansk, where there is a major University Center of Asian Studies. The last one was held in September 2014 (KFA Poland: 2014).

CONCLUSION

Given the uncertainties surrounding personnel (nominations at the head of North Korea) and events (a potential collapse of the North Korean system) that may influence prospects for DPRK–Poland relations, I would like to conclude by dividing the conclusion in two parts. The first one is dedicated to the cultural policy of Poland toward the DPRK, and the second one will provide two possible scenarios for how relations might develop between both countries.

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[5] The quote was issued during an open meeting with students of the University of Warsaw on November 12th, 2014

Poland may not have a large cultural policy strategy, but looking at the scope and variety of Polish cultural diplomacy and considering how many of the actions are, we cannot but conclude that Poland is doing well and is even ahead of many Western countries in terms of cultural diplomacy toward the DPRK. Most of the Polish cultural diplomacy is government-controlled. This allows Polish authorities to design actions carefully. On the other hand, it hampers the development of a cultural policy based on a network of independent actors. It should be underlined that a deep knowledge of the Other's culture can be the first step towards the improvement of international relations.

Concerning the last point, regarding relations between both countries, we may apply two potential scenarios. The first scenario is the stagnation one: the DPRK continues to pursue provocations and practice a nuclearization policy that will rebuffs Polish efforts to develop a long-term economic cooperation between both countries. In this scenario, the cooperation maybe limited to some kind of cultural exchanges. The second one is the harmonization scenario: after a period of North Korean aggressive policy, the DPRK would withdraw its nuclear capacities. This development may lead to a diplomatic engagement of the DPRK, and cooperation with different partners. The cooperation between the DPRK and Poland may be improved on political, cultural, and economic matters. By discouraging progress on nuclear talks, by withdrawing from International Treaties (such as the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), the DPRK authorities are discouraging any important progress in their relations with foreign partners such as Poland.

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ATHENÆUM

Polish Political Science Studies

Polskie Studia Politologiczne

EFFICIENCY OF STATE FOREIGN POLICY. INTRODUCTION TO DEFINITION PROCESS*

*Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska***

— **ABSTRACT** —

The aim of this article is to present the definition of efficiency of state foreign policy. As a result of theoretical research, the definition of efficiency that views efficiency of state foreign policy as the relationship between the intended objectives and the achieved effects, taking into account the resources used and measures adopted in the pursuit of these objectives. It is the sum of the component efficiencies in achieving the country's raison d'etat, its long-term and short-term objectives and ad hoc goals, and finally the level of state activity in the international arena

— **KEYWORDS** —

efficiency of state foreign policy, theoretical category, definition process, efficiency, effectiveness

1. DEFINITIONS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Creating new knowledge in the field of international relations nowadays is full of difficulties. Both in deepening of the existing categories and in expansion of theoretical models and tools, the epistemological perspective has become extremely important in contemporary research. Multiplicity of available theoreti-

cal approaches largely hinders the process of drawing conclusions or making inferences in the study of international relations. The need to acquaint oneself with the pre-existing knowledge and achievements and, above all, their critical analysis significantly broaden the research framework wherein one has to position one's own research, and thus requiring definition. We should therefore focus on either the most influential theories, or those particularly close to the specific topic or issue. The category of efficiency has direct theoretical and empirical relevance, which means that a theoretical model can be applied and used in empirical considerations. Research in international relations offers both a chance for meta-level discussions, and for implementation of basic research.

The root of epistemological problems in theory of international relations seem to be primarily errors in formulating definitions of basic notions and phenomena. Janina Kotarbińska (1955) points out that „confusion in a theoretical discipline is always a bad thing. Confusion in logic, one of whose main tasks is precisely to counter and combat confusion is particularly bad. Confusion in the theory of definitions – the main tool in our fight against confusion – is very simply a mortal sin". This statement was intended as applicable to logic, but it can also equally easily be applied to any other discipline. Also Jan Zimmermann (2009) – in the context of defining terms within administrative law – states that „confusion and disarray in terminology […] are significant. This creates a natural demand for introducing order into the field, and defining terms and concepts using permanent legal definitions. […] Establishing a too narrow or a too broad definition may have very far-reaching consequences and cause vast disagreements and arguments in application of specific legal provisions". Therefore, at the initial stage in creation of a model, one needs to precisely define the object of research and the methods and techniques to be used.

The process of formulating definitions is burdened with many requirements and sub-stages. The first issue is the decision on the intended function of a given definition, and therefore the purpose of defining. In this paper, the main intention and aim is to give a new meaning to the term *efficiency of state foreign policy.* Given both the complex nature of the definiendum, and the difficulties associated with an attempt at specifying all objects or subsets falling under such a definition, the author shall endeavor to formulate a normal (intensional) definition, and not a partial (extensional) one. Stefan Nowak (1970: 74) points also to the fact that this choice is natural where „the scope of the generally accepted meaning of a given term is either internally heterogeneous, or indistinguishable from certain phenomena that are outside the range of that meaning to such

an extent that building an adequate description which would attribute certain properties and characteristics to all objects within that range and only to these objects is not possible". The significance of the term *efficiency* is precisely that: very heterogeneous and ambiguous, and consequently remains open. However, one can still distinguish the necessary and sufficient condition (see Nowak 1970: 76–77) for belonging to the set being defined: which is for the [W1] ratio of value of achieved results to value of expenditures to be a ratio exceeding 1.

The proposed definition is of a synthetic nature, and is one stipulating the meaning of the defined term. Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (published in Poland as *Krytyka czystego rozumu*, 2013) distinguishes – among the four types of propositions – synthetic *a posteriori* propositions, and consequently definitions that contain knowledge validated by and grounded in facts. At the same time, the posited definition is a border-line case according to Peter Unger (1979: 117–154), as it refers to a set of designates that do not exist in reality. It is important to recognize that any definition adopted must be a sum of designates sufficient to determine the object of research – that is to accept that the definiens can not be broader than the definiendum. In the context of social sciences research, encompassing also the study of international relations, Nowak (1970: 81) states that „for a definition of a given term to be considered satisfactory, it is sufficient for this definition to clearly describe the characteristics and criteria for belonging to the set being defined, that is the necessary and sufficient conditions permitting to distinguish the designates of a specific term from objects or phenomena that are not members of this set. Anything else that we want to add to any definition understood in these terms, no matter whether we want to specify conditions or features characteristic only for the set being defined, or those that the given set shares with other, external sets, should be considered as *excessive or superfluous* to the definition of a given term".

As indicated by Martin Kahl (2013: 35–60) in his article *Causes, Effects and Effectiveness – Conceptual, Epistemological and Methodological Considerations*, the term *effectiveness* in the ordinary, common meaning of the word can be understood as the degree to which a given goal is achieved by individual actors, instruments or policies. Such a broad interpretation of the meaning of the term *effectiveness* results in its ambiguity, and renders it highly imprecise. In the context of political science, one can therefore discuss *effectiveness* as a feature of a given politician, state or organization, but discussions on *effectiveness* of individual actions or activities – for example, effectiveness of sanctions imposed or of solutions incorporated into the legal framework – are equally valid. We

often encounter this term – used with positive or pejorative connotations – also in the context of politics itself, in the Weberian sense of the word, where *politics* means the pursuit of power over a state or (pursuit for) influencing the division of power.

2. CATEGORY OF EFFICIENCY IN SCIENCE DISCIPLINES

2.1. Terminological issues. Effectiveness *versus* efficiency

Theoretical category of efficiency of state foreign policy is not described clearly and unambiguously in literature. The first issue that needs clarification is therefore the problem of terminology, associated with the frequent interchangeable use in Polish-language literature, in particular that on political science, of the terms of *effectiveness* and *efficiency.* English-language publications pose no similar problem, as the term *efficiency* usually means both efficiency and effectiveness as an incorporated element thereof. However, in economics it is common to use the term *effectiveness* in its narrower, more precisely defined meaning (see Clark 2000: 3–25). Similar solution can be found in German literature – the term *Effektivität* there also means both efficiency and effectiveness. In broad terms, both efficiency and effectiveness mean achieving a positive result, a desired effect.

However, Józef Kukułka (1978: 23–55) and Terasa Łoś-Nowak (2006: 236–245) give these terms two separate meanings. Effectiveness of state foreign policy is shown in the actions undertaken having achieved the desired results – therefore this term applies more to assessment of the final outcome. Efficiency of foreign policy on the other hand is manifested not only in the result itself, but also in the degree to which the resources at one's disposal have been used. This difference lies, in short, in the term *efficiency* being broader than that of *effectiveness*, as a wider range of components of a decision-making process and the resulting action is covered by the evaluation inherent in the term *efficiency* (not only the outcome or output as such, but also avoidance of waste in achieving it).

It seems, therefore, that the category of efficiency is multidimensional, as designating something as efficient is the culmination of a process where at the end an analysis of the ratio between the effects achieved to the expenditure incurred is performed; the level of efficiency is then assessed using a predetermined measurement scale. Efficiency may have an economic, social or political dimension. Figure 1 below shows the process of efficiency analysis, while

Figure 2 presents how effectiveness of an action is analyzed. It should be noted that the first three steps of both models are the same – it is necessary first to define the goals of an action, determine the resources held and available for use, and finally define the action per se. With high probability it can be assumed that, due to partially isomorphous nature of both these processes, *efficiency* and *effectiveness* are often mistakenly used as synonyms. However, their similarity ends at the stage of analysis itself.


Figure 1. A simple model for analysis of efficiency of an action
**Source:** Own research.

Figure 2. A simple model for analysis of effectiveness of an action
Source: Own research.

In order to solve this issue, the use of both these terms in parallel, as interchangeable, is often sanctioned. However, due to the need to precisely define the category of *efficiency* for the purpose of this paper, it is imperative that a clear distinction between *efficiency* and *effectiveness* is made. As indicated by Agnieszka Bryc (2009: 193), „it can be considered acceptable to apply the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness as synonymous, with the exception of cases where a more detailed analysis is required".

2.2. Efficiency in economics

The notion of efficiency defined as the ratio of effect or output versus expenditure or input (in production terms) is used in economics at the macro-, meso- and micro-scale. This category, thanks to its wide application options, is from a cognitive point of view highly versatile, if not entirely universal, as it can provide an understandable description of certain key features of many phenomena. The efficiency index or ratio is a relative magnitude of two selected numerical values, and thus is conditioned by the selection of indicators used.

The purpose of the present paper is not to perform a comprehensive analysis of the category of efficiency within the framework of economic sciences, as this could in fact constitute a topic for a separate, long article.

However, it is necessary to present how the term *efficiency* is understood in strictly economic terms in order to allow for its correct application in the area of transnational relations. The above means specifying such constitutive features and criteria for this category that will be universal or sufficiently multidimensional for an interdisciplinary application. One must bear in mind though that there is no single, universally accepted definition of efficiency (see Kozuń-Cieślak 2013a: 157–181). It is the author's deliberate choice not to present below the various efficiency definitions and ratios, and the corresponding mathematical formulas that can be (and are) used in studies at a micro- or meso- scale. In macro-economic analysis such specific and detailed definitions of various dependencies are not widespread. One of the main reasons for this is the impossibility of gathering huge amounts of data and entering them into the algorithm, or – alternatively – fragmented nature or inaccessibility of the data. Of course, research at the macro-level still holds significant cognitive value – its particular nature is simply different, and consequently requires the use of a different set of indicators, ratios and formulas.

Despite the ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings of the discussed terms, one can attempt to consolidate these varying definitions into several semantic groups, dividing the possible relationships between the categories of efficiency and effectiveness into clearer types. Grażyna Kozuń-Cieślak (2013b: 14–15) distinguishes five main types of relationships between these concepts: effectiveness as a condition/element for achieving efficiency, efficiency as a criterion for measuring effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness as independent categories, efficiency as productivity/yield and efficiency in terms of allocation of resources (Pareto efficiency). It seems that the greatest interpretation concerns arise in the case of viewing efficiency as conditioned by effectiveness. Wojciech Gasparski (2008) emphasizes that measures undertaken in the economic sector in order to be efficient must be both effective and economical (read: cost-effective), with the value of effects or results achieved exceeding the value of costs incurred, while still keeping in mind that the measures undertaken must fit „within the framework defined by the social axiomatic context, where society offers conditional approval for the selection of objectives and measures of their attainment dependent on their ethical nature". On the other hand, Stanisław Nowosielski (2008: 41) differentiates two meanings of the term _efficiency_ depending on the intended scope of components taken into account in assessment of efficiency. And thus, _efficiency sensu largo_ combines effectiveness, expediency and economy (cost-effectiveness), while in its _sensu stricto_ meaning it refers only to the cost-effectiveness of a given action. Despite the fact that the above approaches seem quite varied, they are all equally valid and cannot be called into question as they are all grounded in economic theory and practice.

The approach to the category of efficiency has evolved over time, from a simple cost-effectiveness ratio of a given action to a multi-dimensional analysis, involving not only the financial and organizational context, but also the moral one. One of the underlying reasons is the fact that the term _profitability_ itself also took on a broader meaning, going beyond the initial purely financial, revenue-centered aspects. Maria Holstein-Beck (1987; 1997) discussed the above mentioned evolution and change in how these terms are understood. Analysis of this process is important for attempts to translate or redefine the meaning of efficiency formulated in economic terms into one applicable to political science as well.

Categories of efficiency – the possible ranges of meaning that can be used to measure efficiency – differentiated by Maria Holstein-Beck are as follows:

- Performance – in the context of Harington Emerson's technical and economic approach;

- Competence – as per the organisational and bureaucratic approach of Max Weber and Richard Beckhard;
- Proficiency – in the context of praxiological approach developed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Tadeusz Pszczółkowski;
- Functionality – humanist approach of Douglas McGregor, James L. Price, and David J. Lawless;
- Communicativeness – personality approach developed by Burt K. Scanlan and Kazimierz Obuchowski;
- Morality – in the context of environmental responsibility.

Efficiency in economic terms can be directly and simply separated from effectiveness. Economic processes are characterized by a certain purposefulness, which allows for subsequent evaluation of the actions and measures taken. This assessment takes place on two levels: the first is whether the set objectives have been attained (goals can be achieved or not, a binary choice) – thus in fact evaluating effectiveness; with the second involving the question of the ratio of input (expenditure or costs) to the achieved effects (effects or output may exceed the costs, or be inferior/of lower value in comparison), and therefore considering efficiency as such.

As shown in Table 1, the outcome of actions or measures undertaken in economic process might thus be: 1) effective and efficient; 2) effective and inefficient; 3) ineffective and efficient; and finally 4) ineffective and inefficient (cf. Nowosielski 2008: 39–46). In optimal conditions, a process may be classified as both effective and efficient.

Table 1. Typology of economic processes and phenomena in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness

PROCESS	EFFICIENT	INEFFICIENT
EFFECTIVE	Planned goals are achieved during the process Output (effects) exceeds costs (input)	Planned goals are achieved during the process Costs (input) exceed output (effects)
INEFFECTIVE	Planned goals are not achieved during the process Output (effects) exceeds costs (input)	Planned goals are not achieved during the process Costs (input) exceed output (effects)

Source: Own work elaborated on the basis of: S. Nowosielski 2008: 39–46.

The foundations of the theory of economic efficiency in conditions of perfect competition were laid by Vilfredo Pareto. This theory is based on the belief that the

conditions for efficiency are satisfied only when no improvement in the utility of a consumer is possible without a worsening of the utility of some other consumer (see Barr 2012: 46–49; Kozuń-Cieślak 2013a; Kozuń-Cieślak 2013b; Szudy, 2014; Rutkowska 2013: 443–444). As explained by Nicholas Barr (2012: 46), „Pareto efficiency incorporates two value judgements: 1) social welfare is increased if one person is made better off and nobody worse off; and 2) individuals are best judges of their own welfare". This means that the common good, interpreted as public interest, cannot be upheld. Due to its harsh conditions, *Pareto efficiency* (*Pareto optimum*) may be useful only in terms of a finite set of alternatives, for example in power engineering or in vector problems (see Tomoiagă, Chindriş, Sumper, Sudria-Andreu & Villafafila-Robles 2013: 1439–1455; Godfrey, Shipley & Gryz 2006: 5–28). However, the notion of Pareto efficiency cannot be applied to social science, as situations meeting the perfect and strict conditions set out by Pareto are impossible.

An attempt to adjust the theory of efficiency according to Pareto to real-life criteria is the so-called *Kaldor-Hicks efficiency*, known also as *Kaldor-Hicks improvement*. As Nicholas Kaldor (1939: 549–552) and John Hicks (1939: 696–712) posit, a resource allocation could be considered efficient after all if those that are made better off could hypothetically compensate those that are made worse off (whose utility was worsened). In this model, the issue of social justice is taken into account, but this method of judging economic re-allocations of given resources still remains applicable to a limited number of circumstances.

Efficiency in terms of economic science is treated primarily as a category denoting cost-effectiveness of a given action (cf. Barburski 2008: 31–56) or profitability of activities undertaken by a person or an entity, for example by an enterprise (see Kulawik 2010: 43–63; Szymańska 2010: 152–164). Such a definition of the category of efficiency refers purely to financial and production dimensions - that is, the domain of economics. However, it is only one of the many possible meanings of this term; it can also be applied in the area of politics, communication, interpersonal relations or praxeology. It should be emphasized that an attempt to use or adapt economic indicators in political science analyses would be pointless.

2.3. Efficiency in political sciences

A much greater problem, extending across a wide range a research areas, is the issue of key elements of definition of efficiency in state foreign policy. The process of efficiency assessment is in itself a multi-component phenomenon, permanently embedded in a particular scientific paradigm. The specific dynamics of both international relations themselves, as well as of studies devoted to these relationships force researchers – to a certain extent – to incorporate an increasing number of components in this analysis. Among the many factors shaping the geopolitical sphere of the modern world one should name – after Józef Kukułka (2010: 219) – inter alia political factors, military, economic, cultural components, technological, ideological and ecological factors; of course, aspects such as energy, access to raw materials, logistics or religion should not be neglected either. It must therefore be assumed that „a dynamic, multi-component approach to processes of international relations shows that at the core, their main purpose is to satisfy – to the maximum degree possible – the needs, interests and objectives of various actors in international relations (states, international organizations and institutions) in the course of developing their mutual relations" (Kukułka 2010: 219).

As the most important theories of international relations of the 20th and 21st centuries are considered the theories of realism and neo-realism, liberalism and neo-liberalism and the postmodern theory. Each of these paradigms presents a different approach – not to the efficiency of foreign policy as such, but to the hierarchy of objectives, modes of action, objects of such action and tools employed. Each of these models also uses a different method to assess the outcomes of a given action (see Łoś-Nowak 2006: 84–85; Czaputowicz 2008: 50). The meaning of the term *efficiency* remains constant across all of the above presented theories. The choice of a specific model was usually dictated by which theory at the time was enjoying greatest popularity in the study of international relations, and was the dominant paradigm.

The issue of determining what exactly is meant by the term *efficiency of state foreign policy* is an extremely complex and multidimensional matter. After all, analysis and assessment of actions directed at other subjects of international law should be based primarily on a theoretical model of efficiency of national foreign policy. The most important goal of the research conducted is therefore to analyze the role and potential of state foreign policy and the strategy pursued by the state in the international arena, as well as to assess the consequences of these actions.

Foreign policy is a tool used by the state to satisfy its needs and interests on the international arena. Its evaluation should be placed on the axis traced between two ideal types at the opposite ends of the scale (vide Weber 1995; Załęski 2003: 45–51; Bäcker 2011: 201–213; Bruun 1972; Wolin 1981: 401–424): one being foreign policy carried out in an ideally efficient manner, the other – perfectly inefficient foreign policy. Inefficient external policy means actions undertaken are ineffective, unprofitable and badly-suited to the objective pursued and inconsistent with the raison d'etat. In contrast, efficient foreign policy is characterized by full satisfaction of the needs and interests of the state (objectives are achieved at all levels). The level of efficiency of foreign policy should be examined from the perspective of strategies governing the undertaken actions, the tactics adopted and the (right) selection of methods and tools for its implementation. Between the extremes of entirely inefficient and efficient external policy, there are many models with a varying degree of inefficiency (or, from a different point of view, efficiency). It is therefore necessary to create precise criteria describing perfectly (in)efficient foreign policy of a state.

Efficiency of foreign policy should be tested in parallel on two levels – in terms of available resources and means, and the end result of measures employed or actions taken. Only combining these two aspects allows to create a full picture and perform a comprehensive assessment of the role and position of a given state in the international arena. Analysis of the resources available to be employed in external actions of a state should be based on a detailed description of its diplomatic and military potential and level of access to raw materials and other resources. Assessment of the final outcome, on the other hand, requires verification of the degree to which the available resources were used and how well they were employed in real-life situations on the international arena.

To systematize the wide field of external activity of a state, it is necessary to divide foreign policy into the domains of bilateral relations, multilateral relations and global relations (see Haliżak 2014: 19–30; Thompson 2013; Stone, Slantchev & London 2008: 335–362; Saggi & Murat Yildiz 2010: 26–37; Rixen & Rohlfing 2007: 389–414). At the bottom of the pyramid, as the most natural, primary relationships, are the relations between two partners – they enable the attainments of particular interests (*vide* Łoś-Nowak 2014: 89–112; Rixen 2010: 589–614; Blum 2008: 323–379). Such fundamental significance of bilateral relations is also justified historically, as the first multi-party intergovernmental organizations in their modern meaning were created only in the 19th century, much later than states began to establish bilateral contacts (*vide* Łoś-Nowak 2004: 38–39; Bierzanek

& Symonides 2008: 285–336; Pietraś 2006: 92–118; Ruggie 1992: 561–598). Subsequently, multilateral relations at a regional level (cf. Zajączkowski 2014: 65–88; Bojarczyk, Czarnocki, Dumała, Krzywicka, Maj, Topolski & Ziętek 2014: 238–273), followed by global-level interactions were established. Despite the clearly apparent importance of regional relationships, with neighboring countries associated in relevant regional organization (such as the Visegrad Group and GUAM – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development), most often they are not a national priority. Instead, inter-governmental organizations with a global reach (such as NATO, the EU or the UN), due to their extensive influence are considered to be crucial partners for a state and, as remarked Kalevi J. Holsti (2004: 184), are in fact responses to the weak state.

Some researchers argue that efficiency of policy can not be viably analyzed at all. Mirosław Sułek (2010: 57) concludes that efficiency in international politics is impossible to measure. He points out that „analysis of efficiency has its origin in economic calculations, established to meet the needs of companies operating in a free market which determines the prices of goods and services. This allows to determine whether production is profitable, and what is its specific efficiency, i.e. the ratio of output to input. A similar mechanism does not work in the sphere of international politics, thus there are no parameters allowing for efficiency analysis in this context. Even if we assume that the strength of a state should be taken as its *currency, we* still do not know what can it *buy* with a given amount, or what price should be set when *selling* something. In short, we do not know sufficiently clearly what the effects or results are, or what specific outlays or costs are borne; therefore assessment of efficiency in politics is rendered basically impossible". While it is certainly true that the sphere of transnational political relations is separate from the economic domain, such an approach appears not to take into account the possibility of a different definition of efficiency than that relating to financial and organizational issues. Table 2 shows various types of efficiency assessment, assuming outlays and results are clearly distinct (observed as different stages). It should be noted, however, that the approach presented by Mirosław Sułek ignores in the analytical assessment procedure the category of objectives. A take on efficiency viewing it as shaped by three factors: 1) objectives, 2) outlays and 3) results is a much more comprehensive approach than one based solely on the outlays versus results ratio.

Issues related to purposefulness (focus on objectives) of a country's foreign policy are also raised by Agnieszka Bryc (2009: 196). The author states that „evaluation of foreign policy efficiency consists in comparing the start *versus*

Table 2. Categories of outlays, results and efficiency

OUTLAYS	RESULTS	EFFICIENCY
Well defined (measurable)	Well defined (measurable)	Well defined (measurable) – cost and profit (results) assessment
Well defined (measurable)	Insufficiently defined (non-measurable)	Insufficiently defined (non-measurable) – cost analysis
Insufficiently defined (non-measurable)	Well defined (measurable)	Insufficiently defined (non-measurable) – result (profit) analysis
Insufficiently defined (non-measurable)	Insufficiently defined (non-measurable)	Insufficiently defined (non-measurable) – „political" analysis and assessment

Source: Sułek 2010: 57.

end state, that is the objectives declared at the onset with the progress of their implementation in the period considered, taking into account the conditions (both positive and negative) in the international environment, and assuming the optimal selection of methods and means". In light of the above comments, state foreign policy can in fact be analyzed in terms of efficiency. However, the principle underlying all such discussions must be well-grounded in the context of a particular paradigm; it is imperative to define what exactly is *input* in terms of international relations, and what is *output*. One should also keep in mind that „assessment of efficiency of state foreign policy is quite ambiguous. This characteristic is mainly due to the fact that the categories of analysis include both measurable (quantifiable) and immeasurable (unquantifiable) factors, often listed subjectively by the individual researcher, thus making the final evaluation less precise and rather biased" (Bryc 2009: 206).

The approach to the category of efficiency of foreign policy emphasizing both its importance and inherent difficulties in its definition is the prevalent one among political science researchers. Still, also in the area of political science it is necessary to distinguish the notions of efficiency and effectiveness of foreign policy. Figures 5 and 6 below show simplified models for analysis of, respectively, efficiency and effectiveness of actions taken in international politics. Assessment of efficiency consists in joint examination of three separate elements, while evaluation of effectiveness applies only to assessing the results or consequences of measures adopted.

Figure 3. A simple model for assessment of efficiency of state foreign policy
Source: Own research.

Figure 4. A simple model for assessment of effectiveness of state foreign policy
Source: Own research.

3. Conclusions

Creation of a theoretical category of state foreign policy is fraught with difficulties. However, the basic definition, the lowest common denominator all would agree on is that effective policy is one by which an entity or individual achieves the desired objectives at the lowest possible cost. Still, in formulation of a model, one must determine not only the ideal type (perfectly efficient policy), but also a number of types with a varying degree of inefficiency, with negative connotations.

As a result of theoretical research, the definition of efficiency that views efficiency of state foreign policy as the relationship between the intended objectives and the achieved effects, taking into account the resources used and measures adopted in the pursuit of these objectives. It is the sum of the component efficiencies in achieving the country's *raison d'etat*, its long-term and short-term objectives and ad hoc goals, and finally the level of state activity in the international arena.

Classes of efficiency of state foreign policy:
  – Perfectly efficient foreign policy
  – Partially efficient foreign policy
  – Partially inefficient foreign policy
  – Perfectly inefficient foreign policy

We should also be well aware of a large role of researchers in the study of efficiency. The range of meanings of the term *efficiency* goes far beyond the category of pure *cost efficiency* – hence many factors taken into account are dependent on individual assessment by the researcher. The defined category remains open, and it seems the epistemological field (episteme) is appropriate for the realities of the current international system. Hence the definiens should be left open, flexible, adaptable and responsive to the changes taking place in the modern world.

Due to dynamic development of the international system, it is extremely difficult to provide an iron-clad, certain catalog of factors and elements to be used in assessment of efficiency of state foreign policy. The complex nature of relations at a transnational level does not allow for the permanent placement of a given factor on such a list, and no list would be applicable to all circumstances.

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POLITICAL SYSTEMS

BROKEN DEMOCRACY, PREDATORY STATE AND NATIONALIST POPULISM

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The main aim of the article is to try to analyze the functioning of Victor Orbán's regime in Hungary in the period from 2010. Analyses oscillate between considering issues such as the development of democracy in Hungary after 1990, history and background of functioning of the Fidesz party, and the course of Orbán's exercise of power. In the paper, the reasons behind the taking of power by Fidesz party were analyzed by taking into account the specifics of Hungarian democratic experience after 1989, processes of state's reforms and economic crises. The article ends with the analysis of five pillars of Victor Orban's policies.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

system transition, political parties, Hungary, Victor Orbán, Fidesz, democracy

A new, right-wing government led by Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party came to power in Hungary on May 2010[1]. Since then, it has significantly altered the country's legal, social, and political infrastructure. Its 53% absolute majority achieved at the ballot boxes meant a two-third majority of seats in Parliament due to the disproportional nature of the electoral system. The Socialist Party

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[1] Fidesz (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*, Alliance of Young Democrats) was founded in 1988 as a youth, liberal, anti-communist party. Now taking the name "Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance", it is the major conservative-populist party in Hungary. In 2010, it won the elections in being formally in coalition with the Christian Democrats (KDNP), an insignificant political force in itself. To find out more about Fidesz and its ideology (Bozóki 2008: 191–231).

(MSZP), which was in power between 2002 and 2010, received 19.3% of the votes only, while a new far right party, Jobbik, made 16.7%, which was interpreted by many as a shocking result. These latter parties remained in opposition together with the green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), which received 7.5% of the votes.

The governing party (Fidesz), enjoying a qualified majority, unanimously voted for the new Constitution. Fidesz has substantially weakened the balance of power, tightened its grip on public and commercial media, restricted people's initiatives, the freedom of the press, social rights, civil liberties, and cut social benefits. It has done away with the principle of power-sharing. Power is concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister, who did all to centralize his power, personalize politics, create a new clientele dependent on the state, and marginalize the democratic opposition. His notion of a "central arena of power" (mentioned in one of his speeches as early as in 2009) (Orbán 2009) has thus become a reality. The democratic state has been taken over by a small, coherent group of political entrepreneurs, who use the state largely for their own advantage. They offered neoliberal economic policies to the upper classes and ethno-nationalist, populist discourse to the poor. Such an autocratic turn has been unprecedented in the history of the European Union.

Between 1990 and 2010, Hungary was a functioning liberal democracy, when judged against the principles and practices of a modern, Western-type democracy – i.e., the one characterized by competition between political parties, the participation of civil society and respect for civil rights. By 2011, the democratic political order fell into a crisis in Hungary and it has remained so under the attack by the government. The ruling party has succeeded in deconstructing the components of a consensus-based liberal democracy in the name of the majoritarian democracy (Lijphart 1999). However, Orbán went even further – by eliminating independent institutions he transformed this so-called majoritarian democracy into a highly centralized, illiberal regime (Levitsky, Way 2010)[2]. The "majority" today is nothing but an obtuse justification for the ruling political party to further cement its power in a country where the majority of citizens believe that things have gone badly awry. If this so-called "revolutionary" process continues, the result will be semi-democracy, both in the short run and, if they get their way, in the long run as well.

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[2] The term illiberal democracy was first coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997.

This anti-liberal turn did not emerge out of the blue: it was a direct response to the hectic reforms implemented by previous governments between 2006 and 2010, as well as to the corruption and the economic crisis that ensued. The rise of the Orbán regime has deeper roots as well, the ones that refer to structural, cultural, and political factors that evolved over the period of post-transition Hungary. They include the early institutionalization of a qualified majority consensus, which has obstructed reforms over the past two decades, a plethora of informal practices, ranging from tax evasion to political party financing, which have stalled building a formal democratic institution system; and the serious impact of existing democratic forms on the competition between political parties, which has gradually killed off both the willingness of civic groups to engage in politics and incentives for results-based performance by governments, and has instilled a hatred towards politicians and politics among the population. The survival of the privileged and influential social groups on the other side of transition has also weakened networks of solidarity. Finally, the failure of meaningful economic reforms made the country defenseless against the global financial crisis that exploded in 2008. Taken together, all those factors have produced a perfect political storm.

THE REASONS BEHIND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ORBÁN REGIME. THE EARLY INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE COMPULSION TO FORM A CONSENSUS

During the transition to democracy in Hungary, consensus-building was perceived as a "prestigious" political measure. The "Founding Fathers"[3] of democracy at the round-table talks wanted the new, democratic institutional system to be based on as wide a consensus as possible. Meanwhile, the out-going representatives of the old regime wanted to retain their voice in politics. As a result, a complete set of rules was born that sought to strengthen the new democratic order, its stability and its governability, including the qualified

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[3] The reference here is not to a specific and familiar group of figures but to all those involved in making reforms to the 1949 Hungarian Constitution after 1989. Hungary was the only one of the former Eastern Bloc countries that did not adopt a new constitution – one of many preconditions for the current problems facing the country.

majority rules, which affected a wide spectrum of policy issues. Apparently, the "Founding Fathers" believed that they could safeguard freedom by increasing the number of decisions that required a qualified majority vote.

These measures created a democracy in which in the period between elections, the ruling governments' power became almost "cemented". It became nearly impossible to remove an incumbent government from the outside. However, this simultaneously made effective governance more difficult. The government in power, due to the high volume of qualified majority rules, had to rely on the *opposition* to take decisions on basic issues. Paradoxically, the Constitution thus granted both a lot of power *and* limited political responsibility to the government.

In 1989, the "Founding Fathers" exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards the notion of power. They wanted a strong, democratic form of government based on wide popular support; at the same time, they were averse to the very idea of power itself. To ensure the country's effective governability, the "Founding Fathers" provided excessive safeguards to the political system in comparison to other segments of the society (Bozóki 2002). To put it simply, they overestimated the population's desire for stability. What they did not take into account was the fact that the "illusion of stability" over the long haul could make the system inflexible. The desire for stability is associated not only with the legacy of the era of János Kádár (a communist chief who ruled the country between 1956 and 1988), but also with the hectic, new capitalist system of the past twenty years and the injustices it produced. Democracy in Hungary, in the formal sense, is the most stable in all of Central Europe, because since 1990, all coalition governments have completed their four-year terms of office. However, formal stability has come with a price as the existing regulations have largely prevented the political system from correcting itself. The constitutional system between 1990 and 2010 guaranteed that the government remained in power for the entire cycle, and it thereby ensured the governability of the country. However, it also straight-jacketed the incumbent government through qualified majority rules. Most of these measures, raised to the constitutional level, proved counterproductive. There are additional institutional and structural reasons that explain Hungary's inability to react to external challenges promptly (Zoltán 2013; Kis 2013), and why Hungary became more vulnerable than other countries during the global crisis. Psychological and institutional stability are important aspects. However, it has become clear that treating the idea of stability as a fetish has thwarted the country's development.

THE PRACTICE OF INFORMALITY

Throughout its history, Hungary was frequently an occupied country, and this produced a political culture characterized by the prevalence of informal practices and the lack of institutional accountability. Hungarians had learned that they only had to feign that they were obeying the rules imposed upon them by foreign invaders: below the surface, they established a system of informal rules governing the society and culture. Hungarians lived with the duality composed of formal and informal rules, the rules which most often were inherently ambiguous and contradictory. Therefore, Hungarians learned to amble their way around these rules in a conniving fashion, finding loopholes and cutting corners, and this behavioral pattern remains deeply engrained in Hungarian society. They gave the proverbial emperor what the emperor demanded, as it were, but they also evaded taxes where they could. They began to push for individual interests beyond the government by organizing informal networks and small groups. However, they did not form formal organizations, such as unions. Civil society groups and unions helped individuals orient themselves and survive not through collective action, but rather via hush-hush negotiations.

The Kádár regime became a "soft dictatorship" because it was softened by lies. The reason it became more livable is that the system often did not take its own rules seriously. The system of double rules continued to exist, and one had to navigate the maze of formal and informal rules with caution. Under Kádárism, citizens grew accustomed to those procedures that made the dictatorship bearable. For Hungarians, the old system was not nearly as bad as it was for Poles, Czechs, or Romanians. Thus, in 1989, Hungarians broke only with the institutional system of dictatorship, but not with the customs and informal procedures associated with that system (Bozóki, Simon 2006: 146–194). The corrupt nature of the Kádár regime made it easier for people to maneuver within the system, but it does not automatically mean that every system should be corrupt. Moreover, illusions attached to the Kádár regime made it all the more difficult to break with its political culture.

The political sphere assumed increasing power over various segments of society, from the media through the economy, from education through the social sectors to the theater. Election results determine who may become the editor of a newspaper, a school principal, a theater director, or a business leader. In Hungary, in contrast to the standards in normal democracies elsewhere, it is extremely important which party is in power. This means that the financial

security of many depends on the given political circumstances and the ability of people to position themselves rather than on professional merit and performance. This frustrates all those who wish to deliver in their respective fields professionally. The society has been built on the phenomena of informality and clientelism, so political parties try to deepen their influence through its practice.

The main issues during the past twenty years of Hungary's democracy were not primarily based on the constitutional problems of 1989, but on the ambivalent attitude of the Hungarian society to the formal political institutions. The period following the 1989 Revolution often surprisingly resembles the era before the revolution, because the society again tries to fashion its own informal customs to the new rules.

THE PHENOMENON OF "PARTOCRACY"

During the second decade of democracy in Hungary, party politics superseded almost all other aspects. The confrontation between the ruling government and its opposition became so intense that it became nearly impossible to solve the country's problems through negotiations, which would have required responsible policy debates and wide-ranging consultations. Fidesz initiated confrontation – when it was in power, together with the Independent Smallholder's Party (FKGP) and Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) between 1998 and 2002 – as a means of strengthening its initially weaker political position. It was determined to divide the society using the politics of symbolism. Public discourse was based on party allegiance and such discourse could not replace (or at least complement) the necessary policy dialogue or the unbiased popular discourse. The main rival of Fidesz was the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) which came back to power in 2002 and ruled the country until 2010. Out of their eight years in power, they were in coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) for six years. The phenomenon of "partocracy" appeared: what had once been the party-state was replaced by the state of democratic parties[4].

There are several reasons for the political crisis in Hungary that unfolded after the autumn of 2006, and one of them is the rule of parties. The reforms

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[4] A very similar phenomenon to the Italian party system in the 1970s and 1980s, called *partitocrazia*.

announced by socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 did not take the power of partocracy into account. In a strong democracy, party pluralism develops within the legal framework and is checked by other actors in the system. As such, competition between the parties cannot transform into the dominance of the parties. In Hungary, however, a system was established whereby democracy is almost exclusively exercised by parties, and for this reason, the good of the public becomes secondary to the interests of parties. In the meantime, the rising level of voters' identification with parties and the polarization of the party system created an atmosphere of, what many Hungarians called, a "cold civil war" between the left and right. Behind the sharp rhetorical struggle, a system of interdependence has evolved. This system governs both the relationships within and amongst the parties. One of its most important elements is its policy of rewarding and issuing threats to individual members. Thus, party leaders could maintain both "confidence" as well as "solidarity" with one another, because they knew everything about each other's affairs.

In Hungary, parties assumed civic duties. It was parties that organized "movements"; it was parties that established "public benefit" foundations, "professional" groups and the "citizens'" circles. Parties were the ones that delegated representatives to various committees; they sought expert advice of their own experts. Moreover, they had their own journalists writing media reports. In such a system, instead of independent economic experts and market players, there were only think tanks that were sustained by parties and their strawmen. In this system, affairs could only be settled through parties and their clientele. The state was a state of parties, together with its tax authority and security forces.

The particular features of the Hungarian political system – including a collection of candidate nomination slips, a high threshold for entering parliament, the large number of regulatory areas in which there is a requirement to have a qualified majority in order to create laws, the opacity of political party financing, and the privileged position of political party foundations, and so on – facilitated the survival of already-existing parties and made it difficult for new political forces to enter Parliament. Hungarian electoral laws were amongst the least proportional in Europe. That said, a strong democracy does not equate to enshrining the opportunities provided by a multiparty system into law. The Hungarian system was characterized by a highly politicized society, and the excessive sway that political parties had in various areas of public life. This has led to the withering away of the autonomy of certain segments of the society. Furthermore, it has impeded the ability of the entire system for innovation. If a society's progress

depends on the loyalty to a party rather than on economic performance, people lose interest in producing genuine results.

As the proportion of "partocracy" increases within a democratic regime, corruption becomes an increasing temptation. It is no coincidence that to this day Hungary has no fair party finance law, nor are there any strict rules against the conflict of interests within the decision making bodies controlled by political parties. Corruption does not seem to be an external problem, but an integral part of the system (Magyar 2012; Magyar, Vásárhelyi 2013).

DEMOCRACY OF PRIVILEGES

The fact that people lost faith in democracy is presumably partly the responsibility of those who form public opinion. After 1989, the roles of the intellectuals changed: their goal was no longer to act as substitutes for democracy that was missing, but to foster dialogue and offer alternatives, contribute to public affairs independently from political parties, participate in public debates, shape values, and raise doubts and fundamental questions.

Only a few journalists faced the fact that several of their colleagues were becoming the mouth pieces of various political and economic actors rather than expressing independent opinions and exposing issues without massaging facts. What should we think of the Hungarian politico-economic elite, which over twenty years has been unable to produce new ideas, behaving at times like a witch doctor, by prescribing the same remedy for every illness? The intellectuals, many of them followers of neoliberal teachings, did not question whether it was true that privatization and deregulation automatically cured the banes of the economy. They did not venture to view the state and the market in a more balanced light (i.e., that the economy and society are interrelated). Political analysts have been stuck in giving their so-called "value-free" comments on the superficial power games of the political elites, and they did not offer meaningful insights on the substance of democracy. Political scientists, if they were to take their profession seriously, should have assessed political phenomena in the social contexts in which they emerged. What is more, they were expected to offer more profound analyses on the relationship between politics and the society than they did. If civil society representatives turned a blind eye to the processes that were destroying democracy, it was no wonder that the politicians they elected themselves did the same. Politicians do not live outside the parameters of a society;

they only do what this society permits them to do. The intellectual elite tended to forget that democracy could not be solely the affair of politicians, though naturally politicians bore greater responsibility for it than others did.

After 2000, the intellectuals became the guardians of the status quo. It seemed that the patience of the lower classes of society was endless; it also seemed that many of those who had received higher levels of compensation from the state could "get away with" the economic transition. Not only did the memory of the transition become unpopular, but also the entire political class lost its credibility. A significant portion of the intellectuals were responsible for the fact that in the decade following the turn of the millennium, the consolidation of democracy turned into a farcical chase for illusions.

Between 2006 and 2010, the proponents of the ill-conceived reform policies of the ruling former socialist and liberal parties tested the patience of hundreds of thousands of people who were falling into poverty. One particular feature of the process of privatization in Hungary was that after an initial "spontaneous" period, foreign capital had the greatest ownership over the economy. Under these circumstances, the unconditional acceptance of the system by the Left, the discourse of "There Is No Alternative"[5] suggested that its followers were on the side of foreign capital and not of the local Hungarian population. The system did not become popular among the electorate, and as such, this perception sealed the fate of the left-liberal elite. The democratic center did not offer an alternative, for example, with an empathetic, plebeian-type of politicizing to voters. Thus, it paved the way for the extreme right, which sent the following message to hundreds of thousands of uprooted people in its campaign slogans: "Hungary belongs to Hungarians". Nearly by definition, if the policy of the left lacks social solidarity, the values remaining on the side of the road are lifted up by the extreme right based on ethno-nationalist rhetoric. In the battle for economic survival, the ethos of the fight for civil rights faded. In the conditions of neoliberal variant of capitalism, the labor market had already become divided into the "important people" and the "redundant" camps. Furthermore, the technocratic elite often proved incapable of easing social tension. The exclusion from the labor market for extended periods and social marginalization served as the bases for the gain in momentum by radical anti-democratic movements.

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[5] The rhetoric of "TINA" ("There Is No Alternative") was an inherent part of the dominant neoliberal discourse (Steger, Roy 2010).

THE FAILURE OF THE REFORMS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The political transition of 1989 did not mark the end of the transformation from the old regime. Economic reforms and new institutions were needed, and the new constitutional framework required content. All of this required credible politicians, or people who would swear on their lives that their ideas were not just empty rhetoric that fed the mass media. In the autumn of 2006, when its own credibility was shaken, the Hungarian government submitted a vote of confidence to go ahead with the reforms. Without this vote of confidence, the society did not support the reforms. Against this backdrop, how could reforms be pushed through? Perhaps the reforms would have succeeded, had the socialist-liberal government clarified the rules of the game beforehand. At the time, socialist Prime Minister Gyurcsány's proposed anti-corruption legislation was the only reform effort that could have garnered substantial popular support. However, this initiative also failed, because the coalition parties of the time nipped it in the bud.

In Hungary, the terms "reform" and "austerity" became conflated. The political elite should have realized that instead of taking decisions in a coup-like manner – decisions that would affect the livelihoods of many – they should have held a dialogue with stakeholders. They should have been able to explain and convince voters of the anticipated long-term benefits of their policies. The disillusionment that followed was escalated by political scandals. The Prime Minister's speech of May 2006, held in closed circles at Balatonőszöd (the speech was leaked by opponents from within the party in autumn 2006), shocked popular opinion and made it impossible for the reforms to gain popular support. The credibility of the planned reforms was questioned at the core: the very person who had initiated them admitted before his fellow party members that he had earlier not spoken truthfully[6].

The poor design of the reforms generated intense debates for years to come. Yet none of the debates made it any clearer to voters whether the sacrifices they

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[6] A recording made at a meeting of Gyurcsány's Socialist Party held on May 26th, 2006, surfaced in the press in mid-September of that same year. Gyurcsány was heard admitting that "we have obviously been lying for the last one-and-a-half to two years". This resulted in a series of demonstrations against the government. Even though Gyurcsány and the MSZP did not deny the veracity of the recording, the Prime Minister refused to resign (Gyurcsány 2007; Debreczeni 2012).

were making for the reforms would be worthwhile. The government had no vision concerning how healthcare, transportation, or education would improve for citizens; deregulation and pro-market economic policies, inherited from the transition period, were its sole plans. Moreover, communicating the reforms was limited to internal discussions within the political parties. The global financial crisis of 2008 reached Hungary at the time when the government was rapidly losing its domestic political credibility. The result was the nose dive of the Hungarian economy. Only an agreement with the IMF and a quick loan from the Fund was able to save Hungary. Gyurcsány's resignation in the spring of 2009 was the direct result of the economic crisis. His departure led to Gordon Bajnai's one-year "crisis-management" term in office, and, indeed, short-term crisis management presided over long-term reforms. It became obvious to everyone that the socialist and liberal forces behind the government would suffer severe losses during the 2010 general elections.

Over the past twenty years, the consecutive prime ministers often wanted to both implement reforms and please those who opposed reforms. Not one prime minister tried to break with the rule of political parties; instead, each had merely hoped that the "partocracy" would simply accept the reforms. In 2008, voters in a referendum, initiated by Fidesz, rejected the introduction of tuition fees in higher education and the partial co-payment within the healthcare system. In addition, they supported the withdrawal of the already-implemented "visit fees" to be paid to doctors. It thus became apparent that the socialist-liberal coalition had exhausted its political reserves. Thus, the government became weak, burdened by the demands of political governance and the severe lack of confidence that people had in the bureaucracy. Consequently, by 2010, the government had become defenseless against the emerging autocrats. The promise of a "strong state" enabled anti-democratic endeavor to gain popular support.

A democratic state does not rest upon the tips of bayonets: it is strong when it enjoys the trust bestowed upon it by its citizens and weak if this trust is lost. During the 2010 general elections, voters began to see the Hungarian conception of "government" as producing a weak "Weimar" state that could not maintain order. Voters increasingly believed that this weak government had turned Hungary into the country that may be labeled as an "also ran" in the race for democracy in the region. The need for a definitive majority increased, as well as for strong political leadership. Many came to believe the following: "we do not know what is to come, but because what we have now cannot continue, bring on the unknown!".

THE ORBÁN REGIME AND THE CRISIS OF HUNGARIAN DEMOCRACY

Despite the serious structural problems described above, for twenty years the Hungarian political system was a liberal democracy characterized by a multi-party system, free elections, representative government, strong opposition, free media, strong and respected institutions that protected the rule of law (i.e., the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsman's Office), and independent courts. Barring a few striking exceptions, humans rights were generally respected, and religious freedoms were not restricted. During the two decades after 1989, incumbent governments had lost every election (with the exception of 2006), the media criticized politicians heavily, democracy was consolidated, and Hungary joined the European Union. The above-discussed problems notwithstanding, until the eve of 2006 Hungary remained a success story of democratic consolidation (Bozóki, Simon 2010: 204–232).

By 2011, however, Hungarian society was forced to realize that the system that had become increasingly freer over the decades had come to a standstill, and it was turning into autocratic direction. This raises the following questions: Is it possible to roll back history? Is it possible to return to a semi-authoritarian regime as a fully-fledged member of the European Union?

CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's policies are based on the pillars of 1. a „central arena of power" (*centrális erőtér*), 2. the rhetoric of "national unification", 3. a change of the elites, 4. the practice of power politics, and 5. a belief in "revolutionary circumstances".

First, Orbán's notion of a "central arena of power" aimed to eliminate the idea of competition endorsed during the transition to democracy. He wanted to create a system based on the monopolization of the most important elements of political power which are strongly connected with each other through personal networks. In his view, the central area of power should be filled by the politically homogenized culture of the national community which is largely defined on the basis of ethnicity. If out of the three components of liberal democracy – participation, competition, and civil liberties – the option of competition is weakened or removed (through the modification of electoral laws) and the

institutions that safeguard the rule of law are destroyed, hardly anything is left of democracy. What remains, resonates from the era of state socialism: the "people's democracy". Orbán does not need economic, cultural and political alternatives; he strives to establish his own unitary system of values, which is identified with the national interest. Yet where no alternatives exist, there is no room for liberal democracy either.

Second: almost all of Orbán's important messages are based on the notion of "national unification", which has both symbolic and literal importance. It is used both in foreign and domestic policy. As regards the former, he expressly criticized the Treaty of Trianon that concluded World War I, as well as the legacy of the Communist system and the forces of globalization, both of which he found to be the most important political issues of the day. Orbán suggests that the "nation", understood as an extended family, serves as the bastion that offers protection against these forces. The idea of national unification also maintains that Hungarians living outside Hungary are not minorities, but full members of the Hungarian nation with corresponding rights and privileges. As such, these Hungarians are granted Hungarian citizenship upon request, regardless of where they live, and thus they are also automatically granted voting rights. Orbán believes that the civic right to freedom, membership in the European Union, and being a political ally of the West are only important insofar as they do not contradict the priorities of "national unification". Nonetheless, this policy cannot be described as pure ethno-nationalism, because the cabinet gave equal voting rights to those native Hungarians who live outside Hungary. It was reluctant to grant the same electoral procedures to those who had left Hungary and moved to the West as economic migrants after the accession to the European Union. The government distinguishes between the citizens of the same country when it decides about who the "good" Hungarians are (who deserve full state service) and who are the not-so-good ones who do not deserve the same procedural treatment. Therefore, the rhetoric of "national unification" hides the practice of selective nationalism.

As far as domestic policy is concerned, "national unification" refers to the "system of national cooperation" (a set of "unorthodox" policies combining statism, economic nationalism, crony protectionism and neoliberalism), which has emerged as an alternative to liberal democracy. However, the priorities of Orbán's "system" are not to improve the livelihood of the poor, the marginalized and Roma communities, nor does it encompass the concept of the Republic and the respect for social and cultural diversity. Through his words, Orbán wishes to

give the impression of uniting the nation by basing its policies on work, home, order, family and the feeling of security (Korkut 2012: 168–177). These basic, conservative concepts are deeply rooted in the more traditional part of the Hungarian society, and the prime minister smartly exploits the emotional impact of these slogans to sell his policy effectively. Yet the reality is that his policies divided society. In his dictionary, the term "people" is not defined as groups of individuals, social classes, or a political community in general, but instead represents a selective ethno-national category justified by history interpreted by him (Bozóki 2013: 346–367).

Third, Fidesz radically changed the administrative elites, by replacing not only top administrative office holders, but also the economic and cultural leaders tied to the experience of previous decades. The first Orbán government (1998–2002) used culture to strengthen its own power. By contrast, the second Orbán administration saw cultural pluralism as a source of unnecessary costs and potential criticism – and it wanted to eliminate both. It did not engage in a cultural battle because it did not want to argue. Instead, it simply changed the administrative elites as broadly and deeply as possible. The aim here was to dismantle the political independence of institutions and to put a group of Orbán loyalists in key positions. Anti-communism was the ideology bolstering this move, which today is no more than a cover for this quest for power. Cultural policies have been replaced by symbolic politics. This endeavor to solidify clientelism sent the message that life outside the "system of national cooperation" was unthinkable.

Fourth, the government's policies were not based on any single ideology, because according to the Prime Minister, the era of ideologies had ended. Viktor Orbán is in no way a conservative politician; he is a nationalist and populist leader who prefers confrontation to compromise. He thinks that competition is always a zero-sum game, in which "either–or" choices cannot be transformed into "more or less" type of solutions. Instead of ideas, Orbán believes in maximizing power, because for him it is not freedom, but a tight-fisted leader who can assure order. Moreover, he believes that he "naturally" embodies the traditional, patriarchal values of hundreds of thousands of rural Hungarians. Those who identify with this mindset are individuals who are servile towards their superiors, but stamp upon their own employees. They also include those individuals who are only obedient towards their superiors if they feel that they are under their watchful gaze. Orbán skillfully attacked banks (most of them are in foreign hands), multinational corporations, foreign media, and the officials of

the European Union on the grounds of economic nationalism and "sovereign" democracy to earn votes. In the meantime, he introduced a flat tax, restricted the rights of employees, the unemployed and the homeless, divided trade union, nationalized local schools, and eliminated the autonomy of universities. In this situation, "privatization" and "nationalization" do not much differ from each other because the state itself is privatized, i.e. captured by partisan interests. The party-state has been revived in the form of a "family" of power.

Fifth, Orbán interpreted his electoral victory as "revolutionary". This allowed him, with a two-thirds parliamentary majority in hand, to employ exceptional methods by making claims to exceptional circumstances (i.e. "revolutionary conditions"). As a result, Orbán deployed warlike, offensive tactics, pushing legislation that quickly and systematically rebuilt the entire public legal system. Fidesz often referred to the ideas espoused in the 1848 Revolution led by Lajos Kossuth (i.e. "revolution and struggle for freedom"), but Fidesz's own "revolutionary struggle" has undermined freedom. In its stead, Fidesz has established a single-party state, where power rests with the party and the prime minister himself. The state has been captured by a closed group of like-minded political entrepreneurs, a new elite with homogenized attitudes, which uses the state to extract resources for their own particular goals under the aegis of the "common good" and "public interest". Their strategy has been based on the practice of conversion of power, back and forth: political power strengthens their economic power and vice versa. The qualitative majority in the parliament gave an extraordinary opportunity for the ruling party to legislate corruption according to its interests. As it turned out, corruption was not a set of deviant practices, coming from outside the state any longer. On the contrary, it became the leading principle of the state. Corruption, which used to be deviant behavior, became the norm. It is "invisible" because it is the law itself, defended by the "refurbished" Constitutional Court. Paradoxically, from a democratic point of view, the problem is not so much if government people break the law, but it is if they keep it.

While most people wanted to remove Orbán's government from office, they were unable to find a viable political alternative since the opposition has been fragmented for long period of time. There was also no visible group of dissidents existing within Fidesz, who were critical of Orbán and who could offer an alternative vision for the center right. As such, the will of the leader is largely binding and faces no internal limits.

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PROVISIONAL GOVERNING COUNCIL AS PART OF THE IMPACT OF STATE AUTHORITIES ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE POLISH AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH (1948–1951)

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—— ABSTRACT ——

On April 26, 1948, the Provisional Governing Council of PAKP was formed on the basis of minister of public administration Edward Osóbka-Morawski's directive. The decision was a consequence of the removal of Metropolitan Dionizy (Waledyński) from his position as the head of the Orthodox Church. It left the *de facto* function of the board of trustees in charge of the Orthodox Church. Provisional Governing Council had *de facto* the function of the receivership management in charge of the Orthodox Church. It took over all matters and documents of the Warsaw Orthodox Theological Consistory and the entire property of the Church in Poland. The state authorities appointed the Provisional Governing Council two main tasks to solve. They concerned: the problem of autocephaly and election of a new superior. The Council was also to solve the problem of deposed Metropolitan Dionizy (the expulsion outside Warsaw) and the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Church. Until July 1951, these tasks were completed.

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INTRODUCTION

On April 26th, 1948 Provisional Governing Council of Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (PAKP) was formed on the basis of minister of public administration Edward Osóbka-Morawski's directive. The decision was a consequence of the removal of Metropolitan Dionizy (Waledyński) from his position as the head of the Orthodox Church[1]. The national authorities entrusted the chairman of the council to Archbishop Tymoteusz (Szretter). Moreover, there were appointed as members: Bishop Jerzy (parish priest of Łódź)[2], Father Jan Kowalenko (managing the diocese Warsaw), Father Eugeniusz Naumow (parish priest of Gdańsk), Father Wsiewołod Łopuchowicz (metropolitan cathedral vicar), Father Michał Kiedrow (administrator of the monastery in Jabłeczna), and Mikołaj Sieriebriannikow, as so called representative of the "secular factor" (M. Sieriebriannikow was at that time the president of the Russian Charity Association) (Urban 1996: 74–75). In some meetings Jarosław Demianczuk-Jurkiewicz (Director of the Department of Religious Affairs MAP) and Serafin Kiryłowicz and Kazimierz Szulc (counsel Department) participated as the representatives of the state authorities.

Provisional Governing Council had *de facto* the function of the receivership management in charge of the Orthodox Church. It took over all matters and documents of the Warsaw Orthodox Theological Consistory (WDKP) and the entire property of the Church in Poland. At the same time, a resolution to dissolve the Metropolitan Chancellery was adopted (in its place the Council Chancellery was created). Despite these decisions, WDKP continued its work. In the years 1948–1951, administrative system of dual power actually existed in the Orthodox Church.

It is worth noting that establishing of the Provisional Governing Council had no legal basis. This kind of institution was not stated neither in the Decree of the President of November 18th, 1938 on the Relation of the State to PAKP, nor

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[1] The removal of Metropolitan Dionizy was politically motivated. The authorities did not accept him as the superior of the Church (hierarch was accused of collaboration with the pre-war regime and the German occupiers). The dismissal of the Metropolitan was also the violation of existing normative acts (including Presidential Decree of November 18th, 1938) by national authorities.

[2] On June 18th, 1948, Provisional Governing Council gave Bishop Jerzy (Korenistow) the title of Bishop of Łódź, suffragan of Warsaw diocese, Archives of New Files (AAN), the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) Protocol 3 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP, June 18th, 1948.

in the Internal Statute from December 1938. Institutions of this kind did not exist in other normative acts of the Second Republic. For this reason, the body was illegal and contrary to the pre-war regulations creating the legal position of the Orthodox Church (Urban 1996: 94; Matwiejuk 2007: 44–45). Not without reason, characterizing this body, Metropolitan Dionizy wrote that "it violated the established canonical and hierarchical order in the Church and in general complicated its canonical situation, making members of the Council the rapists of canons, usurping the rights belonging to the canon Metropolitan and violating the principle of hierarchical obedience"[3].

It is difficult to say why the state authorities decided to create the Provisional Governing Council, and did not appoint Archbishop Tymoteusz as the Metropolitan, who they worked closely with in real. He acted as Deputy Metropolitan (from November 12th, 1948 to July 1951 and from December 9th, 1959 to May 1961) and Metropolitan (from May 5th, 1961 until May 20th, 1962). Perhaps the receivership management was supposed to be a pattern which was supposed to be used in case of forced personnel changes in other churches and religious associations.

After World War II, the Soviet religious authorities, using the Moscow Patriarchate, began the process of subordination of the Orthodox Churches in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to pursue their own religious policy. The favorable element was taking over power in the area by the communists, as well as the rivalry between the Moscow and Constantinople patriarchates for influence in the Orthodox world. After joining Estonia on March 9th, 1945, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Constantinople jurisdiction) was eliminated, and the parishes and the faithful were incorporated into the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church. A similar fate befell the Orthodox Church in Latvia.

In the second half of 1945, the Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia was subordinated by the government decree to the Moscow Patriarchate, which formed the Exarchate in Prague headed by Archbishop Eleutherius (Vorontsov)[4]. The next step was to give autocephaly (December 9th, 1951) (Suvarsky 1982: 56–61). This act was not recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, recognizing

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[3] Archives of Warsaw Orthodox Metropolis (AWOM), sign. R IV–2B 1144, The Metropolitan Dionizy's letter to the Minister of Public Administration on December 2nd, 1948.

[4] Yet in May 1945, at the diocesan meeting in Olomouc, the Orthodox faithful decided to ask the Serbian Orthodox Church to be covered by its jurisdiction.

only the autonomy of the Church in Czechoslovakia, the subsidiary directly from it[5].

A new personnel policy in the Orthodox Church was also led by the authorities in Romania. After the death of Patriarch Nicodemus (Munteanu), a strong opponent of communist rule, in 1948, the authorities influenced the choice of his successor. As a result of pressure on the hierarchy, Justinian (Marina) became the new patriarch. In autumn 1948, Exarch Stefan (Szokow) was also forced to resign from the office of superior of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria (Parry 2007: 65–66; Ramet 1984: 194). The hierarch, also enjoying great authority and support of the faithful, was accused by some bishops of sympathizing with the UK and the US (similar allegations were put forward against Metropolitan Dionizy in Poland) (Antonova 2011: 78–81).

In the changed post-1945 political situation in Hungary, several Orthodox parishes belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople turned to the Patriarch of Moscow Alexy II for adoption into the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the beginning of 1949, the Provisional Management Board of the Hungarian Orthodox Parish was appointed. And on November 15th, 1949, Hungarian deanery was erected (Péter 1995: 19–20).

After 1945, in the so-called "satellite states", the Soviet authorities influenced filling the positions of superiors of local Orthodox Churches. They aimed to their subordination and full control. One also attempted to use their activities both in the domestic and international affairs (including the World Council of Churches) (Ławreszuk 2009; Curanović 2010).

This article aims to show the activities of the Provisional Governing Council in three main areas (obtaining autocephaly, removing Metropolitan Dionizy and the election of the new Superior of the Church), which were appointed by state authorities, to indicate that this appointment resulted from changes in the state policy towards the Orthodox Church and the desire to acquire full control of its activities. The main determinant was supposed to be the election of the superior, who would collaborate closely and realize the state religious office guidelines. Archival resources gathered in Archives Records in Warsaw, Archives of the

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[5] This fact contributed to the exacerbation of mutual relations between the patriarchates. Constantinople did not give the Church of the Czech Republic and Slovakia autocephaly until 1998 (see: Ławreszuk 2009: 288).

Institute of National Remembrance, and Archive of the Warsaw Metropolitan Church were used in this study.

The years 1948–1951 were a difficult period for the functioning of the Orthodox Church in Poland. It was deprived of his superior, who enjoyed great authority among both the clergy and the faithful in the country, and among the Orthodox hierarchs in the world. Besides, important issues for the development and future of the Church (including the case of reorganization of the administrative structure, the training of staff) were still not resolved.

The state authorities appointed the Provisional Governing Council two main tasks to solve. They concerned: the problem of autocephaly and the election of a new superior. The Council was also to solve the problem of deposed Metropolitan Dionizy (the expulsion outside Warsaw) and the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Church. An important element was also managing the daily affairs of the Church and leading to a normalization of internal relations. In this last aspect, however, the main role was played by WDKP[6].

The first meeting of the Provisional Governing Council was held on May 5th, 1948. During the session, the fact of withdrawal of recognition Metropolitan Dionizy as the superior of the Orthodox Church in Poland was acknowledged. Some doubts about the nature of canonical irregularities related to this issue were reported by Father Jan Kowalenko. They concerned the matter of informing the hierarchy of his revocation from his position. This was rather brutally commented by Jarosław Demiańczuk-Jurkiewicz, who stated that "[…] the matter of the Metropolitan's notice to withdraw the recognition by the Citizen President of R.P. is a secondary issue, which belongs to the Polish Government, which in its time will do this"[7]. The members of the council were also notified by Archbishop Tymoteusz about sending a letter to Patriarch Aleksy, whose aim was to establish the canonical communication with the Moscow Patriarchate[8].

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[6] AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, The Decree on the Appointment of the Provisional Governing Council of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. On May 24th, 1948, WDKP circular addressed to the clergy PAKP on the appointment of the Interim Governing College was also released.

[7] AAN, MAP, sign. 1044, Protocol no. 1 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on May 5th, 1948.

[8] AAN, MAP, sign. 1044.

THE CASE OF AUTOCEPHALY

One of the tasks of the Council was to bring to the canonical ordering the issue of autocephaly. This matter was not difficult to solve, because it was supported by the Polish authorities. The Orthodox hierarchy was also aware of the need to re-obtain it from the Moscow Patriarchate. The last one was interested in changing the situation which had arisen in 1924[9].

The removal of Metropolitan Dionizy opened the way to obtain autocephaly from Moscow[10]. On April 30th, 1948, Archbishop Tymoteusz addressed a letter to Patriarch Aleksy "[…] with a sincere and favorable treatment of the desire of The Hierarchy and flock of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church to establish relations with the Holy Russian Church and for appointment of a special audience for the delegation of our Church"[11]. The fact of sending the letter even before the first official meeting of the Provisional Governing Council (gathered on May 5th) testified about the priority of this issue. In the later part of the letter, Archbishop Tymoteusz asked for the appointment of the audience for a delegation of the Orthodox Church, whose task was to establish direct relations, to present the situation of the Orthodox Church in Poland and to "get the blessing of the Parent Russian Church"[12].

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[9] The Orthodox Church in Poland received autocephaly from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1924. However, it was not recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate. Orthodoxy in its organizational structure has no central authority, which is characteristic of Catholicism. Its organization is based on autocephaly, meaning independence of individual Orthodox Churches. It manifests itself in a separate internal system, the independence of the Church hierarchy in the country from the hierarchy of the Church located in another country, the existence of separate legislation, and in preserving local customs and rites of the church. Autocephalous Church does not break with the dogmatic and canonical relationships with other Orthodox Churches, which together form the Universal Orthodox Church, and it recognizes the primacy of honor of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Zyzykin 1933; Znosko 1973).

[10] It was confirmed in February 1947 by H. Świątkowski, who wrote in a special memorandum that the regulation of relations with the Moscow Patriarchate was not difficult: "It's more a personal matter than essential. There can be no accord with the Moscow patriarchy, and no agreement on autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church until it is headed by Metropolitan Dionysius, whose remaining at its current position is like a challenge for the Moscow Patriarchate", AAN, The Office for Religious Affairs (UdSW), sign. 131/391, The Memorial of H. Świątkowski "The Case of Polish Orthodox Church in Poland" on February 10th, 1947.

[11] AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, The Archbishop Tymoteusz's Letter to Patriarch Aleksy on April 30th, 1948.

[12] Patriarch Aleksy initially set the date of receiving the delegations on June 2–5th, 1948, AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, The Letter from Patriarch Aleksy to Archbishop Tymoteusz on May 12th, 1948.

During the meeting of May 11th, 1948, the delegation to Moscow was gathered. It was assumed that it would be comprised of five people[13]. The controversy aroused about the question of who of the hierarchs should stand on its head. In the opinion of Father E. Naumow it should be Bishop Jerzy (in his opinion, Archbishop Tymoteusz as head of the Church should send a delegation, and not take part in it). M. Sieriebriannikow had the opposite view. He argued that Archbishop Tymoteusz's participation would demonstrate greater prestige and authority of the entire delegation. It was finally decided that the delegation will include Archbishop Tymoteusz, priests: Michał Kiedrow, Wsiewołod Łopuchowicz and Eugeniusz Naumow, and M. Sieriebriannikow. At the next meeting of the Council, Father W. Łopuchowicz was replaced in the delegation by Bishop Jerzy, which was done at the request of Archbishop Tymoteusz[14].

The official visit was held between June 19–27th, 1948. In the course of it, on June 22nd, "The Act of Reunification of Polish Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church and Giving Autocephaly" was signed. In a statement of the church delegation, autocephaly in 1924 was acknowledged as non-canonical and invalid. At the same time, it was stated that the Orthodox Church could not maintain liturgical and prayer communication with Metropolitan Dionizy, being disconnected from the Parent Russian Orthodox Church. They also proclaimed to stop "prayerful communion with all the priests and faithful […] who share Metropolitan Dionizy's error [recognition of his autocephaly of 1924 as canonical – S.D.] until they repent"[15]. In response to this statement, the resumption of canonical and liturgical communication with the Orthodox Church in Poland was done[16]. As pointed out by Ryszard Michalak (2014: 119), by establishing communication with the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Council received an additional (after the decision of MAP) legitimacy of its authority over the Polish Orthodox Church.

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[13] During the discussion, it was wondered whether members of the delegation would be only members of the Council or the people who did not belong to that body. Bishop George (he put forward the candidacy of Father W. Wieżański) and M. Sieriebriannikow opted for the latter solution. It was finally decided that the delegation should consist only of members of that body; AAN, MAP, Protocol no. 2 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on May 11th, 1948.

[14] Protocols nos. 2 and 3 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on May 11th, 1948, and on June 18th, 1948.

[15] The report on the trip of the delegation PAKP and the text "Act of reunification…" is held in the AAN, MAP, sign. 1043.

[16] The case of autocephaly, see: K. Urban (1993); M. Bendza (2006).

On November 27th, 1948, during the meeting of the Provisional Governing Council the message from Patriarch Aleksy of confirmation of the autocephaly of Orthodox Church in Poland by the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church was acknowledged[17].

Receiving autocephaly was important both for the Church and the State. As Antoni Mironowicz (2005: 244) stated, it confirmed "[…] separateness of the inner life of the local Church, its hierarchy independence of foreign centers, and it allowed to maintain local customs and rituals, legislation and judiciary. In turn, for the state authorities autocephaly was an opportunity to self-arrangement of relations with the Orthodox Church, without the interference of external factors". At the same time, the relations with the Moscow Patriarchate were normalized. On the other hand, it is difficult to agree with the statement that since then, the actions of the Orthodox Church in Poland were derived from Polish-Soviet and the state-church relations in Poland and the USSR. Without a doubt, they tried to use PAKP on international fora (the struggle for peace and disarmament in the vision promoted by the USSR propaganda). The reality was far more complicated, as – for example – subsequent removal of Metropolitan Makary from management of the Orthodox Church in Poland (Żerelik 1996: 31)[18]. The issue of autocephaly of 1948 and the state of the mutual relationships was described aptly by Metropolitan Sawa (Hrycuniak), who stated that it was first and foremost a political process, and the Orthodox Church in Poland was deprived of choice. It must be kept in mind that the religious policy of the communist authorities sought to limit activities and take full control of churches and religious associations[19].

THE ISSUE OF METROPOLITAN DIONIZY

After solving the case of autocephaly, Provisional Governing Council began to work on finding a place where Metropolitan Dionizy, who was removed from the management of the Church, would stay. This issue aroused much controversy among the members of the Council, who repeatedly dealt with it. In most cases,

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[17] AAN, MAP, sign. 1045, Protocol no. 7of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on November 27th, 1948.

[18] In 1957, Polish authorities began the process of removing Metropolitan Makary from the management of the Orthodox Church, which was finally completed at the end of 1959.

[19] More about the post-war religious politics, see: R. Michalak (2014).

they concerned the expulsion of the hierarchy outside Warsaw. At the request of Archbishop Tymoteusz (meeting on June 30th, 1948), they decided to ask the authorities to transfer the Metropolitan from the Metropolitan House in Warsaw and assign him a permanent place of residence. It was argued that the old age of the hierarchy required appropriate living conditions, which he was currently deprived of. They suggested his release from the house arrest and allowing him to stay at a designated place[20].

The case of moving the Metropolitan also returned at the meeting held on November 12th, 1948. Father Eugeniusz Naumow pointed out on the need for displacement of the hierarchy out of Warsaw. At the next meeting (on November 27th, 1948), Fathers W. Łopuchowicz and E. Naumow were mandated to find an appropriate place for the permanent residence of the Metropolitan[21]. At the same time, Ministry of Public Administration suggested placing the hierarchy in Otwock, as it was a health resort where it was possible to rent or purchase the villa[22]. However, the Church authorities were opposed to such a solution. They were afraid that placing the hierarchy in the town near Warsaw could be not desirable "for the good of the Church". During the discussion there was also a proposal to place the Metropolitan in Orneta or Płock[23].

It is worth noting that the view of the members of the Provisional Governing Council regarding leaving the Metropolitan of Warsaw was not uniform. Definitely, the government and part of the clergy with the Father Eugeniusz Naumow at the helm were in favor of such a solution. Bishop Michał expressed a different

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[20] AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, Protocol no. 4 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on June 30th, 1948. The Letter of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP to the Ministry of Public Administration on July 1st, 1948.

[21] AAN, MAP, sign. 1044, Priest E. Naumow's Report Presented at the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on November 12th, 1948. Protocol no. 7 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on November 27th, 1948.

[22] AAN, MAP, sign. 1044, The Memorandum from the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on November 27th, 1948. It is worth noting that in Otwock, the Metropolitan had his own villa purchased in the 1920s (it was the summer residence of the hierarchy). In 1946 it was sold to the Missionary Benedictine Sisters.

[23] The proposal of Orneta was submitted by Father E. Naumow, who emphasized that the parish owned a house with a home chapel. Moreover, "the beautiful city has a good connection with Olsztyn and good climatic conditions". Fathers Łopuchowicz and Naumow were obliged to investigate on-site conditions in Orneta and Płock, and to submit a detailed report; AAN, MAP, sign. 1044, The Memorandum from the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on November 27th, 1948.

view on this issue. He suggested leaving Metropolitan Dionizy in Warsaw (in the Metropolitan House), with separate rooms and a personal chapel[24].

At the meeting on December 16th, 1948, the case of the Metropolitan residence was raised again. Previously authorized priests (Fathers W. Łopuchowicz and E. Naumow) did not supervise the indicated earlier towns Orneta and Płock within the prescribed period (December15th). The Council re-appointed them to undertake this mission and further instructed to check housing conditions in Poznań and Kalisz. Eventually, it was decided that a permanent place of residence of Metropolitan Dionizy could not be located in Warsaw, as well as near the capital[25].

On January 25th, 1949, Father W. Łopuchowicz submitted a report on staying in Płock. It was decided that in the building of the Orthodox parish in Płock there are suitable apartments for a possible residence of Metropolitan Dionizy and for his ministry (the hierarch was to have an entire floor of the parish house at his disposal). At the same time, the Council authorized Archbishop Tymoteusz to ask the state authorities to prepare the entire operation (the displacement of private tenants and allocation of the required amount of state funds to carry out the necessary repair)[26]. For unknown reasons, the Metropolitan, however, was not transferred to Płock.

In connection with the dragging out of the issue of the expulsion of the Metropolitan, there were voices of speeding up the whole process. Among other things, at the meeting of the Council on March 16th, 1949, M. Sieriebriannikow indicated that in the last period, a "drastic situation" in connection with the person of Metropolitan Dionizy had been created in the Orthodox Church in Warsaw. He stressed that among the "Orthodox populations, especially among women, rumors are disseminated about some persecution and harassment, applicable to him, which the other bishops and members of the Council are

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[24] Father Naumow even claimed that leaving the hierarchy for permanent residence in the capital and permitting the celebration of worship in the Orthodox metropolitan home chapel will be perceived by the faithful as a situation compromising the Council. AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, E. Naumow's Report to the Director of Religious Beliefs at the Ministry of Public Administration on November 30th, 1948.

[25] AAN, MAP, sign. 1045, Protocol no. 8 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on December 16th, 1948.

[26] AAN, MAP, sign. 1044, Protocol no. 10 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on January 25th, 1949.

allegedly involved […]. This creates him a martyr, his followers gather at services celebrated by him at the home church. Therefore, among the faithful undesirable ferment is produced, which, if not interrupted instantly, may lead to unpleasant consequences"[27]. Given the above, the Council obliged Archbishop Tymoteusz to take as soon as possible appropriate steps towards the transfer of Metropolitan Dionizy from Warsaw.

It is worth noting that the removal of Metropolitan Dionizy from Warsaw was also important due to the forthcoming election of the new superior of the Church. In August 1949, the Council expressed concern that his presence in Warsaw and occupying the metropolitan rooms can become an obstacle to the normal conduct of elections[28]. In the absence of a decision of the church authorities, the issue of the Metropolitan was taken by the Office for Religious Affairs (UdSW), formed in April 1950. The metropolitan received a letter ordering him to settle in Łagów Lubuski in April 1950[29]. However, the visitation of the future place of settlement made by Father Atanazy Semeniuk and the document prepared by him, entitled "report on the unsuitability of allocated buildings for the residence of the Metropolitan", postponed for nearly a year the deportation (Urban 2007: 19). The Metropolitan himself, realizing that he would have to leave Warsaw, suggested placing him in Krakow. Finally, the state authorities indicated Sosnowiec, justifying the choice with "the climate", which supposedly was good to the hierarch[30]. In order to prepare suitable premises, Fathers W. Łopuchowicz and A. Semeniuk were sent to Sosnowiec at the end of April 1950. The Metropolitan has received an order to leave Warsaw in May 1951. He was settled in the building on 90 Żymierskiego Street[31].

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[27] AAN, MAP, Protocol no. 21of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on March 16th, 1949.

[28] AAN, MAP, Protocol no. 16 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on August 23rd, 1949.

[29] AAN, MAP, UdSW, sign. 9/27, W. Wolski's Letter to Metropolitan Dionizy on April 19th, 1950.

[30] In fact, in a short distance from the Metropolitan's house in Sosnowiec there was steelworks Szopienice; more broadly about the last years of Metropolitan Dionizy's life, see: S. Dudra (2010).

[31] The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), Katowice Branch Office (Ka), sign. 02/48, The Memo on May 12th, 1955. Urban reports that the deportation was probably at the end of April or in early May 1951, see: K. Urban (2007: 20).

THE ELECTION OF A NEW METROPOLITAN

In parallel with the case of finding a place where Metropolitan Dionizy, removed from the management of the Church, was to stay, the Provisional Governing Council together with the state authorities intensified their preparations for the election of a new Metropolitan. The latter wanted the new Archbishop to pursue a policy consistent with the Polish raison d'état. This matter was also consulted with the Soviet religious authorities. In June 1948, the counselor of the Polish Embassy in Moscow Janusz Zambrowicz discussed this issue repeatedly with the head of the IV European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs W. Aleksandrow. During one of the meetings, Zambrowicz asked directly about the indication of the relevant hierarchy[32].

At the beginning of 1949, the Religious Department of MAP described the "personal skills" of the future candidate for the position of the Metropolitan. It was decided that he should have the ability to reorganize the life of the Orthodox Church, authority among the clergy and followers, appropriate training and experience as a bishop, and knowledge of the Polish language and Polish citizenship. At the same time, they stressed that none of the members of the Council of Bishops PAKP has not fully corresponded to the above-mentioned requirements. Generally, the authorities did not have political reservations against any of the hierarchs, because in their opinion they were loyal-connected to the new sociopolitical reality.

In the absence of a suitable candidate, the matter of filling the Metropolitan vacancy was protracted. The state authorities suggested that just as after 1918, when Bishop Jerzy (Jaroszewski) was brought from Italy, similar steps should be taken to resolve the current personal crisis. They pointed to the Soviet Union, where several hierarchs, former Polish citizens, were present[33]. Finally, the concept was supported by the Ministry of Safety and the Office for Religious Affairs. In the opinion of the latter, the clergy from the Soviet Union gave, on the one hand, the guarantee of absolute loyalty, and on the other hand, close cooperation with the Moscow Patriarchate directing worldwide Orthodox Church policy in a large part of the local Orthodox Churches. In this case, they counted on the support of "precious" – from the point of view of Moscow's policy – initia-

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[32] AAN, MAP, sign. 1043, Memorandums from the Talks between J. Zambrowicz and the Head of the IV European Department MID W. Aleksandrow from 17th to 29th June 1948.

[33] AAN, MAP, UdSW, sign. 9/6, Memorandum from 1949.

tives (including peace matters). It was hoped that the voice of the Orthodox Churches would reach the influential, opinion-forming Christian communities in the world. Basically, in international forum, PAKP, as well as other Orthodox Churches of the socialist countries, were to support the position and demands of the Moscow Patriarchate[34]. The latter was also interested in controlling the situation in the local episcopates. An important factor was also the reevaluation in the Polish state policy, the Stalinist system being shaped especially after 1948/1949, as well as a strong position and influence of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the adopted political arrangements, members of the Council of Bishops PAKP at its meeting on April 19th, 1951, requested of the Moscow Patriarchate that they give a clergy person an ecclesiastical canon law permit to move into the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church in Poland. The adoption of the above resolution was preceded by numerous consultations with the Office for Religious Affairs, which all the details had been agreed with (including the composition, timing, and funding of church delegations traveling)[35].

The case of the head of Orthodox Church in Poland was positively concluded during the visit of representatives of the Moscow Orthodox Church (June 13–20th). On June 15th, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church passed Archbishop of Lviv and Ternopil Makary (Oksijuk) on PAKP jurisdiction[36]. His choice was primarily due to finish the case of filling the Metropolitan throne and give a guarantee of loyalty to the Polish and Soviet authorities. They also counted on the involvement of the hierarch in missionary action among the Greek Catholics (he was very active in the action of liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church through the inclusion of its parishes into the Russian Orthodox Church).

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[34] The use of PAKP on the international forum was escalated only in the 60s. The plan was even to appoint the office of suffragan bishop at the Metropolitan office, coordinating foreign operations, and to develop a program of activity on the international forum; AIPN BU 01283/1653, Information Referring to the Current Situation in the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church on December 28th, 1963.

[35] AAN, UdSW, sign. 9/6, The Memorandum on the Meeting with Archbishop Tymoteusz on April 7th, 1951.

[36] Archbishop Makary (1884–1961) was born in Łukowisko (a village near Międzyrzecz Podlaski), graduated from Theological Seminary in Chełm and Theological Academy in Kiev, where he earned a doctorate in theology (1914). He taught, among others, at the University of Kiev. In 1942, he was ordained a priest and made vows, serving at the same time a pastoral ministry in Kiev parishes. In 1945, he received bishop's chirotonia and was appointed to the diocese of Lviv–Ternopil, see: D. Sawicki (2011: 10–11).

Formalities of filling of the Metropolitan Cathedral were completed in early July 1951, after the arrival of Archbishop Makary to Warsaw. On July 6th, the Council of Bishops passed a resolution to accept Archbishop Makary to PAKP jurisdiction. A day later, he was elected as "the Metropolitan of Warsaw and the whole Poland". Thus, the next task given to the Provisional Governing Council by religious authorities was positively resolved.

SUMMARY

The Provisional Governing Council, in addition to the above themes, undertook a number of other issues important for the functioning of the Church (including the matter of Orthodox churches retained by the Roman Catholic Church). They also dealt with the budget, which a special committee (comprised of the Bishop Michał, Father W. Łopuchowicz, and M. Sieriebriannikow) was appointed to prepare. The agenda included also dealing with the property of Orthodox Church left in abandon ed parishes as a result of resettlement as part of the "Wisła" action (it concerned provinces of Kraków, Lublin, and Rzeszów). In this case, it was, among others, the decisions to ban the sale of sacred objects (only the possibility of their lease was allowed)[37].

Despite functioning of the Provisional Governing Council, Warsaw Orthodox Clergy Consistory continues to operate; it was not liquidated until December 1951. In December 1948, the Council of Bishops resumed its activities. It was led by Archbishop Tymoteusz, who had been the deputy Metropolitan already since November 12th. In addition, the Metropolitan law office started to work on April 1st, 1949[38]. Essentially, these institutions were duplicated partially within the scope of the administrative and ecclesiastical activities, which created, in many cases, the state of chaos and disorganization (e.g. in terms of filling the pastoral centers in western and northern Poland).

In four years, the main tasks given to the Provisional Governing Council by the state authorities had been resolved. The Orthodox Church received autocephaly, Metropolitan Dionizy was moved outside Warsaw, and a new superior

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[37] See: The Protocols from the Meetings of the Provisional Governing Council, AAN, MAP, sign. 1044 and 1045.

[38] AAN, MAP, sign. 1045, Protocol no. 21 of the Meeting of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP on March 16th, 1949.

was elected. Basically, the Council implemented only the tasks assigned by the state authorities. Despite the attempts, they failed to reactivate the Orthodox Theology Studies at Warsaw University. They did not succeed in the attempt to create the jobs for Orthodox chaplains, who could meet the religious needs of Orthodox soldiers serving in the Polish Army and the inclusion of pastoral care of prisoners in prisons. The Council also failed to carry out the reorganization of diocesan structures in accordance with the requirements of autocephaly (the existence of at least 4 eparchies). Raised in November 1948, the concept of creating 3 of the dioceses (Warsaw–Bielsko, Łódź and Wrocław, and Białystok–Gdańsk), as well as the Bishop Michał's (Kiedrow) concept (dated January 1951) relating to the division into four dioceses (Warsaw, Białystok, Łódź, and Gdańsk), did not obtain the support of the state authorities. Finally, on September 7th, 1951, the Council of Bishops, now under the guidance of Metropolitan Makary, made a new diocese division, including four dioceses: Warsaw–Bielsko, Białystok–Gdańsk, Łódź–Poznań, and Wrocław–Szczecin[39].

It is worth mentioning that due to personal crisis after the death of Metropolitan Tymoteusz (1962), the concept of "re-appointment to the life of the Provisional Governing Council PAKP" appeared among the clergy. The supporter of such a solution was Father E. Naumow. In a letter sent to the Office for Religious Affairs he stated that it was "the best form of government […] it was fair and democratic body in relation to the clergy and faithful, loyal to its People's Government"[40]. In the changed political circumstances the state authorities, however, did not decide to repeat such a solution.

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[39] Previously, the state authorities had rejected the Metropolitan Makary's concept of territorial division of the Metropolitan on dioceses: Warsaw–Bielsko, Białystok–Sokółka, Łódź and Wrocław, and Gdańsk–Szczecin; AWMP, Metropolitan Makary's Letter to the Office for Religious Affairs on August 16th, 1951, and September 7th, 1951.

[40] AAN, UdSW, sign. 68/2, Priest E. Naumow's Letter to the Office for Religious Affairs on February 20th, 1964.

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POLISH EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES IN THE LIGHT OF EP ELECTIONS.
ANALYSIS OF THE EUROSCEPTIC "OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE"

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The objective of this article is to explain the differing levels of support achieved by Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections in Poland for the years 2004, 2009, and 2014. Taking into account the specificity of EP elections, which in theory assign greater importance to European issues, the analysis is conducted using the "Eurosceptic opportunity structure", which is composed of: political space, social attitudes towards integration, and the external factor (the dynamics of the European integration process). Additionally, there is analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties standing for election. The analysis demonstrates that the supply and demand sides created a similar opportunity structure for Eurosceptic parties in all three elections, while the external factor provided those parties with greater possibilities in 2004 and 2014. Analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties, however, indicated that they had greater chances to attract voters by invoking the European question in 2004 and 2014. The combination of these conclusions along with the support received by Eurosceptics in particular elections confirms the validity and the explanatory function of the adopted assumptions, while emphasizing the fundamental role played by the parties themselves in the examined aspect. Nonetheless, to confirm the primary

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assumption and state with more certainty the impact of the European issue on electoral behaviours, more in-depth analysis is necessary.

—— **KEYWORDS** ——

INTRODUCTION

European elections are increasingly attracting the attention of scholars from a range of disciplines. One sure reason is the fact that support is systematically growing for Eurosceptic groups, who have turned the European Parliament elections into a forum for voicing their objections to the process of European integration, among other issues.

According to the academic literature, the successes of the Eurosceptic parties are very often explained with the theory of the "second order" character of European elections (Reif, Schmitt 1980, Reif 1984, Marsh 1998). Such elections, which are not decisive for the exercise of political power at the national level, may be viewed by the electorate as an opportunity to express discontent with the current government, or with (mainstream) parties more generally, and thus encourage voters to look beyond the traditionally dominant parties. As such, these contests are frequently marked by the emergence or success of smaller protest parties, often with distinctive agendas. What is more, the higher profile given to European issues by EP elections further tends to make these elections particularly attractive arenas for expressing discontent with European politics, generating votes for political movements focused on European integration, particularly Eurosceptic parties (Harmsen, Spiering 2004: 23).

The objective of the research is thus to explain the performance of Eurosceptic parties in the EP elections in Poland. This is an interesting case to study, as over the previous three elections support for Eurosceptic parties has fluctuated significantly. In 2004, Eurosceptics recorded their highest level of support at 28.54%; in 2009, that support fell to 4.19%, while in the most recent elections in 2014, Eurosceptic groups were the beneficiaries of 15.69% of votes[1].

Considering the specificity of elections to the EP, which in theory give higher profile to European issues, in our analysis we assigned the most importance to European issues analysed through the lenses of the "Eurosceptic opportunity structure" and the activity of Eurosceptic parties in this respect. We assume that this approach can be helpful in explaining the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties. We are also aware that this is not the only explanation. European Parliament elections are difficult to separate from their social and political context in the country, as well as the specificities of particular parties and their electorate. Nevertheless, the perspective adopted in this article will primarily highlight the European question.

The research is based on a qualitative analysis of the electoral manifestoes and materials presented by parties: flyers, electoral spots, and statements by leaders during election campaigns[2]. When source materials were not available, we reviewed secondary sources in the form of reports and analyses. To define the demand side, we have used public opinion polls conducted mainly by CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre).

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The concept "Eurosceptic opportunity structure" is based on the theoretical structure of supply and demand analysis applied most frequently in explaining the success of populist and radical right parties (see Mudde 2007). For this reason, when examining the supply side we draw attention to the nature of the rivalry focused on European issues within the party system, analysing if a "political opportunity structure" on the issue of Europe exists. Kitschelt argues that in order for such an opportunity structure to develop, the mainstream parties need to cluster around the centre, leading to the creation of an opening in the political spectrum. Convergence of mainstream parties around a socially important issue may lead to the appearance of niches in the political space, meaning a gap can open up between the distribution of electoral preferences and the positions adopted by political parties (Kitschelt, McGann 1995). In this situation, the "specific arena dimension theory" (Hainsworth, O'Brien, Mitchell 2004: 53) tells us that a party offering a different and clear agenda in a given issue can benefit

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[2] A significant portion of the analyzed materials comes from the Workshop for Documentation and Studies on Political Life at the University of Wrocław, Institute of Political Science (PDiBŻP).

from the absence of differences between the agendas of the other parties, and also when the other parties present ambivalent, poorly-defined agendas. This theory is also reflected in the "issue voting theory" by A. Campbell (1960) in the aspect of the issue position of a party (Falter, Schoen 2005: 228–229).

On the demand side, the analysis will cover the social perception of the European integration process. Of importance is whether there is a differentiation among the attitudes of public opinion towards integration, and whether society demonstrates Eurosceptic tendencies. However, it should be emphasized that research on the demand side indicating the potential electorate of such parties does not provide an answer to the question of why certain voters cast their votes, nor how many potential voters will vote for them. The answer to this question would require statistical analysis of the electorates of particular parties, which exceeds the remit of this article.

These factors should be mentioned alongside the contextual aspects. In respect of the European elections, we place particular emphasis on external determinants, which may be associated with the dynamics of the European integration process. These factors can influence shifts in the positions of parties towards European integration. They can also impact social perception of the integration process. They create conditions for parties which are capable of exploiting the changing conditions for rapidly mobilizing electoral support by taking advantage of the European issue (Milner 2000; Benedetto, Moxon-Browne, Quaglia 2004; Moroska 2010).

Thus, our central argument is that a combination of the political space available, the electoral potential and the contextual environment can create more or less favourable Eurosceptic opportunity structure in Poland. At the same time, we concur with Mudde that "irrespective of how favourable the breeding ground and the political opportunity structure might be to political parties, they merely present political actors with a series of possibilities. In the end, it is still up to the parties to profit from them" (2007: 256). For this reason, it is also necessary to engage in an in-depth analysis of the attitudes assumed by Eurosceptic parties: what was their exact position on integration (according to their programs and electoral rhetoric), was it coherent and cohesive, was it distinct from that of mainstream parties. Among others, these are the factors which, according to the theory of issue voting, can contribute to casting a vote for a given party (Falter, Schoen 2005: 228–229).

The research is based on the concept of Euroscepticism proposed by Professors Taggart and Szczerbiak, which defines hard and soft Euroscepticism.

However, the concept has been modified and broadened, ultimately constructing a four-item classification of positions on European integration.

Supporters of European integration		Opponents of European integration	
Euroenthusiasm		Euroscepticism	
hard	soft	soft	hard

Fig. 1. Positions on European integration

Source: Moroska 2010: 69.

Crucial for this concept is the division between Euroenthusiasm and Euroscepticism, which is based on the idea of the status quo. Eurosceptics accept at most the current state of European integration (status quo). Euroenthusiasts agree to the further, planned development of the integration process. Both attitudes can present different levels of intensity in more moderate (soft) and radical (hard) positions. Hard Euroscepticism is a principled opposition to the integration project based on the transfer of state competences/power to supranational institutions. It can demand an exit from the European Union and/or build an alternative project which is much more narrow in comparison to the present EU, or reduction of the competencies of the EU to the situation as it stood before the present treaties, such as under the regime of the Maastricht treaty. Soft Eurosceptics express a definite opposition to the further development of the integration process, enlargement of the EU's institutional competencies, and construction of a federal Europe. In the case of the candidate countries, they do not oppose membership but they are also not enthusiastic about it; the attitude is unclear and uncertain. Euroenthusiast positions could be described by analogy. Soft Euroenthusiasts are in favour of further integration but at a moderate tempo and to a limited extent. They can question some elements of the integration process and competencies of the EU, but they are not critical of further development of the whole process. In the case of candidate countries, membership could be conditional. Hard Euroenthusiasts fully accept the prospect of further European integration (transfer of state competencies to the supranational level). This can manifest itself in the postulate of strengthening the EU institutions and the support for the federal Europe (Moroska 2010: 68–72). It should be kept in mind that in practice, the borders between particular ideal types are significantly less clear. In many cases, the elements of particular types blend together in the programmes of political parties.

POLISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
(DEMAND SIDE ANALYSIS)

Public opinion polls show that support in Poland for the country's accession to the European Union in the period from the inception of democratic transformation up to the day preceding the accession referendum in 2003 oscillated between 55% and 77%; those opposed amounted to 6% in 1994 and over 30% in 2003 (CBOS: BS/119/100/95, BS/137/2000, BS/182/2003). The highest level of support for integration was achieved by the accession referendum held on June 7–8th, 2003, which recorded 77.45% of votes in favour and 22.55% opposed[3].

A visible but temporary drop in support for the idea of European integration immediately following the accession referendum in the period between November 2003 and April 2004 should be noted. During this time, supporters of integration constituted 60%–64% of those surveyed, while opponents were 29%–30%. This reduction in support immediately following Poland's entrance into the EU was the result, among others, of significant social uncertainty regarding the "new reality" posed by a united Europe.

Just before the first elections to the EP, in May 2004 support for integration rose slightly (to 71%), while the percentage of those opposed fell to 20%. In the following years, support for the idea of integration grew continually, achieving a level of 89% in the run-up to elections in 2014. The proportion of opponents of integration fell to 7% in 2014 (Cichocki 2011). Since 2004, only once there has been a significant collapse in support among Poles for integration. It occurred at the turn of 2012 and 2013, and in December 2013 reached a record low of 72% (opposed – 21%). Such low support was explained as being mainly determined by the crisis in the Euro zone and the resultant economic slowdown in Poland (CBOS: BS/196/2004, BS/64/2009, BS/56/2014).

Despite the high level of support for Polish membership in the EU, particularly in the years 2005–2014 Poles were not equally supportive of all attempts to further "deepen" European integration.

In 2004, this was shown in attitudes towards the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe, and in 2009 towards the Lisbon Treaty. In both cases, the number of opponents reached nearly 20%. Additionally, in 2009, 21% of Poles felt that the integration process had gone too far, while in 2014 the percentage of people polled expressing this opinion rose to 29%. Moreover, in the period 2004–2014,

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[3] Turnout for the referendum was 58.85%.

there was a significant increase in reluctance towards the European Monetary Union and the common currency. In 2004 and 2009, around 38% of Poles were against adoption of the Euro, while in 2014 this number grew to 72% (TNS Pentor; CBOS 151/2014).

While Poles do perceive many benefits flowing from Poland's membership in the EU (the most salient are the opening of borders, the possibility of finding work outside the country, the influx of European funds including co-financing of road infrastructure investments), an opening was available to Eurosceptic parties in the form of pointing out the negative influences that survey respondents felt were generated by integration with the European Union. Opinion polls indicated such factors as limitations on Poland's sovereignty, the subordination of the country to decisions taken by the EU authorities and the lack of equality among Member States as, in the opinion of respondents, the most important decisions are taken by the largest and richest states (CBOS 54/2014).

In summary, it should be stated that while a significant majority of Poles demonstrate a pro-EU attitude, the opposition of a portion of society to significant aspects of integration, as well as the specific nature of EP elections ("second order elections") which provide voters with the chance to follow their "hearts" rather than "heads" (voters have no need to vote strategically in fear of their vote being rendered meaningless as there is 'less at stake' than in more important "first order elections") (Reif, Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984), create electoral opportunities for Eurosceptic parties.

PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN EP ELECTIONS (POLITICAL SPACE ANALYSIS)

Before proceeding to supply side analysis, it is necessary to give an overview of the electoral committees which took part in the election and the support they received, indicating their position towards European integration (see Tab. 1). Generally speaking, the Polish political space, in contrast to many western European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, is characterized by a lesser degree of convergence of mainstream political parties around European issues. Since 2001 (the moment when the groups currently dominant on the Polish political scene came to the fore), the party system has hosted a full spectrum of attitudes, from Euroenthusiastic to parties at the edge of Euroenthusiasm and Euroscepticism, to hard Eurosceptics. Similarly to the attitudes of society at large

towards integration, the majority of Polish political parties were characterized by an unequivocal Euroenthusiastic position on European integration. Their support was relatively stable, oscillating between 52% and 69% during particular elections (see Tab. 1). On the other extreme, support for devoutly Eurosceptic groups was characterized by significant fluctuations, polling between 4.19% and 29% in particular EP elections. A unique aspect of the Polish political scene is the relatively high support (19% in 2004 and 32% in 2014) for groups which can be regarded as straddling the border between soft Euroenthusiasm and soft Euroscepticism. The strong groups of this type, support for which demonstrates a growth trend, are doubtlessly important from the perspective of the electoral strategy adopted by the two groups of parties described above.

It should be emphasized that the division into Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics is not clearly linked with the left–right ideological divide. Nevertheless, among Eurosceptic groups the dominant formations are right-wing, frequently displaying populist and extremist tendencies. The Euroenthusiastic scene is dominated by centrist and left-wing groups.

Tab. 1. Political committees and their support in EP elections[4]

Election year and aggregate support	'Eurosceptic' Committees	'Border' Committees	'Euroenthusiast' Committees
2004	• League of Polish Families (LPR) – 15,92% • Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) – 10,78% • The Union of Real Politics (UPR) – 1,87% • All-Poland Citizen Committee (OKO) – 0,58%	• Law and Justice (PiS) – 12,67% • Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) – 6,34%	• Civic Platform (PO) – 24,1% • Democratic Left Alliance – Labor Union (SLD-UP) – 9,35% • Freedom Union (UW) – 7,33% • Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDPL) – 9,35% • National Electoral Committee (NKWW) – 1,56% • National Party of Retirees and Pensioners – People's Democratic Party (KPEiR-PLD) – 1,56% • Initiative for Poland (IdP) – 1,45% • Polish Labour Party (PPP) – 0,54%
	28,54%	19,01%	52,45

⁴ Only nationwide committees.

Election year and aggregate support	'Eurosceptic' Committees	'Border' Committees	'Euroenthusiast' Committees
2009	Republican Right (PR) – 1,95% Libertas (LP) – 1,14% The Union of Real Politics (UPR) – 1,1%	Law and Justice (PiS) – 27,4%	Civic Platform (PO) – 44,43% Democratic Left Alliance – Labor Union (SLD-UP) – 12,34% Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) – 7,01% Agreement for the Future (PdP) – 2,44% Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) – 1,46% Polish Labour Party (PPP) – 0,7%
	4,19%	27,04%	68,77%
2014	Solidary Poland (SP) – 3,98% Poland Together (PR) – 3,3% The Congress of the New Right (KnP) – 7,15% National Movement (RN) – 1,4%	Law and Justice (PiS) – 31,78%	Civic Platform (PO) – 32,13% Democratic Left Alliance – Labor Union (SLD-UP) – 9,44% Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) – 6,8% Europa Plus – Your Movement (EP-TR) – 3,58%
	15,69%	31,78%	52,53%

Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (National Electoral Commission).

Euroenthusiast and "border parties" position

An essentially unchanged hard Euroenthusiastic position is maintained by post-communist left-wing groups (Democratic Left Alliance – SLD, frequently forming election lists together with Labor Union – UP), as well as its splinter group (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland – SDPL), the post-Solidarity liberal Freedom Union (UW), and the liberal Your Movement (TR)[5]. They have supported both Poland's rapid entry into the EU and then a deeper process of integration, going as far as a federal Europe model (Zuba 2009; *Eurowybory 2009* 2010) (see Fig. 2, 3, 4).

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[5] Previously known as the Movement of Support (2010) and Palikot's Movement (2011–2013).

The liberal-right Civic Platform (PO), one of the dominant parties on the Polish political scene, falls during the analysed period (2004–2014) between hard and soft Euroenthusiasm, slightly adjusting its attitude based on its position on the government–opposition axis, as well as the adopted election strategy (see Fig. 2, 3, 4). The party presented an essentially positive attitude towards further integration, expansion of the EU's authority and strengthening of community institutions at a moderate pace; nevertheless, in 2004, it conditioned acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty on retention of Poland's voting power established under the Nice Treaty. After the elections of 2005, the party quickly withdrew from the "Nice or death"[6] stance, shifting towards hard Euroenthusiasm (Zuba 2009). Since that time, it has consistently emphasized that Poland's place is inside European structures, while simultaneously proposing measures to strengthen them by presenting moderately pro-federal attitudes. The party has unequivocally supported the introduction of the Euro in Poland, but has yet to specify when this would take place (*Eurowybory 2009* 2010; Spots 2009 & 2014).

The conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, which is the second-largest party on the Polish political scene, as well as the smaller Polish People's Party (PSL) (particularly in elections of 2004), have presented largely ambivalent attitudes towards European integration, which straddle the border between soft Euroenthusiasm and soft Euroscepticism. The parties have supported a loose international model based on the concept of a "Europe of Nations". Both membership in the EU and further integration, including adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, were conditioned on their being in the Polish national interest (Moroska 2010). The dualistic attitude of Law and Justice towards European integration was the result of a division in that respect among the party's members and its electorate. By adopting the 'border' position, the party tried to maintain internal cohesion as well as to capture both the sceptical and the mildly Euroenthusiastic electorate. By the same token its position became the largest challenge for Eurosceptic parties. In the period being discussed (2004–2014), the position of Law and Justice on the European issue was moving slightly to one of the mentioned directions, depending on their current strategy and position (in opposition or in government). Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify radical differences in the party's attitude in the period leading up to European elections. The only noticeable change occurred between the 2004 and 2009 elections when Law and Justice shifted slightly towards soft Euroenthusiasm, yet it

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[6] The Civic Platform slogan to retain Nice Voting System in the European Constitution.

did not abandon its radical criticism of integration and the EU itself, aiming at attracting the Eurosceptic electorate. In 2014, while PiS did express its opposition to the federalization of Europe, the party did not exclude deeper integration, including Poland's accession to the Eurozone, but on condition that such was clearly beneficial to the Polish national interest (*Eurowybory 2009* 2010; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2014).

After 2005, PSL slightly changed its attitude towards European integration, adopting a moderate pro-European stance; surprisingly, Self Defense (SRP) did the same, abandoning its criticism of European integration and the EU, taking similar positions to PSL (see Fig. 2, 3, 4) (Zuba 2009).

Smaller Euroenthusiastic parties appeared during particular elections, such as NKWW and KPEiR-PLD in 2004, and PdP in 2009, as well as the previously mentioned TR in 2014. They were not, however, a permanent feature of the political scene. An exception is the Polish Labour Party (PPP), participants in two elections (2004 and 2009), adopting a soft Euroenthusiastic position in both (*Eurowybory 2009* 2010).

The preceding analysis indicates that the distance between mainstream parties on the issue of European integration converged in 2009. In addition, the positions of these parties should be considered more Euroenthusiastic than in the 2004 elections. This situation was sustained in the 2014 elections. In accordance with theory, this creates more favourable conditions for Eurosceptic parties. Nonetheless, the position of Law and Justice underwent only a minor shift, which, in the context of the political space, did not significantly change the situation of Eurosceptic parties in the three analysed elections. The Eurosceptic parties thus had access to an open space for hard Eurosceptic positions, yet they were forced to compete with Law and Justice for the more moderate Eurosceptic electorate.

Analysis of the demand and supply side (opening in the political spectrum) demonstrates that the "Eurosceptic opportunity structure" was similar in all three elections, while in 2014 it seems slightly more favourable considering the larger percentage of Eurosceptic attitudes among the society. In this situation, and in accordance with Mudde, who argues that it is still up to the parties to profit from the political opportunity structure, it is necessary to analyse the Eurosceptic part of the political scene.

Eurosceptic parties' positions

As in the case of the mainstream parties, the positions of Eurosceptic parties are diverse in terms of the strength of their attitudes, arguments invoked, and clarity of electoral offer. They also took place in quite diverse circumstances, taking into consideration mainly European context.

Elections to the European Parliament in 2004 were primarily symbolic, as they were the first held in Poland following its accession to the European Union. In addition, the week following the elections was to feature the signing of a new treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Nevertheless, the campaign was dominated by national issues rather than European ones. The discussion concerning the Constitutional Treaty, as well as that of the conditions imposed on Poland to join the EU and the apprehensions associated with them, were reflected in the campaign to a very limited degree. The discussion primarily concerned the political and economic crises Poland was experiencing at that moment (Szczerbiak 2004; Spots 2004). The only party that tried to take full advantage of the European issue was the League of Polish Families (LPR). The party adopted a clear and hard Eurosceptic position, which not only opposed further integration and the Constitutional Treaty, but also demanded an in/out referendum for Poland's EU membership, as well as restriction of the integration process to purely economic cooperation in the form of the European Economic Community (see Fig. 2). This party was distinguished from other Eurosceptic groups by its radically nationalist and Catholic anti-EU rhetoric, which portrayed the EU as threat to the Polish sovereignty and Christian values (*Eurowybory 2004* 2005; Moroska, Zuba 2010). The second largest Eurosceptic party, Self Defence (SRP), emphasized that it was in favour of Poland's integration with the European Union, but under the principles of a Europe of Nations, equal rights and legal, political and economic equality. This meant that Self Defence was opposed to the federalizing trend in Europe, limitations on national sovereignty and the condi-tions of Poland's accession to the EU. In respect of that last aspect, it focused primarily on issues associated with the economy and demanded renegotiation of the accession treaty, particularly its agriculture and industry terms (*Eurowybory 2004* 2005; Stanowisko Samoobrony 2005; Spots 2004). In general, SRP presented a rather ambivalent attitude towards European integration, somewhere between hard and soft Euroscepticism. A characteristic shared by both analysed parties was populism, which manifested itself in such aspects as close coupling of anti-EU rhetoric with criticism and aversion towards Polish political elites who, in

those parties' view, worked to serve foreign interests, leading to the collapse of the state. They made themselves out to be the sole defenders of the true national interest (*Eurowybory 2004 2005*; Moroska 2010: 245–251). The All-Poland Citizen Committee (OKO), formed just before the elections, expressed its protest in similar terms. However, its position towards the EU was unclear. In its programme and election flyers the committee made only brief mention of the need to renegotiate the terms of association with the EU, simultaneously expressing support for the development of European states within the EU on the basis of equality and maintenance of sovereignty, with respect for cultures and religions (*Eurowybory 2004* 2005; Spots 2004). The Union of Real Politics (UPR), however, presented a clear "soft" stance towards European integration (see Fig. 2). It came out in support of membership while remaining opposed to the current direction of integration heading towards a supranational and federal structure. It proposed retention of the universal consensus voting standard, limiting the power of the EU authorities and reducing the EU bureaucracy (*Eurowybory 2004* 2005; Spots 2004). In comparison to SRP, and particularly LPR, UPR criticised integration and the EU in far less radical terms, placing itself closer to the position of Law and Justice (see Fig. 2).

The situation in Poland and Europe changed dramatically in 2009. After the stormy coalition government of PiS-SRP-LPR that led to the ultimate disappear-


Fig. 2. Polish political parties' attitudes toward the EU, 2004 election

Source: Authors' illustration.

ance of the two smaller coalition partners from the domestic political scene, Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party assumed power, leading to stabilization of the country's political situation. At the same time, Poland was perceived as a "green island" floating among a sea of European states drowning in economic crisis. Both these factors doubtlessly strengthened the country's position in the European Union. After the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, the EU managed to prepare an abridged version of the pact to reform the European Union in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. Elections to the European Parliament were held after the Lisbon Treaty, following the difficult process of ratification in 2008, had received the blessing of the largest political parties (ratified by the Polish Parliament in April 2008) and only awaited the President's signature (Szczerbiak 2009; Zuba 2010). Thus, during the election campaign, it did not give rise to any particularly strong emotions. As was the case in 2004, the 2009 campaign was dominated by domestic issues, the main theme of which was the country's economic condition (among others the impact of the crisis on Poland's economy was discussed). The discourse was monopolized by two blocks – the governing Civic Platform and opposition Law and Justice, which clearly sought to marginalize smaller parties (Spots 2009; *Eurowybory 2009* 2010). Europe was not absent from the campaign, but the mainstream parties battled over who would best represent Poland's interests in the EU. Only Eurosceptic groups – the Union of Real Politics, the Polish branch of Libertas, and the Republican Right (PR) – made efforts to address this issue, dedicating significant time to it in election spots, programmes and flyers (Szczerbiak 2009; *Eurowybory 2009* 2010; Spots 2009).

The Eurosceptic parties generally presented more moderate stances compared to 2004 (see Fig. 3). All accepted Poland's membership in the EU and the conditions of Poland's accession while at the same time expressing their strong objection to further integration in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. UPR, as in the previous campaign, invoked the idea of a Europe of Nations, opposing further integration, the common currency and the EU bureaucracy. Similar postulates, draped in less radical clothes, were voiced by PR. Both parties in their anti-EU rhetoric made visible reference to ideological elements such as the threat to Christian values and Polish identity, as well as protection of national sovereignty; however, this was similar to the conservative-patriotic rhetoric of Law and Justice, which in 2009 strongly emphasized the emotional aspect, pointing to the threat to national interests coming primarily from Germany (*Eurowybory 2009* 2010; Spots 2009).

Two important aspects of the 2009 elections must be highlighted. First, the ambiguous attitude to European integration presented by Libertas, the party founded by the Irish millionaire Declan Ganley a few months before election. Ganley himself did not want to be labelled a "Eurosceptic", criticising the EU and opposing the Lisbon Treaty mostly for its anti-democratic character. The starkly Eurosceptical position of the Polish politicians in Libertas (former League of Polish Families politicians) contradicted Ganley's seemingly pro-European declarations. The contradiction was deepened by placing several pro-European politicians on the Polish Libertas election slate. Such a strategy deepened the illegibility of the formation's profile; the strategy was vague and dubious. It left the party vulnerable to attacks by other Eurosceptic groups and from PiS (Zuba 2010: 87–89). Second, none of the Eurosceptic groups participating in the 2009 elections could be considered protest groups. While primarily Libertas and, to a degree, UPR voiced criticism of the elite in Brussels, on the domestic plane those parties did not represent themselves as protest parties. This was particularly emphasized by the Republican Right party, which declared on the first page of its election manifesto that "We are not a party of protest, but rather a party seeking to fix Polish politics" (*Eurowybory 2009* 2010: 138).

In 2014, the EU experienced what was likely the most serious internal crisis in its history, which over time had an increasingly negative impact on European


Fig. 3. Polish political parties' attitudes toward the EU, 2009 election

Source: Authors' illustration.

society. The fiscal and economic problems that beset the Eurozone affected not only the 17 countries that had adopted the common currency, but also the other Member States to varying degrees. At the same time, internal divisions among EU states crystallized, such as between rich and poor states, and those inside and outside the Eurozone. The economic crisis, excessive bureaucracy and slow decision making equally weakened the EU's international position. This gave a boost to Euroscepticism across Europe. In the United Kingdom, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) came out on top, while in France the victors were the National Front (FN). Eurosceptics also achieved electoral success in Denmark, Greece, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Hungary. In Poland, Eurosceptic parties also increased their support, particularly in comparison to 2009.

In 2014, similarly to 10 years earlier, a greater radicalization of anti-EU attitudes and thus polarization between the Eurosceptic parties and Law and Justice occurred (see Fig. 4). As previously mentioned, PiS expressed opposition to the idea of a federal Europe, but did not exclude the idea of deeper integration to the extent that such would bring clear benefits to Poland. The Eurosceptic parties took the opposite position, not perceiving any advantages at the political level to integration. Three of the four Eurosceptic parties – Solidary Poland, New Right Congress, and the National Movement – demanded not only the halting of European integration, opposing the Lisbon Treaty, but also restriction of the integration process to purely economic cooperation (Solidarna Polska 2014; Kongres Nowej Prawicy 2014; Ruch Narodowy 2014; Spots 2014). The New Right Congress, and particularly its leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, went so far as to demand the rolling-up of the EU. Only Poland Together expressed opposition to further integration in a more measured tone (Polska Razem 2014).

In the election programmes and campaigns of the Eurosceptics, the EU was depicted primarily as a threat to Polish national interests, particularly in respect of the economy and values. The Polish economy was supposedly under threat mainly by the forcing of new climate and energy regulations, European rules governing shale gas extraction and limitations on coal mining. This last issue was of particular importance in light of the domestic situation, as miners employed strikes and protests in the months leading to the election to voice their displeasure with government policy. The issue of Polish agriculture was also touched on, stating the necessity of improving payments to farmers. However, taking into account the scale of the crisis gripping the EU, it is quite curious that the Eurosceptics made in fact no efforts at politicizing this issue. The parties placed far more emphasis on axiological issues rather than economic ones,

appealing to the Christian values which Eurosceptics claimed were under threat by the EU law being imposed on Poland. Solidary Poland, Poland Together, and the National Movement, but also Law and Justice claimed that Polish national identity, traditions, culture, customs and way of life should be protected at all costs from the tendencies demonstrated at the EU level to conduct "dangerous cultural experiments" (Solidarna Polska 2014; Kongres Nowej Prawicy 2014; Ruch Narodowy 2014; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2014; Spots 2014).

Because the election campaign was largely focused on domestic themes, in the main on criticism of the ruling parties (PO and PSL from 2007 on), Eurosceptics attempted to use their outsider position by making the campaign a protest against mainstream parties. This opposition was also joined to the European issue, with declarations such as the statement that Poland is poorly represented by the elite in the European arena. Criticism of Prime Minister Donald Tusk was expressed by all parties, such as Poland Together, who stated that his activities posed a direct threat to Polish Christian values. Solidary Poland attacked not only the ruling Civic Platform party, but also Jarosław Kaczyński as the leader of Law and Justice, emphasizing that both he and PM Tusk had failed Poland by their actions on the European scene, and had therefore ceased to be trustworthy in the eyes of Poles.


Fig. 4. Polish political parties' attitudes toward the EU, 2014 election

Source: Authors' illustration.

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that a characteristic of Eurosceptics' positions and rhetoric in 2004 and 2014 was not only greater radicalism in their attitudes, but also sharp criticism of domestic political elites, who were perceived as working against the national interest within the EU. These elements were far less visible in the 2009 campaign.

CONCLUSIONS

The objective of the preceding analysis was to explain the performance of Eurosceptic parties in the EP elections in Poland in 2004, 2009, and 2014, by assigning the most importance to European issues analysed through the "Eurosceptic opportunity structure" and the activity of Eurosceptic parties in this respect. We assumed that a combination of the political space available, the Eurosceptic potential among society, the contextual environment (particularly the dynamic of the European integration process) can create a more or less favourable "structure" for Eurosceptic parties. At the same time, we also assume that the attitudes and behaviours of the Eurosceptic parties themselves constitute an important factor, as they have the potential to make greater or lesser use of the opportunities that arise.

The analysis has demonstrated firstly that, in spite of a generally high level of support for European integration among Polish society, in all of the analysed elections there were visible negative attitudes towards various aspects of the integration process, creating potential opportunities for Eurosceptic parties. Secondly, analysis of the supply side (opening in the political spectrum) demonstrates that the political space for Eurosceptic parties was similar in all three elections. Thirdly, in respect of contextual factors, and particularly external ones, it would seem that the dynamic of the European integration process and events associated with it were more favourable to Eurosceptic parties in 2004 and 2014 than in 2009. Fourthly, and what would seem of greatest significance, in the 2004 and 2014 elections (differently from the 2009 elections) Eurosceptic parties demonstrated strong decentralizing tendencies in adopting hard Eurosceptic attitudes. By the same token, they differentiated to a significantly greater extent than in 2009 in respect of their electoral offering in comparison to the closest party on the Eurosceptic–Euroenthusiast axis: Law and Justice. They, therefore, created a situation in which their appeal could be distinguishable for the voters. Moreover, particularly in the context of the "second order elections" theory,

the clear protest by Eurosceptics in the 2004 and 2014 campaigns could have contributed more to their achievements at the polls than in 2009.

To summarize, in accordance with the adopted theoretical assumptions, the analysis has demonstrated that Eurosceptic parties had greater chances to attract the Eurosceptic electorate in 2004 and 2014 than in 2009. These conclusions along with the support garnered by the Eurosceptics in individual elections has confirmed the credibility of the adopted assumptions and its explanatory function in respect of the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties, while indicating the fundamental role of the parties themselves in the aspect under study. Nevertheless, in order to confirm the primary findings and more confidently ascertain the impact of the European issue on the voting behaviour, it must be subjected to further in-depth analysis regarding *inter alia* voters' awareness of the European question, as well as of differences in the positions taken by political parties and whether the European question was important for the electorate of the parties being studied (Falter, Schoen 2005: 228–229). These aspects take on particular importance considering the fact that in all of the analysed elections, the campaign was focused on internal issues while only marginally addressing European integration.

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THE SELECTED ISSUES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS AN INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORAL LAW SINCE ITS INCEPTION UNTIL NOW

Agnieszka Marczyńska*

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

It is without any doubt that one of the most important elements of every democratic political system is a Parliament, that is, a collective authority elected in direct elections, which is simultaneously an emanation of will of citizens as a sovereign. Over the years of the technological development of societies and evolution of the economic cooperation amongst states, its role and scope of responsibilities have gradually grown. The European Parliament is one of the key elements of the institutional system of the European Union, and thus, the only body, the composition of which is elected in direct election. This body, as a forum for universal representation by the elected deputies from the member states, brings together views and positions not only of the representatives but also of their electorate. The parliament is also an expression of the multinational EU community, its voice and its desire to have influence on the fate of the entire EU.

This article presents the evolution of the European Parliament and of the election law concerning this body, since its formation as an institution of the European Union until now. The purpose of this article is to present changes which have taken place in the EU legislation in respect of the electoral law, on the basis of which members of the parliament are elected, since the formation of the EP. The main subject of this article covers following issues: how the evolution process of the parliament has looked like over the years, how its position in the institutional architecture of the EU has been evolving and how it has been endeavoured to harmonize electoral procedures to this body over the years. The article is about the evolutionary political

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position of the EP. The article focuses on selected aspects of unification of the electoral procedure for the election to the EP due to their path-breaking character and importance of the procedure being currently in force.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS AN INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

One of the key bodies of the European Communities is the European Parliament, which has been known under this name since 1962. It is the only experiment of this kind in the field of supranational democracy (Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton 1996: 16) which reflects the principle that nations should take part in the exercise of power through an assembly representing them (Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton 1996: 313). The beginnings of formation of the European Parliament model can be found in the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter referred to as ECSC) on April 18th, 1951 (Europa-Verträge und Gesetze 1972). The first session of the ECSC Assembly took place on September 10th, 1952, and was attended by 78 deputies. During negotiations on the adoption of the Treaty, Jean Monet, who was one of the deputies, suggested the establishment of an Interparliamentary Assembly among the existing classic bodies of international organizations, which would consist of parliamentarians of the member states. The Assembly was supposed to have advisory powers and the privilege to express *the vote of no confidence* to the authority (Klepacki 1967: 25). The above-mentioned view, which had reflected the trend towards supranational integration, found its expression in the statutes of the organization. It is believed that the prototype of the European Parliament should be sought in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, which was established in August 1949 and was the first European parliamentary assembly. However, the efforts to establish a federal bicameral parliament proved to be unsuccessful. Anyway, it seems to be reasonable to mention these efforts, since they are undoubtedly a confirmation of the presence of a developed concept, which was patterned upon national models of a representational institution of parliamentary nature (Kruk 1997: 7). The supporters of the supranational integration saw a future common Western European Parliament in the Assembly (Marszałek-Kawa 2002: 8).

Under the Treaties of Rome adopted on March 25th, 1957, two European Communities were established, namely the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as Euratom). The Statutes of the two European Communities in institutional terms were patterned upon the ECSC status and sanctioned that every one of the Communities would have the following organs: an International Council of Ministers, a Special Commission, which would act as a managing authority, a Parliamentary Assembly and a Court, which would exercise the judicial authority. While both of the statutes were created, the main assumption was that they would have a joint parliamentary body. However, originally it was not assumed to create such a body for all three communities. As a result of numerous conferences, meetings and discussions, the so-called concept of the joint institutions for the European Communities was created, on the basis of which the joint parliamentary body for the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom was created (Galster 1997: 9–10). The Convention, however, does not include the status of the body mentioned above. It only constitutes that a joint parliamentary body will be established for the three communities (Europa-Verträge 1972: 258–262).

The first session of the joint parliamentary body of all three European Communities took place in Strasbourg on March 19th, 1958. It was attended by 148 deputies representing national parliaments of the so-called "Six", i.e. Germany (FRG), Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The joint body was granted consultative-control powers, however, it was characterized by a constant activity in the sphere of customs from the very beginning and it aimed at strengthening its position through consistent increase in its powers (Kruk 1997: 8). Under the Treaties of Rome, the European Parliament had no tools to shape and influence the policies of the member states. It was only the Article 238 of the EC Treaty that entitled EP to consulting association agreements (Czachór 1994: 80). With the resolution of 1959, the Assembly changed its name to the European Parliamentary Assembly. While it was in 1962 that the Assembly adopted the name of the European Parliament. The opponents of the new name, while maintaining their position, were arguing that the Treaties establishing the European Communities did not use the name in their content. Some of the opponents were going further and were questioning the desirability of the appointment of a body of this nature and they negated simultaneously the adopted development direction of the Communities, which, according to them, as a result aimed at establishment of a transnational structure of federal nature

(Kruk 1997: 8). Legal sanctioning of the name "The European Parliament" took place on the date of adoption of the Single European Act, hereinafter referred to as SEA, i.e., on February 17th, 1986, which finally entered into force on July 1st, 1987. While strengthening the EP position, the SAE introduced the principle of expression its approval for conclusion of accession agreements with new member states and association agreements by the Communities (Marszałek-Kawa 2004: 81).

Under the Treaties mentioned above, the members of the Parliamentary Assembly were supposed to be appointed by the parliaments of the Member States. The provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1951, stating that the Parliamentary Assembly is composed of „[…] representatives of nations united in the Community", introduced two alternative models for appointing members of the Assembly. The first of them provided that representatives of the member states should be elected by national parliaments from their members once a year. The second one provided that representatives should be elected in direct universal suffrage under the conditions adopted by the law of the member states.

The Treaties of Rome went even further; they stipulated that the composition of the assembly would be determined by a direct universal suffrage based on a uniform electoral procedure, which would be in force in all member states (Grzelak 2004: 24). According to the art. 138 of the Treaty: "The Assembly will present proposals on direct universal suffrage according to a uniform procedure in all member states. The Council, acting unanimously, shall establish appropriate procedures, which will be recommended for adoption by the Member States in accordance with their individual constitutional requirements" (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed 25 March 1957, Journal of Laws 2004, No 90 item 864/2). Until creation and adoption of a uniform electoral procedure, the deputies shall be elected by national parliaments. Thus, as it results from the analysis of the Treaty, it was the National Assembly that was responsible for drafting a uniform election law. It was in the period from 1958 to 1975 that the Assembly adopted two resolutions and created two drafts of the uniform electoral law. The working party chaired by Ferdynand Dehousse presented its proposals as first one on May 17th, 1961. The draft assumed that ⅔ of the members of the Parliament would be elected by direct universal suffrage and the rest of the deputies would be appointed by the parliaments of the Member States. The European Parliament passed the draft mentioned above to the Council of the European Union, however, it was not subject to discussion due to the many differences of opinion among the member states (Gebethner,

Urbaniak 2003: 13). The attempts to harmonize and regulate the elections to the European Parliament were undertaken in 1963 and 1969, but they were also unsuccessful. The next attempt to draft a project of the electoral law for the European Parliament was undertaken by Schelto Patijn. It was as a result that in January 1975, the European Parliament passed the draft of the law by a majority of 106 votes, which was signed by the Council of the European Union on July 12th, 1976. This proposal contained many articles relating to activities and functioning of the European Parliament, among others, the issue of the term of office. Schelto Patijn, who was already mentioned above, strove for a compromise with the opponents of universal suffrage and creation of a uniform electoral law. The draft of the electoral procedure prepared by him and adopted by the Council assumed that the first elections to the European Parliament should be carried out based on the national, not necessarily uniform procedure, and authorized the newly elected Parliament to create a new electoral procedure in the future. The draft of the electoral law sanctioned also that a deputy should be independent and autonomous in his decisions and the members of the parliament should vote based on their own beliefs. The deputies should not be restricted by any mandate or instructions (Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton 1996: 41). Until 1979, i.e. the first general election, deputies to the European Parliament had been appointed by national parliaments of the member states from the their national deputies (Kenig-Witkowska, Łazowski, Ostrihansky 2006: 81).

As new member states accessed to the European Communities, the number of the deputies gradually grew. As I have already mentioned above, the number of the deputies in the European Parliament at the moment of its establishment was 142; this number increased to 198 in 1973, when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom acceded to the European Communities. On the day of first direct universal suffrage, the number of the deputies was already 410. In 1981, after the accession of Greece, the number of the deputies rose to 434 people (Małuszyńska, Gruchman 2010: 4). And so, with every accession of new member states to the European Communities, the number of the deputies in the EP systematically grew and currently amounts 751 deputies.

It is next to the Council of the European Union, which has decision-making and legislative powers, and to the European Commission, which in turn is the EU's executive arm, that the European Parliament has a significant impact on functioning of the European Union. However, at the time of its establishment, as it was shown above, it had not widely developed powers. Its powers were limited mainly to consultative and advisory ones. While from the moment of its

establishment, it tried successively to extend its impact and gain greater ability to influence the functioning of Communities and policies of the Member States (Apostoł 1995: 10). The increase in the powers of the EP compared to other EU bodies is a response not only to their evolution towards closer cooperation, but also towards more comprehensive integration amongst Member States. The increased powers have not offset the phenomenon, which is called "a deficit of the democratic legitimacy" in the European literature (Dinan 1993: 188). This "deficit" is due to the fact that the process of the successive transfer of the legislative powers from the level of the Member States to the EU level is a process of transferring legislative powers from representative bodies elected in democratic elections to the body consisting of the representatives of governments (Council), in which the participation of the representative body, i.e. parliament, is incomparably smaller than in the Member States. The gradual elimination of this deficit of the democratic legitimacy is an essential element for counteracting the process of alienation of citizens from the process of governance of the Union (Ostrihansky 1995: 7). It should also be noted that the EP is a different institution than the existing parliaments in the Member States. There is no ruling majority or opposition in it, it does not have a classic legislative function, it does not have a legislative initiative, it has quite a small role in the legislative act. It also does not perform its duties on behalf of one and the same Member State, since its members are elected by the citizens of all member states (Chmaj, Skrzydło 2011: 119).

WORKS ON STANDARDISATION OF THE ELECTORAL LAW TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OVER THE YEARS

One crucial problem of the electoral law to the European Parliament is a lack of common and uniform regulations related to organisation of elections in Member States. At the community level, there were several attempts to develop a uniform electoral law. The first provisions concerning the electoral procedure to the Joint Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community were included in the Treaty of Paris of 1951. Provisions of the treaty regulated only the rule of the university and directness of the elections, while ECSC states had a freedom in respect of details of the electoral procedure (Bardi 1990: 503–529). Members of the European Parliament were nominated pursuant to the above mentioned regulations, in some cases accepting common elections (Kownacki 2004: 18).

The issue of harmonisation of the electoral procedure was considered only in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. According to Art. 138 Par. 3[1], all Community Member States were to implement a uniform electoral law. The first attempt of standardising the matter of uniform electoral law and direct elections to the European Parliament was a submission of a draft of an electoral convention to the parliamentary commission of the European Parliamentary Assembly, which was presided by a Belgian socialist Fernand Dehousse. It took place on May 17th, 1960 and the convention was named after the chair's name, i.e. so-called Dehousse's convention (Bieber 1981: 21–28.) The draft assumed that the Assembly of 426 members would be nominated in the course of general election, taking place once per five years. However, during a transition period, ⅔ of the Assembly members would be elected directly, i.e. according to the new rules, and the rest would be nominated by national parliaments of member states. The elections in each Community state would take place on the same day. The convention included also regulations concerning the minimal age of eligibility to stand for election, set for 21–25 years, and the incompatibilities rule, i.e. the rule forbidding joining function of a member of the European Parliament and a member of a national parliament. The project authors did not focus much on the common electoral procedure but only stated that during a transition period, the elections would take place as previously in accordance to national procedures. Article 9 of the Convention generally stated that the procedures should be uniform to the highest possible extent. Finally, the Convention by Dehousse was to enter into force after having been ratified by all member states, however, this failed due to an objection of France (Chałupa 2008: 3–4).

The following attempt of harmonising the European Parliament electoral procedure was undertaken when next countries entered the Community, i.e. United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. It took place in 1973, at the time when the president of the Parliament Commission was a Danish social democrat S. Patijn. The Commission was called after its chair – the Patijn Commission. The result of the Commission's works was a convention draft, submitted in January 1975, which was titled Legal act concerning election of members of the Assembly in direct elections. Article 1 of the Act assumed that organisation of direct and general elections to the European Parliament would be based on a uniform electoral law, developed by the European Parliament. However, the Convention did not specify its term (Millar 1990: 37–44). It specified the number of Parliament

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[1] Art. 190 of the Treaty forming the European Community.

members at 355, the term of office of 5 years and the list of functions which could not be combined with the function of a parliament member, the schedule and general rules of elections.

Parliament members were not to be burdened with instructions of mandates of a state they came from. What is more, the document indicated the criteria allowing candidates to start in the election, however, did not systematise the electoral system, authorising the European Parliament to harmonise it. It was also agreed that the election date would be set authoritatively and would take place in one period. Member states were just obliged to organise elections in one period, covering four consecutive days, from Thursday till Sunday, and that they can start counting votes from the moment of a finish of the election in the last country. Other issues concerning organisation and conduction of the election were within competences of particular member states.

Finally, the Patijn Report was adopted with slight amendments by the European Council in January 1975. The number of members was changed to 410, while the election was to be conducted within four consecutive days, starting from Tuesday till Sunday. Particular elements of the electoral procedure were left within responsibilities of Member States (Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton 1996: 10). Previously, during the European Council summit in Paris in 1974, there was made the decision that the first election to the European Parliament were to take place as late as in 1978 (Bardi 1990: 520). It should be also mentioned that the first election to the European Parliament finally took place from 7th until 10th June 1979.

On the basis of agreements set in Patijn report, representatives of the Member States agreed on the content of the earlier mentioned Act, concerning election of European Parliament members in direct and general elections during the summit of the European Council, which took place in July 1976. The Act was the first official document of European Communities, including a set of basic rules of EP electoral law for all member states, at the same time being the first step towards harmonising the electoral procedure. Finally, the Act was adopted on September 20th, 1976 by the Council decision no. 76/787/ECSC. A detailed description of provisions included in the act shall be presented further in this article.

Further defining of a uniform electoral act was continued in the European Parliament when a French member of Christian democracy fraction Jean Seitlinger became the chair of the Commission for politic affairs. He exercised this function in the years 1979–1984, and in October 1980, he presented his

report. In February 1982, it was adopted by the Commission, and on March 10th, 1982, by the Parliament. According to the draft, the European Parliament elections should be based on regulations included in the Act of 1976 and national law of Community states. According to Art. 2 of the draft, all member states would be subject to a proportional electoral system and would be divided into multi-member districts. What is more, that document introduced the D'Hondt method as the system of selecting members (Art. 3, Par. 1), preferential election within a single list, the right to vote and start in elections regardless the place of living, a flexibility in the field of geographical and ethnical condition, a lack of election threshold, as well as a two-day voting period.

However, the presented project was not approved by the European Council. J. Seitlinger considered the fact that it was very difficult to convince European Council members to make more complex amendments in the EP electoral law, thus, he focused on fundamental elements of the electoral system. However, the Council did not decide to introduce changes proposed in the Seitlinger's report before the election in 1984. A lack of a unanimous consent at the level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives resulted from a negative position of the United Kingdom, which was an opponent of introducing a proportional system due to the fact that British electoral law was based on the plurality voting system (Westlake 1994: 77–78).

During the second tenure of the EP, in the years 1984–1989, Reinhold Bocklet, the Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee, focused on developing a uniform electoral law. A draft he presented in 1987 assumed an adoption of a proportional system, with single or multi-member districts, creating national voting districts, an introduction of an election threshold of maximum 5% and the necessity to have a citizenship allowing both voting as well as to be eligible to be elected. The Bocklet report acquired a positive opinion of the EP Political Affairs Committee, which directed it to a detailed development by a working team composed of the members of Political Affairs and Legal Committees. The group was presided by R. Bocklet. In 1986, the group presented a verification, however, similarly as previously discussed projects, it was not presented at a plenary session (Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton 1996: 64).

During the third EP tenure in the years 1989–1994, the task to prepare a draft of a uniform electoral law was committed to the Institutional Committee, which supervised the Political Affairs Committee, presided by a Belgian liberal Karl de Gucht. He presented an initial version of his report in 1991. It was regarded as flexible. A resolution of the European Parliament, stating that

a uniform electoral procedure should constitute a general, not detailed formulation, resulted in the fact that the report was adopted on October 10th, 1991. The chief aim of the report was specified in Art. a of EP Resolution of October 10th on the European Parliament's guidelines for the draft uniform electoral procedure „[…] acknowledging that the main aim was to lead to harmonising electoral criteria in all member states after twelve years after the first direct election. The European Parliament should immediately adopt the procedure being a widely understood consensus of all Community members. A uniform electoral procedure in all countries would politically enforce the importance of the institution and consolidate its democratic legitimisation in the field of economic and monetary cooperation, aimed at transforming the Community into a body of an European federation…"[2].

A catalogue of solutions proposed by Gucht, included in the EP Resolution, contained provisions concerning an introduction of an age census for passive and active voting rights of 18 years. The situation of citizens of other member states staying abroad should be set by internal regulations of a particular member state. Art. 2[ii] includes an obligation of organising the election within four particularly set days. Another solution proposed in the Resolution, on the basis of Art. 2v, was a prohibition to be at the same time a MEP and to serve a function set in the Act concerning election of the Assembly members in direct and general elections of September 10th, 1976, broadening those functions by a district management member. Despite the fact that EP claimed to organise the election basing on the proportional system, due to an objection of the United Kingdom it was decided that "[…] no more than ⅔ of members were elected in accordance to the national system, provided that the rest of them are elected in a way that the proportion between the number of acquired votes and the number of members is kept in the national scale". The Gucht's report in its final version was adopted only in 1993. Next, the report was directed to the Council. At that time, the Community presidency was held by Denmark, which was more focused on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, what resulted in the fact that the above report became a subject of negotiation only at the end of 1993. When making an opinion on the submitted project, it was stated that it is the least coherent among all previously presented as far as the uniform electoral

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[2] European Parliament Resolution of October 10th, 1991 on the European Parliament's guidelines for the draft uniform electoral procedure, http://www.ena.lu.

law is concerned. Due to its too general character, it was even said that it is incompatible with Art. 138 of the Treaty on European Union, which authorises the EP to develop projects aimed at enabling an organisation of direct elections basing on an uniform electoral law in all member states.

The following election was organised basing on the rules specified in the Act of 1976 (De Vries 1996: 417–421). The above mentioned Treaty on European Union concluded on February 7th, 1992, by the power of its provisions, introduced the rule of EU citizenship. Art. 8b stated that „each EU citizen living in the area of a member state which he or she is not a citizen of, is has the right to vote and is eligible to be elected to the PE in a member state he or she lives, basing on the same rules as this state's citizens". The Treaty entered into force on November 1st, 1993[3].

Amsterdam Treaty, enacted on October 2nd, 1997, amended the above mentioned Art. 138 Par. 3, stating that it is possible to organise general direct election to the EP in accordance to an uniform procedure or basing on common rules for all member states. This treaty entered into force on May 1st, 1999[4].

A result of the amendment of Art. 138 Par. 3 was a report of the Institutional Committee of the European Parliament, which in the years 1994–1999 was presided by Georgios Anastassopoulos from Greece. This report specified the election rules, e.g. introduced a 5% election threshold, an obligatory division into voting districts only in case when the number of citizens of a member state exceeds 20 million. Additionally, the act assumed the rule of not combining the function of a MEP with the function of a national deputy. The report was adopted on July 15th, 1998. According to the report, new solutions accepted „[…] a simple and flexible model, while the introduced changes should always consider two superior rules: close cooperation with the electorate and proportion"[5].

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[3] Treaty on European Union of February 7th, 1992, Journal of Laws C no. 191 of 29.7.1992.

[4] Amsterdam Treaty of October 2nd, 1997, Journal of Laws C no. 340 of 10.11.1997.

[5] *Introduction, Elections to the European Parliament: 10–11 & 13 June 1999 Electoral Procedure*, Electoral Law, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/election/law/en/lain01en.htm.

COUNCIL DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1976
NO. 76/787/ECSC, EC, EURATOM AND ITS AMENDMENT
BY DECISION NO 2002/772/EC, EURATOM

A breakthrough in a development of a uniform electoral law took place in 2002, when the Institutional Committee was presided by Jose Maria Gil-Robles y Gil-Delgado, who was previously a president of the EP. In 2002, during the summit in Nice, the issue of preparing a standardised electoral procedure for the EP was not a subject of proceeding. His report concerned the amendment of the Act of 1976 concerning direct and general election to the EP. His authorship project was adopted on the basis of the consent procedure of June 12th, 2002, and was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on October 21st, 2002.

The above mentioned lack of introducing a uniform EP electoral procedure at the Community level makes that specifying the regulations is mainly of the responsibility of member states. The Act of 20.09.1976 includes general rules of organising EP election which were amended in 2002 (Polarczyk 2009: 2).

Pursuant to Article 1, election of the European Parliament members shall take place within the scope of general, direct, free and anonymous election. What is more, according to Par. 1, the election is organised on the basis of the proportion rule, which can evince in a use of allocation of members of the system of party lists or a single vote subject to a transfer. The proportion rule was introduced only when amending the original version of the Act of 1976. The preferential electoral law is characterised by the fact a vote constitutes a list arranged on the basis of voter's preferences. A voter arranges the candidates according to own preferences, e.g. checking all or some of them with number 1 for the best candidates and number 2 for a following one. In this way, he or she creates a so called preferential list. Examples of such solution include e.g. Schulze method or voting with transferable vote method. Single transferable vote system consist in that a voter selects one candidate from the list, at the same time selecting other candidates, which should receive his/her vote when his/her initially selected candidate received enough number of votes or too less number, what makes him/her eliminated. This system is used e.g. in Ireland or in Malta (Bartholdi 2003: 17–23).

Pursuant to Art. 2 of the Council Decision, member states are allowed to form voting districts or to divide a voting area in other way, generally not

violating the proportional character of the electoral system. Currently, only few countries divide their areas into voting districts and the largest number of them is formed in Poland – 13. Pursuant to Art. 3, one crucial issue which is guaranteed to Community states is the possibility to introduce a minimal election threshold, provided that its maximal value is 5%. Member states are allowed to set an upper limit of expenditures for the electoral campaign (Art. 4). MEP are elected for 5 years tenure, which starts on the day of the first session after the election. The Parliament meets without the necessity of convening it, on the first Tuesday after a month from the end of the electoral period. Competences of the outgoing Parliament end in the moment of the opening of the first meeting of new Parliament. The tenure of each MEP starts and ends in the same term (Art.5). Article 6 includes the guarantee of a freedom of MEP. MEPs cannot be burden with any instructions, nor receive any bounding mandate. Article 7 includes the rule of not combining the MEP function with particular functions. The specification of detailed rules of organising elections is still at the responsibility of particular member states on the basis of national legislation, pursuant to Art. 8. What is more, it is stated that no one is allowed to vote more than one time in particular EP election (Art. 9). Pursuant to Art. 12, EP verifies the mandate of MEPs. It notes results officially announced by member states and settles disputes which can result due to the Council Decisions, other than those resulting from national regulations, to which the Decision does not refer. Article 13 of the Council Decision includes provisions concerning a selection of a member due to a resignation, death, or loss of the mandate by other member. The procedure to select a member in such situation is at responsibility of member states. What is more, member states are authorised to specify cases when a MEP loses the mandate due to national law. If a national legislation includes such provisions, the loss of the mandate is pursuant to such regulation. In such case, proper national authorities inform the European Parliament about such fact. However, in case when the vacancy results from a resignation or death, the EP president immediately informs proper authorities of a Community state about such fact.

The Act of 1976 on direct and general election, amended by the decision of 25.06.2002 and 23.09.2002, is the only amendment concerning a uniform EP electoral procedure so far. After that amendment, there have not been any real attempts of standardising the electoral law. Currently, we still lack such attempts.

DIRECTIVE NO 93.109/EC OF 06.12.1993

The right of all EU citizens to vote and start in the EP elections in a state where they have the right to live was acknowledged pursuant to Art. 20 Par. 2 B of the Treaty on European Union (further referred to as TEU), and Art. 39 Par. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. For the aims of realisation of the TEU directives in the scope concerning electoral rights of the EU citizens living in a Community state which he/she is not a citizen of, the Council, on 06.12.1993, issued the Directive no. 93/109/EC stating detailed conditions of passive and active electoral rights in the EP elections for the EU citizens, living in a member state they are not citizens of (Directive no. 93/109/EC of 06.12.1993, Journal of Laws L no. 329 of 30.12.1993: 34). This Directive specifies rules according to which citizens of member states living in a country other than their state of origin have active and passive electoral rights. The directive at its start defines terms used in its content. One of the most crucial definitions states that a Community voter is a voter authorised to vote in a member state when he or she lives, while a person eligible to be elected is an EU citizen eligible to be elected to the EP in a member state of place of living. Directive specifies that an EU citizen who is not a citizen of a member state where he/she lives and meets all other voting and being elected conditions which a state sets for its citizens has an active and passive EP electoral right in a member state where he/she lives. On the other hand, such right is not given to persons who, as a result of a sentence or a decree issued on the basis of a penal or civil law of a member state, whether of living or origin, were deprived of the law to start in the election. However, if citizens of a member state where he/she lives can start in the election only when they have the citizenship for a minimal period, it is regarded that EU citizens meet this requirement provided that they were citizens of one of Community states for the required minimal period. On the other hand, if citizens of a member state of the place of living have the right to vote or to start in the election only when they lived in the minimal period of living in the electoral area of this state, it is assumed that Community members eligible to vote and to start in elections meet this condition provided that the place of living period is the same as the minimal period of living in other member states. What is more, pursuant to Article 7 of the Act, member states are allowed to check if a particular EU citizen who expressed the will to vote in a particular country is not deprived of this right on the basis of regulations of the country of his/her origin. For this aim, a member state of the place of living can transfer the country of origin a statement supplied

by a Community voter. What is more, a member state of the origin, in the proper term and proper way, shall provide essential and normally available information, however, it includes only such detailed data which are absolutely available to realise this project. One can use the obtained data for this aim. If the provided information discredit the statement content, a member state of the living place undertakes proper actions in order to undertake actions to prevent this person to start in election (Art. 7).

According to the Directive, to be able to use the right to vote in a member stay where he or she lives, a voter just needs to express such will. If a participation in the election in a member state where a voter lives is obligatory, he is obliged to take part in the election also in case when one expressed such will.

In order to enter the voters' list, he or she is obliged to submit the same documents which are required from voters having the citizenship of this particular member state. What is more, in order to be on the list of eligible voters, a voter should submit an official statement in which he or she states the citizenship, the address of a stay in a member state and in some cases also the election district or local community, on the list of which he or she was registered for the last time. In that document, a voter needs also to state that he or she shall use the voting right solely in the member state of his or her stay. That member state is allowed to ask a Voter to include in a statement that he/she has not been deprived of the voting right in the home country, as well as that the presented ID card is valid. Additionally, the member state is allowed to ask a Voter to state the date from which he or she stays in this or other member state. Community Voters remain at the voters' list until they submit an application of a removal from the list or till they are officially removed due to a failure of meeting the condition of using the voting right.

Similarly, however slightly different, is in case when a citizen of a member state expresses the will to start in the election in a member state of his/her stay, different of his nationality and citizenship. In the same way as in a will to vote in a member stay of one's stay, a voter who wants to start in the election is obliged to submit an official statement, which includes his/her citizenship and the address of a stay in the member state, to state that he/she is not starting in the EP election in another Community state and, when applicable, to indicate a voting district or local community in his/her home country, on the voters' list of which he/she was last registered. One difference is the obligation to submit a certificate acknowledging that a candidate was not deprived of passive voting right in that member state or that the authority is not informed about such fact.

Such certificate is issued by a proper administrative authority of the candidate's home country (Art. 10 Par. 2).

A specific type of a limitation of active and passive voting rights was introduced in Art. 14 of the Directive. It concerns the case when in a particular Community state the percentage of EU citizens in the age allowing them to vote, which at the same time is their residence but they are not its citizens, is over 20% of the total number of EU citizens who live in this country. In the presented situation, such member state can introduce, by way of derogation, special requirements related with the period of residence. As far as the active voting right is concerned, it may grant the right to the voters eligible to vote, which have lived in this member state for a certain minimal period of time that cannot be longer than 5 years. In the case of starting in the elections, a Community voter can be eligible to start in the election if he/she has lived in this member state for a certain minimal period of time, which can be maximally set at 10 years. The discussed article was applicable to states which were Community members before 1995. The above mentioned right was used by Luxembourg, which introduced the requirement of 5 years of residence in order to obtain the active voting right (Grzelak 2004: 35).

In the case when a member state refuses to register one in the voters' list or rejects the application concerning a start in the election, one has the right to use proper legal means on the same rules as the legislation of this member state concerns voters and candidates that are this state's citizens. The Directive obliges Community states to inform voters in a proper form and in proper time about detailed conditions and rules of voting and standing in the election in this country. The above mentioned prohibition of multiple voting and starting in the election is to be guaranteed by common flow of information between Community state about entries on the electoral lists of voters and candidates who expressed such will in the country of residence. What is more, a home member state should implement proper means in order to prevent from the situation when its citizens vote or candidate during the same election in more than one Community state.

The above discussed Art. 10 Par. 2 of the Directive 93/109/EC, pursuant to provisions of the Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20.12.2012[6], was amended. The

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[6] Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20.12.2012 amending the Directive 93/109/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the

requirement specified in Art. 10 of the Directive 93/109/EC, that a Community citizen, when submits an application to stand as a candidate in a member state he is not a citizen of, submits the attestation from the competent administrative authorities of his home Member State certifying that he has not been deprived of the right to stand as a candidate in that Member State or that no such disqualification is known to those authorities, was removed. It was replaced by an official statement of such candidate, submitted at the moment of submitting an application to stand in the election, acknowledging that he or she was not deprived of the right to stand in the election to the EP in his/her country of origin. Due to the above, in the Art. 10 of the Directive 93/109/EC, Par. 2 was removed, being replace by point d), stating that a candidate, when submitting an application, states that he was not deprived of the right to stand in the election in his country of origin by the power of a judicial decision or an administrative decision subject to an appeal. There was also introduced a requirement of informing the candidate's home member state by the member state of the candidate's residence about the above mentioned official statement in order to verify if that EU citizen was not actually deprived of the right to stand in the election to the EP in the state of his citizenship. After reception of such notice, the member state of the candidate's origin relays available proper information in any applicable way within 5 working days from the reception of the notice or, when possible, in a shorter period. Such information may include solely detailed data, which are indispensable to execute this obligation and can be used only for this aim. In case when the member state of the candidate's residence does not obtain the information in time, the candidate is allowed to stand in the election. However, when the obtained information turn out to discredit the content of the submitted statement, the state undertakes proper actions in accordance to its national legislation in order to disable this person stand in the election or, if it is not possible, to prevent an election of this person, or, in the case when he or she is elected, to prevent him/her from execution of the function. Such actions are executed regardless the fact if the member state of the candidate's residence obtained the information in the period of 5 days or not.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Council Directive 2013/1/EU, by 28.01.2014, the Community states were obliged to introduce legislative, executive and

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European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, Journal of Laws L. 26 of 26.1.2013: 27.

administrative regulations necessary for execution of the Directive. Member states immediately inform the Committee about that regulations[7].

SUMMARY

The European Union has not developed a uniform electoral law for the elections to the European Parliament. Despite defining the fundamental set of electoral rules in the Act on the election of European Parliament members in direct general election of 20.09.1976, there is still a large discrepancy in the election of MEPs. Despite the fact that since the very beginning of the existence of Communities the problem of lack of a uniform electoral law was the subject of works of various parliamentary committees, reports developed in the course of them did not contribute any new solutions, most of them copying the earlier proposed procedures. One chance for a constructive settlement of the above mentioned issue was the report proposed by a British liberal Andrew Duff, which was developed in October 2008. The primary aim of the report is empowerment of the European dimension of the election that the public eye and media engaged in political choices concerning the future of EU. As a result, a crucial role should be played by European political parties. Further part of the report indicates that the recognisability of the democratic role of the Parliament among the society is still limited. Political parties of the European rank are still at an early stage of development, election campaigns are more of a national than European character, and media coverage of the EU functioning is still irregular. The project's author was arguing that a change of the electoral system may have an influence on an increase of the attendance, an empowerment of the European scale of the election, making them more personal.

The Duff's report includes five main propositions of changing the existing electoral procedure. The first of them is an introduction of an obligatory division of states into voting districts when the number of citizens exceeds 20 million. The author proposed also the possibility of forming special districts to satisfy needs of linguistic minorities. The second proposal concerns a ranked voting

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[7] The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Journal of Laws EU 2007 C 306/1. Consolidated Treaty on European Union of 20.03.2010 was published in the Official Journal of the EU C 83/13, while the Treaty on functioning of the European Union in establishing the European in the Official Journal of the EU C 83/47.

system, using half-open lists, along with the currently used Single Transferable Vote. Voting with a use of half-open lists is a situation when a voter selects candidates within the list. The third proposed solution is a novelty in the concepts of harmonising the electoral procedure. The project assumes an introduction of an additional so-called Union voting district. Due to that, it is proposed to increase the number of MEPs from 751 to 776. EP Members would be elected in national elections but from one Eurolist, common for the whole EU and one district covering the whole area of the Community. European political parties would appoint candidates, who would come from at least one third of member states and were selected in accordance to the equality of gender rules. Citizens of community member states would have the right to two votes, the first one for candidates or an individual candidate, depending on the electoral system of a particular state, and the second one for a preferred candidate from the EU list. The division of places would be conducted in accordance to Sainte-Laguë's method. According to Duff, there should be election threshold for this district. This novelty would expand the selection range for voters and highlight the European scale of campaigns, at the same time leading to an enforcement of European political parties. Candidates would have the right to start both from the EU list as well as the national one. Candidates officially living in more than one member state and candidates with a dual citizenship would have the right to stand in the same election from more than one national or regional list.

A result of the above presented novelty would be an appointment of an electoral authority at the Community level. Its task would be a coordination of the election from the Eurolist. It would also set the upper limit of expenditures on election campaigns of parties and candidates. It would be formed by representatives of all member states, one from each state, and representatives of the Committee and the Parliament. The fourth proposal included in the Duff's report relates to the period of the election. It would take place only on Saturdays and Sundays, what, according to the author, would make it have a general European character. He proposed that the minimal age of being eligible to vote in the whole EU should be set at 16 and to stand in the election at 18 (Bachrynowski 2010: 61).

He also proposed a decrease of the number of days for the election from four to only two. The report was subject to a discussion during plenary sessions of the EP in the years 2009–2014. The main assumption of works of the Constitutional Committee was that the regulations entered into force as the community law already during 2014 election. The evaluation of the report is not

explicit. Authors indicate positive aspects of presented proposals, focusing also on its disadvantages and difficulties which can be met at its implementation in the proposed form. The right of citizens of two votes and standing in elections in several member states at the same time would require an additional amendment of Directive 93/103/EC, which concerns detailed conditions of executing the right to vote and stand in election to the EP of EU citizens residing in a member state and not being its citizen. The Directive excludes the possibility of giving two votes in the same election and to candidate in more than one EU country (Gostyńska 2010: 4).

According to reviewers, an election of additional 25 MEPs from the European list and dividing seats between member states before each election can violate current balance in the institutional hierarchy in the EU and significantly increase the potential of the largest states at the cost of those smaller ones[8].

Duff's report seems to be discussing the issue of harmonising the electoral procedure to the European Parliament in the most detailed way when compared to all reports presented so far. It is a subject of discussion until now due to a resistance of some member states to make such serious amendments in their electoral systems. As a result, it seems that a development of a uniform EP electoral procedure, common for all members, is still not possible. Member states, affectionate to their internal regulations, are not eager to introduce any changes in own electoral systems, what would be ineluctable at standardisation of the electoral procedure for the EP election.

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REVIEWS

Kreatywność i innowacyjność w erze cyfrowej – twórcza destrukcja 2,
ed. by Anna Zaorska, Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech, Bohdan Jung, Szkoła
Główna Handlowa, Warszawa 2014, pp. 268

Michał Piechowicz*

The collective work edited by Anna Zaorska, Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech and Bohdan Jung entitled *Kreatywność i innowacyjność w erze cyfrowej – twórcza destrukcja 2* [*Creativity and Innovativeness in the Digital Era – Creative Destruction 2*] appeared on the publishing market in 2014. It is an interesting item, taking a non-standard approach to issues connected with new media, innovativeness and an interdisciplinary look at the aspect of creativity in the contemporary communication.

The main intellectual inspiration for the analysis carried out in this book was the seminal work by one of the classics in economics, J.A. Schumpeter, and in particular his concept of innovation and creative destruction (Schumpeter 2003). In this context, the essence is also rapid scientific and technical progress of the last turn of the century, dynamic propagation of digital technologies, and economic and social changes connected with it (see: Hagedoorn 1996). In this sense, the creative destruction is a process of changes, which consists in implementation of new and more efficient solutions (innovations) before existing and therefore less effective ones become completely out-of-date, inefficient and useless.

The authors have observed that traditional notions of creation and creativity[1] were mostly associated with the realm of humanism and the field of fine arts; whereas innovations and innovativeness were related to scientific discoveries, technolo-

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[1] The interdisciplinary approach has been taken in the book, in which people's actions motivated by their creative potential, as well as technological, economic and sociological factors, are recognized as the sources of creativity and innovativeness in the economy and society.

gical progress and changes in enterprises' activities. Moreover, they suggest that this division has become stronger owing to the promotion of the concepts of J.A. Schumpeter. He singled out three phases of the process of creation and use of innovations as well as making changes in the approach to the business of enterprises: invention, innovation, and imitation. In this sense, the increase of the importance of innovation in strengthening the enterprises' competitiveness has created the need to better understanding of the previous phase of invention (ingenuity) as a process of producing ideas, carrying out research and development (R+D) and transforming their results into useful technologies and new business applications. The authors call this "the creativity in business" and claim that the dynamics of the changes in this realm has increased in the age of globalisation and digital revolution.

In the non-economic realm, greater importance and dynamism of creativity is noticed, which makes use of technological innovations, i.e. digital technologies, communications networks, and communications technique. Moreover, nowadays the creativity is more often not only a creative element of individual geniuses. This phenomenon evolves and is characterised by gradualness, by being in permanent state of process as well as cooperation within the team of people, by new needs in terms of management of processes and teams, settling differences of interests, evaluation of values, protection of legal ownerships, etc. Therefore, a finding is made that in the fields and processes discussed in the book, managerial approach to the growth of creativity and innovativeness is being popularised. The authors observe that this phenomenon can imply creative destruction also in the non-economic realm.

Therefore, taking into consideration present conditions and abilities to produce new ideas, solutions and performances in a large number of fields: business, culture, science, and social activities, the authors have assumed that in the digital era the importance, ability and the need of creativity and innovativeness appears in all fields of human activity.

However, one needs to point out that the changes in the economic, technological, organizational and strategic realm, which take place under the influence of combination of digital strategies, are characterised by great diversity and variety. The authors claim that though the mechanism of creative destruction still works, the course and results of these changes in particular companies, sectors, places, countries and analysed periods are not the same, as they depend – to a large degree – on changeable business, localisation, or institutional determinants.

Therefore, it is no wonder that theoretically and cognitively based work, which connects interdisciplinary look on the nagging concerns of the contemporary researchers, encourages to more accurate analysis of the contents.

The interesting issue is addressed by Joanna Kusza, who reflects on the essence of the creativity and the pure joy of "creation". She approaches critically to the subject and observes that the word "creativity" appears too many times in various conceptions and discussions, which the author recognises as specific misuse and even "casting spell on reality". Thus, she starts to participate in the discourse connected with the essence of creativity and takes into consideration ideas adopted by B. Jessop as a conception belonging to cultural political economies (see: Jessop 2009).

In the text by Bohdan Jung, we find the highlight of the difficulties in quantification of the phenomenon of creativity and the review of trials and methodological approaches, also on the international level.

The technological and social approach is the essence of considerations made by Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech. The author introduces an innovative look on the influence of the digital technologies on social changes. In this perspective, the growth of the social media at the background of changes connected with the usage of means of communication is crucial. In this context, one needs to appreciate the arrangement of the terminology, which is a starting point for consideration on the growth and transformation of the media and participation of their receivers in the shaping of these changes. What is interesting, the author uses the term "new new media" and in this context, she also analyses the changes of behaviour of the groups of receivers of the digital media.

The special attention paid to the issue of creation of knowledge and innovation, information technologies and their activation in the social and humanistic studies, one will find in the article by Andrzej Bukowski and Seweryn Rudnicki. The authors have revised commonly agreed thesis that the digital revolution has invigorated mainly the growth of the technical studies, proving that in the social and humanistic studies the innovative potential has not yet been exhausted. On the basis of the studies, there blurs the real picture and contribution of these studies in social and economic life, and they are determined by institutional conditionings. Then, the authors focus on the unexploited potential of these fields of interest.

The aspect of the product and creative industries has been developed in the passage produced by Sylwia Bąkowska and Monika Tomczyk. In the article, we find an interesting perspective on economy of feelings (experiences) that is the conception trying to create suitable conditions for efficient relationships between the producer, the goods, and the consignee. The authors observe that in order to provide the added value (also in the field of communication), it is precisely these digital technologies that provide great opportunities of innovative ways to create values of the business model in the creative industries.

Annetta Jaworska writes about an interesting and frequently neglected aspect of access to the benefits of culture in the age of the digital revolution. She demonstrates

business models which are the consequence of the search of the producers of the benefits of culture for new modes of action, improvement of communication and exchange of goods between the producers and the consumers.

One needs to observe that the growth of information technologies and their application to the media not only propels the changes in the provision of different types of services, but also greatly influences variable attitudes of these services' consumers. When selecting the film sector, Maciej Bednarzewski has decided to present vectors of changes, which not only result from the applied innovative digital technologies, but also from the usage of new devices or the growth of new abilities and needs.

On the other hand, Nina Stępnicka has taken the analysis of the rise and growth of the Internet auction sites as the example of the action of mechanisms of the creative destruction in the digital economy. The e--commerce market has been discussed here by using the example of the auction website Allegro.pl.

Radosław Malik offers the analysis of the interaction taking place as a result of outsourcing and offshoring of the production of modern business services by corporations to countries where such services are carried out.

The example of the China has been taken by Iwona Nowańska, who in the case study suggests the new interpretation of the Schumpeter's triad that is the sequence: inventions–innovations–imitations. The author sets herself a goal of analysing the level of innovativeness of the economy of the China, and examination of the long-term economic changes taking place in the Chinese economy and society. She observes that important role is played by innovative processes, which have intensified and positioned this country as one of the leaders in technological and economic progress.

Thus, the authors direct our attention to the creative economy and the "creative class" that propels its growth, to which the technological development, new forms of communication and the changing role of the media have crucial importance in creation of trends and forms of consumption of new abilities. Thanks to the considerations of the authors of this book, every creator-designer, explorer, or freak of the new forms of communication will broaden his or her perception of the world of digital media and may reconsider the essence of some mechanisms that work behind it. Moreover, the comprehensive approach to aspects considered in the reviewed work, as well as the essence of argumentation in the light of changes taking place in the contemporary world and in communication, are all the reasons to highly evaluate the scientific value of this work.

The substantial content of the book, its structure and the selected methodology gives no rise to concerns. What is worth highlighting, the manner of narration is smoothly flowing, clear and suitably fitted to the form and the content of the message.

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Mariusz Popławski, *Municipalities and Local Associations as Subjects of Public Power Decentralization: On the Example of the Kujawsko--Pomorskie Region in Poland*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2014, pp. 246

Zuzanna Osmólska*

The self-government and public administration researchers in Poland know that there are not many books focused on public power decentralization. Perhaps, because it is a complex and difficult issue. It requires great courage and caution, because of connection between legal, economic, and administrative issues. There are even less publications based on empirical research. The public power decentralization descriptions usually end on theoretical considerations, which – although important – often do not show the complexity of the issue and do not relate to a specific reality. Therefore, and even more, Mariusz Popławski, the author of the reviewed book, should be congratulated. Not only because of the "research courage" in undertaking such a difficult issue, but also for its effects.

It should be noted that Mariusz Popławski is a specialist in local government, the third sector, and decentralization issues. He received his PhD at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, based on paper, translation of which is the subject of this review. He is the author of many articles relating to local government, public administration, and NGOs. However, above all, he is truly interested in decentralization issues, which is proven in his book.

The book, what is unique, focuses on the problem of public decentralization in the context of two types of local actors and their relationship to each other: municipalities and local associations. The author's main purpose is the attempt to answer three research questions: (1) what is the character of the relationship between municipalities and local associations?; (2) what are the differences between municipalities and local

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associations in regard to relative independence from the public centre?; (3) what are the most often problems that occur within local associations and municipalities relations? (Popławski 2014: 9). Author presents three hypotheses for each question, which have been verified by using both quantitative and qualitative methods. It should be noted that methodological sphere is a real strength of the book. The author pays attention to the selection of appropriate research methods and techniques and to preparing the survey – a tool needed in verification process of the research' hypotheses. This can be evaluated by reviewing the questionnaire, which was included in the appendix of the book.

The book's content is divided into five chapters. First one, entitled *Decentralization of Public Power. The Dispute over the Essence of the Process and Definitions*, relates to defining the basic category – the public power decentralization. The author presents two decentralization approaches, analyzes a lot of definitions and finally, formulates his own definition, and a very unique one. He also identifies points to distinguish decentralization from centralization, deconcentration, and delegation.

Second chapter – *Municipality as a Subject of Public Power Decentralization* – refers to problems connected with self-government concept. At the beginning the author presents local government characteristics and its history in Poland. It is the introduction to full analyses of municipality as a subject of public power decen-

tralization, including legal status of municipalities, the decision-making process, statutory and control organs, management and executive organs, and supervision of municipalities. The author also dedicated a part of this chapter to characterize tasks, competences and resources of municipalities as objects of public power decentralization. It is worth noting that this chapter presents an unusual perspective on municipalities issue, which certainly goes beyond standard "textbook" approaches.

The third chapter is entitled *Local Associations as Subjects of Public Power Decentralization*. It includes such issues as the social nature and local association definitions, the legal status of associations in Poland, and – as in the previous chapter – tasks, competences and resources of local associations as objects of public power decentralization. In this part, the author shows that he is well-versed in the law and rules of local associations' operations. He makes a thorough analysis of the fundamentals of their actions.

In the next chapter – *Lower Subjects of Public Power Decentralization: Municipalities and Local Associations* – the author focuses on theoretical foundations of cooperation of municipalities and local associations. He also presents selected aspects of potential of local associations for taking part in the correction of imperfection of decentralization. It is a very important and very innovative part of the book. It explains circumstances encouraging interactions between the municipalities and local associations

that have been built, which has its roots in the public power decentralization processes.

In the last chapter, the author presents results of his own research. The aim of the survey was to gather opinions of local associations' representatives on cooperation with municipalities on their actions' territory. It is to commend the author for selected questions and for the quality of his analysis, the effect of which can be found in relevant conclusions.

It should be noted that the reviewed book was prepared with an enormous solicitude. Evidence of this is well-prepared and very rich bibliography, well thought-out book construction, and interesting graphical presentations. Such details will facilitate the publication's reception.

But most importantly, the reviewed book concerns a very innovative issues. Most books in Polish language dealing with the matter of self-government and local associations focus on the law and institutions. Meanwhile Popławski not only describes issues that are not often undertaken, but also makes it in a very interesting context of public power decentralization.

Subject taken in the book is a major asset. This publication is one of the few which refers to so important issues as the cooperation between local associations and municipalities. The author presents them in a concise and synthetic way, but without neglecting important problems such as legal problems and its potential.

A big advantage is also an interesting research perspective used by the author. Popławski decided to put his main subjects – local associations and municipalities – in a very complicated context of decentralization. He presents an innovative theoretical contribution in the presented issues, which can certainly be used in other publications related to the municipalities and local associations functioning.

A positive quality of the book is also the fact that the author based it on his own research. It is not very usual in Polish political science. Furthermore, they are made with remarkable methodological maturity, leading to really interesting conclusions.

All of these arguments make the book *Municipalities and Local Associations as Subjects of Public Power Decentralization: on the Example of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region in Poland* an excellent elaboration on very important though rarely undertaken problems of local associations and municipalities cooperation in the context of public power decentralization. It perfectly combines issues from different fields of law, public administration, and political science. The book is certainly worth recommending for students who look for something more than typical textbook presentation. But it is absolutely a "must read" book for all of officials and third sector employees, who are interested in their municipalities and local associations cooperation.

POLISH ABSTRACTS

Jarosław Nocoń, *Normatywne zaangażowanie współczesnej teorii politycznej*

Zasadniczą tezą artykułu jest twierdzenie, że współczesne trendy rozwojowe teoretycznej refleksji o polityce wykazują asocjacje ideowe o nieco innym charakterze i w innych wymiarach niż dotychczasowe związane z klasyczną filozofią polityczną. O ile w klasycznej formie refleksji zaangażowanie normatywne wynikało zasadniczo z troski o dobro wspólne oraz dążeń do poszukiwania idealnego modelu ładu i porządku społecznego, o tyle obecne trendy rozwojowe teorii politycznej – zwłaszcza wpływy postmodernizmu w naukach społecznych – inicjują nowe formy więzi z aksjologią polityczną.

Słowa kluczowe: teoria normatywna, filozofia polityczna, postpozytywizm

Sabina Olszyk, *Stereotyp wroga w działalności politycznej – refleksje teoretyczne*

Pojęcie stereotypu wroga, które na stałe zagościło w dyskursie publicznym zarówno w języku potocznym, publicystycznym, jak i naukowym, nie zostało dotychczas poddane gruntownej naukowej analizie. W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę sformułowania definicji „stereotypu wroga" jako samodzielnego bytu językowego oraz przedstawiono etapy jego kształtowania się w rzeczywistości politycznej. Artykuł ma charakter ściśle teoretyczny bazujący na dokonaniach naukowych prowadzonych w ramach obszarów badawczych związanych ze stereotypem oraz wrogością. W opinii autorki konieczna dla realizacji postawionego celu jest analiza zjawiska stereotypizacji dokonana z następujących perspektyw naukowych: socjologicznej, psychologicznej, językoznawczej. Niezbędna wydaje się również refleksja nad problematyką wrogości w ogóle, a w szczególności uwzględniająca figurę wroga w działaniach politycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: stereotyp wroga, wróg, stereotyp, stereotypizacja

Tomasz Czapiewski, *Łącząc inkrementalizm ze zmianą polityczną. Teoria przerywanej równowagi w naukach o polityce*

Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie aktualnej definicji i pozycji teorii przerywanej równowagi, która jest jednym z najbardziej wpływowych podejść badawczych dotyczących procesu politycznego w naukach o polityce, stymulując koncepcje i badania przez ostatnie dwie dekady. Baumgartner i Jones inkorporowali pojęcie z badań nad ewolucją gatunków, ale – jak wskazuje autor artykułu – pozbawiając go pierwotnej operacjonalizacji, zamieniając w metaforę o bardziej pedagogicznym walorze.

Autor wyjaśnia, jak teoria przerywanej równowagi jest przydatna w analizie zmiany politycznej w systemach politycznych innych niż Stany Zjednoczone, ale w europejskich systemach politycznych konieczne jest uwzględnienie roli partii politycznych i ich preferencji. Zaprezentowano także, jak teoria jest faktycznie raczej znacznie poprawioną wersją teorii inkrementalizmu niż wykorzystaniem dorobku biologii w polityce. Autor odróżnia także pełną sukcesów aplikację teorii, która opisuje rzeczywistość procesu politycznego, od wyjaśnień i związków przyczynowych, które zdaniem Baumgartnera i Jonesa taki przebieg procesu zdeterminowały.

Słowa kluczowe: teoria polityki, proces polityczny, polityka publiczna, zmiana polityczna, teoria przerywanej równowagi

Joanna Sanecka-Tyczyńska, *Rozważania teoretyczne i metodologiczne o racji stanu*

Rację stanu rozumiemy jako system egzystencjalnych interesów państwowych realizowanych w sposób bezkompromisowy, co do których powinien istnieć konsensus głównych sił politycznych w danym państwie. Może ona być również traktowana jako osobna wartość lub kategoria myśli politycznej, wokół której budowane są wizje państwa obejmujące politykę wewnętrzną oraz międzynarodową. Analizując teoretyczne i metodologiczne aspekty racji stanu, należy stwierdzić, że cechuje ją niejasność definicyjna, duża pojemność treściowa, czasowa zmienność, trudności w określeniu katalogu interesów państwowych składających się na rację stanu, oraz różnorakie podejścia teoretyczne i metodologiczne. Wszystko to odstręcza badaczy od zajmowania się tą kategorią. Paradoksalnie owa wielowymiarowość i wieloaspektowość, połączona z polską specyfiką pojmowania *raison d'état,* może stanowić o jej atrakcyjności badawczej. Ciekawa z punktu widzenia teorii racji stanu jest jej współczesna ewolucja w kierunku ponadnarodowej *raison d'état*. Nieuniknione procesy globalizacji oraz działanie międzynarodowych i ponadnarodowych organizacji i instytucji prowadzą do uniwersalizacji racji stanu. W toku owej ewolucji zmienia się sposób rozumienia takich pojęć jak suwerenność czy bezpieczeństwo państwa (nieodzownych składników racji stanu). Suwerenność zastępowana jest przez pojęcie podmiotowości, a bezpieczeństwo nabiera coraz to nowego zakresu przedmiotowego.

Słowa kluczowe: racja stanu, teoria polityki, metodologia, myśl polityczna

Andrei Taranu, *Symbolika populizmu*

Ogromna większość artykułów dotyczących populizmu opisuje to polityczne zjawisko jako trudne do wyjaśnienia i analizy ze względu na jego dyskursywną różnorodność i behawioralny „kameleonizm". Co więcej, twierdzę, że termin „populizm" opisuje większą liczbę politycznych i społecznych faktów, niż pojedynczy termin jest w stanie pomieścić w swej objętości semantycznej. Skupiam się głównie na psychologicznych źródłach populizmu, które mogą być obserwowane w symbolicznej sferze polityki. W tej perspektywie postrzegam polityczny symbolizm, będący częścią teorii behawiorystycznej, jako lepsze narzędzie służące ujawnianiu dyskursu populistycznego niż zwykłe techniki analizy politycznej.

Słowa kluczowe: demokracja, populizm, teoria behawiorystyczna

Nick Polyovyy, Dilara Gadzhyieva, *Synergiczna modyfikacja symulacyjnego modelu „nagłego" formowania się protestu J. Daviesa*

Artykuł dotyczy oceny stosowności symulacyjnego modelu protestu J. Daviesa. Autorzy starają się pokazać bliskość modelu J. Daviesa oraz synergiczny paradygmat parametru porządku. Zaproponowana przez autorów modyfikacja modelu J. Daviesa służy ukazaniu rozproszonego formowania się krótkoterminowych działań protestacyjnych. Podkreślono też szczególną rolę aktualnych oczekiwań i przekonań ludności w formowaniu się protestu. W zaprezentowanej modyfikacji modelu J. Daviesa autorzy proponują rozważenie stosunku negatywnych oczekiwań ludności i związanej z nimi politycznej rzeczywistości. Weryfikacją tego modelu stają się polityczne procesy na Ukrainie na przestrzeni ostatnich dwóch dekad. Autorzy podkreślają fundamentalną odpowiedniość między rzutowanymi na przeszłość przewidywaniami zawartymi w modelu a rzeczywistym przebiegiem procesów protestacyjnych na Ukrainie.

Słowa kluczowe: model J. Daviesa, synergiczna modyfikacja, działania protestacyjne, symulacja formowania się działań protestacyjnych

Łukasz Dominiak, *Libertarianizm a problem alimentów na dzieci*

Przedmiotem dociekań niniejszego artykułu jest relacja pomiędzy libertarianizmem a instytucją alimentów na dzieci. Artykuł wskazuje, że instytucja ta jest niekompatybilna z klasyczną libertariańską teorią sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, reprezentowaną przez takich libertariańskich filozofów polityki, jak: Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella czy Robert Nozick. Pomimo tej niekompatybilności z klasycznym libertarianizmem głównym problemem badawczym artykułu jest pytanie o to, z którą interpretacją libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej instytucja ta może być kompatybilna. Tezą, którą stawia niniejszy artykuł, jest twierdzenie, że tą inter-

pretacją jest teoria Israela M. Kirznera bazująca na tak zwanej etyce odkrywcy-twórcy. W badaniach użyto metody równowagi refleksyjnej.

Słowa kluczowe: libertarianizm, sprawiedliwość dystrybutywna, alimenty na dzieci, etyka odkrywcy-twórcy, pierwotne przywłaszczenie, teoria usprawnieniowa

Patryk Wawrzyński, Ralph Schattkowsky, Marek A. Muszyński, Gabriela Czarnek
Rola emocji i zaangażowania w oddziaływaniu narracji pamięci: raport z badań eksperymentalnych

W raporcie zostały zaprezentowane wyniki badań eksperymentalnych nad związkiem między wzbudzeniem emocji i zaangażowania a skutecznością polityki historycznej rządu. Przeprowadzone pomiary pozwoliły zespołowi manipulować emocjami inspirowanymi w narracji (neutralne – pozytywne – negatywne) i stopniem zaangażowania uczestników w popularyzację opowieści (brak zaangażowania – niskie zaangażowanie), a także umożliwiły obserwację różnic między warunkami w wynikach dla zmiennych niezależnych: zapamiętywania informacji, zmiany postaw i zachowania. Oprócz przedstawienia zgromadzonych danych raport zawiera zwięzły wstęp teoretyczny do badań (zwłaszcza hipotez teoretycznych weryfikowanych w projekcie) i krótką dyskusję wyników końcowych.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka historyczna rządu, polityka pamięci, emocje, zaangażowanie, eksperymentalne nauki polityczne

Joanna Grzela, *Niemiecka polityka arktyczna – pomiędzy ekonomią a ekologią*

W ostatnich latach w wyniku zmian klimatycznych nastąpiło wiele zmian na dalekiej Północy. Pokrywa lodowa Arktyki topnieje w szybkim tempie, a to oznacza znaczny wzrost poziomu morza, a także zmniejszanie się przestrzeni życiowych zwierząt. Z drugiej strony znikający lód Arktyki otwiera nowe obszary eksploatacji dla ludzi. Arktyka może także stać się wkrótce największym na świecie zbiornikiem czystej wody i żywności. Ocieplenie prowadzi do zmian w ekosystemach, wzbudzając wiele pytań dotyczących podziału terytorialnego regionu, jego ochrony i wykorzystania. Zmiany zachodzące w Arktyce stanowią wyzwanie na wielu płaszczyznach: gospodarczej, społecznej, bezpieczeństwa i ochrony środowiska. Przede wszystkim liczą się interesy gospodarcze (dostęp do prawdopodobnie największych na świecie złóż ropy naftowej, gazu i metali szlachetnych) oraz ekologiczne (ochrona środowiska). Biegun Północny, choć z różną intensywnością, staje się obecny w polityce zagranicznej wielu państw. Na Starym Kontynencie dostrzega to zarówno Unia Europejska, jak i poszczególne kraje członkowskie. Jednym z nich są Niemcy. Kraj ten jest zainteresowany daleką Północą z ekonomicznej i ekologicznej perspektywy.

Słowa kluczowe: Arktyka, Niemcy, polityka arktyczna

Mo Guo, *Współpraca energetyczna Rosji i Chin w nowej erze*

W ubiegłym roku (2014) po długoletnich negocjacjach Chiny podpisały z Rosją kontrakt na dostawy gazu, co stanowi kamień milowy chińsko-rosyjskiej współpracy energetycznej. Umowa ta stwarza szansę przyjrzenia się zarówno rozwojowi rosyjsko-chińskiej współpracy energetycznej, jak i relacji obu państw na przestrzeni ostatnich 15 lat. Analizując bogatą historię ich stosunków, można dojść do wniosku, że ostatnio osiągnięte porozumienie determinowane jest zróżnicowanymi czynnikami. Ważna jest nie tylko próba ich zrozumienia, ale także postrzeganie współpracy energetycznej na tle rozwoju ekonomicznego, relacji międzynarodowych oraz w kontekście światowego ładu. Dzięki temu możliwe staje się zrozumienie, jak doszło do podpisania umowy energetycznej oraz co oznacza jej zawarcie dla obu krajów.

Dla obu państw osiągnięte porozumienie jest wypadkową wewnętrznych potrzeb i zewnętrznej presji. Rosja poszukuje nowych rynków, starając się przy tym unikać politycznego i ekonomicznego ryzyka. Chiny zaś potrzebują strategicznego zabezpieczenia i odpowiedniego partnera politycznego. Co ważniejsze, obie strony zgadzają się, że partnerstwo energetyczne może procentować w sferze politycznej. Porozumienie obu państw stanowi przykład mocarstwowej kooperacji i umiejętności rozwiązywania konfliktów. Zasadniczą rolę w tej współpracy odegrał wysoki stopień konsensusu zarówno w sferze politycznej, jak i na poziomie strategicznym. Przedstawiona tu charakterystyka polityczna opisuje czynniki, które przyczyniły się do przełomu w rosyjsko-chińskiej współpracy energetycznej, ale może jednakowoż odsłonić niestabilne i newralgiczne punkty analizowanego porozumienia.

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki chińsko-rosyjskie, współpraca energetyczna, rosyjska polityka energetyczna

Beata Piskorska, *Efektywność miękkich instrumentów Unii Europejskiej w transformacji wschodniego sąsiedztwa. Przykład kryzysu na Ukrainie*

Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza instrumentów miękkiej siły UE wobec konfliktu na Ukrainie. Główne założenie brzmi: koncepcja miękkiej siły może być wykorzystana jako podstawa teoretyczna do interpretacji wpływu Unii Europejskiej na regiony mniej stabilne, szczególnie stojące w obliczu rozprzestrzeniania się konfliktów międzynarodowych. Na podstawie bieżących wydarzeń na Ukrainie i utrzymywania się wysokiego poziomu niestabilności w regionie trzeba jednak stwierdzić, że instrumenty te w stosunku do Rosji są nieefektywne. W celu udowodnienia wyżej wymienionego założenia należy zdefiniować istotę i specyfikę miękkiej siły Unii Europejskiej w postwestfalskim ładzie międzynarodowym. W kontekście stosowania tych instrumentów analiza obejmie też przejawy ich realizacji i efektywność w polityce UE wobec kryzysu na Ukrainie. Zasadnicza jest zatem odpowiedź na kilka pytań badawczych: po pierwsze, jaka jest specyfika Unii Europejskiej w postwestfalskim ładzie międzynarodowym? Po drugie, jakie instrumenty posiada Unia Europejska do swojej dyspozycji i czy jest zdolna za ich pomocą sprostać celom

i oczekiwaniom stawianym wobec niej przez środowisko międzynarodowe? Wreszcie, jak możemy ocenić efektywność instrumentów *soft power* Unii Europejskiej stosowanych przez nią wobec specyficznego regionu Europy Wschodniej, szczególnie podczas kryzysu na Ukrainie?

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, miękka siła, Ukraina, wschodni sąsiedzi, Partnerstwo Wschodnie, kryzys na Ukrainie

Dušan Leška, *Europeizacja systemu politycznego Słowacji w trakcie procesu przystąpienia do Unii Europejskiej*

Europeizacja oddziaływała na wszystkich etapach rozwoju społecznego na Słowacji – z różnym natężeniem i w różnych formach – od momentu podpisania przez Słowację umowy stowarzyszeniowej z Unią Europejską. Znaczący wpływ dało się zauważyć już na etapie tranzycji, kiedy to konsekwentna implementacja wymaganych przez KE/UE kryteriów kopenhaskich pomogła Słowacji wrócić na ścieżkę demokratycznego rozwoju. Nie chodziło li tylko o wprowadzanie w życie powszechnie akceptowanych zasad demokracji parlamentarnej, ale także o aktywne oddziaływanie instytucji KE/UE w ramach możliwości stworzonych przez podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej. Spełnienie kryteriów kopenhaskich i rozpoczęcie negocjacji otworzyło zupełnie nowy etap, polegający na wcielaniu *acquis communautaire* (porządku prawnego Unii Europejskiej) do wewnętrznego porządku prawnego kraju. W tej fazie zdecydowanie dominował model europeizacji przebiegającej unilateralnie, w płaszczyźnie „góra–dół", a więc przyjęcie standardów i praw Unii Europejskiej, uczynienie kraju kompatybilnym z innymi państwami członkowskimi Unii. Po wejściu Słowacji do UE rozpoczyna się dwuwektorowy proces europeizacji, przebiegający zarówno w kierunku „góra–dół", jak i „dół–góra".

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, europeizacja, system polityczny Słowacji, tranzycja, transformacja

Zviad Abashidze, *Rozbicie etniczne jako wyzwanie dla postsocjalistycznej Gruzji*

Artykuł dostarcza podstawowych informacji na temat integracji obywatelskiej w Gruzji. Jako kraj wielonarodowościowy Gruzja w sposób oczywisty doświadcza wielu problemów związanych z integracją narodu. Najliczniejsze mniejszości – Azerowie i Ormianie – są w niedostatecznym stopniu obecne i nienależycie reprezentowane w sferze publicznej. Państwo gruzińskie staje więc przed trudnym problemem włączenia mniejszości do tejże sfery. Z perspektywy międzynarodowej wskazać można kilka modeli rozwiązania kwestii mniejszości. Gruzja powinna zdecydować się na jeden z nich. Brakuje jednak uniwersalnego wzorca postępowania w tej materii. Każdy kraj staje przed osobliwymi trudnościami

i przeniesienie obcego modelu akomodacyjnego na lokalny grunt w skali jeden do jednego nie będzie ani właściwe, ani adekwatne. Autor, omawiając perspektywy integracji obywateli, opowiada się za modelem „integracyjnym", a nie „asymilacją", „dyferencjacją" czy czystym „multikulturalizmem". W przypadku asymilacji władze kraju spotkają się z zasadnymi zarzutami ze strony mniejszości dotyczącymi zatracania się ich narodowej tożsamości. Model dyferencjacji oznacza wykluczenie mniejszości ze sfery publicznej. Czysty multikulturalizm będzie zaś prowadził do dalszej fragmentacji kraju. W gruzińskiej rzeczywistości bardziej odpowiedni i możliwy do zrealizowania wydaje się więc model integracji wzbogacony o element multikulturalizmu.

Słowa kluczowe: konsolidacja narodu, mniejszości etniczne, integracja obywateli

Nicolas Levi, *Racjonalistyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych: przypadek stosunków między Koreą Północną a Polską po 1989 roku*

Artykuł skupia się na relacjach między Polską a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną po roku 1989. Do roku 1989 stosunki między tymi krajami były bardzo bliskie. Dzisiaj zachowanie Korei Północnej wobec Polski jest racjonalne. Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec Korei Północnej jest dopasowana do polityki Unii Europejskiej w tej kwestii. Władze europejskie wspierają zmiany polityczne północnokoreańskiego reżimu. Polska uczestniczy w sprawach wewnętrznych Korei Północnej na wielu płaszczyznach (na przykład w kwestiach humanitarnych).

Słowa kluczowe: Korea Północna, KRLD, Polska, polityka racjonalna, asymetria stosunków

Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska, *Efektywność polityki zagranicznej państwa. Wstęp do definicji*

Celem artykułu jest wyznaczenie definicji kategorii efektywności polityki zagranicznej państwa. W wyniku badań teoretycznych została przyjęta definicja ujmująca efektywność polityki zagranicznej państwa jako zależność pomiędzy zamierzonymi celami a osiągniętymi efektami przy uwzględnieniu wykorzystanych zasobów i środków. Jest ona sumą efektywności realizacji racji stanu, realizacji celów długoterminowych, realizacji celów krótkoterminowych, realizacji celów doraźnych oraz poziomu aktywności państwa na arenie międzynarodowej.

Słowa kluczowe: efektywność polityki zagranicznej państwa, kategoria teoretyczna, proces definiowania, efektywność, skuteczność

András Bozóki, *Zepsuta demokracja, państwo drapieżcze i nacjonalistyczny populizm*

Głównym celem artykułu jest próba analizy funkcjonowania „reżimu" Victora Orbana na Węgrzech w okresie od 2010 roku. Rozważania oscylują wokół takich zagadnień, jak: rozwój demokracji na Węgrzech od 1990 roku, historia i tło funkcjonowania partii Fidesz oraz przebieg sprawowania władzy przez Orbana. W tekście podjęto analizę przyczyn przejęcia władzy przez Fidesz, odwołując się do doświadczeń węgierskiej demokracji od 1989 roku, procesów reformowania kraju i kryzysów ekonomicznych. Artykuł wieńczy analiza pięciu filarów władzy Victora Orbana.

Słowa kluczowe: tranzycja systemowa, partie polityczne, Węgry, Viktor Orban, Fidesz, demokracja

Stefan Dudra, *Tymczasowe Kolegium Rządzące jako element wpływu władz państwowych na politykę Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego (1948–1951)*

Tymczasowe Kolegium Rządzące PAKP zostało powołane 26 kwietnia 1948 roku zarządzeniem ministra administracji publicznej Edwarda Osóbki-Morawskiego. Decyzja ta była następstwem usunięcia metropolity Dionizego (Waledyński) ze stanowiska zwierzchnika Cerkwi prawosławnej. Spełniało ono *de facto* funkcję komisarycznego zarządu kierującego Kościołem prawosławnym. Przejęło wszystkie sprawy i akta Warszawskiego Duchownego Konsystorza Prawosławnego oraz cały majątek Cerkwi w Polsce. Władze państwowe wyznaczyły Tymczasowemu Kolegium Rządzącemu do rozwiązania dwa główne zadania. Dotyczyły one: problemu autokefalii i wyboru nowego zwierzchnika. Miało ono też zająć się sprawą odsuniętego metropolity Dionizego (wysiedlenie poza Warszawę) oraz reorganizacją struktury administracyjnej Cerkwi. Do lipca 1951 roku zadania te zostały wykonane.

Słowa kluczowe: Kościół prawosławny, Sobór Biskupów, Tymczasowe Kolegium Rządzące

Aleksandra Moroska-Bonkiewicz, Joanna Kozierska, *Polskie partie eurosceptyczne w świetle wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Analiza eurosceptycznej „struktury możliwości"*

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie zróżnicowanego poparcia, jakie partie eurosceptyczne uzyskały w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce w 2004, 2009 i 2014 roku. Biorąc pod uwagę specyfikę wyborów do PE, które w teorii przypisują większe znacznie kwestiom europejskim, w przeprowadzonej analizie skupiono się głównie na problematyce europejskiej analizowanej za pomocą tak zwanej eurosceptycznej

struktury sposobności, na którą składają się: przestrzeń polityczna, społeczne postawy wobec integracji oraz czynnik zewnętrzny (dynamika procesu integracji europejskiej). Ponadto analizie poddane zostały postawy partii eurosceptycznych biorących udział w wyborach. Analiza wykazała, że strona popytu i podaży stwarzała podobną strukturę sposobności dla partii eurosceptycznych we wszystkich trzech elekcjach, natomiast czynnik zewnętrzny dawał potencjalnie większe możliwości badanym partiom w 2004 i 2014 roku. Analiza postaw partii eurosceptycznych wskazała natomiast, że partie eurosceptyczne miały większe szanse przyciągnąć wyborców za pomocą kwestii europejskiej w 2004 oraz 2014 roku. Zestawienie powyższych wniosków wraz z poparciem, jakie uzyskali eurosceptycy w poszczególnych wyborach, potwierdza zasadność oraz funkcję wyjaśniającą przyjętych założeń, podkreśla jednak zasadniczą rolę samych partii w badanym aspekcie. Niemniej aby potwierdzić te wstępne wyniki badań i z większym prawdopodobieństwem stwierdzić wpływ kwestii europejskiej na zachowania wyborcze, niezbędne są dalsze pogłębione analizy.

Słowa kluczowe: wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego, postawy partii politycznych, eurosceptycyzm, euroentuzjazm, sruktura sposobności, poparcie wyborcze

Agnieszka Marczyńska, *Ustanowienie Parlamentu Europejskiego jako instytucji Unii Europejskiej oraz ewolucja ordynacji wyborczej do tegoż organu od momentu jego powstania do chwili obecnej – wybrane zagadnienia*

Jednym z najważniejszych elementów przesądzających o demokratycznym ustroju państwa jest bez wątpienia parlament, czyli kolegialny organ wyłaniany z bezpośrednich wyborów, będący jednocześnie emanacją woli obywateli jako suwerena. Na początku parlamenty wypełniały mało skomplikowane zadania, były jedynie organem reprezentacyjnym. Z upływem lat, rozwojem technologicznym społeczeństw i ewolucją realiów ekonomicznej współpracy państw ich rola oraz zakres kompetencyjny ulegały stopniowemu wzrostowi. PE jest jednym z kluczowych elementów systemu instytucjonalnego Unii Europejskiej, a tym samym jedynym organem, którego skład jest wybierany w bezpośredniej elekcji. Organ ten, jako forum powszechnej reprezentacji przez wybranych deputowanych z państw wspólnoty, skupia poglądy i stanowiska nie tylko samych reprezentantów, ale również ich elektoratu. Parlament jest również wyrazem wielonarodowej społeczności UE, jej głosem i dążeniem do wpływania na losy całej UE.

Artykuł przedstawia ewolucję Parlamentu Europejskiego oraz ordynacji wyborczej w wyborach do tegoż organu od początku jego kształtowania się jako instytucji Unii Europejskiej do chwili obecnej. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie przemian, jakie od początku tworzenia się PE następowały w ustawodawstwie UE w odniesieniu do samego PE oraz do ordynacji wyborczej, w oparciu o którą wyłaniani są jego członkowie. Podstawową tezą przedmiotowego artykułu jest zagadnienie, jak wyglądał proces ewolucji PE na przestrzeni lat, jak zmieniała się jego pozycja w systemie instytucjonalnym UE oraz jak

z biegiem lat dążono do ujednolicenia procedury wyborczej w wyborach do tegoż organu. Artykuł dotyczy ewolucyjnej pozycji ustrojowej PE. Skupia się na wybranych aspektach ujednolicania procedury wyborczej w wyborach do PE z uwagi na ich przełomowość i doniosłość w obowiązującej obecnie procedurze.

Słowa kluczowe: Parlament Europejski, Unia Europejska, wybory, prawo wyborcze